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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the history of natural gas in twentieth-century Iran, foregrounding the 
interactions between energy technologies, the natural environment, and the politics of national 
development. In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, it argues that modern Iran has 
been co-constituted with natural gas and its infrastructures of use, both reflecting the hopes of Iranians 
and constraining what was possible with their physical and technological properties. Over the past 
seventy years, Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of gas energy, a 
result of the decades-long efforts of both the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy and the post-1979 
Islamic Republic to make the resource a pillar of Iranian society. Under these two regimes, gas 
energy—seen as abundant, inexpensive, clean, and modern—became a crucial embodiment of official 
commitments to national development and public welfare, both informing and being harnessed by a 
developmental vision for Iran that remained remarkably stable across the violent revolutionary divide. 
Drawing on analyses of internal correspondence and reports produced by officials working in Iranian 
ministries, the National Iranian Oil and Gas Companies, and British Petroleum; scientific articles published 
by Iranian experts; magazines, photographs, and promotional materials produced by the NIOC and the 
Ministry of Petroleum for public audiences; and articles appearing in national dailies, this dissertation 
brings together the political, technological, social, geologic, and climatic histories of Iran to chart in a 
largely chronological manner the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the centerpiece 
of the industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of two regimes. United by natural gas, 
the enmeshing of these perspectives reflects the crucial role of nonhuman factors in this story, significant 
but heretofore largely overlooked elements of Iranian history. Going beyond the questions of geopolitics 
and religion that have largely dominated discussions of the country’s modern history, this dissertation 
argues that factors like the volatility of natural gas, the fractured rock of limestone formations, the height 
of mountain ranges, and the hot sun of a semi-arid climate all worked to push Iranian policymakers 
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Also, Nippy, the Norfolk Island Pine that has 
kept me silent company all these years. 
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THE DOMAIN OF GAS:  
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN MODERN IRAN, 
1935-1995 
Ciruce A. Movahedi-Lankarani 
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet 
This dissertation examines the history of natural gas in twentieth-century Iran, 
foregrounding the interactions between energy technologies, the natural environment, and 
the politics of national development. In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-
geology, it argues that modern Iran has been co-constituted with natural gas and its 
infrastructures of use, both reflecting the hopes of Iranians and constraining what was 
possible with their physical and technological properties. Over the past seventy years, 
Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of gas energy, a 
result of the decades-long efforts of both the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy and the 
post-1979 Islamic Republic to make the resource a pillar of Iranian society. Under these 
two regimes, gas energy—seen as abundant, inexpensive, clean, and modern—became a 
crucial embodiment of official commitments to national development and public welfare, 
both informing and being harnessed by a developmental vision for Iran that remained 
remarkably stable across the violent revolutionary divide. Drawing on analyses of 
internal correspondence and reports produced by officials working in Iranian ministries, 
the National Iranian Oil and Gas Companies, and British Petroleum; scientific articles 
published by Iranian experts; magazines, photographs, and promotional materials 
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produced by the NIOC and the Ministry of Petroleum for public audiences; and articles 
appearing in national dailies, this dissertation brings together the political, technological, 
social, geologic, and climatic histories of Iran to chart in a largely chronological manner 
the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the centerpiece of the 
industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of two regimes. United by 
natural gas, the enmeshing of these perspectives reflects the crucial role of nonhuman 
factors in this story, significant but heretofore largely overlooked elements of Iranian 
history. Going beyond the questions of geopolitics and religion that have largely 
dominated discussions of the country’s modern history, this dissertation argues that 
factors like the volatility of natural gas, the fractured rock of limestone formations, the 
height of mountain ranges, and the hot sun of a semi-arid climate all worked to push 
Iranian policymakers toward identifying natural gas as the energy source around which to 
build a new society. 
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Introduction 
To walk through contemporary Tehran is to notice quickly the ubiquity of 
neighborhood restaurants, large and small, proudly advertising kabāb-e zoghāli, or kabab 
cooked over charcoal. Lunchtime crowds wait, watching while cooks, dressed in white 
and sweating over long coal pits topped with skewered meat, tend to their fires with the 
rhythmic waving of handheld fans. It is to open the trunks of passenger cars and see 
canisters of compressed gas filling most of the available space, and to hear taxi drivers 
bemoan their car’s feebleness when using compressed natural gas in Tehran’s famously 
hilly terrain. It is to exit the Haft-e Tir Square subway station and see an enormous and 
colorful banner hanging above multiple lanes of traffic celebrating the completion of yet 
another stage of the South Pars gas field’s commercial development. It is to hear 
persistent rumors that the citizens of the province of Sistān-Baluchestān had supported 
the 2017 incumbent candidacy of President Hassan Rouhani because of their joy at 
finally being connected to the national gas network. That the smoky aromas and glowing 
2 
embers of neighborhood eateries have become notable to city residents, that most motor 
vehicles have been equipped to use both gasoline and CNG, that the Iranian state publicly 
celebrates seemingly obscure happenings in the country’s gas industry, and that the 
residents of one of Iran’s most restive regions would laud closer ties to central 
government are all a result of one of the most significant developments of 20th-century 
Iran: the rise of natural gas as the country’s keystone energy source. Over the second half 
of the twentieth century, gas energy—at once abundant, volatile, cheap, clean, polluting, 
and dangerous—became woven through nearly every facet of Iranian life, changing how 
people heated their homes, fueled their vehicles, and cooked their food. The thorough 
integration of gas into Iranian society was not happenstance; rather, it was the result of 
sustained attention and effort by two ruling regimes over decades of time, both informing 
and being harnessed by the competing social visions that swirled around Iran. 
*** 
In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, natural gas and its 
infrastructures, even more than oil, came to embody profound imaginings of Iran’s 
future. This dissertation argues that natural gas energy was inextricably tied to the 
transformations of Iranian society in the latter half of the twentieth century, both 
reflecting the hopes of Iranians and constraining what was possible with its physical and 
technological properties.1 It further argues that gas has been the crucial means by which 
1 Pioneered with respect to the Middle East by Timothy Mitchell in his famous chapter “Can the Mosquito 
Speak?,” in Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2002), nonhuman actors have been increasingly recognized as significant forces within the history of 
the region. This perspective, developed in Science and Technology Studies in contrast with purely social 
constructionist viewpoints that privileged human social actors, emphasized the generalized symmetry 
between human and nonhuman actors when describing social systems. Associated most strongly with the 
3 
two Iranian regimes have sought to simultaneously modernize their country, address 
deteriorating urban air quality, and bolster their legitimacy. All the crucial differences 
between the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Republic notwithstanding, the 
developmental policies that natural gas energy embodied remained remarkably similar 
across the violent revolutionary divide. Shaping their policies were fundamental 
topographic, geological, climatic, chemical, and technological realities, all-enveloping 
and interpenetrating contexts that pushed Iranian policymakers toward identifying natural 
gas as the energy source around which to build a new society. Between the 1950s and the 
present day, Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of 
Actor-Network Theory of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, building on the latter’s rejection of a priori 
assumptions about the significance of various actors in the history of science in his book The 
Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988), the perspective has inspired numerous scholars across a wide variety of disciplines, in large part 
because it is best understood as an intellectual orientation or strategy of analysis rather than as a rigorously 
defined theory. For a simultaneous description and example of application of ANT see Latour’s Aramis, or 
the Love of Technology, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, 2002). 
Latour’s perspective has significant philosophical implications, particularly surrounding the destabilization 
of traditional distinctions made between culture and nature and the resulting collapse of what Latour argues 
is a central tenet of modernity (Latour was not the first to argue for this blurring of boundaries; in particular 
see Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century,” Socialist Review, no. 80 (1985): 65-108). Latour explores this issue in his book We 
Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
ANT is not without its critics, many of whom see in the perspective an abandonment of moral stakes in 
favor of pure descriptivism and an unsupportable attribution of intentionality to nonhuman actors (for a 
concise explication of many of the critiques of ANT see Langdon Winner’s “Upon Opening the Black Box 
and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology,” Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 362-378; for a critique of the symmetry of humans and 
nonhumans in ANT see Andrew Pickering’s The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995) in which he argues that human and nonhuman agency are 
unequal, with the latter enveloped by that of humans). Nonetheless, Latour’s ideas, as shifting and subject 
to revision as they have been over the last three decades, have begun to find broader purchase and by the 
early- to mid-2010s, an increasing number of scholars of the Middle East had begun to employ such 
analytical tools. Some of the earliest were On Barak, who focused on how railroads, undersea cables, and 
marine life have helped make modern Egypt in his book On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern 
Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013) and Ronen Shamir, who studied the 
construction of electrical systems in Mandate-era Palestine in his book Current Flow: The Electrification of 
Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013). The influence of Latour’s ideas continues to 
grow in the study of the Middle East and this author personally knows of several in-progress dissertation 
and book projects that are employing these methods. 
4 
 
gas energy, the adoption of which reflected powerful and intertwined impulses toward 
national independence, the creation of a sovereign technological modernity, and the 
mitigation of certain forms of environmental violence. Iranians claimed the right and the 
ability to exploit their gas resources from international energy firms in the 1950s, quickly 
devising expansive schemes to make use of their gas reserves. By the 1970s they had 
constructed massive refineries and country-spanning pipeline networks, in the process 
imbuing gas with notions of independence and self-modernization. Far from a network of 
pipes silently and invisibly operating in the background, gas energy and its systems were 
deliberately made visible through celebrations of its ability to enable new “modern” 
lifeways. Gas’s potential as a cleaner-burning fossil fuel was quickly linked to concerns 
for Iran’s worsening urban air quality and its status as a cheap, abundant, and domestic 
source of energy, thereby making it into a potential savior able to both arrest Iran’s 
deteriorating environmental conditions and simultaneously intensify its drive for a fossil 
fuel-based modernity. 
The story of Iranian gas was one written in infrastructure. It was written with steel 
and telex machines, inside London’s corporate boardrooms and the lungs of Tehran’s 
residents, on the texture of the Earth’s crust and the shop floors of Iranian factories. It 
combined webs of steel pipe, expert networks, financial flows, and the fractured matrices 
of limestone rock.2 Far from neutral technological systems inertly shuffling gas from 
 
2 In the past few decades, a dizzying corpus of literature addressing infrastructure and its social lives has 
been produced. Brian Larkin, in “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology, vol. 42 (2013): 327-343, defines infrastructures as “built networks that facilitate the flow of 
goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space,” possessing physical forms that “shape the 
nature of a network, the speed and direction of its movement, its temporalities, and its vulnerability to 
breakdown,” and “literally providing the undergirding of modern societies” (p. 328). As Larkin himself 
notes, infrastructures are more than technical systems; they also channel and inform social and cultural 
5 
place to place, these assemblages of steel, hydrocarbons, expertise, rock, and money were 
co-constituted with a changing Iran, both the physical condensation of political and 
technical choices as well as influential actants in their own right.3 Natural gas 
infrastructures were an important part of Iranian efforts to industrialize their country, and 
the planning, design, and construction processes embedded politically charged notions of 
contexts in which they reside (p. 329). An infrastructural perspective is powerful, and scholars have used it 
to address everything from water systems to international finance, but energy systems have nonetheless 
been a significant focus. As a whole the field builds on the insights of Thomas P. Hughes in Networks of 
Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press,1983). In his book, by comparing the development of the electrical grids in the United States and 
Germany, Hughes emphasized the significant influence that the social and political contexts within which 
infrastructures reside had on their design and functioning as technological systems. Akhil Gupta furthers 
the point, asking us to remember that many live with only partial access to supposedly ubiquitous energy 
infrastructures in his article “An Anthropology of Electricity from the Global South,” Cultural 
Anthropology, vol. 30, no. 4 (2015): 555-568. Analyses of electricity have come to the Middle East as well 
with Ronen Shamir’s Current Flow. Rather than examine a particular form of infrastructure, On Barak has 
emphasized the overlapping infrastructural developments that have helped make modern Egypt in On Time. 
Indeed, infrastructural systems rarely exist in isolation and the development of one can and frequently does 
come at the expense of another, a crucial point made by Toby C. Jones with respect to the priority 
American society has given energy infrastructures over those of water in Running Dry: Essays on Energy, 
Water, and Environmental Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015). Brian Larkin 
focuses on interlocking infrastructures—particularly media technologies like cinema and electrical grids—
to explore how colonial regimes in Nigeria sought to create new African subjects through new forms of 
media in his book Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2008). Ahmad Shokr has explored the connections between development politics 
and the Aswan High Dam in his article “Hydropolitics, Economy, and the Aswan High Dam in Mid-
Century Egypt,” The Arab Studies Journal, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 9-31. 
3 In using the term “assemblage” this dissertation follows in the footsteps of numerous scholars of 
infrastructure who have been influenced by Jane Bennett’s seminal “The Agency of Assemblages and the 
North American Blackout,” Public Culture, vol. 17, no. 3 (2005):445-465, in turn based on the work of 
Gilles Deleuze. Bennett defines an assemblage as “first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins 
are historical and circumstantial, though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, which can be 
quite strong. An assemblage is, second, a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with 
energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it. An assemblage is, third, a web with an uneven 
topography: some of the points at which the trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily 
trafficked than others, and thus power is not equally distributed across the assemblage. An assemblage is, 
fourth, not governed by a central power: no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine the 
consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An assemblage, finally, is made up of many types of 
actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, vegetables, and minerals; nature, culture, and technology” (p. 
445, n. 2). 
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Iran’s future in them.4 More than passive tools waiting to be deployed in pursuit of 
political ends, the technologies available to Iranians shaped what was possible and what 
was not through both their technical abilities and material properties.5 Infrastructural 
systems like those for producing, transporting, and distributing Iran’s natural gas 
reflected human ambition, material property, and natural context meeting in a blurry and 
porous zone of interconnection and interpenetration. The shape of Iran’s natural gas 
infrastructures were influenced not only by the political ambitions of Iranian 
development planners and the capabilities of available technologies, but also the volatility 
of natural gas, the varying compositions of natural gas reservoirs, the corrosive effects of 
impurities, the height of mountain ranges, the depths of rivers, the local climates of urban 
areas, and an almost countless number of other factors. Rather than a place where the 
human and the natural worlds met, technologies of gas use were thus the distilled and 
material manifestation of Iran as a singular entity combining both. Acknowledging the 
central role that technology has played in Iran’s development is crucial to understanding 
the country’s recent past, but this recognition goes much further than offering a new set 
 
4 In his influential article “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” Daedalus, vol. 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121-136, 
Langdon Winner has famously pointed to how politics can be and are embedded in technological systems. 
Particularly notable is the deliberate racism of the Long Island highway network and its nine-foot 
overpasses, freely allowing private automobiles, overwhelmingly owned by middle- and upper-class 
whites, to use the new parkways while users of the city’s 12-foot public buses, predominantly lower class 
and black, could not. 
5 The ability of infrastructural projects to reflect the political proclivities of their creators is not infinite, a 
point Gabrielle Hecht makes in her exploration of the French nuclear power industry in the decades after 
the Second World War. For France’s “technologists,” a term Hecht uses to refer to experts in the employ of 
the French state, “debates about the nature of this relationship [between technology and politics] were 
contests for the power to shape the future of France and its identity” (p. 5). But “engineers did not have 
infinite choices,” as Hecht also writes, and thus while their choices were always political on at least some 
level, they cannot be reduced solely to the province of politics (p. 15). Hecht terms this intersection of 
technology and politics “technopolitics,” emphasizing the material grounding of the political formulations 
embedded in technological systems. For more see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear 
Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998). 
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of analytical tools for teasing apart the influences that have acted in the transformations 
of Iranian society. At stake is a fundamental ability to think the human, the material, and 
the natural together; to see nonhuman factors as important drivers of historical change in 
their own right; and to understand that there is no human without the technological and 
the natural in equal measure. 
In Iran, pipeline systems and new refineries arose to link homes and petroleum 
fields. In the heated dreams of state officials, natural gas and its systems of conveyance 
would become an enormous web that would draw Iranians into a singular national 
whole.6 But gas could drive apart too, and for long years those same officials, in their 
concern for technical and economic efficiency, undermined their own unifying vision. In 
the uneven spread of gas service across their country, in the precedence of urban over 
rural and new neighborhoods over old, Iranians seemingly saw their own value as 
national subjects reflected, a sight that displeased many in their seemingly unequal 
6 Nationalism and national unity have been potent forces in modern Iranian history, a reality well-
recognized by scholars. Afshin Marashi, in Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940 
(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2008), studies how political legitimacy in Iran moved from 
ideas of sacred kingship in the mid-19th century to Muhammad Rezā Shah’s invocation of nationalist 
themes. He ultimately argues that the state, in the context of Iranian intellectuals engaging with notions of 
Iran’s “authenticity,” intentionally constructed new national spectacles in an effort to bind state and society. 
In The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ali 
M. Ansari also examines the relationship of the Iranian state with nationalist currents in Iran, arguing in
contrast to Marashi, that Rezā Shah’s use of monarchical legitimation strategies rooted in divine right was
strikingly similar to those used by Khomeini some fifty years later and ultimately paved the way for the
latter’s rise in the late 1970s. In her highly original Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-
1946 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet seeks to complicate
Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” and the dominant hold it has had on
understandings of nationalism. Examining the late-19th and early-20th centuries, Kashani-Sabet instead
roots the Iranian sense of nationhood in the concept of Irānzamin, the need of Iranians to defend their
country’s borders and the sense of homeland it engendered. Kashani-Sabet’s intervention underpins this
dissertation’s argument in its effort to move the focus of study of Iran’s communal identity away from form
and symbol to tangible and material bases. Natural gas energy and its infrastructure did not define Iran as a
nation, but it did provoke feelings of belonging and non-belonging in residents of the country.
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positions.7 The highly visible successes of Iran’s new natural gas infrastructure—
gleaming edifices of sophisticated technology, a clean and convenient fuel, new national 
revenues—were thus from the system’s very beginnings stalked by its failures and 
shortcomings. But Iran’s natural gas projects failed in other ways too: largely unmet were 
expectations that the use of natural gas would be accompanied by significant 
improvements in the air quality of Iran’s cities.8 Iran’s intensifying struggle with air 
 
7 Increasingly, scholars have begun to explore the ways in which infrastructures have served to segment 
societies by marginalizing some communities and elevating others, highlighting not only the politics 
embedded in such technical systems but also the ongoing and shifting uses of infrastructures and the 
uneven access to the benefits they purport to provide. In Roads: An Anthropology of Infrastructure and 
Expertise (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox explore road 
construction in the Peruvian Andes and its social consequences, finding not only that roads have largely 
failed to address existing inequalities but that those failures have in turn beget social longings for more and 
newer roads. Antina von Schnitzler, in Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after 
Apartheid (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), explores how conflicts over citizenship, 
belonging, and payment in Soweto, South Africa are sited within water meters. Charlotte Lemanksi has 
also studied the relationships between citizenship and infrastructure in South Africa, exploring in her paper 
“Infrastructural Citizenship: The Everyday Citizenships of Adapting and/or Destroying Public 
Infrastructure in Cape Town, South Africa,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (2019) 
how residents of Cape Town perform citizenship in practice in relation to the infrastructures they use in 
their everyday lives. Lemanski expands upon her ideas regarding infrastructural citizenship in her paper 
“Infrastructural Citizenship: (De)Constructing State-Society Relations,” International Development 
Planning Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (2020): 115-125, arguing that infrastructures are crucial meeting points for 
states and citizens and embody citizenship for both; for citizens infrastructure is the material representation 
of the state whereas the state itself plans for citizens through infrastructure and its maintenance. Focusing 
on access to water among the residents of Mumbai and the work of engineers and officials to provide it to 
recognized customers and deny it to others, Nikhil Anand argues for a powerful notion of hydraulic 
citizenship where service from the city water department serves as a marker of belonging and citizenship 
able to be leveraged to make broader claims on the state. See Hydraulic City: Water and the Infrastructures 
of Citizenship in Mumbai (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017). Rosalind Fredericks, through her 
exploration of sanitation in Dakar, Senegal, adds to this emerging discussion by highlighting the crucial 
component of labor in the functioning of urban infrastructures as well as the political formulations that 
arise from them; see Garbage Citizenship: Vital Infrastructures of Labor in Dakar, Senegal (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2018). 
8 Failure to meet environmental goals is a common feature of energy systems, as Cymene Howe explores 
with respect to a large wind farm built in Mexico. As this dissertation also does, Howe argues that the 
relationship between energy and the environment cannot be properly understood without acknowledging 
the interactions between various human aspirations for energy and the material forces at play. See 
Ecologics: Wind and Power in the Anthropocene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019). Breakdown 
and failure have been formative influences in the literature on infrastructure. In her article “The 
Ethnography of Infrastructure,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 43, no. 3 (1999): 377-391, Susan Leigh 
Star proposed an understanding of infrastructure as largely invisible until moments of breakdown reveal 
their presence. In contrast to those who have built on this idea—represented by the contributors to Stephen 
9 
pollution in the postwar period sat at the intersection of social and natural phenomena, a 
product of rising fossil fuel combustion, the folds of mountain chains, and the bright sun 
of a semi-arid climate. What Iranian city residents experienced was not the human 
pollution of an otherwise pristine natural world, but the alterations in the natural urban 
environment as influential actants changed their behavior. Iranians and their cities were 
the environment, and as populations rose and more motor vehicles plied the roadways, as 
more factories were erected and people consumed more goods, and as more and more 
byproducts of fossil fuel combustion were released into the air, that environment began to 
change.9 Residents of the country’s capital saw that smoggy, smoky meshing of human 
Graham’s edited volume Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails (New York: Routledge, 2010) and 
Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift in “Out of Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance,” Theory, 
Culture, and Society, vol. 24, no. 3 (2007): 1-25—other scholars have noted the particular visibility of 
infrastructure in the cities of the Global South. In “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Brian Larkin 
reminds us that infrastructures, particularly those for energy and transport, are often intentionally built to be 
visible demonstrations of state power. Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox in Roads also demonstrate this to 
be true, as does Nikhil Anand in Hydraulic City and Christina Schwenkel in “Spectacular Infrastructure and 
Its Breakdown in Socialist Vietnam,” American Ethnologist, vol. 42, no. 3 (2015): 520-534. Graeme 
Macdonald, in his exploration of the ways that representations of oil infrastructures are always both deeply 
local and inevitably global in “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture,” in Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, 
Culture, ed. Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, 36-77 (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2017), also attends to the visibility of infrastructures. This dissertation too seeks to 
highlight the almost extreme visibility of natural gas infrastructure in Iran, exploring how that visibility 
reflected and shaped its influence in society.  
9 William Cronon has famously led the way in understanding urban areas through an environmental 
perspective. His seminal work, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1991), by focusing on the city of Chicago and its increasingly close relationships 
with its hinterlands to the west, was instrumental in beginning the slow unraveling of human-nature 
binaries that had strongly shaped understandings of the relationship between people and the natural world. 
Focusing on the production of commodities—in both the literal and metaphorical sense—Cronon shows 
how Chicago both produced the rural west and vice versa. Cronon’s partial dissolving of the boundaries 
between human and nature have been fertile grounds for other scholars, and interest in such a perspective 
has exploded in the past decade. Eduardo Kohn, in his book How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology 
beyond the Human (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013), argues that all beings can think 
via the production of and interpretation of signs, working to undermine notions of human exceptionalism 
that posit our divorce from the natural world. In Beyond Nature and Culture, trans. Janet Lloyd (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), Philippe Descola argues that the nature-culture dualism is a 
peculiarly Western notion of relatively recent vintage. Building on the structuralist views of Claude Lévi-
Strauss, Descola traces the history of nature-culture dualism and contrasts it with alternatives from around 
the globe, seeking ultimately to describe a more fundamental schema that unifies human and nature. Jane 
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and nonhuman factors with their eyes, felt it sear their throats, and contrasted it with 
memories of old Tehran and its beautiful skies.10 Their laments were expressed in 
photographs, air quality measurements, penned reminiscences, and the conversion of 
factories and automobiles from oil to natural gas fuel.11 In contrast to existing literature 
that has treated Iranian environmentalism as an entirely post-revolutionary phenomenon, 
this dissertation shows that concern for the environment and attempts to mitigate air 
pollution had their roots in the late-Pahlavi era.12 During that time, Iranian experts and 
officials worked to understand the problem and fashion solutions for it, not merely 
 
Bennett explores the implications of such a collapsed dualism, asking what it would mean if we seriously 
treat all things as able to be influential in the world, theorizing a materiality that hums with life in the 
relations between actants. See Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010) for more. 
10 In his book Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 2010), Brett L. Walker, focusing on the intersection of toxic industrial pollution, 
disease, and pain in Japan, argues that modernity has failed to free humans from the constraints of nature: 
to harm nature is to fundamentally harm ourselves. 
11 William Cronon has pointed to the centrality of culture in mediating understandings of the natural world. 
In his article “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” Environmental 
History, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1996): 7-28, Cronon explores how notions of nature as pristine wilderness 
and human activity as a despoiler of it were built, ultimately arguing that the dichotomy is false and that 
nature is visible even in areas where extensive human activity is present. Note that this is not the total 
collapse of the human-nature binary that some other authors have attempted. Cronon is rather arguing 
against the notion that only so-called wilderness wholly devoid of human presence counts as “nature.” 
12 While legislative and legal aspects of environmental protection in the Pahlavi era are often 
acknowledged, there has so far been little to no discussion of the actual policies and efforts undertaken to 
manage Iran’s urban air quality. Even the start of air quality monitoring is often ignored, as the existing 
literature dates its beginnings in Tehran to 1993 and the establishment of the Air Quality Control Company. 
In contrast, this dissertation shows that air monitoring in the capital region was first undertaken by 
academic researchers, government officials, and employees of the national petroleum companies at least 
two decades prior. The literature includes Farhad Atash, “The Deterioration of Urban Environments in 
Developing Countries: Mitigating the Air Pollution Crisis in Tehran, Iran,” Cities 24, no. 6 (2007), Vahid 
Hosseini and Hossein Shahbazi, “Urban Air Pollution in Iran,” Iranian Studies 49, no. 6 (2016), and 




channeling expertise produced elsewhere but working to generate original knowledge.13 
Many looked at the polluted cities of the Global North and shuddered, in turn seeking a 
modern way of life that could avoid such a fate. They sought to use natural gas as an 
energetic foundation upon which Iranians could chart a new course for their country, one 
where they drank deeply from their own natural resources to build a prosperous sovereign 
nation free of the poisonous fumes and hacking coughs that marked the dark 
environmental underbelly of the industrialized world. Many Iranian officials bet on gas as 
a clean source of fuel, ultimately finding their hopes foundering on the inherent 
insufficiency and brittleness of technical solutions to the problem.14 
 
13 Though scholars have been slow to recognize experts working in the Global South as doing more than 
applying knowledge produced in the world’s wealthy nations, there is growing recognition of them as 
important contributors to global knowledge networks. In her 2001 book of comparative historical 
sociology, Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), Sarah Babb, by analyzing hundreds of undergraduate theses in competing Mexican 
economics programs, has demonstrated the value in examining the disciplinary output of particular 
academic fields. Going beyond an intellectual history of trends within the discipline of economics in 
Mexican universities, Babb’s text also demonstrates the value of these forms of technical literature to 
learning about both the broader social contexts within which experts were working as well as the paradigms 
competing to address national challenges. Unlike Babb, who largely positions her economists as reacting to 
international trends in thought, Omnia El Shakry, in her book The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of 
Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), explores 
Egyptian social scientists as not just consumers of knowledge and theory produced in Europe and North 
America, but as full participants in the global production of social scientific knowledge and “actively 
involved in the development and transformation of the social sciences” (p. 1-2). Iranian scientists and 
engineers were likewise active participants in the creation of knowledge in fields like petroleum geology, 
petroleum engineering, and the natural environment. Like the social scientists El Shakry and Babb focused 
on, the publications and conference papers of such engineers and natural scientists are ripe for exploring 
not only the intellectual questions they studied, but also the social contexts within which they worked and 
the ends they saw their labors as furthering. 
14 The Middle East has been notably underrepresented in the growing body of works of environmental 
history. Alan Mikhail has been a notable presence, however, focusing on the environmental histories of the 
Ottoman Empire in his books Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), The Animal in Ottoman Egypt (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), and Under Osman’s Tree: The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Environmental 
History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017). Many works have contrasted water and the arid 
environment of the region, perhaps most famously Karl Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism: A Comparative 
Study of Total Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957). Others include Paul Ward English’s 
“Qanats and Lifeworlds in Iranian Plateau Villages,” in Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural 
Environments: Legacies and Lessons, eds. Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna (New 
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At stake for Iranians was not the idea of an energy transition. Natural gas as a 
sociotechnical force did not spring into being fully formed. Nor was it developed in 
isolation, siloed off from other sources of energy. Indeed, its roots lay in the great prize 
of southern Iran: oil. Iran’s petroleum industry was founded in 1901 with the British 
businessman William Knox D’Arcy’s receipt of a concession to find, produce, and 
market petroleum—oil, asphalt, ozokerite, and natural gas—from Mozzafar ad-Din Shāh, 
the fifth Qājār monarch. It was the Middle East’s earliest major foray into the world of 
petroleum, and the first commercial-grade strike came in May 1908 at Masjid-e 
Sulaymān, situated in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains in Iran’s Khuzestān province. 
Within a year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established to exploit the resource and 
by 1912 the company had completed the initial version of what would eventually become 
the world’s largest oil refinery at Ābādān, soon thereafter beginning operations to refine 
and export oil products. In 1914, with the Royal Navy’s decision to fully convert their 
warships from coal to oil, the British government took a controlling 51 percent stake in 
 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Faisal Husain’s “In the Bellies of the Marshes: Water and Power 
in the Countryside of Ottoman Baghdad,” Environmental History, vol. 19, no. 4 (October 2014): 638-664; 
Jennifer L. Derr’s The Lived Nile: Environment, Disease, and Material Colonial Economy in Egypt 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); and Francesca De Chatel’s “The Role of Drought and 
Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution,” Middle East Journal, 
vol. 50, no. 4 (2014): 521-535. Environmental imaginaries have also been explored in Diana Davis and 
Edmund Burke III’s edited volume Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2011) and Diana Davis’s “Potential Forests: Degradation Narratives, 
Science, and Environmental Policy in Protectorate Morocco, 1912-1956,” Environmental History, vol. 10, 
no. 2 (2005): 211-238. Big histories that embrace large expanses of time or planetary-scale climatic shifts 
have also been used to examine Middle Eastern history, including Edmund Burke III’s “The Deep History 
of the Middle Eastern Environment, 1500 BCE – 1500 CE,” in The Environment and World History, eds. 
Edmund Burke III and Kenneth Pomeranz (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009) and Sam 
White’s “The Little Ice Age Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: A Conjuncture in Middle East Environmental 
History,” in Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Alan 
Mikhail, 71-90 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). While not an exhaustive list of published 
environmental histories, these works are representative of the concerns that have largely animated scholars 
working in the field: most particularly water. 
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the company, turning it into a de facto arm of British imperial administration. With 
demand from the Royal Navy skyrocketing as the conversion process took hold, APOC 
oil production steadily increased over the following years and prospecting was 
undertaken to find new fields to support the growing appetite for Iranian oil. By the 
1930s the Haft Kel fields were under full production alongside those at Masjid-e 
Sulaymān, and the Ābādān refinery’s capacity had been expanded some fivefold. 
In 1933, however, the original oil concession was voided after more than four 
years of negotiations between the Iranian government and APOC. Rooted most 
fundamentally in the dissatisfaction of the Iranian government with the original 
agreement’s revenue sharing arrangements, something exacerbated by APOC’s creative 
accounting practices, the new agreement reduced the size of the concession area and 
guaranteed a minimum annual royalty payment to the Iranian government in return for a 
new sixty-year term for the concession. Renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 
1935, the British company thus maintained nearly total control of Iran’s petroleum 
resources, something explicitly defined as including any natural gas found in the 
concession area. Far from an incidental inclusion, natural gas was already being produced 
in significant quantities in Iran as a byproduct of oil extraction. With gas being 
significantly harder to confine and transport, however, the AIOC largely treated it as a 
non-economical waste product, either using it freely in their own operations or, as was 
true for the majority of the volumes it extracted, flaring it in the oil fields. This deliberate 
unseeing of Iran’s natural gas was a crucial part of the company’s efforts to maintain 
their focus on furnishing cheap oil to foreign markets. AIOC managers fundamentally 
saw natural gas and its potential utilization in Iran as a cost rather than an opportunity. In 
14 
 
response, they subordinated natural gas to the oil, focusing on their combined extraction 
from the earth and former’s ostensibly unwanted nature as a byproduct. 
In contrast to the AIOC’s combined corporate and imperial disregard of the 
resource, Iranian efforts to make gas into an economical product would become a crucial 
factor in the country’s development over the following fifty years. As part of that process, 
the use of natural gas by Iranians and the construction of the infrastructures that made its 
exploitation possible became important expressions of a deep current of economic 
nationalism within Iranian politics. With roots in the sizeable concessions granted to 
foreign enterprise in the late Qājār era, the ability for Iranians to control their own natural 
resources was a significant driver of Iranian political developments throughout the 
entirety of the twentieth century. The long refusal of the AIOC to find productive outlets 
for Iran’s gas and the subsequent efforts of the Iranian government to make the 
consumption of the fuel source a reality in the country, were thus seen as an expression of 
a broader desire for Iranians to be masters of their own destiny, free of the foreign 
influence understood as impoverishing and constraining Iran. Far from the AIOC’s 
efforts to make gas invisible in service of their own goals, Iranian officials trumpeted its 
presence and their work to make it useful, employing the resource in their efforts to build 
not only a newly industrialized economy, but also a truly sovereign nation. 
From its inception as both a material entity and as a force within Iranian society, 
natural gas was deeply intertwined with oil. Beyond its formation via the same processes 
and often in the very same deposits as crude oil, natural gas existed as a usable resource 
in Iran because of the country’s oil industry. For most of the twentieth century, all of the 
natural gas available in Iran was so-called associated gas, or gas produced as a byproduct 
15 
 
of oil extraction. Natural gas’s aboveground presence was almost wholly dependent on 
the continued existence of global oil markets and their need to be fed with the product of 
Iranian reservoirs. Rather than a replacement for an oil-based energy regime, natural gas 
was layered upon it and thus, despite the claims of some contemporaneous actors, the 
history of Iranian natural gas was not one of transition away from one form of energy to a 
purportedly better and more modern one.15 Most Iranian officials never envisioned a 
wholesale transition away from oil products within Iran itself, always seeing it as a way 
to reduce but not eliminate petroleum consumption. Indeed, within Iran the consumption 
of both fossil fuels increased in the second half of the twentieth century, with gas 
lessening the but not eliminating the growth of oil use. The story of natural gas in Iran is 
thus one that should not be understood as a tale of replacement, but as an additional and 
heretofore unacknowledged chapter in the history of fossil fuel energy use in the country. 
In charting the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the 
centerpiece of the industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of both the 
Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, this project builds upon the intervention of 
scholars working in the budding field of energy humanities. Such scholars have argued 
that fossil fuels should be taken seriously as direct influences on human societies and 
cultures and emphasized how accelerating energy consumption has been equated with 
modernity itself, not only as a function of increased industrialization but as a concept 
 
15 On Barak has explored this point, using the simultaneous existence of animal, coal, and water regimes to 
point to the fact that understandings of energy transitions are illusory and the product of post hoc 
teleologies in his article “Three Watersheds in the History of Energy,” Comparative Studies in South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, vol. 34, no. 3 (2014): 440-453. 
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born of and shaping societies around the world.16 Often heavily focused on petroleum oil, 
something reflective of the substance’s extreme salience within the history of the 
twentieth century, these works stand in contrast to perspectives that have traditionally 
emphasized narratives of private enterprise, wealth, and geopolitical power, often with an 
arrow of causality running in that order.17 In contrast to the largely European and North 
American perspectives that have long been privileged in discussions of oil and energy, in 
recent decades scholars have produced highly influential works addressing the 
governmental, racial, and environmental histories of oil in other parts of the world, 
particularly the Middle East.18 Significantly for this dissertation, other scholars have 
16 For more on the historical roots of the concept of energy and its birth in the context of European empire, 
the valorization of wage work, and the hierarchical ordering of humans and nonhumans, see Cara New 
Daggett’s The Birth of Energy: Fossil Fuels, Thermodynamics, and the Politics of Work (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2019). Bob Johnson discusses the influence that fossil fuels have had on cultural 
change in the United States in his book Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels and the Making of American Culture 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2014). Though the energy humanities are still a young and 
rather inchoate field, for years there had been slow drip of scholarship that would later come to be 
understood as part of it. The collection of previously published essays in Imre Szeman and Dominic 
Boyer’s Energy Humanities: An Anthology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017) 
highlights the breadth of work that has begun to coalesce as the energy humanities—from excerpts of 
David Nye’s 1990 Electrifying America: Social Meaning of a New Technology to Amitav Ghosh’s 2005 
musings on the Oil Novel through his analysis of Abdelrahman Munif’s Cities of Salt to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s 2009 exploration of the effects of the Anthropocene on historical thought in “The Climate of 
History: Four Theses” to Dominic Boyer’s 2014 analysis of energy and its relationship to governance and 
self-governance. The articles collected in Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman’s edited 
volume Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017) 
further highlight how oil and oil infrastructure have shaped cultures and aesthetics around the world. 
17 Epitomized by Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Free 
Press, 1990; Reprint 2009) and The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2011), such perspectives often emphasize the technical and capitalist ingenuity of 
early oil entrepreneurs and the world-shaking giants that grew out of their efforts. Works like Valérie 
Marcel’s Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Baltimore MD: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006) that are focused on national oil companies also tend to recreate this emphasis on economics 
and business histories. 
18 Particularly influential has been Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of 
Oil (London: Verso, 2011). In the book Mitchell argues that through their physical properties and the 
global social and labor systems their exploitation prompted, coal and oil have had significant influence on 
the types of governance experienced by people around the world. In his book America’s Kingdom: 
Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), Robert Vitalis 
17 
 
explored the crucial role of oil in state building in the region as well as the technical and 
infrastructural practices and perspectives that shaped both the oil industry itself and its 
political significance.19 
While coal too has received some measure of attention for its influence on Middle 
Eastern and world history,20 in comparison to oil few scholars have explored the 
 
explores the racialized social orders that American oil firms exported around the world as part of their 
efforts to secure and extract oil as cheaply and reliably as possible. The contributors to Touraj Atabaki, 
Elisabetta Bini, and Kaveh Ehsani’s edited volume Working for Oil: Comparative Social Histories of Labor 
in the Global Oil Industry (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) continue that emphasis on oil’s 
labor history by exploring topics as diverse as Indian migrant oil workers in the AIOC fields of Iran in the 
early twentieth century, oil workers in Houston as part of larger labor movements, and the undermining of 
civil-state relations in Colombia by the latter’s use of violence to protect American oil interests. Andrea 
Grace Wright has studied labor and migration in oil industry to explore the Arabian Sea as place, linking 
the politics and cultures of South Asia and the Arabic-speaking region of the Persian Gulf; see her 
dissertation “Migratory Pipelines: Labor and Oil in the Arabian Sea” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 
2015). Though not focused on the Middle East, Myrna I. Santiago’s book The Ecology of Oil: 
Environment, Labor, and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) is significant for studying such themes as well, showing how oil production in the Veracruz 
peninsula and the environmental damage and altered social structures it prompted turned the region into a 
significant site of class conflict during the Mexican Revolution, ultimately arguing that Mexican oil 
workers were crucial contributors to the political developments that would eventually prompt the 
nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry. 
19 The important role of oil, the wealth derived from its sale, and their interactions with the environment in 
state building in the Middle East has been explored by Toby Craig Jones in his book Desert Kingdom: How 
Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) as it was 
expressed through the postwar Saudi state and its use of both oil expertise and oil wealth to build its own 
authority in restive areas through significant environmental and hydrological engineering. In his book 
Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2019), Jim Krane has explored the tension between the need of Gulf states to export oil for its revenues and 
the increasingly energy-hungry and energy-wasting societies over which they rule, arguing that energy 
subsidies must be curtailed if these states are to survive. In her work Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural 
History of BP in Iran (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018), Katayoun Shafiee analyzes how disputes 
between the AIOC and the Iranian government over control of the country’s oil, the labor needed for its 
production, the proceeds of its sale, and the physical properties of oil as it was reflected through systems of 
expertise prompted the company to develop many of the techno-economic techniques that would underlay 
the global oil industry as well as shape the emerging national politics of oil-producing states. Mandana E. 
Limbert, in In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), has explored how Oman’s newfound oil wealth transformed life in the country in 
the late twentieth century by focusing on the arrival of new infrastructures like piped water and mass 
schooling. 
20 Perhaps most famous is Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of 
the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) which argues that the 
abundant and easily accessible coal deposits of northwestern Europe allowed the region to overcome the 
Malthusian trap of population growth that other regions fell victim to. Significantly complicating that 
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influence of natural gas on the petroleum-rich nations of the Middle East. Much of the 
literature on gas has focused on energy exports, their economics, and their relationship to 
geopolitics in both the Middle East and beyond,21 while the few histories of the industry 
largely address countries like the United States and the Soviet Union.22 English-language 
literature on the Iranian gas industry has predominantly been technical literature focused 
on its implications for domestic energy and foreign export policies,23 while those 
addressing the broader industrial and business history of the sector have largely confined 
their analyses to the post-revolutionary period.24 Within Iran, a notable body of Persian-
 
narrative, On Barak, in his book Powering Empire: How Coal Made the Middle East and Sparked Global 
Carbonization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2020), argues that long before oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities in the region, the use of coal by European states was sparked by the 
demands of empire in the Middle East, eventually leading to the worldwide carbonization that now 
threatens the globe.  
21 Exemplars include the contributors to Jeronim Perovic’s edited volume Cold War Energy: A 
Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); the 
contributors to the edited volume of David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe, and Mark H. Hayes’s Natural Gas and 
Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Agnia Grigas’s 
The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Paul Stevens in 
“Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit Pipelines,” Middle East Journal vol. 
54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 224-241, analyzes at a very high level the historical viability of oil and gas transit 
pipelines, underscoring the difficulties that rent-seeking policies and conflicts of interest have posed to 
long-distance pipeline projects that crossed multiple countries. Interestingly, Stevens notes that oil 
pipelines have historically had better prospects than gas lines owing to the former fossil fuel’s greater 
energy density and multiple economical forms of transport. 
22 Other than Daniel Yergin’s discussion as part of his book The Quest, examples include Christopher 
James Castenada’s Regulated Enterprise: Natural Gas Pipelines and Northeastern Markets, 1938-1954 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1993) and Jonathan P. Stern’s Soviet Natural Gas 
Development to 1990: The Implications for the CMEA and the West (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1980). 
23 Examples include Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani’s Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and 
International Implications (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981) and Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani and Sharmin 
Mossavar-Rahmani’s The OPEC Natural Gas Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). More 
recently, these topics were analyzed in Maximillian Kuhn’s dissertation “Enabling the Iranian Gas Export 
Options: The Destiny of Iranian Energy Relations in a Tripolar Struggle over Energy Security and 
Geopolitics” (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2012). 
24 Most significant among these is Elham Hassanzadeh’s Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the Post-
Revolutionary Period: Optimism, Scepticism, and Potential (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
Though still largely a book addressing the legal and business environments relating to natural gas in Iran, 
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language material on the natural gas industry has been published. Often celebratory or 
hagiographic in nature, the works are largely based on oral interviews with notable 
industry figures and are primarily concerned with the major decisions and challenges the 
industry faced as it was understood by high-level figures. While useful as collections of 
oral histories, the perspectives most strongly articulated in these works are often heavily 
weighted toward the political preoccupations of the Islamic Republic and the 
development of the industry in the post-revolutionary period.25 What no previous work 
has done, and what this dissertation does do, is shed light on the ways natural gas as both 
a fossil fuel and as the sophisticated systems enabling its use shaped the social, cultural, 
and political transformations of Middle Eastern societies. Natural gas was not seamlessly 
interchangeable with other forms of fossilized carbon, instead possessing unique 
characteristics that both shaped ideas of what kind of society might be built with it and 
interacted in particular and contingent ways with communities of the region. Iran was at 
Hassanzadeh’s work is nonetheless the most comprehensive treatment of the industry thus far published. 
Her notable access to major decisionmakers both within government and industry circles has enabled 
Hassanzadeh to weave together an analysis highlighting the political and economic tensions that have thus 
far largely stymied efforts to turn Iran into a major natural gas exporter. Also largely unexplored is the 
transformation of Iranian society into a major gas consumer in its own right. 
25 Notable examples include Mohsen Shirāzi, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran: Az Āghāz tā Āstāneh-ye Enqelāb, 
interview by Golāmrezā  
Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1999), available online at https://fis-
iran.org/fa/resources/development-series/gas; Hamid Rezā ‘Arāqi’s Bist Sāl bā Gāz (Tehran: Shāpikān, 
1390); and Majid Bujārzādeh and ‘Ali Bahādar’s Gāz Enerzhi-ye Pāk bā Nim-e Qarn-e Talāsh: 
Panjāhomin Sāl-e Tasis-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran (Tehran: Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran – Ravābat-
e ‘Omumi, 1395). Though largely dependent on the same sort of oral histories and privileging the 
perspectives of the Butane Gas Company, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn Hasantāsh and Mikāyil ‘Azimi’s Tārikh-
e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran (Tehran: Kavir, 1394) undertakes significantly more analysis and narrative 
work to tell the story of Iran’s liquid gas industry. The oil and gas industry has been further discussed as 
part of larger perspectives on Iran’s economy in Ibrāhim Razāqi’s Eqtesād-e Iran (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 
1367) and industrialization in Husayn Mahbubi Ardekāni’s Tārikh-e Moassesāt-e Tamaddoni-ye Jadid dar 
Iran (Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Dāneshgāh-e Tehran, 1376). 
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the forefront of making extensive use of natural gas in the Middle East, but it is not alone 
in owning significant deposits beneath its earth and territorial waters. Other countries like 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait all possess significant reserves as well. Much as 
was the case in Iran, this gas has been exported in significant quantities, used to supply 
domestic energy markets, and burned as waste. Natural gas thus crosses the region’s 
boundaries in multiple ways, being transported by ship and pipeline from producers to 
consumers and found in large-scale geologic formations above which national borders 
twist and turn. Like Iran, many Middle Eastern societies, particularly those of the Persian 
Gulf, have deep relationships to the natural gas found within their national borders, 
relationships that go well beyond issues of commerce, economics, and geopolitics. The 
history narrated in this dissertation is particular to Iran in the period between the mid-
1930s and the mid-1990s, but in its broader concerns, motivations, and methodologies it 
is nonetheless relevant to countries across the region and the world. In doing so it begins 
to fill a significant gap in our understanding of how human societies around the world 
have been co-constituted with fossil fuels. Indeed, in order to fully understand how fossil 
fuel energy influences the fate of humanity on a global scale, it is not sufficient to focus 
on the world’s wealthy and most industrialized regions; particular attention must also be 
given to the adoption and the sociotechnical force of fossilized carbon fuels in the self-
consciously developing societies of the Global South, studying how such resources take 
on potent political, cultural, and social dimensions that are not easily set aside no matter 
how pressing the need. 
Crucial to undertaking such an effort is to attend to the particular stories of 
societies in the Global South. The history related in this dissertation is rooted in the 
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particulars of Cold War-era Iran, for despite notable connections to and affinities with 
stories of petroleum and development around the world, such broad perspectives are 
insufficient for truly understanding the intersection of politics, the environment, and 
petroleum in the country.26 Tracing the story’s beginnings to the operations of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company in the 1930s, this dissertation studies how natural gas shaped Iran’s 
political, social, and economic development over the subsequent half century, 
highlighting how natural gas energy and the environment were co-constituted with a self-
consciously modernizing society. Drawing from a wide variety of sources, including 
Persian- and English-language periodicals; national and corporate archives in Iran, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States; reports housed in the libraries of Iranian 
ministries and the national petroleum companies; and academic and scientific 
publications by Iranian experts, it argues that natural gas and its infrastructures were 
deeply embedded in Iranian understandings of what a modern society could and should 
be. While the idea of “modernity” is both unstable and deeply fraught—often doing more 
to obscure than to illuminate historical relationships through its use by contemporary 
actors and later scholars alike to implicitly deploy their own cultural and political 
proclivities—it has nonetheless been deeply formative to the understanding of many 
writing on the subject of recent Iranian history.27 The seeming paradox of a secularizing 
 
26 Dominic Boyer has pointed to the necessity of avoiding overreliance on abstract concepts like the 
Anthropocene and their attendant universalisms when discussing energy projects, urging instead for an 
accounting of local particularities and the effects of local power relations as equally formative forces as 
settler colonialism and transnational financial flows. For more see his work Energopolitics: Wind and 
Power in the Anthropocene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019). 
27 The essays collected in Ramin Jahanbegloo’s edited volume Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004) are emblematic of several of the themes that have thus far proven 
to be core to discussions of modernity in Iran: intellectual engagements, gender, and theology. 
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and modernizing nation suddenly choosing theocracy has prompted an outpouring of 
analysis on Iranians’ engagements with modern thought and the efforts of twentieth-
century Iranian intellectuals to localize the ideas and theories with which they engaged in 
order to create a modernity that was congruent with Iranian culture and traditions.28 
Others have argued that the Iranian experience of modernity was a fundamentally 
historical one, an understanding that embraces the instabilities, contradictions, and altered 
lifeways of Iran’s recent past. For these scholars, the most salient developments during 
the period were often political or legal, and great attention is given to the secularizing and 
28 In his numerous works, Ali Mirsepassi has explored how Iran’s decades-long movement for a nationally 
authentic modernity has been formed in connection to the ideas and intellectuals of the European 
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, particularly in the thought of Martin Heidegger. See his book 
Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) for more on Iranian engagements with European thinkers from Hegel 
and Marx to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Mirsepassi further argues in Political Islam, Iran, and the 
Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
that the love affair of Iranian revolutionary thinkers with the thought of Heidegger has trapped the 
country’s politics in decaying and inflexible notions of national authenticity. Going beyond more famous 
figures like Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Mirsepassi further uncovers the movement’s roots in the thought and 
influence of the largely overlooked Ahmad Fardid in his work Iran’s Troubled Modernity: Debating 
Ahmad Fardid’s Legacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Farzin Vahdat has also 
explored this terrain with his book God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002) and its focus on clerical engagement with European 
thought, ultimately arguing for the roots of revolution in different conceptions of human subjectivity: a 
positivist and non-individualized one pursued by the Pahlavi monarchy and a divinely mediated 
subjectivity espoused by revolutionary thinkers. Farhang Rajaee further explores the attempt of Iranian 
thinkers to construct an Islam able to resist the attractions of modernity and secularism in his book 
Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007), 
in the end arguing that the failures of Iranian politics over the previous century were largely rooted in the 
extreme embrace by various Iranians of either secular modernism or Islamist ideology. Though less focused 
on the specific question of modernity, in his book Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 1998) Ali Gheissari studies Iranian intellectual engagement with questions of 
nationalism and identity, arguing that the failure of the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution prompted 
Iranian intellectuals to give disproportionate attention to politics and political action and precluded a deeper 
intellectual engagement that might have produced a more sustainable melding of Iranian culture and 
modernity. Representing a different strain of thinking on Iran and in a departure from the previous authors, 
Abbas Milani breezily argues in his work Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran (Washington, D.C.: 
Mage Publishers, 2004), by locating modernity in ideals like rationalism and rule of law, that Iran and its 
people have been modern for hundreds of years and that the conflicts of the previous century have been 
rooted in a clash between this deep well of native modernity and “religious obscurantism.” 
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modernizing policies of figures like Rezā Shah Pahlavi.29 Rising to power in the 1910s as 
the leader of the Persian Cossack Brigade, a military unit modeled after the Cossack 
cavalry units of the Russian Imperial Army and one of the most effective forces in the 
Qājār army, Rezā Khan took de facto control of Iran in a 1921 coup d’état. Initially 
allowing Ahmad Shah to maintain his throne, in 1925 Rezā Khan formally deposed the 
final Qājār monarch and proclaimed himself Shah and the first of the Pahlavi dynasty. 
Until his removal by British and Soviet forces in 1941, Rezā Shah oversaw a broad-
spectrum effort aimed at Iran’s rapid modernization. Building on the scattered initiatives 
of the Qājār kings, heavy investment was made in Iran’s system of transportation, notably 
its road network and the Trans-Iranian Railway;30 educational institutions like the 
 
29 Well known is the collection of essays in Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher’s Men of Order: 
Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004) that 
explicitly compare and contrast the secularizing and modernizing policies of the two autocratic leaders, 
touching on everything from party politics to military reforms to westernizing dress codes. Similar themes 
are explored in essays collected in Stephanie Cronin’s The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under 
Riza Shah, 1921-1941 (New York: Routledge, 2003), though with greater emphasis on Iranian tribal groups 
during the period and the shifting place of women in Iranian society. The importance of Reza Shah’s 
reforms has been a consistent perspective in the scholarship on Iran, finding expression as far back as the 
1960s in Amin Banani’s The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1961). Like many of the authors concerned with Iranian intellectual engagements, Banani wonders whether 
the increasing Westernization and modernization of Iran threatened a fundamental rupture with tradition. 
30 While few in-depth studies have been undertaken of Iran’s infrastructural developments in the Rezā Shah 
era, in his 1993 article “Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920-1940,” Iranian 
Studies, vol. 26, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1993): 235-250, Patrick Clawson evaluated Rezā Shah’s investment 
in Iran’s transport network, ultimately finding that it was crucial to lowering transport costs and making 
Iranian agricultural exports competitive in foreign markets and thereby earning the country the revenues 
needed for the industrialization programs the Shah was pursuing. Eschewing such economic analyses in his 
article “The Vernacular Journey: Railway Travelers in Early Pahlavi Iran, 1925-50,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, vol. 47 (2015): 745-763, Mikiya Koyagi has explored the social space of the Trans-
Iranian Railway during the period in his article, ultimately showing how the railway traveler was 
constructed to be an exemplar of Iran’s new modernity and how the deep heterogeneity of passenger trains 
undermined notions of a unitary Iranian subject, ultimately contributing to the class consolidation of Iran’s 
new middle classes. Koyagi has also explored in his article “Drivers across the Desert: Infrastructure and 
Sikh Migrants in the Indo-Iranian Borderlands, 1919-31,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East, vol. 39, no. 3 (2019): 375-388, how the trans-Baluchistan railway infrastructure—and the 
“complex coordination of the many political and sociotechnical components of the infrastructural system” 
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University of Tehran as well as the education of some Iranians in Europe and the United 
States; industrial plants; and military equipment. Far more controversial were Rezā 
Shah’s efforts to Westernize and secularize Iranian society through measures like the 
banning of the chador, the mandate of Western-style clothing for men, and the increasing 
expectation that women work outside the home, go without hijab, and uphold 
increasingly Euro-American styles of domestic femininity.31 
 
(p. 376)—enabled and shaped the permeable social, cultural, and intellectual boundaries between Iran and 
India that recent scholarship has begun to uncover.  
31 Gender and sexuality have been a central field where debates about modernity in Iran have played out. 
Looking primarily at the Qājār nineteenth century, Afsaneh Najmabadi demonstrates both the extent to 
which premodern Iranian gender was non-binary and the slow withering of Iranian society’s strong 
homosocial and homoerotic spark as part of the encounter with modernity and the European gaze in her 
book Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). Camron Michael Amin focuses on Rezā Shah’s 
Women’s Awakening Movement in the 1930s in his book The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: 
Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865-1946 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002), 
showing how the early Pahlavi state’s interest in women was tied almost exclusively to their roles as wives 
and mothers, subordinating their interests to those of the nation and ultimately doing much to reduce the 
question of women’s emancipation in Iran to the question of the veil. In Sexual Politics in Modern Iran 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Janet Afary studies Iranian gender and sexual 
politics over the past two hundred years. Afary again highlights the extensive homoeroticism of premodern 
Iranian society as well as the process of re-domestication of Iranian women as part of Rezā Pahlavi’s 
modernizing reforms, ultimately extending her analysis to show that the patriarchal attitudes and politics of 
that era were wholly adopted by revolutionary thinkers, causing them to make common cause with more 
religious and conservative thinkers, resulting in the extensive restrictions placed on women in the wake of 
the 1979 revolution. In her article “Dressing Up (or Down): Veils, Hats, and Consumer Fashion in Iran,” in 
Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, edited by 
Stephanie Cronin, 149-162 (New York: Routledge, 2014), Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has shown how the 
industrialization and secularization drives of the Rezā Shah period were intertwined. By the mid-1920s a 
nascent fashion industry began to develop, not only prompting changes in dress and the use of images of 
women for advertisements, but also providing for new economic opportunities for clothing and textile 
production. Iran was of course not alone in the Middle East in gender being an important part of the 
experience of modernity for people in the early twentieth century. Elizabeth Thompson’s Colonial Citizens: 
Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000) offers an excellent example of the utility of gender analysis in studying the region, 
demonstrating how economic and social anxieties in the wake of World War I and under French colonial 
rule prompted a “crisis of paternity”—who should carry the role of the national father—that ultimately 
resulted in a re-subordination of women to patriarchal control during the countries’ move toward 




Iran’s social transformations during the late Qājār and early Pahlavi eras have 
been the subject of numerous studies by scholars of Iranian history. Modern scientific and 
medical knowledge were crucial to many of these changes, helping to seed an emerging 
middle class that valued technoscientific education and expertise.32 Combined with the 
intense interest of Iranian leadership under Rezā Shah and later his son and heir 
Muhammad Rezā Shah in modernizing their country, the groundwork was laid for many 
of the Cold War-era developments explored in this dissertation.33 Distinguishing the 
 
32 Bridging explorations of gender and the influence of modern medical knowledge in Iran is Firoozeh 
Kashani-Sabet’s Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in Iran (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). In her book, Kashani-Sabet analyzes how women were at the center of the politics 
of hygiene and reproduction and consequently how modern medical knowledge and social expectation 
shaped broader debates on Iranian modernization. In his book Who is Knowledgeable is Strong: Science, 
Class, and the Formation of Modern Iranian Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 
Cyrus Schayegh explores how the emerging middle classes in Iran used modern scientific and medical 
expertise as the means by which they could distinguish themselves from the rest of Iranian society and 
engage with the state in their efforts to tackle perceived social problems. The intertwined nature of class 
and modernity, and the latter’s expression as ideational, behavioral, and social performances was not 
unique to Iran, something Keith David Watenpaugh has explored in Aleppine context in his book Being 
Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Marwa Elshakry in Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950 (Chicago, 
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) has also explored how scientific knowledge, specifically 
Darwinist notions of evolution, interacted with social, civilization, and class anxieties across the Arab 
Middle East to shape notions of what was possible and desirable with respect to political and social reform. 
Scientific knowledge had significant interactions with religious knowledge in the Middle East as well, 
something Alireza Doostdar explores in his book The Iranian Metaphysicals: Explorations in Science, 
Islam, and the Uncanny (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). Therein he studies how mystical 
and occult practices and beliefs in Iran, stubbornly resistant to suppression from social and clerical elites 
over the previous century, have interacted with modern scientific reason to shape both heterodox and 
mainstream orthodox Shi’i beliefs and, in turn, the ideas underpinning the Islamic Republic. Though 
addressing far more recent times, Mazyar Lotfalian has sought to explore how Muslims from Iran to 
Malaysia have sought to understand science and technology in his book Islam, Technoscientific Identities, 
and the Culture of Curiosity (Dallas, TX: University Press of America, Inc., 2004), ultimately showing how 
practicing scientists in those regions sought to show both the non-universality of what they consider an 
integrated Western value system and re-found science and technology in an Islamic rather than a secular 
framework. 
33 Nearly forty years after its initial publication, in many ways the North Star of scholarship on modern Iran 
prior to the 1980s continues to be Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), a grand fusion of the economic, social, and political history of the 
country. Utilizing a neo-Marxist approach derived from the work of E.P. Thompson, Abrahamian sees the 
fundamental drivers of 20th-century Iranian history as being ethnic groups—vertical groupings of people 
bound by language, tribal affiliation, region, etc.—and social classes, or those people bound by a common 
relationship to the means of production. While the politico-economic and Marxian outlook on Iranian 
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modernization policies of Muhammad Rezā Shah from those of his father was the rise of 
extensive five- and seven-year development plans. Beginning in the late 1940s with the 
establishment of the Plan Organization, a government department tasked with creating 
and overseeing the country’s modernization plans, Iranian officials began a decades-long 
push to diversify and grow their country’s economy, improve living standards, boost 
military might, and gain increased national independence. Particularly with the Third 
Development Plan of 1962-1968, the first program to see any real success, nearly every 
aspect of Iranian society became subject to technocratic improvement. Initiatives were 
undertaken in areas as diverse as literacy programs, rural land reform, the promotion of 
new industry, and the improvement of Iran’s systems of transportation and 
communication, many aspects often in concert with foreign consultants and contractors.  
While Iranian modernization plans were intertwined with foreign expertise and 
the presence of the American Point Four—a U.S. program begun in 1949 with the aim of 
aiding developing nations—and military aid missions, they must also be understood as an 
expression of the ambitions of the Shah and an educated and technocratic class of Iranian 
officials. Holding a strong affinity for modernization theory and thus often implicitly or 
explicitly using the wealthy societies of North America and Western Europe as 
aspirational ideals for Iran, these officials devised enormous and complicated plans aimed 
history that Abrahamian adopts leads him emphasize material changes within Iranian society, particularly 
as they relate to industrialization and altered living standards for people across the country, the fundamental 
role of technology and infrastructure as accretions of material and social actors remains obscured, being 
largely treated as black boxes notable only for their effects on other aspects of Iranian society. For a shorter 
and more accessible version of Abrahamian’s discussion, see his book A History of Modern Iran 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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at catapulting their country and its people into a new era of power and prosperity.34 
Fundamental to the Iranian government’s modernization plans were the country’s rising 
oil revenues, a truth that has strongly shaped study of Iran’s Cold War-era development 
programs. By and large such analyses have viewed Iran’s petroleum resources, when they 
address them at all, as sources of revenue otherwise largely divorced from Iran’s 
 
34 Ramin Nassehi, in his chapter “Domesticating Cold War Economic Ideas: The Rise of Iranian 
Developmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s,” in The Age of Aryamehr: Late Pahlavi Iran and its Global 
Entanglements, ed. Roham Alvandi, (London: Gingko Library, 2018), and in contrast to a body of literature 
that has generally viewed Iran’s economic history as unique, has demonstrated just how strongly influenced 
Iranian technocrats were by both modernization theory and Latin American economic protectionism during 
the crucial Cold War period. Iranian officials were not unique in their use of the industrialized nations of 
Europe and North America as exemplars nor in their embrace of top-down and state-directed models of 
development. In Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2012), Arturo Escobar recounts how developmental discourse took 
root via systems of knowledge production and dissemination in crucial fields like economics, studying its 
translation into power via a case study of Colombian rural development programs. Iran’s encounter with 
development was shaped by the rise of modernization theory, the notion that there was a singular politico-
economic pathway to modernity, described most famously by W.W. Rostow in his 1960 book The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960), and 
that “underdeveloped” societies could be and should be hauled up the developmental ladder by hook or 
crook. Rooted in the American experience with the Tennessee Valley Authority program, the totalizing 
model of heavy infrastructure improvement, rural land reorganization, and social change strongly shaped 
the foreign policy of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, being exported around the world in an 
effort to stave off communist revolution. There is a significant body of literature on modernization theory, 
but the story’s broad contours are ably sketched by a trio of works. Nils Gilman explores the intellectual 
history of modernization theory and its entry into the highest circles of American power in his book 
Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003). In his book Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Michael E. 
Latham studies how modernization theory not only functioned as an ideological imperative among 
American decision makers, but also channeled older notions of imperialism and Manifest Destiny. David 
Ekbladh, in his work The Great American Mission: Modernization and Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), explores the roots of America’s modernization 
efforts in New Deal programs like the TVA and how such programs became proof of American 
liberalism’s ability to make the world a better place, impulses that continue to shape the foreign 
interventions of the United States in the 21st century. The reshaping of Middle Eastern societies by the 
combination of power and knowledge was not unique to the Cold War era, something that has been 
explored in particular depth with respect to Egypt. Though a number of works have been written on the 
subject, particularly influential has been Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1988), which uses a Foucauldian lens to study how modern Egypt was in part made via 
British colonial control and the production of knowledge of its people and their disciplining. Also notable is 
Khaled Fahmy’s All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cairo: 
The American University in Cairo Press, 2003) for its crucial reminder that such historical processes were 
not solely the product or the tools of European colonial empires. 
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transformations during the period.35 In contrast to perspectives that have often 
emphasized oil receipts and the programs they paid for, this dissertation challenges 
notions that the influences of fossil fuel resources on energy-rich Middle Eastern 
societies were rooted first and foremost in the revenues generated from their sale abroad. 
It instead emphasizes that the material volatility of natural gas and the imposing physical 
infrastructure used to harness it were instrumental in shaping the political, commercial, 
and social effects of gas in Iran.36 
 
35 Iran’s Cold War-era development programs have been a consistent subject of exploration over the past 
half century. As far back as the late 1960s with George B. Baldwin’s Planning and Development in Iran 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), analysts have been taking stock of the country’s 
economic and developmental fortunes. Six years later in his article “Development Planning in Iran: A 
Historical Survey,” Iranian Studies, vol. 6, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 176-228, Farhad Daftary published a 
detailed look at the successes and failures of Iran’s first four development plans, paying careful heed to the 
returns on investments made. In their book The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran, 1971-
1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil, both former employees of 
the Plan Organization, offer a very useful view into the planning process in Iran, offering both descriptions 
of how the Plan Organization undertook its work and evaluations of development planning’s interaction 
with the broader political context both before and after the revolution. Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones 
focus on the work of Abolhassan Ebtehaj as head of Iran’s central bank and the Plan Organization in their 
book Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development under the Shah (London: Frank 
Cass and Company Limited, 1989), arguing that it was the Shah himself, his love of expensive arms, and 
his tolerance for corruption that undermined Iranian development programs, something opposed by 
technocratic officials like Ebtehaj. Afsaneh Najmabadi studies the 1962-1972 program of land reform in 
Iran, emphasizing its effects on the rural populace through cooperatives and altered political orientations in 
Land Reform and Social Change in Iran (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1987). In his book 
Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 
2000), Mohamad Gholi Majd also addresses land ownership in Iran, focusing on how the resistance to land 
reform united landowners and the clerical establishment in Iran, forging a potent alliance that would elevate 
revolutionary figures like Ayatollah Khomeini. More recently, using the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive 
Master Plan as a case study in her article “The 1968 Tehran Master Plan and the Politics of Planning 
Development in Iran (1945-1979),” Planning Perspectives (2018), Azadeh Mashayekhi has written on the 
Cold War context of Iranian development planning and the role of the Plan Organization in the emergence 
of top-down master planning as the preferred model of urban planning in Iran.  
36 The effects of petroleum on urban communities and landscapes in Iran has been something explored by 
scholars, notably Kaveh Ehsani in his article “Social Engineering and the Contradictions of Modernization 
in Khuzestan’s Company Towns: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman,” International Review of 
Social History, vol. 28 (2003): 361-399. In his article Ehsani studies how the corporate authoritarian 
structures of the company towns built by the APOC were unable to fully control the heterogeneous and 
dynamic urban cultures fostered by the cities’ residents. In their article “Iran’s Global Petroleumscape: The 
Role of Oil in Shaping Khuzestan and Tehran,” Architectural Theory Review, vol. 21, no. 3 (2017): 349-





The history narrated in this dissertation is recounted in a largely chronological 
fashion, from the first efforts of Iranians to find uses for natural gas in the 1930s to the 
rise of new efforts to convert automobiles to gas fuel in the early 1990s. It is most 
strongly rooted in the accounts of natural gas produced by Iranian officials working at all 
levels of governance. Most of this material was collected within the National Library and 
Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the document centers and libraries of 
various government ministries. The correspondence and written reports of Iranian 
officials form a significant evidentiary column for the analysis undertaken in this 
dissertation, significantly complicating and deepening the narrative that the public 
relations departments of the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Gas 
Company, and the Ministry of Petroleum produced for public consumption. That 
narrative itself—expressed through industry periodicals, public speeches by high-ranking 
figures, and books produced for public consumption—is a crucial aspect of the analysis 
undertaken as well, particularly in the ways it did and did not change across the 
revolutionary period of the late 1970s. Lacking in many of these accounts, however, are 
the specific technical and geological details that underlay many of the decisions made by 
officials with respect to the design of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure, something owing 
to the fact that most of the material preserved came from within the managerial and 
administrative levels of Iranian ministries and the national petroleum companies. 
 
helped produce American-esque lifestyles and urban landscapes in Tehran between 1955 and 1978, 
something they contrast with the more localized effects of APOC/AIOC effects in Khuzestān. 
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Technical aspects are much better represented in the materials held by the British 
Petroleum Archive, at least with regard to the era before the 1979 revolution, and as such 
they also represent a crucial pillar for the analysis undertaken in this project. 
Prior to the late 1960s, nearly all of the gas produced in Iran was burned as waste 
in the country’s southern oil fields. Chapter 1, drawing largely on materials from the 
archive of British Petroleum, explores the early efforts of Iranian officials and AIOC 
managers to forestall that waste and find uses for the Iran’s natural gas between the mid-
1930s and the mid-1960s. During that time, the international firms that controlled the 
fields, first the AIOC, and in the wake of the Oil Nationalization Crisis of the early 
1950s, the so-called Seven Sisters of the Iranian Oil Consortium, had long resisted large-
scale utilization of Iran’s gas as unprofitable. Iran was far from the world’s existing 
markets for gas energy and building systems to convey it to places like Western Europe 
would be truly massive and complex undertakings. Proposals for various petrochemical 
projects likewise foundered on an inability to compete in major markets once 
transportation expenses were factored in. Murkier was the economic feasibility of 
recycling natural gas back into the underground reservoirs from which they had been 
extracted. With no real markets available for their country’s gas, Iranian officials pushed 
the Consortium firms to consider this last option, an undertaking that could conserve gas 
for future use. For their part, the companies resisted this as well, considering it 
technically feasible but economically pointless as the lack of a market for Iran’s gas 
meant it was, in essence, commercially valueless. Company officials went further, 
pointing to the unique geology of Khuzestān’s oil fields and the higher-than-normal 
amounts of gas retained underground during oil extraction. They argued that the 
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exceptional web of fissures that ran through the limestone formations the companies 
tapped, when combined with the comparatively restrained production practices that were 
employed, were in practice an effective gas recycling program. The debate over whether 
those conditions were indeed sufficient reflected the competing concerns of the 
Consortium companies and the Iranian government. While company managers were 
primarily focused on the commercial viability of any proposed gas project, Iranian 
officials looked at gas in more expansive terms. They saw a national resource being 
squandered and an untapped source of energy and wealth being burned away in 
unproductive fires. These competing visions, as strongly reflective of the primary 
concerns of participants as they were, were also firmly implanted in the materiality of 
natural gas and the rock formations in which it resided. Far from passive, Iran’s geologic 
structure was a crucial influence on the debate, helping define the terms within which 
commercial and economic viability could be determined. 
Due such conflicts with the Consortium companies, in the 1950s and 1960s 
Iranian officials moved away from seeking close cooperation with the international firms 
in their pursuit of the utilization of natural gas. Petrochemicals, an industry which used 
gas as both a fuel source and a raw material, quickly emerged as a viable outlet. Largely 
using materials from the Iranian national archive, Chapter 2 explores both the first major 
petrochemical project in Iran and, later, the pipeline system that would be the first to 
move significant quantities of gas across the country. The first major gas project to come 
to fruition in Iran was a chemical fertilizer factory built near Shiraz and the gas pipeline 
built to feed it and other industrial units in the area. Built in the mid- and late-1960s, in 
many ways the project was a microcosm of the entire Iranian gas utilization project. 
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While it was an undeniable success, it also reflected the tensions that existed within 
different levels of the Iranian state. Iranian authorities were not unified in their 
understanding of how natural gas could best be utilized within the country. Officials 
within the national petroleum companies, focused primarily on the most efficient use of 
the largest volumes of gas for the smallest possible investment, focused their attention on 
supplying the region’s industrial consumers. In contrast, local authorities, eventually 
enlisting the support of national offices, sought the simultaneous construction of a city 
gas network aimed at smaller residential and commercial consumers, seeing it as a 
potentially significant improvement to the quality of life of city residents. Though a small 
pilot city network was eventually built, the conflict reflected the significant tensions that 
existed within different levels of the Iranian state regarding how gas might best be used. 
Indeed, over the years, the construction of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure was not 
reflective of top-down decrees that were seamlessly implemented, but rather the product 
of sometimes intense negotiation by all involved parties.37 
Iranian ambitions for their country’s natural gas resources went well beyond 
petrochemicals, however, quickly encompassing a desire to embrace a new source of 
cheap and abundant energy to feed the appetite of a rapidly industrializing society. 
Natural gas infrastructure was not the only major infrastructural effort undertaken in Iran 
during the Cold War period and it was built alongside hydroelectric dams, airports, 
 
37 Cyrus Schayegh, in his article “’Seeing Like a State’: An Essay on the Historiography of Modern Iran,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (February 2010): 37-61, has pointed to the need 
for scholars of modern Iran to avoid reproducing the state’s often totalizing claims of ownership of Iranian 
development. The history of natural gas in Iran clearly shows that as influential as national figures, 
organizations, and directives were, the actual contours of the country’s natural gas infrastructure were also 
deeply reflective of multiple levels of Iran’s government and various sectors of Iranian society. 
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highways, and numerous other projects.38 But natural gas use was not common around 
the world, even in industrialized countries, and the new fuel source promised a new level 
of technological sophistication for Iranian society, evidence that Iran was finally attaining 
some level of parity with the world’s wealthy nations. Beginning in the late 1950s with 
canisters of propane and butane, gas quickly became a significant and highly visible 
energy source in many of Iran’s urban areas, a development accelerated by the 
construction of the first Iran Gas Trunkline. Built in the late 1960s to move gas from 
Iran’s southern fields to the country’s northern cities and the Soviet Caucuses, IGAT-1 
would eventually become the backbone of natural gas consumption in the country. As 
sophisticated products of modern technology, the pipeline and its associated facilities 
became monuments to development, embodying discourses that cast gas as a futuristic 
energy source for a future world power.39  
38 To date very little has been written on the infrastructural projects of Cold War-era Iran. While their 
existence is well recognized, their importance and effects are almost universally subsumed into broader and 
more generalized discussions of Iran’s changing economy during that period. The exception is Cyrus 
Schayegh’s “Iran’s Karaj Dam Affair: Emerging Mass Consumerism, the Politics of Promise, and the Cold 
War in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 54, no. 3 (2012): 612-643. In 
the article, Schayegh discusses the role of Tehran’s electricity demand, its connection to an emerging 
culture of mass consumption, and the decision to pursue the construction of the Karaj hydroelectric dam 
and elevate it as a symbol of Iran’s development. 
39 Driven by rising oil revenues, particularly after 1973, a booming economy, and a penchant for advanced 
arms by Muhammad Rezā Shah, in the 1960s and 1970s Iran was a rapidly rising regional power. Though 
the grand expectations of the Shah that Iran would become one of the world’s largest economies within 
decades were never likely to come true, it had nonetheless begun to flex its muscles in places like Oman 
where it helped put down the Dhofar Rebellion between 1973 and 1976. In this Iran was fulfilling both its 
own ambitions and those of the United States, which, oriented around President Richard Nixon’s decision 
in 1969 to entrust regional security to allies and partners, initiated extensive arms sales to the country and 
actively promoted it alongside Saudi Arabia as the primary security guarantor in the Persian Gulf region. 
For more on development of Iran’s security arrangements with the United States and its broader overall 
relationship during the Cold War, see Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States 
and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). The Iranian monarch was not 
passive in courting American attention, however, often exaggerating the extent of the communist foreign 
threat to his regime in order to obtain greater amounts of aid. For more see April R. Summit’s “For a White 




But IGAT-1 was not by and large the product of Iranian ingenuity or expertise. 
Much of it was instead engineered and planned by the Iranian Management and 
Engineering Group, a British firm, and built by a constellation of foreign contractors in 
its southern sectors and the Soviet Union in the north. Iranian officials were involved in 
every step of the process and their perspectives shaped the project in fundamental ways, 
at times not always for the best. IGAT-1 had been imagined not only as a means of 
delivering gas to Iran’s urban areas, but also as a spur to the country’s industrialization. 
As part of that wish, the decision had been made, over the objections of IMEG, to 
produce much of the needed pipe within Iran at a new pipe mill erected for that purpose. 
Despite the significant investment made in the project and the employment of an 
experienced American firm, the project quickly fell behind schedule, necessitating that 
much of the project’s pipe be imported at considerable expense. In the end, despite 
significant uncertainty regarding the design of the pipeline’s Soviet-built northern 
section, trouble with the pipe mill, and a nearly year-long delay in the commencement of 
operations, the main IGAT-1 pipeline was completed in late 1970. The project’s course, 
however, showed just how dependent on foreign expertise the Iranian government and 
the national petroleum companies were for meeting their own ambitions, a fact that 
would be largely elided in contemporary articulations of the project within Iran. 
Despite the significant involvement of international actors in the project, IGAT-1 
was deeply reflective of official Iranian priorities and understandings for the country’s 
future. Chapter 3—primarily employing NIOC and NIGC publications, particularly the 
industry magazine Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran—explores official narratives 
surrounding natural gas and its infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s, analyzing the ways 
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in which it was narratively intertwined with broader understandings of Iran’s future. By 
drawing on their published materials, this dissertation treats the National Iranian Oil 
Company, the National Iranian Gas Company, and the Ministry of Petroleum not only as 
institutions responsible for the construction of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure, but also as 
cultural producers that were instrumental in developing and sustaining important political 
narratives of gas and development.40 Both before and after the revolution, the public 
 
40 The intersection of cultural production and Iranian politics has proven to be a rich vein for scholars of the 
country. As has been the case for much of the literature on the Iran, this is particularly true with regard to 
1979 revolution and later the Islamic Republic. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi 
explore how the technologies of so-called “small media”—cassette tapes with recorded sermons, posters 
with revolutionary slogans, and smuggled pamphlets—were crucial to mobilizing the Iranian population in 
their book Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). In their interpretive work on the revolution and 
wartime Iran, Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi explore the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic 
revolutionary movement and the state it helped build in Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1999). Religion and Shi’ism have often 
been the lens through which scholars have explored Iranian cultural production, as is the case for Kamran 
Scot Aghaie in his book The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 2004) and a number of the contributors to Peter Chelkowski’s edited 
volume Eternal Performance: Ta’ziyeh and Other Shiite Rituals (London: Seagull Books, 2010). Roxanne 
Varzi explored the strained engagement of Iranian youth with those expressions of religious Iranian 
nationalism in her work of anthropology Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution 
Iran (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). Moving away from religious symbolism and its 
reception among Iranians, in her book Soundtrack of the Revolution: The Politics of Music in Iran 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017) Nahid Siamdoust has explored how the state organs of the 
Islamic Republic have used their power over the production and distribution of music to pace Iran’s social 
opening by carefully modulating what is and what is not permitted. Cultural production sits at the center of 
Hamid Naficy’s colossal four-volume history of Iranian cinema A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Vols. 
1-4 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011-2012). Naficy explores how Iranian cinema, as an industry 
and in its particular forms and styles, shaped and reflected the broader social and political transformations 
of Iranian society between the late 19th century the early 21st. Media, culture, and cultural production have 
been a similarly productive perspective for scholars working elsewhere in the Middle East. Notable 
examples include Lisa Wedeen’s Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in 
Contemporary Syria (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) and its exploration of humor in 
Syria as an avenue of authority and resistance in the country; Marwan M. Kraidy’s view of reality 
television as a site of social experimentation in Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public 
Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); the debates over nation and authenticity 
documented in Jessica Winegar’s Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary 
Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); the globalized perspective of Hisham D. Aidi in 
Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 2014); and the 
exploration of how media technologies shape community in the Muslim world by contributors to the edited 
volume of Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson’s New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging 
Public Sphere (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999, 2003). 
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relations arms of these institutions produced numerous periodicals, books, and pamphlets 
for circulation within their organizations and beyond. This media reported extensively on 
company operations and the lifecycles of oil and gas. Through the textual and 
photographic depictions of natural gas infrastructure that were disseminated in such 
publications, over the years a sophisticated idiom of development and technological 
modernity was created to “prove” the possibility of gas infrastructure in Iran; the 
desirability of a gas-based society; and the ability of the Iranian state, working primarily 
through the NIOC and NIGC, to create one. 
In treating these depictions seriously as media and cultural artifacts, and attending 
to how they did, and did not, change over time, it is possible to gain insight into the 
policy orientations that underlay them. More than public relations fluff or dry 
institutional accounts, these publications offer a window into what Sheila Jasanoff and 
Sang-Hyun Kim have called sociotechnical imaginaries, “collectively held, institutionally 
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures” rooted in scientific and 
technological advancement.41 Through attending to the broader context in which these 
words and images operated, the multiple and intermeshing currents of social and political 
thought that comprised these utterances, some overt and some less so, are revealed. Read 
simultaneously as a single interlocking corpus and as diachronic series of utterances in 
dialogue with each other, it becomes possible to see that natural gas was not just a means 
 
41 See Sheila Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity,” in 
Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, eds. Sheila Jasanoff 
and Sang-Hyun Kim, pp. 1-33 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4. This is a revision of the 
definition of a sociotechnical imaginary first proposed by Jasanoff and Kim in “Containing the Atom: 
Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea,” Minerva 47, no. 2 
(June 2009): 119-146. 
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to supply a more intensely energetic future, but a fundamental expression of an evolving 
and heterogeneous social vision for Iran.42 
In the mid-1960s, industry publications began celebrating natural gas as enabling 
“modern” lifeways of cleanliness, convenience, and American-esque domestic 
femininity. Rising household gas use over the following decade reflected the quick 
growth of a new consumer culture and the increasingly Euro-American lifestyles being 
adopted by middle class and wealthy Iranians living in the country’s fast-growing cities.43 
But for the authors of these publications, Iran’s natural gas infrastructure was also 
42 By drawing on the thought of M.M. Bakhtin and viewing decades worth of official publications as a 
singular “novel,” understood in a broad Bakhtinian sense, it is easier to see the underlying sociotechnical 
imaginary shaping each individual article or image. The contextual heteroglossia that runs through the 
corpus is often most in focus only when the observer takes a step back, viewing the collection as a whole 
and attending to the continual dialogism operating within it, particularly across the 1979 revolution. For 
more on the basis of these theoretical positions see M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1981, 2014), particularly chapter four “Discourse in the Novel.” The heteroglossia visible in the corpus 
need not be understood as unintentional accretions, betraying influences that the careful reader might use to 
understand, complicate, or demolish authorial intent. As Shaden M. Tageldin alerts us to in her work 
Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2011), polyphonic streams can be intentional and core parts of how any particular text is 
intended to function. In this way, the articles and images analyzed in this dissertation are best understood as 
simultaneously and intentionally communicating both the specifics of any particular subject and also 
broader points about development and the Iranian state’s relationship to it. 
43 In her excellent work Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolutions of the Modern Era 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), Pamela Karimi has explored how Iranian households and domestic culture 
changed during the Cold War period. Reflecting the promotion of consumer goods within Iran, the presence 
of the American Point IV program and the adoption of their curriculum of domesticity by official 
textbooks, and shifting familial norms, Iranian households underwent significant shifts during the period, 
not only in interpersonal relations but also in the kinds of homes built and the arrangements of space and 
functionality within them. Not all within Iran were supportive of such changes, and such shifting norms 
were subsumed into revolutionary politics by the late 1970s. Consumer culture has been flashpoint for 
national conflict across the Middle East, something Nancy Reynolds has explored with reference to Cairo 
in A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). Though it often played out in distinct ways, the 
intersection of fossil fuels, modernizing development, and culture was not unique to Iran either. Pascal 
Menoret has shown how the combination of Saudi planned urban development and oil wealth has translated 
into the rise of a masculine urban outlaw youth culture centered on dangerous stunt driving as a way to 
reclaim alienating urban spaces. For more see Pascal Menoret Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and 
Road Revolt (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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significant for its symbolic spectacle. In the late Pahlavi era, official discourse frequently 
engaged in almost formulaic recitations of the size and scope of the IGAT-1 project, 
hailing it as a bridge to Iran’s sovereign and technologically sophisticated future. The 
immensity of Iran’s new natural gas infrastructure—the millions of cubic feet of gas 
produced per day, the thousands of kilometers of traversed, the thousands of pounds per 
square inch of pressure—was harnessed as proof of the state’s ability to build this new 
Iran. Through a triumvirate of image, word, and statistic, natural gas energy was built to 
be a fundamental legitimating factor for the regime, proof of its ability to construct a 
brighter future for all Iranians.44 It was a view that championed the efforts of Iran’s elites 
and erased those of the laborers who worked to build and maintain Iran’s gas 
infrastructure, replacing them with heroic visions of massive steel pipes traversing 
mountain ranges, gleaming purification towers rising into the sky, and the convenient 
twist of a knob in the kitchen. It was fundamentally a vision that tied Iran’s state-directed 
modernization programs directly to their material embodiments. 
Iranian hopes for their country’s natural gas resources went significantly further. 
For some, the great promise of gas energy lay not only in its ability to fuel Iran’s 
continued modernization, but also in its potential to alleviate the growing air quality 
problems of Iran’s urban areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, urban residents of Iran 
increasingly began to take note of the growing problem of air pollution. Iranian officials 
were not an exception, and for many the specter of the polluted cities of Europe and 
 
44 The recasting of political issues as neutral technical questions has been something frequently noted by 
scholars of development. Particularly influential has been James Ferguson, who in his book The Anti-
Political Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, 1994) shows how questions of resource allocation were de-
politicized into seemingly technical problems with technical solutions. 
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North America was a sight that threatened the fundamental validity of Iran’s modernizing 
project. In response, they embraced gas all the more ferociously, seeing in it the 
possibility of a cleaner future that would not necessitate a fundamental retreat from or 
rethinking of developmental choices already made. In contrast to accounts that have 
largely treated Iranian environmentalism as a post-revolutionary phenomenon, Chapter 
4—drawing on Iranian archival documents, published materials from contemporary 
Iranian experts and government ministries, and national daily publications like 
Ettelā’āt—explores Iranians’ growing concern for their cities’ deteriorating air quality 
and highlights the centrality of those worries to the process of industrial gasification in 
Tehran and Shiraz. 
Most urban residents in Iran had a particular understanding of air pollution, one 
centered on the tangible experiences of existing within a smoky and smoggy atmosphere. 
Iranians increasingly bemoaned the soot-filled skies of the country as the 1960s and 
1970s wore on and the country’s experts worked to understand the contours and causes of 
worsening air quality. What they found was a confluence of human and nonhuman 
actants, the meeting of fossil fuel emissions with geology and climate. This was 
particularly true for Tehran, where the concentrations of air pollutants circulating through 
the city’s skies, largely fossil fuel emissions, were intensified by the presence of the 
Alborz Mountains, the clear semi-arid skies, and the atmospheric inversions they helped 
form. Iranian officials who sought to help alleviate worsening air quality had little 
influence over mountain ranges and regional climates, but they could work to substitute 
natural gas for dirtier fuels. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, with the completion of the IGAT-1 
pipeline, sustained efforts were undertaken by Iranian officials to convert industrial units 
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to gas in the cities of Tehran and Shiraz. The process was far from straightforward, 
however, reflecting competing and ambivalent attitudes toward the project among factory 
owners and the inability of the NIGC to keep its scheduling promises. Though most 
industrial units in the cities had been converted by the end of the 1970s, it was only after 
considerable scrambling by the NIGC to address the original plan’s inadequate gas 
provision and an agreement had been struck for owners to have access to significant 
financial support. More than the banal textures of a particular historical episode, the 
productive resistance of factory owners reflects the fact that Iran’s modernization efforts 
were not entirely shaped by governmental actors, instead being created in the interactions 
between state and society. 
The systems used to feed factories in Tehran and Shiraz were built as part of 
broader efforts to create networks to distribute the gas transported by the IGAT-1 
pipeline. Using archival documents, published oral histories, and industry publications, 
Chapter 5 discusses the construction of city gas distribution systems under both the 
monarchy and the Islamic Republic, highlighting both the technical choices that shaped 
them and the significant revolutionary meanings that were projected onto the gas 
systems. NIGC officials faced the fundamental choice of whether the gas distribution 
networks they built would be low- or high-pressure. Their embrace of a high-pressure 
system and the larger volumes of gas it could distribute over the objections of the foreign 
consultants hired to design the system reflected a commitment to the long-term use of 
natural gas energy in Iran. The NIGC, despite taking that position, was nonetheless much 
slower in building residential gas systems than it was in feeding gas to factories. It further 
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gave absolute priority to urban areas, almost entirely neglecting rural Iranians in the years 
prior to the revolution.  
In the NIGC’s hierarchy of consumers, many Iranians saw their own expectations 
of receiving gas service frustrated. For them, gas came to represent a future out of reach 
and a stark reminder of the yawning inequalities that marked their lives. As was often 
true around the world, even with the vast sums and significant political capital expended 
on them, Iranian modernization programs met with mixed success at best, foundering on 
unexpected events, corruption, and unintended consequences.45 Many Iranians perceived 
few, if any, benefits from the significant social and economic disruption that often 
accompanied these plans, something that was increasingly contrasted with the lives of 
enormous luxury that the country’s elite began to visibly enjoy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
For rural residents, their inability to make use of natural gas energy, even in those areas 
where pipelines passed close by, was particularly galling, evidence that the Pahlavi state 
had chosen to prioritize the needs of foreign buyers over those of their own people. As 
the revolutionary movement grew in the second half of the 1970s, such frustrated 
ambitions became increasingly integrated into broader revolutionary themes of social and 
economic justice. In contrast to much of the existing literature on the 1979 Iranian 
45 James C. Scott, in his book Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), has famously highlighted how many of the 
most ambitious developmental plans of governments around the world have largely failed to improve the 
lives of those they were supposed to help. Scott argues that four features of a state are significant: 1) an 
administrative ordering of nature and society; 2) a “high-modernist” ideology paired with a hubris rooted in 
science and technical progress; 3) an authoritarian state willing to use its coercive power; and 4) a civil 
society too weak to resist. Despite, or perhaps because of, the strength of these states, they often failed to 
take local custom and practical knowledge into account, effectively dooming their ambitions to frustration 
the moment they were pursued. Iran has been no exception in this regard; indeed, in the Cold War period 
Iran embodied many of the traits that Scott highlights as contributing to both a desire to undertake 
significant life-altering programs and the inability to make them a success. 
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revolution, this dissertation argues that it was the lack of sufficient development, rather 
than its excess, that many Iranians were opposed to.46 But the lack of natural gas service 
for the vast majority of Iranians was not simply one line on the list of Pahlavi 
wrongdoings. With the fall of the monarchy in 1979 and the subsequent rise of the 
Islamic Republic, natural gas maintained the great symbolic value it had acquired in the 
prerevolutionary era. Reflecting that significance, and mirroring the politics surrounding 
access to water in the country, the extension of piped natural gas networks to all Iranians 
became an important expression of the Islamic Republic’s stated commitment to social 
and economic justice. 
 
46 While Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions notes the crucial factor of the country’s 
modernization program and the frustrated expectations of many citizens, he argues that many Iranians were 
upset because they detected a surfeit of economic development and too little political change. Other 
existing literature on the 1979 Iranian revolution has largely emphasized social, (Islamic) ideological, and 
political themes. Said Amir Arjomand, in his book The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in 
Iran (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), sees the revolution as distinctly modern in its 
inconceivability without the strong centralized state of the Pahlavi monarchy and the social transformations 
of the early Cold War era. In a highly structuralist manner, Arjomand argues that the revolution was caused 
by the dislocations of Iran’s social transformations being harnessed by the charisma of Khomeini to further 
the long conflict between the clerical hierocracy and the centralizing Iranian state, a conflict that entered a 
new and decisive phase with the attempt of Muhammad Rezā Shah to break the authority of the clerical 
hierarchy and monopolize power in his own hands. Abrahamian notes the charisma of Khomeini as well in 
his collection of essays Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993), arguing that the revolution was a fundamentally populist uprising with Khomeini 
as its organizing leader. Hamid Dabashi, seeing ideologies as the prime movers of history, plumbs the 
depths of the “Islamic ideology” of the 1979 revolution in his book Theology of Discontent: The 
Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993; 
Reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), arguing that the ideology was created by 
numerous actors in a dialectical relationship with “the West.” In his polemical Iran: A People Interrupted 
(New York: The New Press, 2007), Dabashi further argues that the 1979 revolution was but one episode in 
a longer struggle of Iranians against a colonial modernity that had been imposed on the country. Nikki R. 
Keddie, in her Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Have, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1981) similarly argues that the 1979 revolution was at its deepest rooted in the desire of 
Iranians to shake the foreign influence that had borne down on Iran for nearly 200 years at that point. Roy 
Mottahedeh’s singular The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1985), through its sublime interweaving of personal, intellectual, and social insights, argues that 
the 1979 revolution was the latest expression, altered and updated in response to colonialism and the 
internal conflicts of the hierarchy, of a long-running ethos sustained and defined by the Shi’i clerics. 
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Reflecting that promise, publications of the NIGC and the NIOC changed, 
moving away from emphasizing the landscape-conquering heft of structures like the 
IGAT-1 pipeline, to more human-scale city gas networks. What did not change, however, 
was the continued emphasis on the technical aspects of the system and the use of 
photography and statistics to “prove” the reality of the government’s political 
commitments. There was thus significant continuity in the positions of the Pahlavi 
monarchy and the Islamic Republic, despite the latter’s painstaking efforts to differentiate 
itself from the Pahlavi era. Officials under both governments elevated natural gas as a 
symbol of the new Iran they promised to build, one that was technologically sophisticated 
and, supposedly, aimed at bettering the life of Iranians. In thus emphasizing that Iran’s 
discourses of entitlement were both top-down and bottom-up and remarkably similar 
under both the monarchy and the Islamic Republic, this dissertation complicates notions 
that certain kinds of energy systems are associated with particular forms of politics and 
governance.47 
 Alongside Iran’s efforts during the 1970s to convert factories to gas fuel there 
began a push to convert motor vehicles to gas as well. The exploratory programs 
undertaken in the prerevolutionary period amounted to little with the interruption of the 
1979 revolution, but under the Islamic Republic the idea flourished. Drawing on archival 
documents and industry publications, Chapter 6 recounts the work of Iranian officials to 
create and deploy systems to support automobile gas use. Officials considered two forms 
 
47 In his book Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell has famously argued that different forms of 
government are rooted in the material properties of different fossil fuels and the labor regimes that were 
thereby created: democracy in coal and authoritarianism in oil. This dissertation complicates that picture, 
highlighting just how alike the politics of natural gas were under the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic 
Republic despite the significant differences in their governmental structure and practices.  
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of gas fuel: compressed natural gas and liquid gas. Each form had its own technical 
advantages and disadvantages, characteristics that were most meaningful when 
considered within the social context of Tehran’s urban areas. Iranian experts wrung their 
hands about the safety of transporting liquid gas amongst the notoriously lawless drivers 
of Tehran, the need to establish enough compressor stations to supply a CNG system, and 
the willingness of drivers to adopt gas fuel before a truly national system of distribution 
was in place. Despite such concerns, the promise of automobile gas fuel was almost too 
good to pass up and it took on added significance during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. 
Gas not only promised cleaner skies, but also the establishment of new industry and the 
use of an abundant and inexpensive domestic fuel, considerations that bound the 
possibility of gas fuel to the politics of economic sovereignty that had been sharpened by 
the conflict. Gas and national development thus again became twisted together, but this 
time they would ultimately be at odds. While vehicle conversion kits were successfully 
designed and manufactured in Iran, their generally poor quality and difficulty of 
maintenance effectively rendered the engines on which they were installed more 
polluting than when they used gasoline alone. 
*** 
Despite the at times near exclusivity of attention that Tehran has received in the 
histories of modern Iran, natural gas embraced a large swath of the country, a reality that 
this dissertation has sought to reflect.48 As the administrative and industrial capital of the 
48 Few works look at Iran from the perspective of areas other than Tehran. One of the few is Setrag 
Manoukian’s City of Knowledge in Twentieth Century Iran: Shiraz, History and Poetry (London: 
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country, Tehran played a significant role in both prompting the desire for a natural gas 
system and shaping its eventual contours. Its particularly poor air quality further drove 
considerations for gas as a potential environmental savior. But much of the gas that Iran 
used, particularly in the pre-revolutionary era, was a product of Khuzestān and its 
particular geologies. It was the province’s distance from Iran’s major urban centers and 
the pressures and compositions of its petroleum reservoirs that drove the need for 
massive pipelines and refineries. Shiraz too played an outsize role, both hosting the first 
major gas project in Iran and, in many ways, setting the terms of the country’s 
gasification. Nor were the two cities identical in their reception of gas, with the both 
Shiraz’s local authorities and factory owners aggressively pursuing the new fuel and 
those of Tehran worried more about disruptions to the existing order. In Iran’s rural areas, 
it was the lack of gas that mattered, something that became bound up in broader 
revolutionary discourses in the late 1970s. The history of natural gas in Iran is a national 
one, but it cannot be captured from the top-down view of the national government alone. 
It instead demands that attention be paid to how gas was received in different parts of the 
country, and the local contexts—human and nonhuman alike—that shaped it. 
The intertwining of human and nonhuman factors was particularly evident in the 
issue of Iran’s urban air quality. Despite the eventual widespread adoption of gas fuels, 
the continued intensification of air pollution reflected the lack of a straightforward 
technical fix for Iran’s environmental challenges. Nonetheless, the efforts of Iranian 
officials under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic to convert industries 
 
Routledge, 2012), in which he explores how residents of Shiraz, long seen as the country’s cultural capital, 
employ poetry and the idea of culture to relate to their city, their country, and the history of both. 
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and vehicles to gas fuel ingrained the effects of mountain ranges, arid terrain, and the 
smoke of natural gas combustion in Iranian development policies. Beyond its 
industrializing potential, Iranians valued gas energy as a savior from the environmental 
violence their developmental policies had wrought. Modernization and notions of 
environmental stewardship thus became intertwined in Iran, and the return of clear skies a 
sought-after feature of the modernity many Iranians longed to build. In their pursuit, 
Iranians were not passive consumers of expertise established elsewhere; they were active 
members of global scientific and engineering discourses of energy and the environment, 
working to both develop their own society and sway the ultimate course of fossil fuel-
based civilization worldwide.49 To date, however, that vision has largely failed. 
  
 The story of natural gas in Iran is one that brings together the political, 
technological, social, and environmental histories of the country. It is each of these 
things, but it is also much more, for gas functioned not only as a substance of joining, 
linking together seemingly disparate strands of Iranian history, but also as a co-
constitutive catalyst, influencing each thread in turn. Gas thus offers itself as a powerful 
and manipulable lens through which to examine Iran’s recent past. Turn it one way to 
examine Iranian state building, making visible the extensive continuity between the social 
 
49 Though such individuals have often been cast as compradors of western powers, especially by supporters 
of the 1979 revolution, such a view of them is unreflective of the actual complexity with which they 
engaged the industrialized world. Many longed for a more independent Iran, one not only able to better 
resist the depredations of entities like the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its imperial patrons, but also one 
able to exert itself around the Middle East and the world. Such men thus held positions that were 
anticolonial in their particular application to Iran, but not in universalizing essence. This recursive 
reproduction of colonial perspectives was not unknown in the Middle East, a crucial reality Eve M. Troutt 
Powell has pointed to with regard to 19th-century Egypt in her book A Different Shade of Colonialism: 
Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). 
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visions animating policies under the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Republic. Turn it 
another to see Iranian scientists, engineers, and planners working to create new 
understandings of their country and its needs, going far beyond the mere application of 
expertise created elsewhere. Turn it yet another direction to uncover how changing 
Iranian lifeways were shaped by more than ideology and religion, becoming reordered 
around new technologies of natural gas energy use. With a final twist, the boundaries 
between the human and natural worlds blur, revealing the extensive ways that modern 
Iranian society is as much a product of mountain ranges, ancient seas, and local climates 
as it is human hands. That these varied aspects of the story are interlocked is reflective of 
what natural gas energy has been in Iran: a substance upon which Iranians projected and 
attempted to build some of their most potent national aspirations; an ancient hydrocarbon 
mixture, lifted from deep beneath the earth, transported hundreds of miles by 
sophisticated technological systems to be burned by energy-hungry consumers in ever-
increasing quantities; and a failed environmental savior, ultimately unable to fulfill 
Iranian dreams of clean urban air. A focus on gas thus allows us to go beyond the 
questions of religion, ideological contestation, and Great Power meddling that have 
shaped much of the scholarship on modern Iran to date, seeing how they have been co-






No Gas, No Oil: 






Throughout Iran’s Persian Gulf coastal regions, visual and olfactory evidence of 
natural gas litters the land. In the southeastern area of Baluchestān, large mud volcanoes 
rise prominently above the flat ground, the mounds of hardened white earth the result of 
pressurized natural gas erupting through saltwater-bearing clay to form dark, bubbling 
craters. In the province of Fars, the sulfurous smell of natural gas seepages wafts through 
the air and fetid pools of black water bubble; dark brown and porous accretions of 
calcium carbonate and crystalline sulfur referred to as gach-e torsh cover the ground 
where gas has reacted with outcroppings of gypsum and limestone. In Khuzestān, the 
heart of Iran’s petroleum industry, gas seeps, gach-e torsh, and even naturally burning 
vents of gas litter the central region, providing hints of the vast quantities of wealth and 
energy that lay hidden beneath the surface. In indicating the presence of underground 
petroleum reservoirs, such clues did more than signal to early oil explorers promising 
locations to search for the black gold that would come to be coveted the world over: they 
also asserted the intertwined nature of natural gas and oil. These two substances, in many 
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ways more alike than dissimilar, would together shape Iran’s course of development in 
their inability to be easily separated.50 
 Iranian efforts to harness natural gas began in the 1930s, with entreaties to the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that something be done about the large volumes of natural 
gas the company was extracting and venting as part of its oil operations. From the 
perspective of Iranian government officials, gas represented a vast and largely untapped 
source of energy, wealth, and economic potential. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, they 
pressed the AIOC to find economically profitable uses for it or, failing that, to recycle it 
to the underground petroleum reservoirs from which it had been produced, preserving it 
for exploitation in later years. For their part, officers of the AIOC largely saw gas 
utilization as theoretically promising but always commercially unviable, unable to 
compete with other forms of energy or suitable only for products that lacked sufficient 
markets. They nonetheless explored proposals to use Iran’s natural gas to mine 
magnesium and to manufacture chemicals like carbon black, ultimately concluding that 
none were suitable for full implementation. This subordination of gas to oil was a 
deliberate process, an unseeing of gas’s economic potential for Iran that was pursued in 
an effort to protect the company’s primary mission of delivering cheap oil to foreign 
customers.  
Gas recycling too was seen as technically possible but economically pointless, a 
view rooted not only in commercial calculations regarding the value of natural gas and 
 
50 For more on the geology of Iran’s petroleum-bearing regions see National Iranian Oil Company and 
Iranian Oil Operating Companies, “Present Status of Natural Gas in Iran,” in Proceedings of the Seminar 
on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the ECAFE 
Region, pp. 64-82 (New York: United Nations, 1965). 
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the cost of its reinjection, but also the very geologic characteristics of the rock from 
which the AIOC extracted petroleum. Anglo-Iranian officials argued that because the 
unique geological characteristics of Iran’s oil-bearing region caused more gas to be 
naturally retained in the reservoirs than was the global norm, and that the company 
refrained from aggressive production practices that would upset that balance, they had 
already long undertaken a de facto program of gas recycling. More than mere rhetorical 
justification on the part of a foreign semi-colonial enterprise, this combination of 
economic and natural factors would eventually come to define the course of Iran’s 
burgeoning relationship with its natural gas resources, representing the balancing act 
between economic, political, and social imperatives at stake within the limits imposed by 




 As early as the mid-1930s, officials within the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company began 
to give serious and sustained attention to the large reserves of natural gas found within 
their Iranian concession. Though experiments were undertaken between 1926 and 1928 to 
produce benzol motor fuel from Iranian natural gas,51 exploration into gas utilization was 
set aside until late 1937 when B.K.N. Wyllie, an AIOC engineer, proposed using surplus 
natural gas to extract magnesium from the dolomite rich mountains north of Dezful.52 In 
 
51 “Meeting Held at Britannic House on Tuesday 30th November, 1937, to Discuss the Problem of the 
Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no document number, 3 December 1937, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural 
Gas (44113), BP Archive, University of Warwick [hereafter Utilisation of Natural Gas]. 
52 Memorandum from B.K.N. Wyllie, “Is the Manufacture of Magnesium from Dolomite a Possible Mode 
of Utilising some of the Surplus Gas in Southern Iran?,” no document number, 10 November 1937, 
attached to Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, 11 November 1937, Utilisation 
of Natural Gas. 
51 
November of that year, George Martin Lees, Chief Geologist of the AIOC, wrote that “in 
addition to gas produced with our oil which is surplus to requirements[,] we have, in the 
ground, proved gas fields which are among the biggest of their kind in the world.” This, 
he wrote, quoting another AIOC engineer, “justified ‘a special research project, having as 
its terms of reference the commercial exploitation of this enormous reserve of cheap 
fuel.’”53 Despite some consideration having been made for the use of excess refinery 
gases from Ābādān refinery in domestic applications in the surrounding town in 1936,54 
Lees focused on potential industrial applications, stating that “the only feasible use for 
our gas is as fuel for some industrial operation” like mineral extraction,55 metal and 
cement production, and as a “source of acetylene” and synthetic petrol.56 
Driving this interest in Iran’s natural gas were the large volumes already being 
produced by Anglo-Iranian in the petroleum fields they operated. Most of this gas was 
so-called associated gas, or gas that was dissolved within the oil itself. Though the 
different states of oil and gas at the earth’s surface—liquid versus gaseous—have 
tremendous implications for the utilization of the resources, there is in reality no sharp 
distinction in the ensemble of hydrocarbons that comprise the bulk of their substance. 
Created from the fossilized remains of ancient biological material that has been 
53 Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, “Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no 
document number, 11 November 1937, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
54 J.A. Jameson, “Visit to Iran 1936: Abadan Town – Supply Services, Housing,” H2/132, 1936, p. 5, Visit 
to Iran 1936: Abadan Town: Supply Services, Housing (67507), BP Archive, University of Warwick. 
55 Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, “Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no 
document number, 11 November 1937, p. 1-2, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 




transformed by the heat, pressure, and anaerobic environments of the deep earth, natural 
gas and crude oil are both forms of petroleum. Neither are composed of a single pure 
substance, instead constituted by various organic hydrocarbons, and the difference 
between them lies in the different molecular weights of the hydrocarbons that comprise 
their bulk. Natural gas is composed primarily of methane and other light hydrocarbons 
that are gaseous at surface level pressures and temperatures whereas crude oil contains 
mostly pentane and heavier hydrocarbons that are liquid at surface conditions. Crucially, 
these substances are formed via the same geological processes, resulting in petroleum 
reservoirs containing both light and heavy hydrocarbons in varying concentrations. 
Largely formed within sedimentary rock formations, petroleum deposits often 
migrate upward within the earth, moving through tiny cracks, fissures, and gaps that exist 
within the rock. Significant and exploitable petroleum reservoirs are thus most often 
formed in regions where the earth has been deformed by tectonic movement and trapped 
migrating petroleum beneath an impermeable layer. There oil and gas collect, often 
forming a dome of the less-dense natural gas beneath which lies a column of more-dense 
crude oil. While gas can be produced directly from the gas dome and without significant 
quantities of oil,57 the reverse is not generally true. The creation of oil and gas in the 
same deposits results in some of the hydrocarbons that comprise natural gas—primarily 
methane and ethane, among others—remaining dissolved amongst the heavier 
hydrocarbons of crude oil when placed under high pressures deep underground. Released 
from that pressure when the oil is brought to the surface, such lighter hydrocarbons 
 
57 This is not to say that the gas has no heavier components, as so-called natural gas liquids will often 
precipitate out of gas produced in this manner upon reaching the surface. 
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evaporate out of the crude and are either captured for later use or vented and flared for 
disposal. To produce oil is to thus to inevitably produce natural gas as well, particularly 
as the expansion of natural gas in lower pressures is often what drives oil up the wells. 
The lengthy and complex geological history that gives rise to petroleum reservoirs 
results in each producing field having its own characteristics, an “individuality” reflecting 
the composition of the oil and gas, its natural pressurization of the reservoir, and the 
potential ease of its exploitation.58 In Iran’s southwestern provinces, such factors have 
come together to create one of the richest oil- and gas-producing regions in the world. 
Founded in 1909 and operating primarily within the province Khuzestān, the semi-private 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and later still British 
Petroleum, extracted and exported Iran’s oil to customers around the globe, in the process 
becoming one of the richest and most influential oil producers in the world. From the 
very beginning of its oil operations, however, the company was just as much a producer 
of gas as oil, bringing to the surface all the gas dissolved in the crude they sought. 
Though the AIOC only began recording associated gas production in 1933, retroactive 
assessments based on the known gas:oil ratios—a measure of the amount of gas in a 
given volume of oil—within their reservoirs indicated steadily rising amounts of gas 
being extracted from the ground. In 1911 an estimated 50 million cubic feet of gas was 
produced at the Masjid-e Sulaymān field. That number had risen to a more than 27,000 
million cubic feet in 1937, primarily from the fields at Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel. 
Total production in any given field could vary over time as more or less oil was lifted, but 
 
58 Continental Oil Company, “Natural Gasoline and Natural Gas,” undated, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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by the postwar years, a period when the economic potential of Iran’s associated gas 
would come under greater scrutiny, more fields and gas were being produced than ever 
before. By 1947 more than 80,000 million cubic feet of gas was extracted in five fields: 
Masjid-e Sulaymān, Haft Kel, Naft Sefid, Gachsārān, and Āghā Jāri.59 
For these reasons, George Martin Lees was not alone in taking seriously the 
prospect of Iranian gas. Whether as a raw material for petrochemicals or a source of 
energy for mining magnesium, concern for the fate of Iran’s natural gas reached the 
highest levels of the AIOC’s leadership. On November 30, 1937 a meeting between 
company leadership and production experts was held at Britannic House, AIOC 
headquarters, in order to “initiate a concentration of thought and research on a problem of 
the very highest importance to the Company, namely, the utilisation of the colossal and 
increasing quantities of light gaseous paraffins – mainly methane – produced or available 
in Iran.”60 As Lees had done, attendees focused on industrial applications for gas, 
directing that a small committee of experts evaluate proposed uses like the manufacture 
of magnesium and calcium carbide, transformation to other hydrocarbons, and cement 
production.61 Some options, like the production of acetylene or other hydrocarbons, faced 
significant technical unknowns, while others faced the headwinds of commercial 
59 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry,” HWL/370, 4 June 1948, 
Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948 (58787), BP Archive, University of Warwick 
[hereafter Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948]. 
60 “Meeting Held at Britannic House on Tuesday 30th November, 1937, to Discuss the Problem of the 
Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no document number, 3 December 1937, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural 
Gas. 
61 Ibid., 1-4. 
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viability.62 Several weeks after the Britannic House meeting, D. Comins, an AIOC 
employee, reported early findings regarding the potential production of magnesium in 
Iran. He stated that there was some 76 mcf/d (roughly 800,000 tons per year) of “cheap 
gas fuel available for exploitation” at the Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel oil fields with 
a total known reserves of some 65 million tons, twenty-five at Masjid-e Sulaymān and 
forty at Haft Kel.63 The large volumes of gas were crucial to any potential scheme for 
producing magnesium from the dolomite hills in the region, as Comins’s analysis 
confirmed that “fuel or power costs represent a substantial percentage of the cost of 
production.” He estimated not only that 30,000 tons of magnesium could be produced per 
year if all the surplus gas were used, but also that “power costs per ton of Magnesium 
would be much lower in Iran than in the U.K.,” even when factoring in the £6 royalty per 
ton of gas that the AIOC would owe the Iranian government.64 The crucial referent for 
AIOC experts was the prevailing average price of £140 per ton of magnesium in the 
United Kingdom, and there was a flurry of debate over whether Comins’s original 
analysis accurately reflected both the prevailing conditions within Britain65 and the 
 
62 Ibid., 2-3. 
63 Memorandum D. Comins to Jameson, “Utilisation of Fields Gas,” no document number, 16 December 
1937, p. 1-2, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
64 Ibid., 2. 
65 The debate centered on the exact price at which British magnesium works could obtain fuel. Comins 
maintained that his calculations reflected the broader conditions of the United Kingdom whereas those of 
his critics focused on particular, and particularly favored, producers. For more see Letter W. Mitchell to D. 
Comins, no document number, 20 December 1937 and Letter D. Comins to W.C. Mitchell, no document 
number, 13 January 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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various ways magnesium was produced around the world.66 Even more of an issue for the 
AIOC was the fact that the concessionary agreement under which they operated in Iran 
did not cover the search for any resources other than petroleum. As J.M. Pattinson, an 
AIOC official, expressed, 
 
You will recall that our Concession is granted for the production, refining and transport 
of Petroleum and that this is very specifically stated under Article 1 thereof, and I am a 
little doubtful of our position if we institute a search for a substance which is definitely 
outside this definition.67 
 
E.H.O. Elkington, the General Manager of the Company in Iraq and Iran between 1927 
and 1939, responded that since the large quantities of “methane cannot at present be 
converted into petroleum products,” the AIOC was considering other options. As he 
wrote, 
 
It is realised that under our Concession we have no rights to manufacture magnesium or 
calcium carbide from dolomite, but if after investigation, the use of Fields gas for this 
purpose can be shown to be a commercial proposition, then we should have to take it up 
with the Government and come to a separate agreement with them. 68 
 
The hurdles that thus faced the possibility of using natural gas to produce magnesium in 
Iran— technical soundness, economic viability, and legal opportunity—were 
representative of those that would face all such projects in the following decades. 
Despite the problematic legal standing of the AIOC vis-à-vis the production of 
non-petroleum commodities, throughout 1938 and into 1939 Company officials 
 
66 See Memorandum W.H. Cadman to D. Comins, “New Electro-Thermal Process,” no document number, 
18 January 1938 and Memorandum W.H. Cadman to D. Comins, “Magnesium Production Method,” no 
document number, 19 January 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
67 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to E.H.O. Elkington, P/E/155, 1 February 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
68 Letter from E.H.O. Elkington to J.M. Pattinson, No. 160, 10 February 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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continued to search for means to utilize the increasing volumes of gas they controlled in 
Iran. Standing in the way of increased utilization was, as A.C.G. Egerton,69  Chair of 
Chemical Technology at the Imperial College of Science and adviser to the Company, 
phrased it, a perception that gas possessed a “low convenience value.” “Energy in the 
form of gas has a low convenience value because it cannot be utilized far from the wells,” 
he wrote, and determining the best course of action was “a question of what best form to 
put it in to get the highest ‘convenience value.’”70 To overcome this challenge, AIOC 
officials like Egerton largely sought to literally or figuratively convert methane, the 
predominant component of natural gas, into products that could be more easily and 
economically transported to distant markets. Whether employed as feedstock or fuel 
source, in this way the low “convenience value” of gas could be boiled down and 
concentrated, thereby resulting in products much more amenable to utilization at points 
distant from the petroleum fields. Thus, in addition to projects like the production of 
magnesium with gas fuel—“the winning of metals [with gas] is important and compares 
favourably with the transport of fuel oil and the production power from it at the place 
where it is transported…[and] compares very favourably with the production of metals by 
power provided from coal”—Egerton also proposed using Iranian gas for the potential 
production of petrochemical precursors like acetylene, ethylene, methanol, formaldehyde, 
69 Alfred Charles Glyn Egerton was a principal researcher and pioneer in the field of the use of liquid 
methane as a fuel source.  
70 “Extract from Letter Dated 19th January 1938, Received from Professor Egerton,” no document number, 
19 January 1938, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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and hydrogen cyanide as well as the “liquefaction of methane for use as an aircraft 
fuel.”71 
Egerton’s proposals were taken seriously, and at a meeting held in AIOC 
headquarters the next day it was determined that the extremely low price at which the 
company could obtain Iranian gas potentially made viable projects that would not have 
been economical if undertaken in the United Kingdom. The production of magnesium 
continued to be seen as the most promising avenue being considered. At the time, British 
demand for the metal continued to outstrip available supply and, perhaps more 
importantly, shipping the product was seen as being much more efficient than trying to 
transport gas long distances. “More calories could be exported in the form of magnesium 
than in any other way so far suggested,” it was reported, but despite the promise of 
magnesium exports, throughout the spring of 1938, other avenues of utilisation continued 
to be explored by AIOC officials.72  Included was the potential for the production of 
carbon black as well as helium extraction73 and cement production.74 Cement was seen as 
particularly promising as the establishment of a large gas-fired cement works in Burma 
had already shown that “gas firing, after preliminary difficulties have been overcome, is 
 
71 Ibid., 3-4. 
72 “Meeting held at Britannic House on the 20th January, 1938 to discuss the Problems of the Utilisation of 
Natural Gas in Iran,” no document number, 14 February 1938, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
73 Memorandum from D. Comins to Dr. Dunstan, “Utilisation of Iranian Gas,” no document number, 21 
February 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 




much simpler and requires less skilled attention than coal firing.”75 Cement was also a 
useful commodity for the AIOC in its own operations, and it was reported the “cement 
manufactured is very suitable for cementing of wells and is used by B.O.C. [Burma Oil 
Company] as well as ourselves.”76 Despite this early interest in cement on the part of the 
AIOC, for decades no progress was made. As late as 1955 Anglo-Iranian officials were 
discussing the possibility,77 and in the end nothing would be built until the mid-1960s 
when a cement plant was constructed as part of an industrial complex in Shiraz. 
Evaluations of potential projects continued until the end of 1938 with the AIOC 
undertaking not only economic and market evaluations but also fundamental technical 
research to determine the true feasibility of proposals like the creation of acetylene78 and 
“liquid hydrocarbons suitable for fuel.”79 Despite this foray into basic scientific research, 
high-level company officials stressed that any endeavors undertaken must be in support 
of the AIOC’s fundamental identity as a profit-seeking business. While assembled 
officials agreed with two chemical advisers working for the Company who had “urged 
 
75 “The Burma Cement Company Limited. General Description of the Factory at Thayetmyo, Burma.,” no 
document number, 6 April 1938, p. 10-11, attached to Memorandum from P. de H. Hall, “Gas Utilisation in 
Cement Manufacture in Iran,” no document number, 19 April 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
76 Letter from T.T. McCreath to Captain Comins, “Gas Utilisation in Cement Manufacture in Iran,” no 
document number, 19 April 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
77 Letter from R.K. Dickie to J.M. Pattinson, “Possible Industrial Developments in South-West Iran Surplus 
Gas,” no document number, 28 December 1955, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and 
Utilisation of Gas (59791) BP Archive, University of Warwick [hereafter Iran – Cement Manufacture and 
Distribution and Utilisation of Gas]. 
78 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., Sunbury-on-Thames Research Station, “Gas Research – M.i.S., Visit 
of Dr. J.E. Carrutherse to Professor R. Robinson at Oxford – November 1st. 1938,” no document number, 1 
November 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
79 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., Sunbury-on-Thames Research Station, “Research Advisory 
Committee, Meeting to be Held at Britannic House, London, E.C.2, on Friday December 2nd at 2.30 P.M.,” 
no document number, 25 November 1938, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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that work should be concentrated upon the problem of converting Fields gas into 
acetylene” since it was “a key product capable of subsequent conversion into fuel 
hydrocarbons,” not all were convinced that the efforts being put forth were entirely in the 
company’s interests. It was reported that Baron John Cadman, Chairman of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, had 
 
stressed the opinion, both in relation to the utilisation of Fields gas and refinery gas, that 
in conducting such research work the aspect of ultimate monetary value to the Company 
must not be lost sight of, nor should ‘long distance research’ be allowed to prejudice the 
prosecution of researches of more immediate commercial utility.80 
 
The prioritization of the AIOC’s profitability with respect to Iranian natural gas, 
manifested in late 1938 as a desire to “maintain a balance between immediate and long-
distance research,” was a theme that would come to define the company’s relationship to 
Iran and its natural gas resources.81 In the decades that would follow, the AIOC would 
play a nearly continual game of finding ways to resist increasingly strident demands by 
the Iranian government that something be done with the vast quantities of associated gas 
the company was lifting. Animating that resistance was the simple hierarchy of concerns 
articulated by Baron Cadman in the Britannic House meeting: that whatever good might 
come of increased gas utilization in Iran, for the AIOC and its leadership only those 
courses of action that could be directly shown to be beneficial to the Company would be 
pursued. Everything else was secondary. 
 
 
80 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., Sunbury-on-Thames Research Station, “Research Advisory 
Committee, Minutes of Meeting Held on Friday, December 2nd, 1938 at Britannic House,” no document 
number, 6 December 1938, p. 2, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
81Ibid., p. 2, Utilisation of Natural Gas (44113). 
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With the coming of the Second World War, the AIOC’s efforts to find new outlets 
for Iran’s gas largely came to a halt.82 By early 1944, however, work began to pick back 
up, with much of it focused on the potential of using Iranian gas for the production of 
petrochemicals. Foremost among those was carbon black, an industrial product composed 
of ultrafine particles used as a pigment and as a reinforcing agent in rubber products. 
Though production of the substance was raised as a possibility in 1938, at the time the 
price of the product was considered to be far too low to be a reasonable outlet for Iran’s 
gas.83 Interest among AIOC officials was reignited in early 1944 after a representative of 
the Cabot Company, an American chemical manufacturer, inquired about possibility of 
purchasing 50 mcf/d of Iranian natural gas to supply a potential carbon black plant to be 
established in the country. While tentative discussions in late 1943 were not productive, 
by early 1944 an impending post-war shortage of carbon black in the United Kingdom 
had changed minds. Cabot had already attempted to find a location for their new plant in 
the United States, but legal restrictions in Texas prevented the use of low-sulfur gas for 
the production of carbon black. Mexico had likewise proved unsatisfactory due to an 
insufficient supply of gas and the distance from expected markets. In approaching the 
AIOC, Cabot offered to pay for the gas used via fixed rates or with some 25 percent of 
82 Between 1939 and 1944, it appears that existing proposals were shelved and no new gas utilization 
schemes were proposed, inferred by the complete lack of documentation on the subject held in the BP 
archive, something likely reflecting the onset of the Second World War. When the discussion resumed 
toward the end of the conflict, a whole new set of proposals were considered. 
83 “Meeting held at Britannic House on the 20th January, 1938 to discuss the Problems of the Utilisation  of 
Natural Gas in Iran,” no document number, 20 January 1938, p. 4, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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the value of carbon black produced.84 The low price of gas in Iran and its relative 
proximity to potential markets made Iran a potentially attractive locale for Cabot, and it 
was noted that 
 
on the indication…that waste gas in Perisa [sic] might be available at a very low price 
Cabot considered that on what he has learned of probable Persian costs a plant there 
would be competitive in Eastern markets with plants in Texas. Markets in India, Australia 
and South Africa now supplied under lend-lease would take production of small plant or 
substantial portion of production of plant large enough to be economic.85 
 
Despite Cabot’s confidence, AIOC officials felt that “there does not seem to be much 
money in the project as it has been propounded to us.”86 Nonetheless, they undertook a 
thorough examination of the proposal, and after studying costs of operations of American 
carbon black plants, they “concluded that Iran should be in a good position to produce 
carbon black and withstand somewhat greater transport charges than U.S.A. product.”87 
Further, rather than selling gas to an independent manufacturer like Cabot, company 
officials eventually decided that it would be “best” for the AIOC to own and operate their 
own carbon black facility in Iran, paying Cabot for their designs and expertise.88 While 
there was some concern within Cabot that their marketing of carbon black produced by 
the AIOC would run afoul of the company’s sale quota under the Webb-Pomerene Act—
 
84 Memorandum from D.G. Smith, “Carbon Black,” no document number, 16 February 1944, p. 1, 
Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
85 Telegram to Jackson, No. 64, 17 & 18 July 1944, p. 2, Utilisation of Natural Gas (44113), BP Archive, 
University of Warwick. 
86 Letter from B.R. Jackson to J.A. Jameson, “Carbon Black,” 3-MH/1647, 25 February 1944, Utilisation of 
Natural Gas. 
87 Memorandum from D.G. Smith, “Carbon Black,” no document number, 3 April 1944, Utilisation of 
Natural Gas. 
88 Telegram from Jameson to B.R. Jackson, No. 2, 3 May 1944, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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a 1918 American law exempting some goods and their export associations from antitrust 
regulations—and that their profits might be diminished should they be forced to reduce 
their own production, Cabot declared to the AIOC if the company “could be assured of a 
modest profit” they “would be satisfied.”89 
 The enquiries of the Cabot Company and others like it into the possibility of 
establishing a carbon black manufactory in Iran highlighted the importance of geography 
and geology to any efforts to use Iranian gas. One interested party, a company named 
P.A.W., saw gas as being easier to transport than carbon black itself, and suggested 
piping natural gas directly from the Pāzanān (Pazanun) oil field to a carbon black plant to 
be erected in the port city of Māhshur (today Bandar-e Māhshahr).90 The AIOC 
considered the proposal to be feasible should a “suitable location on [a] level site” be 
found “near deep water loading” at the port.91 Better still, the AIOC determined, 
considering the length of time it would take to build a pipeline and carbon black plant, 
would be to wait for gas to become available at Āghā Jāri “where additional advantage 
would exist in that multi-stage separation [of gas from oil] would facilitate selection of 
the most suitable gas.”92 This course of action was complicated, however, by shifts in the 
project’s urgency. Though the production of carbon black in Iran had originally been 
conceived as a post-war project due to existing stockpiles being considered sufficient, the 
U.K. War Production Department soon deemed the potential shortage far more pressing 
 
89 Telegram to Jackson, No. 64, 17 & 18 July 1944, p. 1-3, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
90 Telegram from B.R. Jackson to Jameson, No. 90, 18 May 1944, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
91 Telegram from B.R. Jackson, No. 22, 1 June 1944, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
92 Telegram from B.R. Jackson to Jameson, No. 26, 10 June 1944, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
64 
and asked that the establishment of plants be considered in Russia and Iran due to their 
large reserves of natural gas.93 If carbon black production was to thus begin in Iran, it 
became critical to choose between using the gas currently being vented into the 
atmosphere at Pāzanān or the delayed but ultimately more controlled option of processed 
natural gas from Āghā Jāri. 
The significance of being able to choose “suitable gas” lay in the need to avoid 
high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide—H2S—in any gas used to produce carbon black. 
Formed by the decay of organic matter in oxygen-free environments and smelling 
strongly of spoiled eggs, hydrogen sulfide is an extremely toxic, corrosive, and 
flammable gas that occurs in varying quantities as part of petroleum and natural gas. 
Natural gas bearing high amounts of hydrogen sulfide, so-called “sour” gas, was 
potentially damaging to piping and other equipment, and waste gases from carbon black 
plants using such gas would contain much higher concentrations of polluting and 
hazardous sulfur oxides.94 AIOC officials considered it ideal that any gas used for carbon 
black manufacture contain at most 0.1 percent H2S content by volume, an amount few 
Iranian sources of gas could meet naturally. They expressed frequent concern over the 
hydrogen sulfide content of available gas, and produced numerous reports on the 
compositions of various gas sources were communicated. Levels varied significantly 
between fields, sometimes even between gas produced in association with crude oil and 
that trapped within gas domes. At Masjid-i Sulaymān, associated gas was eleven percent 
93 Telegram to Jackson, No. 7, 30 May 1944, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
94 See I. Drogin, “Carbon Black,” Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association, vol. 18, no. 4 (1968): 
216-228 for a general discussion of carbon black manufacturing techniques.
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hydrogen sulfide and dome gas four percent, while at White Oil Springs both sources 
contained almost no H2S at all.
95 Pāzanān’s hydrogen sulfide levels were measured as 
0.024 and 0.046 percent at two separate well heads, well within the requirements for 
carbon black production.96 Āghā Jāri, however, posed a significant problem for the 
envisioned carbon black scheme, for its hydrogen sulfide content was measured to be 
0.29 percent, far higher than the desired level of 0.1 percent.97 Any gas produced at Āghā 
Jāri would thus need to be desulfurized, and within the AIOC there continued to be 
extensive debate as to which source of gas—Āghā Jāri or Pāzanān—was preferable. 
 While sending Pāzanān gas to a carbon black manufactory at Māhshur was 
seriously considered, by the summer of 1945 it had been decided that the proper course of 
action would be to site the new plant at Āghā Jāri and wait for the necessary gas 
treatment facilities to be constructed as well. Not only was Māhshur “very well inside the 
dust nuisance area of the Persian Gulf,” but also construction of the plant at Āghā Jāri, to 
be manned by a staff of six British managers and 70 to 80 “native staff,” would require 
significantly less capital outlay. AIOC officials argued that 
 
on the assumption that the railway from Agha Jari to Mashur is definitely going ahead, 
and will, presumably, be completed before the Carbon Black Plant could be operating, 
the Agha Jari proposal would eliminate 40 miles of 12” pipe at an approximate cost of 
£200,000, against which provision would have to be made for 30 trucks and 1 locomotive 
to be added to the railway rolling stock at a cost of about £25,000.98 
 
95 Memorandum from D. Comins to C.A. Harrison, “Potential Gas Supplies in Iran for Carbon Black 
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Beyond the ability to piggyback on already-planned infrastructure, the physical proximity 
of a plant to the Āghā Jāri field would allow any new carbon black plant to gain further 
efficiency by utilizing the natural pressurization of gas lying deep beneath the earth. A 
“site adjacent to the source of the gas supply,” it was noted, “would enable us to utilise 
the gas pressure for power generation in accordance to our usual practice.”99 Despite the 
added benefit of inexpensive power generation, the high sulfur content of the gas at Āghā 
Jāri continued to bedevil AIOC plans for a carbon black plant. In May 1946 it was 
reported that any gas used had “to be reasonably sulphur-free, at…0.03% hydrogen 
sulphide,” a level even lower than the 0.1 percent expressed in prior years. Nor was 
hydrogen sulfide the only contaminant of concern; carbon dioxide levels, particularly in 
“relative proportion” to hydrogen sulfide, were not only significant but also difficult to 
accurately measure. In any case, while it was expected that any carbon black plant could 
be “built on conventional lines,” the “matter of gas desulphurization” continued to need 
“special investigation both technically and economically.”100 
 In the end, the AIOC never did elect to go ahead with the construction of a carbon 
black plant in Iran. Despite a continual need to find avenues for the “disposal of Fields 
gas,” by the summer of 1947 it was decided that a “shortage of steel, dollars and 
construction capacity in Persia would weigh against the installation of carbon black 
 
99 Memorandum from H.W. Lane, “Carbon Black Plant,” no document number, 10 August 1945, 
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manufacturing in Iran in the immediate future.”101 More importantly, however, the 
construction of the plant was seen as largely superfluous to the production and export of 
oil, the primary task of the AIOC. “With the very large programme [for oil production] 
we have in front us,” F.G.C. Morris, a managing director for the Company, wrote, “we 
should not want, from the commercial standpoint alone, to divert time and effort to the 
construction of a carbon black plant.” It was only for “concessional reasons, relative to 
the use of gas,” or for “reason of [British] national need,” that the manufacture of carbon 
black should be considered.102 A final decision was made in the spring of 1949 when it 
was decided that considering the “grave limitations on the supplies of iron and steel and 
other raw materials” as well as the shortage of “technical personnel,” the Company’s 
“materials and manpower are best concentrated on oil projects which are more profitable 
and more important.” Thus, despite the fact that the 
large-scale production of chemicals and carbon black has, from time to time, been 
considered by the Company, but at present it appears best from the Company’s point of 
view, and, indeed, from a [British] National point of view, that the main objective of the 
Company should be the production, refining and transport of more oil.103 
Combined with enduring “uncertainty regarding the Company’s concessionary position 
in the case of the export of chemicals,” the pursuit of carbon black was seen as both 
superfluous and damaging to the AIOC’s pursuit of its primary mission.104 Manifested 
101 Memorandum from J.M. Pattinson to F.G.C. Morris, “Carbon Black,” no document number, 16 June 
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through the consideration and ultimate rejection of the production of carbon black in Iran 
was the AIOC’s fundamental position regarding Iranian natural gas: that AIOC and 
British national interests would dictate the extent to which gas would be utilized. Despite 
its potential use as both a source of energy and as a raw material for the petrochemical 
industry, Iranian natural gas was seen as a distraction and a potential drain on resources 
more profitably, and importantly, dedicated to the production and export of oil. 
Regardless of the fact that enormous quantities of Iran’s natural resources were being 
lost, the AIOC would only consider utilizing gas in circumstances where they could be 
assured both profit and a minimum of disruption to existing plans. Far from being 
confined to the use of gas for the manufacture of carbon black or petrochemicals more 
generally, the AIOC’s subordination of natural gas use to other concerns would strongly 




 Employees of firms like Cabot and Anglo-Iranian were not the only ones 
evaluating potential uses for Iran’s gas in the years after the Second World War. 
Beginning shortly after the end of the war and continuing for many years, officials of the 
Iranian government sought to apply sustained pressure to the AIOC in order to prompt 
them to find productive outlets for the gas they produced. Going far beyond a narrow 
focus on the production of petrochemicals, Iranian officials sought to quickly leverage 
natural gas in any feasible manner. In February 1946, representatives from the Iranian 
Ministry of Finance wrote to the AIOC to ask that the company begin work to make gas 
utilization a reality, prompted by a missive from the Irrigation Company of Shushtar that 
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described a scheme whereby the company was “prepared to defray the expenses of laying 
a pipe for the conveyance of oil gases from M.I.S. to Shushtar, so that they may be used 
as fuel for the inhabitant instead of being wasted.” The letter went on to address the 
utilization of Iranian gas more broadly, saying that  
 
now that the war has been finished, the utilization of oil gases should, in principle, be 
exposed to quick and fundamental investigations and measures. These gases may be 
conveyed by pipes to neighbouring towns to be used as fuel by the inhabitants, or they 
may be used in the localities of origin for the generation of electric power, which could 
be conveyed to the neighbouring cities and boroughs. Finally and alternatively, the gases 
may be returned to the oil wells.105 
 
Asking that a “committee of experts…study the matter,” the Iranian Ministry of Finance 
made it clear that finding ways to use or preserve Iran’s natural gas was an important 
national objective for the country’s postwar years. 
 The centrality of natural gas to official Iranian thinking was reinforced by 
consultants hired to formulate and recommend courses of action for Iran’s national 
development. In the summer of 1947, the Morrison-Knudsen International Company 
submitted its Report on Program for the Development of Iran, a 320-page account of the 
“resources and facilities of Iran” as well as recommendations for the “practical, orderly 
procedure toward improvement and development” of the country.106 An American civil 
engineering and construction company with experience working on projects like the 
Hoover Dam and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, Morrison-Knudsen had been 
contracted by the Iranian government in December 1946 to quickly investigate and draw 
 
105 Letter from Moosa Sheybani of Ministry of Finance to A.I.O.C. 44113), BP Archive, University of 
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106 International Engineering Company, Morrison-Knudsen International Company, Inc., Report on 
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up projects for potential funding from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.107 In total the company submitted an estimated $1,250,000,000 worth of 
development programs, an amount they “deemed sufficient for the present.”108 Sensitive 
to the financial realities that faced the Iranian government and their need to finance the 
projects via loans, however, the company also submitted two variations that costed 
$500,000,000 and $250,000,000 respectively. All three of Morrison-Knudsen’s proposed 
programs touched upon nearly every aspect of Iranian society, from agriculture and 
industry to communications, transportation, and education. Crucial to their vision was the 
provision of “more and cheaper” fuel within Iran, necessary to “stimulate its industries 
and promote the comfort and health” of Iranians. In the late 1940s, Iranian industry 
largely used coal, a resource in short supply in the country, or oil, a comparatively 
expensive fuel. Most individual residents used “straw, weeds, or animal dung” due to a 
scarcity of wood in most regions and an inability to afford the relatively expensive fossil 
fuels.109 While Morrison-Knudsen proposed reducing the cost of oil fuels by largely 
replacing the existing system of rail transport between Iran’s southern fields and its major 
population centers farther north with a system of oil pipelines,110 they deemed the most 
potential as laying within Iran’s natural gas reserves.  
 
107 F. Daftary, “Barnāma-Rīzī, Encyclopaedia Iranica, III/8, p. 809-814; available online at 
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As was already well-understood by the Iranian government, some 120,000,000 
cubic feet of gas was being produced every day in Iran “coincident with and inseparable 
from the production of petroleum.”111 Because “natural gas produced in Iran must be 
used in Iran or wasted,” meaning that it could not be “stored or shipped elsewhere,” 
continuing to rely on oil fuels instead of the available gas would make the country’s fuel 
supply more costly, as the “true cost of the fuel will be the cost of the oil plus the value of 
the equivalent amount of natural gas wasted.”112 Iranian gas, highly variable in terms of 
its hydrogen sulfide content, had previously been thought of little value due to the 
difficulty of purifying it economically. New purification processes, however, had 
changed the equation, and the experience of the United States had shown that long-
distance, high-pressure pipelines could deliver gas at competitive rates to consumers.113 
Morrison-Knudsen thus envisioned a $70.83 million system that, fifteen years in the 
future, would serve some 2 million people by producing, purifying, and transporting 
approximately 118,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day. Collected in the oil fields of 
Khuzestān, the gas would be purified close to the point of extraction before being 
injected into pipelines running to cities like Dezful, Ārāk, Qom, Tehran, Isfahan, and 
Shiraz.114 Though an actual system of natural gas fuel would require the construction of 
pipe distribution systems in Iran’s cities and the provision of gas appliances to 
consumers, Morrison-Knudsen argued that gas and the infrastructures used to move it 
111 Ibid., 247. 
112 Ibid., 245. 
113 Ibid., 247. 
114 Ibid., 247. 
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would be a “tremendous stimulus to [Iranian] industry, and to the improvement of living 
conditions of a large part of the population.” 115 
Morrison-Knudsen’s program was adapted and adopted by the Iranian 
government, forming the basis of the country’s First Seven-Year Development Plan, 
ratified by the Majlis in February 1949. Though the entirety of Iran’s oil revenues was 
earmarked in support of the program, the first plan was largely derailed by the need to 
establish and staff the Plan Organization, the independent government department 
charged with overseeing Iran’s developmental programs, and the crisis sparked by 
Muhammad Mossadeq’s oil industry nationalization in 1951.116 Despite this turn of 
events, the general contours of the natural gas system sketched out by Morrison-Knudsen 
would endure over the following decades, sustained by continued interest in the large-
scale exploitation of natural gas by Iranian government officials. 
Supported by the findings of consultants like Morrison-Knudsen, the Iranian 
government pressured Anglo-Iranian to facilitate an effort to exploit the associated gas 
that the company was producing. Anglo-Iranian officials felt that pressure and worked to 
resist it by emphasizing, sometimes to the point of distortion, both the ways that the 
AIOC was already making use of gas and what they understood to be the uneconomical 
nature of many Iranian hopes. Noting Morrison-Knudsen’s recommendation for a cross-
country natural gas system in Iran, AIOC officials became concerned about their ability 
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to avoid costly gas projects over the long term. Writing in September 1947, a Company 
official worried that the  
demand for a supply of gas for industrial and domestic uses in various towns in Iran will 
obviously become more insistent as time goes on. Although we many hold the view that 
practical issues concerning the distribution of gas in the towns and its safe use by 
domestic consumers render the use of gas on a scale which would justify the piped supply 
extremely doubtful, it will be difficult to continue to ignore such demands on these 
grounds without practical experience to back up our arguments.117 
Such projects, if undertaken, would likely be costly for the AIOC, as the 
laying of trunk gas lines would be an expensive matter and one which would be 
undertaken without the assurance of a substantial gas market; it is unlikely that the 
Company would be able to avoid incurring expenditure in connection with them in some 
form or another.118 
In response to this dilemma, AIOC officials considered undertaking a small and 
carefully selected project of consumer gas distribution in order to obtain the “practical 
experience” necessary to argue against larger programs in the future. Proposed was a 
project to supply gas to Ahvāz, a large town some forty miles from the Anglo-Iranian-
operated White Oil Springs field. In September 1947 it was expected that soon 
approximately 200 million cubic feet of gas would be produced per day in the field, most 
of which would be burned in flares large enough to be visible from the city.119 A plan to 
supply Ahvāz was attractive to AIOC officials, as there was the possibility of 
piggybacking off a gas pipeline already being considered for the company’s own needs at 
117 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to I.M. Jones, “Supply of Gas to Ahwaz Town,” D.O. No. 18, 26 September 
1947, p. 1, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
118 Ibid. 1, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
119 Note to Mr. Rice, Mr. Elkington, and Mr. Gass, no document number, 24 September 1947, Iran – 
Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
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Kut Abdullah, and it was felt that consumption in Ahvāz could be “accommodated in the 
line without [further] capital expenditure.”120 The great difficulty of the proposal, 
however, was building a distribution network. There was a great deal of uncertainty in 
even so basic a question as the number of potential consumers let alone what would 
actually be required in order convert existing facilities to use gas.121 Despite the proposal 
being revived in November 1950,122 it was never implemented and Ahvāz would not see 
gas service until the early 1970s. 
Despite such resistance from Anglo-Iranian, the Iranian government continued to 
apply pressure to the company and it, in turn, sought ways to best resist such efforts. In 
the summer of 1948, in response to further enquiries from the Iranian government 
regarding the production of natural gas and “instances of gas being utilised by [the] 
Company’s installations and the amount utilised,” AIOC officials discussed how to best 
frame their responses.123 At issue were so-called “flow sheets,” detailed accountings of 
field and separator gas production at various pressures and the ultimate utilization or 
disposal of the gas as it flowed through the production and refining facilities.124 While the 
Company could submit flow sheets to the Iranian government in response to their 
 
120 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to I.M. Jones, “Supply of Gas to Ahwaz Town,” 1. 
121 Ibid., 2. 
122 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to L.C. Rice, “Cement Manufacture and Gas Distribution in Iran,” no 
document number, 23 November 1950, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of 
Gas. 
123 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry,” HWL/370, 4 June 1948, 
Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
124 For examples see the attached flow sheets to Memorandum from Waters to Lane, “Natural Gas-Iranian 
Government Enquiry,” DC/JFW/605, 1 June 1948, Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
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requests, it was feared that they were “very difficult to understand and would…only lead 
to further enquiries,” something that employees of the AIOC sought to avoid.125 
Preferable in their opinion was to report “instances of utilisation in a generalised form,” 
an approach that would enable both narrow interpretations of the Iranian enquiries and 
the opportunity to rectify any disagreements in the data submitted. In June 1948, for 
example, an AIOC employee noted in his report on gas utilization that “dome gas 
production has been excluded as not coming within the scope of the enquiry as worded” 
and that 
 
tail gas…[like that from the] topping and skimming plants at M.I.S. has also been 
excluded. This gas was excluded from previous returns to the Iranian Government. Such 
returns were submitted from 1934 to 1940 inclusive, and care has been taken to ensure 
agreement between the figures now given and those previously submitted.126 
 
In the end, flow diagrams were indeed withheld and AIOC officials instead quoted 
figures for the “actual utilisation consumptions,” opting to manipulate the flow of 
information in an effort to manage the potential responses of the Iranian government.127 
Anglo-Iranian’s effort to both control access to information regarding the amounts 
of gas produced and consumed and head off further enquiries from the Iranian 
government was part of a larger effort on the part of the AIOC to portray the company as 
utilizing Iranian natural gas to the greatest reasonable extent. The same company officials 
wrote that it “should be appreciated that the method of multistage gas separation and 
 
125 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry – Natural Gas,” 1. 
126 Memorandum from Waters to Lane, “Natural Gas-Iranian Government Enquiry,” DC/JFW/605, 1 June 
1948, Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
127 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry – Natural Gas,” 1. 
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crude stabilisation employed in our high pressure fields”—a process developed by the 
AIOC in the Haft Kel oil field whereby the hydrocarbon gases dissolved in crude oil were 
released in a staged and controlled manner in order to increase the amount of recoverable 
natural gasoline128—“substantially reduced the amount of gas actually produced in these 
fields and thus constitutes indirectly a utilisation of the gas contained in the crude.”129 
This form of conservation was one rooted both in the geology of petroleum fields and the 
choices that Anglo-Iranian officials made when lifting oil to the surface. While the 
significant volumes of gas dissolved within the oil of petroleum reservoirs are 
unavoidably extracted alongside any produced oil, non-dissolved natural gas can also be 
lifted if aggressive production practices are employed. In the postwar years, those 
aggressive practices involved the lifting of dome gas by producing too near the gas-oil 
line, and, more significantly for AIOC operations, “flowing wells at such a rate that gas is 
produced from produced reservoir crude [sic], resulting in a loss of natural energy and 
possibly of ultimate recovery.”130 For oil to be lifted from underground reservoirs there 
must be a significant difference in pressure at the surface and within a reservoir, a 
pressure differential tied directly to the amount of natural gas residing within the 
reservoir both in solution and within the gas dome. In other words, in gas-driven oil 
wells, production is dependent on gas remaining within the ground as it is the motivating 
force that drives oil up well shafts. By tapping reservoirs too near the oil-gas line or 
128 H.S. Gibson, “Multistage Stabilization of Crude,” Transactions of the AIME, vol. 136, no. 1 (December 
1940): 25-36. 
129 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry – Natural Gas,” 3. 
130 Letter from J.F. Waters to Gass, no document number, 25 August 1948, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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producing oil at too quick a rate, more natural gas is brought to the surface than is 
necessary to move the oil to the surface, thereby, over the long term, reducing the amount 
of oil that can be recovered from the field. In light of this, Anglo-Iranian had often 
chosen to produce oil at a more measured pace, opting to preserve the ability to produce 
oil over longer periods of time in place of greater short-term productivity.131 
 The choice to use production practices in Iranian oil fields that improved the long-
term productive health of the reservoirs was something repeatedly highlighted within 
AIOC correspondence. Company employees reported that by 
 
virtue of our producing practice, both in regard to reservoir control and in regard to 
individual wells, producing gas oil ratios never exceed the gas originally in solution in 
the crude actually produced, in contradistinction to the majority of oil fields where 
producing gas oil ratios are greatly in excess of such dissolved gas.132 
 
“This in itself may be claimed to be a measure of gas conservation,” they wrote, as it 
“follows from this that when the bulk of the recoverable crude reserves have been 
produced, the bulk of the gas reservoirs will remain.”133 Indeed, Anglo-Iranian officials 
reported that in 1947 the multistage gas separation and stabilization process resulted in 
some 5,000 million cubic feet of associated gas, approximately 14 percent of the 
otherwise expected total of 35,668 million cubic feet, remaining unproduced at Masjid-e 
Sulaymān and Haft Kel. A further 12,748.26 million cubic feet of gas, roughly 36 
percent, was used by the AIOC for a combination of refinery operations, “industrial fuel” 
 
131 Letter from J.F. Waters to Gass, no document number, 25 August 1948, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
132 Letter from D. Comins to Gass, “Iran Gas Position,” DC/676, 6 August 1948, p. 1, Iran – Cement 
Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
133 Ibid., 1-2. 
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(electricity generation, furnaces, etc.) and “domestic uses” (including fuel for “heating, 
cooling, cooking” and more) at the two fields, leaving nearly 18,000 million cubic feet of 
produced gas unused. This was a narrow perspective, however, as Masjid-e Sulaymān 
and Heft Kel were not the only operating oil fields being operated by the AIOC in 1947, 
and in 1947 the company produced another 49,410 million cubic feet of natural gas at 
Naft Sefid (3,965 million cubic feet), Gachsārān (6,587 million cubic feet), and Āghā Jāri 
(38,858 million cubic feet). None of the gas produced at the latter three fields was put to 
productive use, meaning that some 67,329 million cubic feet of natural gas, 
approximately 84 percent of the total, was flared or vented to the atmosphere for no 
economic gain. In their reporting to the Iranian government, AIOC officials sought to 
downplay the fact that so much unutilized gas had been produced, writing that since  the 
“Agha Jari, Gach Saran, and Naft Safid oilfields are still in the course of development, 
figures given for utilisation of gas would only be misleading.”134 
AIOC officials were well aware of just what was being lost when such gas was 
not put to use. “Surplus gas production…[at] Agha Jari burnt to waste during 1947 could 
have replaced Abadan’s liquid fuel consumption more than twice over,” Comins wrote, 
“490,241 tons [of liquid fuel] which could have been replaced by 50 m.c.ft/day of gas.” 
Looking beyond the petroleum industry, he also noted that the “Karun [River] mean 
annual flow [of] about 25,000 million tons [of water],” an important part of an ongoing 
irrigation project, “could be lifted 50 feet by utilising about half a million tons/year (50 to 
 
134 Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry – Natural Gas,” 2-3. 
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60 m.c.ft/day) of surplus gas production, now burnt to waste.”135 For AIOC officials, 
more important than finding uses for the associated gas they were producing was 
resisting the pressure the Iranian government was applying. Motivated by concerns 
regarding costs and resource allocation, AIOC officials framed facts and figures of gas 
production and exploitation in such a manner as to paint Anglo-Iranian as having made 
reasonable efforts to use as much natural gas as was technically and economically 
feasible.136 In this way, the fundamentally business choices that were made in the halls of 
Britannic House and the managerial offices of Ābādān were imbued with the seeming 
concreteness of fact while being nonetheless deeply reflective of the commercial 
priorities of the company. In viewing natural gas largely through the lens of oil 
extraction, AIOC managers subordinated it to oil and obscured its distinct economic 
potential for Iran. In their view, gas was a marginally useful byproduct of the operations 
undertaken in support of the company’s central oil export mission, an understanding that 
rendered gas functionally invisible. Far from incidental, this deliberate unseeing of gas 
was crucial to maintaining the low overhead costs needed to furnish cheap oil to foreign 
markets. Company managers were theoretically amenable to the idea of gas utilization 
with Iran, but only so long as it asked nothing of their company and its customers. 
135 Memorandum from D. Comins to Jameson, “Your Enquiries re Iran Gas and Karun Irrigation,” DC/636, 
22 June 1948, Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
136 This was a common feature of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s interactions with the Iranian 
government throughout the company’s involvement in the country. Over the years, formulae were devised, 
figures massaged, and account books guarded in order to provide as much advantage as possible to the 
company in both its negotiations with the Iranian government and the splitting of revenue from the sale of 
Iran’s oil. For more see Katayoun Shafiee’s Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural History of BP in Iran 





 Despite the resistance of Anglo-Iranian to an increased utilization of natural gas, 
the Iranian government maintained a steady commitment to the prospect. In August 1948, 
the Iranian Minister of Finance wrote to the AIOC, saying that an inspector they had 
dispatched to study the question of gas utilization in Khuzestān had submitted a report on 
the potential use of gas in Ābādān. In his work the inspector found that the characteristics 
of Āghā Jāri’s gas rendered it particularly suitable for transportation to Ābādān for use as 
fuel and, crucially, the natural pressures found in the reservoir were sufficiently high to 
be able move it via pipeline to Ābādān without the added expense of building and 
maintaining compressors along the line. The gas was of very high quality as it contained 
an extremely low percentage of sulfur, enabling the gas to be purified at relatively little 
expense. All told, the inspector estimated that the city could be supplied with some 48 
million cubic feet of gas, an amount roughly equal to 475,000 tons of oil fuel per year. 
More importantly, he saw the project as being an easy one to implement in ways that 
went beyond the characteristics of the gas itself. While the distance between Āghā Jāri 
and Ābādān was nearly 100 miles, itself not a terribly long way in the inspector’s 
opinion, the 12-inch gas pipeline would run through a region “where no natural obstacles 
exist” and could follow the existing track that had already been laid for oil pipes.137 
 In light of the inspector’s findings, the Ministry of Finance declared that because 
the “scheme seems practicable and useful…it is appropriate that you [the AIOC] should 
 
137 Letter from Pir Nia for the Minister of Finance to A.I.O.C. Ltd, [Translated by AIOC], No. 3/29328, 22 
August 1948, p. 1, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
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study it as soon as possible.”138 The Ministry of Finance buttressed their request by 
referring to two articles of the 1933 concession agreement between Iran and the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. In particular, Article 12 of the concession agreement stated that 
 
the Company [AIOC]…shall employ all means customary and proper, to ensure economy 
in and good returns from its operations, preserve the deposits of petroleum and to exploit 
its Concession by methods in accordance with the latest scientific progress.139 
 
Reinforcing their position, the Ministry also referred to Article 16 wherein the two parties 
had agreed to maintain the “highest degree of efficiency and of economy in the 
administration and operation of the Company in Persia.”140 In invoking the concession 
agreement in this way, the Iranian government underlined the commitment that the AIOC 
had made to both exploit and preserve Iran’s petroleum, a resource defined as “crude oil, 
natural gases, asphalt, ozokerite” and any products derived from them,141 seeking to 
pressure the company into finding ways to exploit the large volumes of associated gas 
they were producing and wasting. 
 As it was, the AIOC had already considered using gas from Āghā Jāri at the 
Ābādān refinery. In October 1946 the company’s refinery division reported that Ābādān 
required more fuel than was available from excess gas separated at the refinery, a need 
that was being met via the use of fuel oil. Motivating the AIOC’s consideration of the 
 
138 Ibid., 2. 
139 “Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Article 12, paragraph A. 
140 “Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Article 12, paragraph I. 
141 “Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Definitions-“Petroleum.” 
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prospect was the potential to put the fuel oil then being used in the Ābādān refinery’s 
operations for sale on the market.142 With Ābādān’s liquid fuel consumption having 
nearly quadrupled between 1938 and 1947,143 AIOC officials estimated that by 1952 the 
refinery would be consuming some 600,000 tons of fuel oil per year, an amount they 
estimated could be replaced by 60 million cubic feet of gas per day. Nor were these 
calculations entirely theoretical. In December 1950, in response to queries regarding the 
actual need for increased fuel oil on the market, AIOC officials reported that the “oil is 
wanted” and that “indications are that we shall be very tight on Fuel Oil throughout 1951 
and we are, in fact, at the present time having to decline business.”144 This was an 
important point, for the ability of Anglo-Iranian to sell more oil was crucial to their 
willingness to truly consider the project. 
In the spring of 1948, approval was given to build a gas dehydration plant in order 
to test the best methods for supplying gas from Āghā Jāri to Ābādān. Questions 
nonetheless remained about where such a plant might find real use. The Iranian 
government had suggested placing it the Naft Sefid field in order to supply gas to Kut 
Abdullāh, Ahvāz, and Bibiān, but the AIOC deemed those sites to either require too little 
gas or require more steel than was available.145 Indeed, the major limit on the proposal 
142 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to A.C. Hartley, “Gas Utilisation,” no document number, 25 October 1946, 
Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
143 Letter from J.M. Pattinson to Chairman, “Gas Supply for Abadan Refinery,” no document number, 4 
October 1948, attached “Abadan Fuel Consumption” chart, 1 October 1948, Iran – Cement Manufacture 
and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
144 Letter from Snow to J.M. Pattinson, “Increased Fuel Oil Supplies,” no document number, 21 December 
1950, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas. 
145 Letter from Lane to J.M. Pattinson, “Gas Dehydration,” HWL/316, 31 March 1948, Production 15th 
January 1946 to 15th September 1948. 
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was not debates over siting or feasibility, but an insufficient supply of material. Though 
the company reported in late 1948 that it was indeed possible to deliver gas to Ābādān via 
a 12-inch pipe, and further claimed that “Southern Area development schemes have 
always included a gas line to Abadan to supply works fuel,” it also took the position that 
due to an insufficient supply of line pipe the project could not be completed before the 
early 1950s.146 Company officials, at a meeting with representatives of the Iranian 
government in October 1948, nonetheless informed their counterparts that the refinery 
was “perhaps the best outlet” for gas, and while there were as yet no concrete plans due 
to the “shortage of steel and the question of making the most advantageous use of such 
steel as we can get,” had “admitted…agreement in principle to establishing a scheme for 
this in due time.”147 As it was, line pipe needed to be shipped from the U.K. where 
production was “limited by availability of steel supplies and manufacturing capacity.”148 
Despite AIOC officials believing that the pipeline would be completed by the 
close of 1950,149 and continued pressure from the Iranian government to not only use gas 
in the refinery but to also supply Ābādān and other nearby cities via the same pipeline,150 
the project never came to fruition. By December 1950 the proposal to build a new gas 
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line from Āghā Jāri to Ābādān was largely shelved in favor of modifying existing oil 
pipelines to also be able to carry natural gas.151 Further, with the onset of the 1951-1953 
Iranian oil nationalization crisis, all mention the of project ceased. Crucial to this episode, 
however, was not whether a line between Āghā Jāri and Ābādān was ever built, but the 
fundamental orientations of the Iranian government and the AIOC towards Iran’s natural 
gas resources that were reflected in their respective positions. For the Iranian 
government, the gas that was being produced in the Khuzestān fields had intrinsic value 
that was being wasted. Officials like those working within the Ministry of Finance thus 
sought to pressure Anglo-Iranian to find productive outlets for what they considered to be 
an important national resource. The AIOC, in turn, while never disputing the idea that 
Iran’s natural gas possessed value, continued to prioritize the functioning of its oil export 
operations. In the view of company officials, replacing fuel oil consumption with gas at 
the Ābādān refinery was worthwhile only in that it enabled the company to accept and 
meet the demands of greater business opportunities. The reluctance of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company to embrace fully the exploitation of gas would strongly shape the history of 
gas in Iran, compelling Iranian officials to assume responsibility for exploitation of their 
country’s natural gas and, in the process, helping to imbue the resource with notions of 
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Far from marking an end to the issue of Iranian gas utilization, the 1950s were a 
crucial moment of conception for it as broader developments shook the country’s 
political structures and relationships with the outside world. In the late 1940s a coalition 
of diverse political groups known as the National Front was formed under the leadership 
of Muhammad Mosaddeq, a politician of considerable tenure and experience. United by 
an opposition to foreign influence within Iran, the group focused its efforts on the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company and its control of the country’s petroleum resources. Despite taking 
considerable profits from its operations in Iran, over the years the AIOC had consistently 
failed to live up to its revenue-sharing agreements with the Iranian government and 
subjected Iranian workers to low wages and poor working conditions. Rather than reform, 
the National Front sought the wholesale nationalization of the Iranian oil industry as a 
means of asserting the country’s independence, an articulation of economic nationalism 
that reflected deep roots of opposition to foreign economic intervention going back to the 
Qājār era. 
Beginning with the 1813 Treaty of Gulistān that ended the first Russo-Persian 
War, the nineteenth century saw the increasingly active efforts of the Russian and British 
empires to shape Iranian affairs for their own respective advantages. By the last quarter 
of the century, many Iranians had begun to mount increasingly fierce resistance to the 
state of affairs, notching a notable success in 1873 when Nāser al-Din Shah rescinded the 
concession he had granted to the British businessman Julius de Reuter that had given him 
permission to build a railway between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf as well as a 
seventy-year monopoly on all resource extraction in the country. More significant was 
the Tobacco Protest, in which a broad swath of Iranian society came together in 1890 to 
86 
 
oppose the granting of a monopoly concession to another British businessman, Gerald 
Talbot, for the production, sale, and export of tobacco. Though the economic significance 
of the tobacco concession was likely to be far less than that granted to Reuters nearly two 
decades prior, it both threatened a significant source of income for a great number of 
Iranian landowners, farmers, and shopkeepers and wrested away control of a product that 
many Iranians enjoyed in their daily lives. In response to a national boycott of tobacco 
that was incited by a fatwa declaring tobacco consumption unlawful so long as its 
production was controlled by outsiders, the concession was eventually rescinded in early 
1892, an outcome that cheered its opponents but left the Iranian government in 
considerable debt to Talbot. 
Much more than the earlier resistance to the Reuters concession, the Tobacco 
Protest helped spur notions of economic nationalism broadly within Iran. During the 
period, many Iranians began to view the presence foreign businessmen and the increasing 
exposure of the Iranian economy to the global marketplace as dire threats to the country’s 
independence. Among the many opponents of the concessions, Iran was seen to be on the 
losing end of a series of unequal relationships that promised a seemingly unending period 
of exploitation and weakness. Responding to the continued granting of sizeable 
concessions by the Qājār kings in the years after the Tobacco Protest, particularly the 
D’Arcy oil concession, sentiments of economic nationalism helped spur the 1905 
Constitutional Revolution and its demand for the curtailment of the power of Iran’s 
monarchs to make concessionary agreements. Ironically, the revolution’s turmoil and the 
considerable weakening of Iran’s central government in its wake opened the door to a 
stronger British and Russian presence and the division of the country into their respective 
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spheres of influence in 1907. Though Iranians were not united in opposition to a foreign 
presence in the country—at least some saw deepened relationships with foreign powers 
as helping Iran modernize and develop in much needed ways—such events helped 
cement the importance of economic nationalism in Iranian politics. Despite rising to 
power with at least the tacit acceptance of the British Empire, in 1932 Rezā Shah 
unilaterally canceled and sought to renegotiate the original D’Arcy concession, aiming to 
extract a greater share of the profits from the APOC. Negotiating from a position of 
weakness, however, Iranian officials only managed to raise their country’s share of the 
profits from 16 to 20 percent in return for a 32-year extension of the concession to 1961. 
Rezā Shah’s focus on petroleum would prove to be no aberration and in later decades 
foreign control of the lucrative sector would continue to be a focal point of the desire of 
many Iranians to break free of outside influence.152 
With the forced abdication of Rezā Shah in 1941 in the wake of a combined 
British and Soviet invasion of the country, Muhammad Rezā Shah ascended to the 
throne. Perceived as weak and inexperienced, the early years of Muhammad Rezā Shah’s 
reign were marked by considerable political turmoil and a gradual strengthening of forces 
advocating for domestic control of Iran’s natural resources. With such demands 
intensifying and the National Front becoming the predominant bloc in parliament, in 
April 1951 the Shah named Mosaddeq to the position of Prime Minister. A bill 
nationalizing Iran’s oil industry was then promptly passed and reluctantly signed by the 
 
152 For more on how Iran’s history with economic nationalism continues to influence the country’s politics 
today see Evaleila Pesaran’s Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-Reform in 
the Post-Revolutionary Era (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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king. Enormously popular within Iran, the move initiated a three-year period of conflict 
with the United Kingdom and, eventually, the United States. Treating the Iranian action 
as little better than theft, the British government imposed a series of economic sanctions 
on Iran and prevented the sale of its oil on the world market. Though initially confident in 
the indispensability of Iranian oil, the broad backing for the British boycott among the 
nations of the industrialized world quickly began to cause considerable economic 
difficulty in Iran, weakening Mosaddeq’s support and making him vulnerable to the 
British- and American-backed 1953 coup d’état that would see his fall and the eventual 
investment of considerable autocratic powers in Muhammad Rezā Shah. 
Though the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry failed, in the wake of the crisis 
the 1933 oil agreement signed by Rezā Shah was renegotiated and Iran gained important 
new benefits. The 1954 Consortium Oil Agreement divided control of Iran’s oil industry 
between the newly formed National Iranian Oil Company and a Consortium of firms that 
included the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, renamed British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, 
and a number of smaller American companies. Crucial for Iran was the new 50-50 profit 
sharing arrangement, by then the norm in the Middle East, that took the place of the 
relatively low and easily manipulated per-barrel payments that the AIOC had been 
making to the Iranian government.153 In a significant addition, the new agreement also 
formalized Iran’s ownership over the country’s natural gas reserves and made explicit its 
153 Coming in the wake of a crisis in the early 1930s that had seen the government of Rezā Shah attempt to 
renegotiate the terms of its concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the 1933 Concession Agreement 
had specified that the company’s royalty payments would be tied to the physical volume of oil produced 
and dividends paid to the company’s shareholders. In the following years, the AIOC nonetheless worked to 
keep both their account books closed and the Iranian government ignorant of the precise means by which 
royalty calculations were made. For more see Katayoun Shafiee, Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural 
History of BP in Iran (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018), 104-111. 
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right to both consume and export the resource. With this development, Iranian officials 
quickly began to view gas as a potentially significant resource to be exploited, and by the 
early 1960s had begun to describe expansive programs to do just that. In his opening 
remarks for the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources, 
held in Tehran in early December 1964 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Dr. Alinaghi Alikhāni, the 
Iranian Minister of the Economy, presented natural gas as the region’s great hope for the 
future. Speaking to delegates of the member nations and various inter- and non-
governmental organizations, Alikhāni warned that the booming populations of the 
ECAFE countries meant that the limits of “traditional raw material resources” like fibers, 
rubber, and even food were quickly being reached.154 To surpass those limits, new 
sources of raw materials for industry and energy were needed. In Alikhāni’s view, natural 
gas, heretofore largely unused, was poised to fulfill the ECAFE region’s growing needs. 
Ambitious projects spanning thousands of miles would be needed, but so long as member 
states embraced the “practical solutions” and “regional co-operation” that forums like the 
1964 seminar were intended to promote, then their nascent efforts to exploit the potential 
of natural gas could be maintained and expanded 155 
 That Alikhāni was chosen to give the symposium’s opening remarks was fitting. 
Not only did Iran sit atop some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, but by the mid-
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1960s it also stood on the cusp of launching a series of state-directed modernizing and 
industrializing reforms that could conceivably be powered by the use of natural gas. Iran 
was not alone in seeing great potential in natural gas use, and in the 1960s the ambitions 
of the country’s officials blossomed alongside similar hopes around the world. Driven by 
an explosion in the volume of the world’s proven gas reserves in the four years prior to 
Alikhāni’s speech—from some 660 trillion to 1.6 quadrillion cubic feet, approximately 
two-thirds of which was located in the Middle East156—states around the world began to 
look to natural gas as both a raw material for the petrochemical industry and as a fuel 
source. The 1964 symposium at which Alikhāni spoke itself grew out of a prior meeting 
on petroleum resources that had been hosted in Tehran by the National Iranian Oil 
Company and the Iranian government in September 1962, the first major discussion of 
the issue at the international level.157 There, U Nyun, the Executive Secretary of ECAFE, 
highlighted gas as “increasingly important to several countries of the region,” and over 
fifty papers on the production, storage, transportation, or consumption of natural gas were 
presented by delegations from within the ECAFE region and beyond.158 Participants 
declared that the “new and substantial discoveries of natural gas in the ECAFE region, if 
utilized adequately, would play a vital role in accelerating the economic development in 
 
156 Iranian Delegation, “Discussion Paper on Utilization of Natural Gas and its Allied Products as Raw 
Materials for Fertilizer and Other Chemical Industries,” in Proceedings of the Seminar on the Development 
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York: United Nations, 1965), 350. 
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158 United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, “Report of the Second Symposium on 
the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East,” in Proceedings of the Second 
Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far East, pp. 3-28 (New York: 
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the ECAFE countries,”159 and due to the “extreme importance” of finding ways to exploit 
natural gas, they recommended that the U.N. Secretariat prepare a study of gas resources 
and their potential uses in region, with particular attention given to potential joint 
efforts.160 That work by ECAFE and the U.N. Bureau for Technical Assistance 
Operations would form the basis of the 1964 summit. 
A tone of urgency animated the discussion at both summits. Not only did 
delegates see natural gas as having an enormous amount of potential to help their 
countries, but at the time, nearly all known reserves were associated with oil deposits and 
being depleted as a byproduct of oil production.161 As the NIOC and the Iranian Oil 
Operating Companies noted in their joint report to the 1964 symposium, 
since the solution gas is present and since it is an integral part of the oil, intimately mixed 
and co-mingled with the oil, it must be produced if the oil is to be produced. In effect, ‘no 
gas, no oil.’162 
As the region’s largest oil and gas producer and with little progress having been made to 
find economically viable uses for the country’s associated gas in the previous decades, 
Iran faced the issue most acutely. In 1961, 88 percent (approximately 261,000 of 297,000 
million cubic feet) of the gas produced in Iran was flared,163 a situation that persisted with 
159 ECAFE, “Report on the Second Symposium of Petroleum Resources,” 18. 
160 ECAFE, “Report on the Second Symposium of Petroleum Resources,” 18. 
161 ECAFE, “Report on the Second Symposium of Petroleum Resources,” 16-17. 
162 National Iranian Oil Company and Iranian Oil Operating Companies, “Present Status of Natural Gas in 
Iran,” in Proceedings of the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with 
Special Reference to the ECAFE Region, pp. 64-82 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 73. 
163 Of the remainder, most was consumed in the operations of the Abadan oil refinery. ECAFE, “Report on 
the Second Symposium of Petroleum Resources,” 17. 
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87 percent (roughly 334,000 million cubic feet) being burned off in 1963.164 As was the 
case in the late 1940s, finding economical outlets for Iran’s associated gas continued to 
face significant obstacles in the early 1960s. Iran still did not possess a sufficient 
industrial base or consumer distribution network to make use of significant volumes of 
gas. The closest major market, Western Europe, was not a viable candidate for export. 
George T. Ballou, Vice President of the Standard Oil Company of California and adviser 
to the U.S. delegation, in his report to the 1964 seminar noted that 
 
The basic problem facing utilization of the large volumes of natural gas in the great oil 
producing areas of the Middle East is one of finding or developing a large market into 
which the gas can be moved at cost low enough to compete with manufactured gas and 
other fuels. Western Europe is already a large market for gas. But the Middle East is not 
well placed to supply this area in competition with the huge natural gas reserves in North 
Africa which are also pressing for market and with the newly-discovered big reserves in 
The Netherlands.165 
 
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had made this determination as well. In the early 
1950s, responding to an extensive report from Bechtel International on the prospects of 
supplying natural gas to Europe, company officials had considered constructing a natural 
gas pipeline between southern Iran and Western Europe, aiming to deliver cheap gas to 
consumers all across the region. Estimated to cost £274,000,000 and delivering some 1 
billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, equivalent to some two-thirds of Europe’s daily 
gas consumption in 1948, the pipeline would be connected to the existing municipal gas 
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networks of European cities.166 Though gas heating and lighting became relatively 
widespread in Europe during the first half of the 20th century, such systems employed so-
called town or manufactured gas, largely derived from coal rather than natural gas 
extracted directly from the earth. Such gas, produced in specialized facilities close to the 
point of distribution, was economical only because coal was cheap and easy to transport. 
Natural gas required large-diameter, long-distance pipelines for transport, and it was only 
in the years after the Second World War that techniques were developed to enable their 
construction through the kind of rough terrain that any pipelines from the Middle East to 
Europe would need to traverse.167 
 Questions surrounding the plan’s technical feasibility was the only potential issue 
for the project; equally significant were the geopolitical implications. Imagined as 780 
miles of 34- or 36-inch pipe dotted with fifteen compressor stations of 20,000 horsepower 
each, the economic feasibility of the project rested on the existence of very cheap gas—
production costs of “nil”— in Iran.168 Despite the project being deemed technically 
“practicable,” there remained significant reservations. Most damning were geopolitical 
risks and the attendant economic difficulties that might arise from them. Company 
officials worried that the economic logic of the project might be undermined by “political 
issues,” including the possibility that “embarrassing” “[land access] Royalties…will be 
 
166 “Natural Gas to Europe: Economic Survey Estimate,” no document number, 30 May 1951, p. 3-4, Iran – 
Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas (59791), BP Archive, University of Warwick. 
167 Cryogenic storage and transport of natural gas, known as liquified natural gas, was an emerging, but still 
experimental, technology in the early 1960s. It would take many decades before this option would be 
economical.  
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charged by the various governments over whose country the lines will pass.”169 Even 
more alarming was the potential that in time 
countries taking gas from the line will become more and more dependent upon regular 
supplies and great disorganization and hardship could be caused if a country, relatively 
near the source of supply, decided to hold the pipeline company to ransom for more 
money. The time is not foreseeable when racial and political relations will be so amicable 
and settled as to preclude such an event.170 
Yet even more fatal to the project was the fact that the “fallacy of the scheme is that, 
given a pipeline of this length and diameter, it could be used to much better advantage for 
oil than for gas” in that a higher density of energy and money could be delivered to 
Europe if oil was sent instead of gas.171 It was for such reasons that, in the end, the 
project was never pursued, though similar proposals would be periodically floated over 
the ensuing decades. Fundamentally, as was true within Iran itself, technical feasibility 
was not always the primary determinant of whether natural gas projects were considered 
viable. Engineering estimations were instead intertwined with political and business 
decisions, in effect rendering Iran’s natural gas practically worthless for reasons that 
often had little to do with what was technically feasible for it. 
With vast quantities of associated natural gas being flared, largescale domestic 
consumption years away from becoming a reality, and seemingly no realistic export 
169 Letter from Estimating & Technical Expenditure Branch to Pattinson, “Natural Gas to Europe.” 
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prospects,172 Iranian officials working for the National Iranian Oil Company pursued the 
idea of gas recycling. Referring to the reintroduction of extracted natural gas into a 
petroleum reservoir, the practice enables both the boosting of petroleum reservoir 
pressures—thereby increasing the amount of recoverable crude oil, something 
particularly relevant toward the end of the useful life of an oil reservoir—and the 
conservation of gas that would otherwise be vented or flared. For Iranian officials, either 
use was better than the wasting of gas, but, as had long been the case, their ability to 
promote the practice was sharply curtailed by their lack of control of the country’s oil 
fields. Any Iranian efforts to make gas reinjection a reality would necessarily involve the 
cooperation of companies like Anglo-Iranian. Despite this lack of control, Iranian 
officials in the government and the NIOC succeeded in periodically prompting 
companies like Anglo-Iranian/British Petroleum to evaluate the prospects of gas 
reinjection in the decades after the Second World War. 
For their part, the Consortium member companies generally opposed the prospect 
as being uneconomical despite recognizing that the lack of a productive outlet for Iranian 
gas meant that reinjection was the “only practical means of avoiding burning the greater 
proportion of the gas [produced in Iran].”173 Anglo-Iranian itself had long studied the 
prospect of reinjection. As early as the 1920s, company employees had begun to explore 
 
172 While it is true that IGAT-1 (built 1967-1971) was primarily, by volume, an export pipeline to the 
Soviet Union, the truth of situation was that the USSR did not truly need the gas. While importing from 
Iran saved them the need to connect the Caucuses to their national natural gas network, the principle aim of 
the project were primarily geopolitical for the Soviet Union and developmental for Iran. The project was 
essentially a deal where the USSR would fund Iranian development—the construction of the pipeline and a 
steel mill at Isfahan—and accept repayment in the form of natural gas, thereby gaining a foothold in a 
country aligned politically with the United States. 
173 Memorandum from J.M. Pattinson to L.C. Rice, “Surplus Fields Gas,” JMP/OMS, 30 July 1948, Iran – 
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the idea as part of broader initiatives for the recycling back to reservoirs of excess oil and 
oil products, itself motivated by desires on the part of the AIOC to reserve oil for sale in 
times where global supply might be lower and prices higher.174 In order for such recycled 
oil products to be reproduced in later years enough natural gas would also need to be 
reinjected to prevent the overall pressure of the reservoir from dropping too low, 
simultaneously “saving” the resource from “total loss to humanity.”175 Though the 
benefits of gas recycling were apparent enough for the state of Texas to mandate that 
high-value gases be reintroduced to reservoirs in 1935 to good effect,176 Anglo-Iranian 
nonetheless continued to resist its implementation in Iran. In 1938, AIOC officials, at the 
prompting of the Iranian government, once again considered the prospect of gas 
reinjection, exploring the idea of reintroducing gas left over from refinery operations at 
Ābādān into the Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel fields with an eye toward its future 
utilization within Khuzestān. As would become common in the following years, AIOC 
officials quickly focused on the difficult commercial prospects of the project, estimating 
that the cost of reinjection and reproducing the gas, including royalty payments, pushed 
 
174 The careful control of world oil supplies was an important driver of industry behavior throughout the 
twentieth century. Simply put, despite notions of oil’s scarcity, in most years potential global production 
has far outstripped demand. Industry organizations like the Seven Sisters and OPEC have often responded 
by limiting production in order to maintain higher target prices. The recycling of oil and oil products to 
AIOC-controlled reservoirs was thus a way to control and tailor their production to market demands, 
thereby maintaining a higher overall price and enabling the sale of particular products at advantageous 
times. For more on the history of petroleum industry price manipulation see Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The 
Epic Quest for Oil, Money,  and Power (New York: Free Press, 1991). For comments on the AIOC 
operations referred to here, see Chairman at the First World Petroleum Congress, “Science in the Petroleum 
Industry,” p. 566; excerpted in Memorandum from D. Comins, Field Branch Southwell to Fields Branch 
Sunbury, “Dossier of Information on Recycling of Products,” no document number, 19 April 1940, p. 4-5, 
Gas Recycling, Correspondence (42378), BP Archive, University of Warwick [hereafter Gas Recycling, 
Correspondence]. 
175 Ibid., 2. 
176 Ibid., 1-2. 
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the potential sale price of the re-extracted gas too high to realistically find a market, some 
33 percent higher than an equivalent amount of energy produced via hydroelectric means 
that was chosen as a point of comparison. Thus, despite the plan’s technical feasibility, 
the AIOC again opposed gas recycling, arguing that “there could be no possible 
economic justification of repressuring for gas storage purposes.”177 
Prospects for gas recycling were periodically reevaluated during the Second 
World War,178 and in the postwar era the topic began to receive significant amounts of 
attention from both the AIOC and the Iranian government. Concern for immediate 
commercial feasibility rather than long term economic potential continued to drive 
Anglo-Iranian’s approach to the question, causing its officials to again reject the prospect 
of gas preservation for its own sake. Such was the position staked out in 1945 in an AIOC 
report on the amount of proven recoverable crude in Iranian fields. Focused on the 
Masjid-e Sulaymān oil field, the report’s author stated that 
the general consensus of technical opinion at M.I.S. with regards to recycling of gas is 
that…[the] efficiency of crude recovery would either remain the same or would be 
somewhat reduced by gas recycling but would not be increased. 
A policy of gas recycling would therefore be entirely for the purpose of 
conservation. The justification of a heavy expenditure on this account may be questioned 
on the grounds that gas vented to the atmosphere should be regarded as legitimate losses 
in the process of production and is in fact an exceedingly small proportion of the total 
losses when irrecoverable crude in the reservoir is included.179 
177 Letter from D. Comins to Jameson, “Repressuring and Reservoir Gas Storage,” no document number, 
16 February 1938, p. 2, Visit to Iran 1938, Miscellaneous Papers and Notes (67572), BP Archive, 
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As with all prospects for gas utilization in Iran, AIOC officials maintained a focus on 
“expenditures”—the cost of building, operating, and maintaining a system of for gas 
injection. A year later, in February 1946, the point was reinforced. Responding to the 
“question of [the] utilisation of gas [that] has been the subject of periodical enquiry from 
the Iranian government for some years,” one AIOC employee asked 
 
are we or are we not entitled under our Iranian Concession to burn or vent off gas 
(liberated from oil in the course of producing and refining it) to atmosphere when there is 
no economic method of utilising it ourselves or selling it either as gas or in liquid form, 
or are we bound to return the gas at substantial cost to the underground reservoir in order 
to conserve it for possible use at some uncertain date in the future?180 
 
Anglo-Iranian officials went to great lengths to confine discussions surrounding gas 
reinjection to commercial terms, seemingly feeling that any other grounds of discussion 
would be a losing argument for them. This extended to treating detailed reports on 
reservoir conditions as confidential for fear that data in the hands of the Iranian 
government would ultimately translate into pressure to change their policies. In June 
1946, AIOC officials sought to hide the fact that the gas pressure of the Masjid-e 
Sulaymān oil field had fallen faster than they planned due to the “use of dome gas for 
diluting gas vented to the atmosphere during the war years to obviate the necessity for 
flares.”181 Though AIOC officials were themselves concerned with the excess venting of 
gas and the consequent fall of reservoir pressure because of its deleterious effect on their 
ability to recover oil, they nonetheless sought to divert attention from the condition of the 
 
180 Letter from N.A. Gass to Arthur fforde [sic], 6 February 1946, Utilisation of Natural Gas. 
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reservoir, aiming to head off unwanted questions from the Iranian officials were they to 
learn of the reservoir’s reduced long term productivity. As D. Comins, an AIOC 
engineer, wrote, 
 
we should…confine our report to the foregoing case – the energy side [referring to the 
ability to extract oil] – on which we are on firm ground. Return of gas to the reservoir 
purely as a measure of conservation of natural resources as distinct from energy, would 
then become a clear cut commercial issue. To make the point that there is any risk that 
return of gas might reduce oil recovery from porous limestone…is liable to lead to 
speculative and unprofitable controversy in which we should be unable to support 
opinion by facts or firm calculations and to a demand for a great deal more information 
about the reservoir.182 
 
While the option of repressurizing the reservoir existed, that would entail the exact use of 
gas reinjection that company was seeking to avoid. Anglo-Iranian thus reiterated their 
focus on short term commercial prospects a month later when it was decided that the 
“conclusions promised to the I.G. [Iranian government] on recycling of gas would take 
the form of a decision for or against recycle based only on economic grounds.”183  
 In reality, gas recycling was not a singular operation. Local conditions within 
fields and wells could drastically alter the costs and economic prospects of particular 
reinjection projects. In the early 1940s, AIOC employees made estimates of the costs of 
gas recycling for the various fields that the company operated. Costs were tied directly to 
the amount of compression force needed to prepare the gas for injection, itself determined 
by the difference in pressure between the reservoir and that of the gas to be injected. 
While it was generally true that the greater the difference between the pressure of the gas 
after separation from the oil and the pressure of the reservoir the higher the cost, local 
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conditions or economies of scale could counterbalance that phenomenon. At Masjid-e 
Sulaymān, for example, they assessed that some 7 m.cu.ft./day of gas was available for 
reinjection at a recommended surface pressure of 500 psi chosen to result in well 
pressures of between 410 and 430 psi. The two-stage compression process was estimated 
to cost £40,000 to install—roughly £5,700 per thousand cubic feet of gas that would be 
injected per day—and £5,000 per year to maintain. Gas recycling at Haft Kel on the other 
hand, would require a surface pressure of 1500 psi in order to inject some 71.5 
m.cu.ft/day for a desired well pressure of 1160 to 1240 psi. For Haft Kel it was estimated
that installation would cost £340,000, while annual maintenance would cost £40,000. 
Economies of scale would result in a slightly cheaper unit price of about £4,750 per 
thousand cubic feet of gas per day. Complicating the project at Haft Kel was the fact that 
different wells within the field would accept gas to be reinjected at different pressures 
and require varying amounts of energy and complexity to achieve the necessary surface 
injection pressure.184 Variability was characteristic of Iranian fields, and no two wells or 
fields required the same surface injection pressure. Comins noted this, writing that the 
“effects of gas injection upon reservoir pressures” were  “entirely dependent upon local 
conditions.”185 Even the effectiveness of repressurization with the aim of boosting oil 
production was difficult to predict, requiring “very much more intimate knowledge of the 
184 “IRAN: Recycling of Gas to Reservoirs,” no document number, undated, Gas Recycling, 
Correspondence. 
185 Memorandum from D. Comins, Fields Branch Southwell to Fields Branch Sunbury, “Dossier of 




conditions in the limestone” than the AIOC possessed in the postwar years.186 The 
feasibility of gas recycling was thus co-determined by human factors—from AIOC 
production practices to prevailing electricity prices in Iran to the availability of 
equipment—and the geology of the reservoirs themselves. While Anglo-Iranian officials 
worked to limit the Iranian government’s influence over the course of utilization in Iran, 
they also found themselves constrained by the materiality of oil, gas, and the rocks within 
which they resided. 
 The geological makeup of Iran’s southern oil-bearing regions was one of the most 
influential factors shaping the debate over gas reinjection. Far from being an extraneous 
detail, Comins’ 1946 reference to Khuzestān’s “porous limestone” instead reflected how 
crucial the geology of Iran’s oil fields was in the discussions surrounding the feasibility 
and desirability of gas reinjection, something that in turn formed a crucial context for 
debates over whether decisions surrounding gas conservation should be made on 
economic or principled grounds. Running from the northwest to the southeast along the 
southern front of the Zagros Mountains, the Asmari is a long belt of sedimentary reef 
rock and “by far the most important proved [oil and gas] reservoir in Iran.”187 
“Fortunately from the point of view of oil exploitation,” the NIOC and Consortium 
delegation to the ECAFE summit declared, while its nature as the remains of prehistoric 
seas was crucial to its hydrocarbon-bearing status, the Asmari’s productivity was as much 
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the result of a geologically-contingent layer of impervious rock that lay atop most of it.188 
That layer of distinct rock, some 100 feet thick atop most of the Asmari, trapped the oil 
and gas that had formed in place and caused enormous accumulations to form. Indeed, 
Lurestān and Fārs provinces, places where the cap rock was absent, were considered by 
the NIOC and the Consortium companies as poor prospects due the “lack of adequate 
[cap rock] cover.”189  
Nor was this layer the only geologic feature of the Asmari that made it one of the 
world’s most significant regions for oil and gas production. Equally important was the 
existence of a system of vertical fissures and fractures in the limestone and sandstone that 
comprised the Asmari formation. Though the permeability of the Asmari limestone itself 
was poor, the fracture system, “confirmed in numerous localities in Khuzestān,” enabled 
an “extremely responsive flow system” during oil production, “enabling rapid 
segregation of oil and gas to take place in the fissures through which the gas migrates 
readily upward into the gas cap.” The end result of this process was the increased 
conservation of solution gas by natural processes. As the NIOC and Consortium 
delegation wrote, 
 
it has been observed in all the well-fissured fields that the producing gas-oil ratio is up to 
150 scf/stb [standard cubic feet per stock tank barrel, a measure of associated gas 
produced per barrel of oil] lower than the known original solution gas-oil ratio….In the 
Agha Jari Field, for example, some 115 MMscfd of gas…are being separated and 
fortuitously stored in the gas cap by this natural process. This would be regarded as a 
major gas injection project if it had to be effected [sic] from the surface. If producing 
rates are not exceedingly high (as they are not) when compared with the rate of oil and 
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gas segregation within the fissure system, the producing gas-oil ratio will continue to 
decrease, resulting in considerable conservation of the gas.190 
 
When combined with the Consortium companies’ policy to maintain a relatively slow 
rate of production and thereby “produce no excess or ‘gas cap’ gas,” these “fortuitous 
phenomena,” “perhaps unique to Iranian reservoirs,” “resulted and will result in the 
building up of vast reserves of natural gas which will be available for future 
utilization.”191 
Small oil recovery repressurization programs were nonetheless begun in the late 
1940s at Haft Kel and Masjid-e Sulaymān.192 By the 1960s, however, even those 
relatively small operations were being questioned as largely ineffective among AIOC 
officials.193 Formed in the fall of 1961 to analyze and issue recommendations on all 
aspects of natural gas utilization within Iran,194 British Petroleum’s Gas Study Committee 
reexamined the potential effects of gas recycling on oil production in the eight reservoirs 
the company operated. With the exception of Ahvāz, all the fields were contained within 
the Asmari limestone formation, and, except for Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel which 
had developed secondary caps after decades of oil production, had naturally occurring 
primary gas caps. The committee stated that the company’s production practices had 
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indeed meant that associated gas was largely being produced “essentially at the original 
solution gas-oil ratio,” an average of 740 cubic feet per barrel of crude, well below the 
1500 and 1100 cubic feet per barrel that was the average in the United States and 
Venezuela respectively. Still, as had always been the case, gas conservation was 
subordinated to oil production, and the committee also reported that gas was being 
produced in excess of the solution ratio at Masjid-e Sulaymān as the field was reaching 
the end of its productive life.195 Committee members were nonetheless confident that 
BP’s production practices and the Asmari’s fractured limestone would “result in the 
retention in the reservoirs of a large fraction of the gas originally in place,” as much as 85 
percent in some fields.196 
Geology was an important point of emphasis for the Gas Study Committee’s 
report, particularly as it was manifested in different prospects for gas recycling in 
different fields. Thus, despite the fact that by the 1960s gas recycling had found success 
around the world, it was “not universally beneficial to oil recovery.”197 In Iran’s Asmari 
fields, the very same “extreme” system of fractures in the rock that allowed gas to more 
easily accumulate in the reservoir gas cap hampered the ability for reinjected gas to drive 
oil to the surface.198 The committee thus concluded that in fields with relatively poor rock 
permeability like Masjid-e Sulaymān and Naft Sefid, continued or expanded gas 
reinjection would hamper the natural solution gas and water pressures driving oil 
195 Ibid., 16-17. 
196 Ibid., 18. 
197 Ibid., 21. 
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recovery in the wells.199 If the decision were taken to sacrifice future oil recovery at 
Masjid-e Sulaymān in favor of gas conservation, as had been proposed by the National 
Iranian Oil Company, then it would be possible to use a secondary gas cap to store some 
40 million cubic feet of gas per day for “later years for development of local industry” 
when “oil operations” were “declining in importance.”200 The committee had further 
concerns that pressurizing the well to above its natural limits would cause natural gas to 
seep from the ground, particularly in the areas near drilling operations.201 In any case, 
associated gas produced at Masjid-e Sulaymān was being used in company operations, 
necessitating that gas be piped from Ahvāz or Āghā Jāri at “prohibitive cost.”202 
Most other fields were no more promising. At Haft Kel and Gachsārān, analyses 
had found that the natural water drives of the reservoirs—meaning the natural 
groundwater pressure sometimes relied upon to extract oil from reservoirs—were 
superior to that of the solution gas; reinjecting gas to maintain higher pressures would 
thus “lead to reduced oil recovery.”203 While too little was known about Gachsārān’s 
geology to comment on its suitability for gas storage, at Haft Kel the committee 
determined that if it were “decided to ignore reservoir [oil production] losses,” 
approximately 80 million cubic feet of gas could be stored per day for twelve years, some 
300 billion cubic feet in total, at a cost of $5.6 million for the infrastructure to transport 
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gas from Ahvāz to the field. Since compressing and reinjecting Haft Kel’s own gas was 
deemed to be even more expensive, the committee ultimately concluded that “surplus gas 
storage [at Haft Kel] cannot be justified on technical or economic grounds.”204 Naft Sefid 
was no better a prospect with a very large gas column undermining any benefit that gas 
recycling could have for enhanced oil recovery. Nor was the reservoir a good candidate 
for gas conservation; the field’s own gas was being used for company operations, and 
though Haft Kel was within reasonable distance, the sour gas of the latter would 
“contaminate” the unusually valuable sweet gas contained within the Naft Sefid 
reservoir.205 Pāzanān, a field largely untapped in the 1960s, was both expensive and 
potentially dangerous within which to store gas as it had an “abnormally high gas 
reservoir pressure;” combined with the relatively high cost to establish a recycling 
scheme the committee declared that there was “little to recommend this project.”206 Only 
at Āghā Jāri, which had sufficiently high permeability and a weak natural water drive, 
were the prospects of gas reinjection considered at all promising. Estimates on enhanced 
oil recovery varied wildly between a 200-million-barrel loss in recoverable oil to a 500-
million-barrel gain at a cost of between $25 million to $30 million, though any attempt to 
use the reservoir for gas conservation through full repressurization would likely damage 
oil recovery.207 The four members of the Gas Study Committee thus concluded that gas 
reinjection would in nearly all cases likely either ultimately damage oil recovery or have 
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no measurable effect. While British Petroleum’s focus on costs was a key consideration 
in their determination of whether gas should be used for enhanced oil recovery, the 
geology of the fields was the limits within which the company operated. Each reservoir 
may have had its own specific characteristics, but most of Iran’s fields were nonetheless 
similar in their poor prospects for gas-enhanced oil recovery. Uniting the fields was the 
fact that across the whole Asmari formation unusually significant pressure gradients not 
only made recycling operations more expensive, but also limited just how effective gas 
reinjection could be in raising reservoir pressures.208 The Gas Study Committee may have 
recommended against the use of Iranian gas for boosting oil production, but their decision 
was not driven entirely by the company’s own financial concerns. Instead, it reflected a 
mix of their commercial interests with the materiality of Iran as a vast column of 
sedimentary rock. 
The commercial nature of British Petroleum was on greater display in the 
committee’s evaluation of storing surplus gas for future use. The committee reiterated 
their employer’s defense of flaring surplus gas, writing that it had occurred “in Iran just 
as similar conditions prevail or have prevailed in many areas of the world including, in 
the past, the United States.”209 In response to proposals that surplus gas be recycled to 
reservoirs in order to store it for future use, the committee described the “suggestion” as 
an “innovation,” as “such a proposal has never been put into effect in the oil and gas 
industry” anywhere in the world.210 Unlike in their analysis of projects for returning gas 
208 Ibid., 18. 
209 Ibid., 38. 
210 Ibid., 38 
108 
 
to the ground in order to boost oil production where the committee emphasized 
geological factors, their hesitancy toward the idea of gas conservation was rooted 
primarily in commercial and economic concerns. “Storage of gas in underground 
reservoirs is an expensive process,” they wrote, “and a long-term basis requires the use of 
current income on projects for which no return will be realized for many years.”211 To 
reinforce their point, the report’s authors constructed a hypothetical scenario where some 
700 million cubic feet of gas per day was to be compressed and stored. Initial outlays 
were expected to be $50 million and operating expenses $5 million per year plus $0.02 
per thousand cubic feet when the gas was later produced, estimates they considered 
“general in line with industry experience.”212 Expecting that the gas would be extracted 
over a twenty year period, the committee determined that the needed sale price revenue 
of $0.21 to $0.31 per thousand cubic feet was far too high for any realistic market to bear. 
They thus determined that 
 
Although surplus oil field gas can be stored without great difficulty from a technical 
viewpoint, there does not seem to be any economic justification for the operation, which 
is probably the reason it has never been done in the past.213 
 
More to the point, as far as the Gas Study Committee’s members were concerned, was 
that Iran’s extensive known reserves of natural gas—more than 44 trillion cubic feet at 
the time of the report’s completion—and the enhanced preservation characteristics of the 
Asmari rendered as economically wasteful any program for gas conservation, ultimately 
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concluding that “under these conditions, the Committee recommends against large capital 
investment designed primarily to save current associated gas production for future use by 
reinjection.”214 
According to the operating companies, then, the Asmari’s unique geological 
arrangement acted as a de facto reinjection program and there seemed to be little point in 
adding to it. As the delegation to the ECAFE symposium wrote,  
 
these reserves are so large that substantial investment now, to add to them, is not 
economically justifiable. The alternative to the flaring of surplus gas that could be 
economic is to find uses for this gas as it is produced.215 
 
Economics thus sat at the heart of the debate over gas reinjection in Iran, but they 
revolved as much around competing ideas of what it meant to conserve gas and the ways 
that the geology of the Asmari formation seemingly freed British Petroleum from needing 
to concern itself with gas conservation. The “natural conservation process”216 of the 
Asmari limestone formed the basis of the Consortium companies’ resistance to gas 
reinjection projects and, in the end, no major gas reinjection projects, particularly for gas 
conservation, were undertaken in Iran by the Consortium companies. In this way, British 
Petroleum and its peers pursued a notion of “good enough” conservation, one that saw 
the Asmari’s natural preservation as sufficiently effective to obviate any need to enhance 
it. This stood in contrast to a consistent and decades-long Iranian desire to see their gas 
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resources either conserved or put to productive use. Unable to send gas to foreign 
markets or convince the Consortium firms to conserve the associated gas they produced, 
Iranian efforts became focused on the construction of domestic markets and the necessary 
infrastructure of pipelines and refineries to support them. Indeed, the first gas reinjection 
project in Iran would not commence until 1976, years after natural gas would begin to 
find significant consumption within Iran.217 
*** 
In the years stretching between the 1930s and the 1960s, the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company’s view of Iran’s natural gas was rooted in the primacy of oil: gas was 
fundamentally a byproduct and as such lacked any true intrinsic value. Its utilization or 
conservation was worthwhile only in reference to the company’s ability to maintain oil 
production and earn profits, a position that continually undermined efforts to develop 
petrochemical and recycling outlets for the associated gas that the company was 
producing. Iranian officials, in contrast, saw their country’s natural gas as embodying 
tremendous economic and developmental worth, and over the years they maintained a 
steady campaign to press to the AIOC to curtail the amount of gas they vented and flared. 
With no true resolution, the tension between these two views would drive the course of 
Iran’s natural gas for decades to come, helping to imbue the subsequent Iranian efforts to 
pursue natural gas utilization with a nationalist aura. 
217 Elham Hassanzadeh, Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the Post-Revolutionary Period: Optimism, 
Scepticism, and Potential (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 34. 
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More than a commercial and political dispute between two interested parties, 
however, the question of what to do with Iran’s natural gas resources reflected the 
geology of the country’s primary petroleum-bearing region. Iranian and AIOC officials 
alike grappled with the limits and possibilities created by the particular characteristics of 
the Iran’s oil reservoirs and the Asmari limestone formation within which they lay. 
Whether the Asmari reservoirs naturally retained enough gas to make recycling a 
worthwhile investment was a decision rooted equally in both the realities of Khuzestān’s 
geology and the fundamental perspectives vis-à-vis gas that existed within the AIOC and 
the Iranian government. In this way, fractured rock, the folds and thrusts of tectonic 
movement, and pressure gradients deep beneath the earth shaped the choices made and 
the paths taken by the two organizations, sharpening the distinctions between two 
fundamentally different conceptualizations of Iran’s natural gas. 
With European markets beyond their reach and the Consortium companies 
dragging their feet, in the 1960s Iranian officials began to focus on domestic and regional 
outlets, considering it to be “a matter of national importance” to find uses for the 
country’s gas resources.218 While some 60 million cubic feet continued to be used in oil 
refining operations at Ābādān,219 they quickly turned to the possibility of using gas as a 
source of energy. Participants at the 1964 seminar considered natural gas to be an 
attractive fuel source because of its “relatively low price, smokeless flame, steady 
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temperatures, automatic regulation, no need for storage facilities at the consumer stage, 
no handling, [and] no ash.”220 Iran, however, simply did not have the distribution network 
needed to supply natural gas to consumers and businesses, or even to transport it 
anywhere outside of the southwestern region of the country. Any use of gas as a major 
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Chapter 2 
Petrochemicals and Pipelines, 
1955-1970 
In the years between Iran’s 1953 Oil Nationalization Crisis and the early 1970s, 
Iranian officials working inside government ministries and the national petroleum 
companies took enormous strides in finding uses for their country’s natural gas reserves. 
Leaving behind decades of fruitless discussion with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and 
later the other Consortium firms, during that time huge new systems were built to 
transport gas from the primary oil-producing regions of Iran’s southwest to major urban 
centers like Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tehran. New petrochemical facilities were erected to 
take gas and sate Iranian society’s growing industrial hunger for products like synthetic 
fertilizer. Amalgams of steel, concrete, money, and expertise both domestic and foreign, 
these arrangements became the basis for Iranian gas use in the following half century, 
enabling both export and domestic consumption. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, structures like the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory and 
the natural gas pipeline that fed it became focal points of debates surrounding Iran’s gas 
resources and the at times conflicting views of local and national authorities. Plans for the 
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factory and its supporting infrastructures, the first major gas project in Iran, were 
expansive, aimed at transforming natural gas into both a source of energy and a feedstock 
for a nascent petrochemical industry. The Shiraz pipeline was thus simultaneously built 
to support both local energy consumption and national industrialization through the 
production of synthetic petrochemical fertilizers. But prefiguring debates that would rage 
in later decades, from the moment of its conceptualization in the mid-1950s there was 
continual controversy regarding the extent to which the pipeline would provide gas for 
residential versus industrial consumers. Whereas authorities in the National Iranian Oil 
Company and the National Iranian Gas Company prioritized large-scale consumers like 
the fertilizer plant, local and provincial officials pushed for the construction of city gas 
networks and the provision of natural gas energy to ordinary consumers. The latter’s 
eventual but only limited success was reflective of both the importance of such figures in 
shaping Iran’s gas infrastructure and the limits of their ability to affect change when 
national organizations were so intimately involved in the creation of Iran’s gas 
infrastructure. 
 For Iranian officials, the central achievement of these years was the 
conceptualization and construction of the First Iran Gas Trunkline, a thousand-kilometer 
pipeline built to transport refined associated gas from the Consortium-operated oil fields 
in Iran’s south to the Soviet border at Āstārā. Though by volume the pipeline was 
predominantly dedicated to gas export to the Soviet Union, the project was conceived and 
operated primarily as a means of making possible the delivery of natural gas to Iranian 
cities like Isfahan and Tehran. From the start the Trunkline was national in scope, 
eventually becoming an artery for the country and bringing gas to increasingly energy-
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hungry urban areas. The work of numerous ministries, the NIOC, and the newly formed 
National Iranian Gas Company and thoroughly Iranian in ambition, the project’s actual 
design and construction were nonetheless undertaken almost entirely by foreign 
consultants and firms. Iranian gas projects were thus reflective not only of domestic 
policies and ambitions, but also global political and economic forces that converged 
within their materials and processes of construction. The story of Iran’s natural gas 
infrastructures was thus as much one of competing priorities, unfulfilled promised, and 
foreign expectations as it was one of national triumph, making the huge structures like 
the Shiraz fertilizer plant and the IGAT-1 not only means by which Iranian goals of 
industrialization and modernization could be achieved, but also objects that embodied the 




 While officials within institutions like the National Iranian Oil Company and the 
Plan Organization struggled for decades with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the 
other Consortium firms in order to have their country’s natural gas resources put to 
productive use, beginning in the mid-1950s they also began to take significant steps to 
create their own projects for gas utilization. The first major use of gas energy in Iran, 
however, was largely the product of private enterprise. In 1953 the Butane Gas Company 
was founded in Tehran by Mahmud Khalili, his son Mohsen Khalili, and their associate 
Esfandiār Yegānegi. Established to transport liquid gas from the refinery at Ābādān to 
cities like Tehran, Butane Gas enabled for the first time the widespread use of liquid gas 
in Iranian homes. Propane and butane, the two hydrocarbons that comprise the bulk of 
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liquid gas, are integral to crude oil and natural gas and thus found within the very same 
reservoirs. Such natural gas liquids, often a small percentage of the raw natural gas, are 
generally separated out during the refining process, becoming available for sale or use in 
petrochemical production lines. Though gaseous at the earth’s surface, propane and 
butane are both heavier than the methane that makes up the bulk of the refined natural gas 
that is distributed via pipe networks to consumers. Liquid gas’s heavier nature makes it 
significantly easier to compress and possessing of a higher energy density—the amount 
of energy stored in a particular volume—contributing to its ability to be kept as a liquid 
within relatively simple tanks and canisters which can in turn be distributed 
economically. 
Despite the relative ease with which liquid gas can be distributed in comparison to 
natural gas, it nonetheless requires specialized equipment to both fill the canisters and 
make use of them. It was for the lack of that equipment that the bulk of the liquid gas 
produced at Ābādān was flared between the start of refining in 1912 and the early 1950s, 
with only a small amount being utilized by industry employees in Ābādān town and, 
later, Ahvāz.221 Prior to the use of gas, most Iranian households relied on fuels like 
charcoal, firewood, and dried dung,222 though the use of oil products like kerosene had 
risen steadily over the first half of the twentieth century.223 Such fuels were notoriously 
smoky, creating unclean and unconnected kitchens and forcing Iranians to cook their 
221 Hasantāsh, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn and Mikāyil ‘Azimi, Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran 
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223 Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran, Naft va Zendegi (Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e 
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meals in what were often the dirtiest spaces in their homes.224 Following a trip to the 
United States in 1954 where they studied the American liquid gas industry and made 
connections to equipment suppliers,225 Butane Gas began operations, importing much of 
the equipment they needed and adhering to American standards.226 At first the company 
relied on road transport, a long and arduous route,227 bringing propane and butane from 
Ābādān to Tehran in a tanker truck before transferring them to canisters for distribution 
just outside the city.228 From the central filling station, canisters were loaded onto 
emblazoned vehicles for transport through the city for delivery at people’s homes.229 
Butane Gas quickly ran into trouble, however, as few residents of Tehran were familiar 
with liquid gas or the cylinders and appliances needed to make use of it. Many worried 
about the possibility of explosion and refused to adopt the new fuel. Even among those 
who did quickly accept it, often for use in their kitchens, there was a long learning curve 
with respect to adapting existing cooking techniques to the new energy source.230 Butane 
Gas responded by undertaking advertising and educational campaigns, simultaneously 
seeking to convince Iranians of liquid gas’s safety while also educating them on best 
practices for its use.231 
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 Despite these efforts, liquid gas consumption in places like Tehran grew slowly 
during the first few years, and it was largely a luxury product confined to small numbers 
of higher class residents.232 The new and cleaner fuel source, however, allowed Iranian 
families to bring their kitchens within the confines of their homes and helped further new, 
more Westernized ways of living that were beginning to be promoted by the popular 
press, textbooks, and programs like Point Four.233 The turning point for Butane Gas came 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the rapidly expanding middle classes of Tehran 
increasingly adopted gas appliances.234 In response, the company moved into producing 
both the canisters that they used to deliver gas to consumers as well as gas appliances like 
hot water heaters and stoves, quickly becoming a household name across the country as 
the industry expanded.235 The sector’s rapid growth brought competitors like Iran Gāz 
and Persi Gāz, both founded in 1958, which grabbed significant market share and slices 
of the public consciousness.236 Over the following two decades liquid gas consumption 
grew rapidly, from some 2590 tons in 1960 to approximately 572,000 tons in 1979,237 
bringing dozens of distributers into the market.238 Despite the success of the Iranian 
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liquid gas energy industry in the decades after the founding of Butane Gas, the fuel would 
eventually come to be largely supplanted by systems of piped natural gas, first in Iran’s 
urban areas but later more widely. The use of liquid gas thus represented something of a 
transitional step in Iran, providing many of the benefits of gas energy, particularly with 
respect to its comparative cleanliness, without requiring the significant public investment 




The promising success of liquid gas notwithstanding, by the late 1950s Iranian 
officials were beginning to take significant steps toward greater utilization of associated 
natural gas. During that period, beyond the desire to see Iranian natural resources put to 
good use that had animated their thinking for decades, Iranian officials were beginning to 
react to increasing demands for energy and petrochemical products in Iran. State-directed 
efforts at industrialization had begun in the 1930s under Rezā Shah and began to 
accelerate in the wake of the Oil Nationalization Crisis and the return of Muhammad 
Rezā Shah to the throne in 1953.240 Rooted in development planning that had begun in 
the late 1940s, Iran’s post-crisis industrialization plans were driven by the rapid rise in oil 
revenues that had been made possible by the new 1954 Oil Consortium Agreement. 
 
239 For more on the history of the Iranian liquid gas industry see Hasantāsh, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn and 
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Under the new agreement oil revenues grew rapidly for the Iranian government, seeing a 
ten-fold increase from $34.4 million in 1954-1955 to $344 million in 1958-1959. By 
1970 returns would again nearly triple to nearly $1.2 billion and in 1975-1976 Iran 
earned some $20 billion from foreign oil sales.241 While a significant portion of these 
returns were directed toward non-developmental purposes—particularly the military, 
court patronage, and an expansion of the state bureaucracy—large amounts were 
nonetheless expended on infrastructure and as financing for both state-owned and private 
industries.242 Overseen by the governmental Plan Organization, early efforts were 
underwhelming, with the First Development Plan (1949-1951) disintegrating alongside 
the collapse of Iran’s oil revenues during the Oil Crisis and the Second (1955-1962) 
failing to achieve its full potential due to a lack of clear objectives, uncoordinated 
investments, and steady reductions in allocations to the Plan Organization.243 Fortunes 
changed under the Third (1962-1968) and Fourth Development Plans (1968-1973), when 
some $3.9 billion was invested in projects like hydroelectric dams, new and modernized 
port facilities, and thousands of miles of rail and roads. An additional $1.2 billion was 
spent on agricultural modernization, including mechanization and the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides.244 These developmental programs fostered an industrial boom 
in Iran as government policy promoted the domestic production of everything from 
241 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 124. 
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consumer goods like clothing and automobiles to intermediate products like steel and 
machine tools.245  
Iran’s rapid industrialization, rising standards of living, and significant urban 
migration spurred a ravenous new appetite within the country for both energy and 
petrochemical products like fertilizer and plastics.246 With the 1954 Consortium Oil 
Agreement giving the NIOC exclusive rights to distribute and sell oil and natural gas 
products within Iran, as well as mandating that the Consortium operating companies 
make deliveries in support of those activities, Iran’s petroleum reserves were well-
positioned to meet those new demands.247 In the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian officials 
pursued ambitious and complex projects aimed at supporting Iran’s growing 
industrialization via programs that would see significant quantities of gas transported 
hundreds of miles from Iran’s southern petroleum fields to urban centers. One of the first 
such projects to be tackled was one that sought to bring associated gas from Iran’s 
primary petroleum-bearing region in the southwest to Shiraz and its environs for 
consumption by both industry and city residents.  
An early industrial concern to be fed was a large petrochemical plant along the 
Kor River in Marvdasht, some fifty kilometers northeast of the city. Built to meet the 
rapid growth in domestic demand for synthetic fertilizers—“one of the most important 
petrochemical products”—that had been brought about by land reform and agricultural 
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development initiatives then part of the Iranian government’s modernization programs,248 
the contract for construction was signed in 1958 between the Ministry of Industry and 
Mines and a group of European companies including the Ensa and Entrepose (France) as 
well as John Brown & Company (United Kingdom).249 Initially designed to produce 
some 90,000 tons of pure diammonium nitrate fertilizer per year, the contract was later 
amended in the summer of 1959 to specify 41,000 tons of diammonium nitrate, 40,000 
tons of urea, and 1,000 tons of liquid ammonia, all to be produced from natural gas 
feedstock supplied via pipeline from a new gas treatment plant built to supply the project 
at Gachsārān.250 Inaugurated at a ceremony attended by the Shah and President of France 
Charles De Gaulle in September 1963, the plant consumed some 20 million cubic feet of 
gas per day in its operations, separated and treated at Gachsārān and then transported 
over 320 kilometers via a 10-inch pipe to the factory.251 
 The Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory was the first petrochemical facility built in 
Iran and it found considerable success, sufficient to prompt an expansion by a contracted 
Romanian firm in the early 1970s to include units for sodium carbonate and bicarbonate 
production.252 For the most part, Iranian involvement in the project had been confined to 
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ownership and management. Initially owned by a subsidiary of the Ministry of the 
Economy, in the summer of 1964 ownership was transferred to the National Iranian 
Petrochemical Industries Company by order of the Majlis and a year later to the Iran 
Petrochemical Corporation , a subsidiary of the NIOC created for specifically that 
purpose.253 Despite the lack of Iranian involvement in the actual design and construction 
of the plant—Ensa had been in charge of designing, building, and delivering the plant’s 
production equipment while John Brown and Entrepose had built the gas treatment plant 
at Gachsārān, the pipeline to Shiraz, and the factory itself254—the project prompted 
considerable effort on the part of the Iranian government to leverage their country’s 
substantial gas reserves to jumpstart a regional fertilizer network at the heart of which 
Iran would sit. 
*** 
In a series of reports submitted to the December 1964 United Nations ECAFE 
summit on natural gas that had been held in Tehran, the Iranian delegation255 made a case 
that building a petrochemical industry was both economically feasible and crucial for the 
“future progress and industrialization of the countries of the region,” even while 
acknowledging reservations about a “lack of sufficient domestic markets and technical 
253 “Kārkhāneh-ye Kudshimiāi-ye Shiraz,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 5, no. 7 (Mehr 1347), 12. 
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knowledge.”256 To compensate for the as-yet small domestic markets, they revived a 
proposal first floated at a 1962 summit on petroleum resources257 and argued that Iran 
was well positioned—through both geographic proximity and the low cost of natural 
gas—to supply petrochemical products like nitrogenous fertilizers, sulfur, and carbon 
black to the entirety of the ECAFE region. With its huge potential market and growing 
role as a nitrogen fertilizer around the world, ammonia, “the cheapest source of nitrogen 
for agriculture,” was the cornerstone of the proposal.258 Synthesized in dedicated plants 
from atmospheric nitrogen and the hydrogen contained in natural gas, ammonia could 
either be applied to fields directly or used to produce even more potent fertilizers. 
Worldwide demand for nitrogen fertilizers had grown 50 percent in the previous seven 
years, but Asia, Africa, and Latin America, despite possessing 60 percent of the world’s 
arable land, were underserved and consumed only a fifth of global supplies. Rising living 
standards and population growth demanded ever-increasing amounts of fertilizer that 
could not be met through existing production capabilities. Drawing on the example of an 
ammonia plant that supplied Central America and Europe from Trinidad, the Iranian 
delegation proposed to competitively meet that growth in demand. They argued that 
through the large amounts of natural gas already extracted and flared in their country, 
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combined with the availability of inexpensive electricity in parts of southern Iran and the 
potential economies of scale achieved by centralizing production in one country, 
ammonia could be supplied to the ECAFE region. Member nations could, in this way, 
come to a mutually beneficial relationship: consumer nations like India, Pakistan, and 
Japan259 would obtain cheap fertilizer, and Iran would find both a large market for a 
crucial new industry and an outlet for at least some of its natural gas. As the delegation 
wrote, 
 
The prospect for mutual cooperation, therefore, is very bright. Iran has the raw material, 
technical skill and also the means of securing the necessary capital and know-how for 
setting up large-scale ammonia and urea plants. Other ECAFE countries can help, to their 
own benefit as well as to Iran’s, by providing the market.260 
 
Envisioned by the Iranian delegates was a regional network at the center of which would 
sit a large Iranian ammonia plant. The facility, to be constructed along the Persian Gulf 
coast near the major oil- and gas-bearing regions of Iran, was to use gas supplied by the 
NIOC to produce some 650,000 tons of liquid ammonia per year, rising to 2 million tons 
per year over the following seven years.261 The ammonia would then be loaded onto 
ocean-going tankers and shipped to local fertilizer manufactories where it could be made 
into other products. Under this arrangement, buying nations would maintain some 
amount of local control over their fertilizer supplies, avoid the high initial investment that 
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ammonia production required,262 and even find themselves able to repurpose or export 
the hydrocarbon resources that had previously been used to produce fertilizer.263 
The Iranian delegation worked to imbue their proposed project with an air of 
benevolence and magnanimity. They wrote that the project was reflective of the “friendly 
attitudes of Iranian authorities in making available their natural gas resources and other 
necessary facilities for the benefit of the entire region.”264 But while they took pains to 
emphasize how their fertilizer complex could benefit Iran’s neighbors, the project was 
clearly layered with Iranian ambition as well. It was a showcase for Iranian potential, one 
that demonstrated a marriage of natural abundance and the ability to harness it toward 
productive ends. Iranian delegates promised that “the availability of raw material and 
human skill in Iran” would “contribute to the opening of new horizons for the people of 
the ECAFE countries.”265 By making Iran into the region’s principal supplier of 
ammonia, the delegation offered a plan that would improve the region’s economies—and 
make Iran into the indispensable leader of a crucial new industry. Under the proposed 
scheme, Iran would become the dominant supplier of a product that was the “difference 
between famine and full stomachs,” one not easily pushed aside without significant pain 
for people across the region.266 Iranian officials were so keen on the project, and so 
concerned about the necessity of securing markets for their products, that the delegation 
262 Iranian Delegation, “Prospects of Regional Arrangements in Natural Gas,” 430-431. 
263 Iranian Delegation, “Manufacture and Distribution of Fertilizers in the ECAFE Area,” 435. 
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further sweetened the deal by offering to manage and underwrite it, directly subsidizing 
30 percent stakes in the projects and helping to arrange financing for the remainder.267 As 
they wrote,   
 
In order to further this programme we shall be glad to offer the necessary technical know-
how on design and operation of the conversion plants. We will be glad to arrange, if 
required, if [sic] for engineering and construction. We will also be prepared to participate 
in ownership of the conversion units and assist with financing arrangements.268 
 
Iranian officials were eager, in part, because they had already identified a continued and 
growing domestic need for ammonia. By supplying it via the same system, they hoped 
Iranian farmers would stand to reap the windfall that cheaper fertilizers would provide. 
By way of example, the delegation calculated that the price of ammonia would be 30 
percent cheaper if the manufacturing plant had a capacity of 600,000 tons per year (near 
to the initial annual capacity of the proposed plant) rather than 100,000.269 The only way 
such production could be sustained was if a foreign market existed to absorb most of the 
ammonia. Iran thus stood to benefit immensely from a project that rested entirely on the 
fact that large quantities of natural gas were already being produced in the country. 
 Elided in the delegation’s proposal was that the Iranian petroleum industry lacked 
much of the expertise needed to design and build their own projects, forcing them to hire 
foreign companies and consultants. The fertilizer plant at Shiraz that inspired the regional 
network was itself built by British and French contractors. They reported great difficulty 
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in finding adequate numbers of skilled workers within Iran, saying that while “there was 
some hope that retired Consortium or NIOC employees could be hired,” the contractors 
would need to “scour the entire country to obtain skilled trades in sufficient numbers.”270 
Promises to “arrange…for engineering and construction” for partner nations thus was not 
truly an offer of engineering or construction expertise, but a more abstract managerial 
ability to oversee foreign construction firms.271 Nonetheless, this proven ability to 
oversee a chemical fertilizer project from conception to operation became a way for the 
Iranian delegation to promote their country as a leader in the emerging field of natural 
gas utilization. Transforming at least some of Iran’s then-proven reserves of 70 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas272 from waste into a productive resource would do more than 
further the country’s industrialization; it would also be a step toward making Iran the 
equal, or better, of any country in the world. 
 In the end, the regional fertilizer network envisioned by the Iranian delegates to 
the 1964 ECAFE summit proved too ambitious. Though a large petrochemical fertilizer 
complex was built with an eye toward the export market in the Persian Gulf port of 
Bandar Shāhpur between 1967 and 1973 by a company jointly owned by the National 
Petrochemical Company and Allied Chemical,273 and a second by a joint venture between 
Iran National Petrochemical Company and the Mitsui Group of Japan was begun in 
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1973,274 those facilities also quickly turned toward serving the domestic market.275 Thus 
while in the following years Iran’s petrochemical industry would continue to expand, 
Iranian gas utilization was driven primarily by a desire among Iranian officials to see gas 
used as a source energy. In Shiraz, despite the prominence that the petrochemical 
fertilizer plant received as the first and most notable success of the program to use natural 
gas in Fārs, it was the possibility of piped natural gas being distributed as fuel to 
residential and industrial consumers in the city that preoccupied local and provincial 
authorities. 
*** 
Beginning in the mid-1950s, H.E. Mehdi Farrokh, the Governor-General of Fārs, 
began a campaign to have natural gas from the Consortium-operated field of Gachsārān 
transported for consumption in Shiraz, the province’s largest city. Eager to advance such 
a project, in the summer of 1955 Farrokh wrote to the provincial director of the U.S. 
Point Four mission to Iran, asking about possible funding for such a plan. The director 
demurred, suggesting that a gas distribution network would compete with “several other 
projects which the peoples of Shiraz have been hoping for,” including a sewage system, 
an expansion of the city water network, recreational facilities, and an increase in 
electricity generation. In any case, almost none of the preparatory work needed for a gas 
274 This project was quickly beset with trouble as the oil shock caused its estimated costs to increase more 
than six-fold and construction was interrupted by both the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. For 
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144-150.
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network had been done, and the director wrote that an “engineering survey and economic 
analysis…by a competent Engineering firm or organization” needed to be undertaken 
before any “applications for financing” would be considered.276 Farrokh nonetheless 
captured the attention of national officials, and in December 1955 the Plan Organization 
asked the NIOC to draw upon their connections with consulting engineers and pipelaying 
contractors to undertake preliminary evaluations of the possibility of using natural gas in 
Fārs, something it claimed was in the “interest of the majority of the people” of the 
province.277 At stake for the Plan Organization was both residential use in Shiraz—at the 
time home to some 150,000 people—and industrial, specifically naming the Marvdasht 
and Fasā sugar loaf factories in the city’s vicinity.  
For their part, the NIOC had already begun exploring the possibility of gas 
delivery to Shiraz and funding had already been set aside in the 1956 budget for an 
evaluation of its prospects.278 There was a great deal of enthusiasm for the prospect of gas 
delivery, enough that the NIOC, in light of their concerns for the “heavy expense” of 
pipelaying and the “huge investment” that would be needed to bring gas to Fārs, asked 
the office of the Prime Minister to issue an order saying that no such program should 
proceed without proper evaluation and consideration.279 The NIOC had completed their 
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studies by early 1957,280 and by the spring of that year the governor resumed his efforts 
to procure gas for his province, decrying the delay the NIOC studies had caused and 
arguing that its availability would accelerate the growth of industry in Shiraz.281 Farrokh 
based his position on Shiraz’s growing energy needs, something that had begun to 
outstrip the traditional coal and charcoal sources that city residents had been using. The 
demand for fuel was such that considerable attention was already being given to 
increasing the delivery of oil products to Shiraz, though that too would require great time 
and effort. Considering the relative proximity of Fārs to Iran’s primary gas-producing 
regions, however, and the way that gas was being largely discarded by the Consortium 
companies, provincial authorities in a variety of ministries were strongly supportive of 
plans to pipe gas to the city, believing that through the “transforming [of] people’s lives” 
residents would quickly come to know the “benefits of gas use” and the establishment of 
new industries would be facilitated.282 
 Despite the efforts of the authorities in Fārs, little progress had been made in 
bringing a gas pipeline to Shiraz into being. That began to change in late 1958 with the 
signing of the agreement between the NIOC and the group of European firms hired to 
build the Shiraz fertilizer plant. With the Shah expressing a desire to see the project 
completed as quickly as possible, in the fall of 1958 the NIOC moved to construct the 
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fertilizer plant and its associated pipeline simultaneously.283 While the task of finding the 
necessary foreign financing necessary for the project slowed things through the fall of 
that year, much to the chagrin of Fārs’s governor,284 by February 1959 the project had 
begun in earnest.285 Residents of Fārs expressed both support for and concern about the 
project. The Agricultural Union of Fārs strongly backed the plan,286 while the head of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Bandar Bushehr worried that the needs of the fertilizer plant 
would overwhelm the region’s ports and impede existing commercial activity.287 By 
February 1960, however, the NIOC had begun to resist the construction of a gas system 
to serve residential consumers in Shiraz, stating that such a network was “not part of the 
pipelaying plan” and “from an economic perspective” was “also not affordable.” They 
would instead prioritize industry, the “major consumers” of gas that were more easily 
served.288 Other Iranian officials opposed this hierarchy of consumers, with the Prime 
Minister of Iran writing to the NIOC to express his opinion that with the pipeline and 
fertilizer factory projects significantly underway it was time to ensure that a city gas 
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network would be read as well.289 The governor of Fārs likewise wrote to the NIOC to 
press that it was expected that the residents of Shiraz would be able to make use of 
natural gas as soon as the pipeline from Gachsārān was ready, as had long been 
planned.290 
 Despite the efforts of the Prime Minister and the governor of Fārs to ensure that 
the residential gas service in Shiraz would begin alongside the commencement of 
operations at the fertilizer plant, there would be a years-long gap between the two. While 
some initial studies had been performed, their completion had been suspended due to lack 
of financing.291 By April 1962 gas had begun flowing to the chemical plant, the 
Marvdasht and Kavār sugar loaf factories, the Fārs cement works, and the local power 
plant, successes that prompted other industrial concerns in the city to express a “desire” 
for gas.292 With the start of full-scale service in 1963, Shiraz became the first Iranian city 
to consume natural gas. Despite planned branch lines running to Jahrom and the Fasā 
sugar loaf factory being dropped due to problems with the new gas refinery at 
Gachsārān,293 the start of industrial gas service spurred a flurry of new activity regarding 
broader access to the new fuel and the governor used this moment to again push for 
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residential gas service in Shiraz, praising the government’s commitment to “using the 
country’s natural resources for the benefit of [all] class,” and writing that they were “near 
to witnessing the biggest celebrations in the history” of the province should gas be 
supplied to city residents. Still, while it was “not inappropriate at this moment for the 
NIOC and the Ministry of Industry and Mines” to “allocate a portion of this gas for 
public consumption in Shiraz,” the city was not able to finance the 300 million rial job 
themselves. He therefore requested that the Prime Minister order the Plan Organization to 
help the city pay for the work, disbursements that would be repaid in installments over 
the following years.294 Despite the governor arguing that without their aid local 
authorities could not fulfill their “duty…to bring this plan and program of broad benefit” 
into being,295 the Plan Organization refused, citing a reduction in the organization’s funds 
and the impending end of the Second Development Plan later that year.296 
 There continued to be dissent within Shiraz itself to the idea of building a natural 
gas system for the city. In the summer of 1962, the Shiraz Electrical Company wrote to 
the mayor of the city to promote the superiority of electricity to gas. The company argued 
that natural gas fuel was both expensive and unsafe. At the time, with some two-thirds of 
Shiraz’s homes being made of mud, Shiraz Electricity contended that laying pipes to 
them, in addition to the costs associated with ripping up roads and alleys and establishing 
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new institutions to oversee gas service, was dangerous, particularly in the winding 
alleyways of the old city. Furthermore, the company claimed, approximately a third of 
the city’s homes employed house servants, members of society they claimed should not 
be trusted with the dangerous and “precise technical” tasks that utilizing gas fuel 
required, perhaps inadvertently underscoring visions of natural gas as a particularly 
modern and sophisticated fuel. In contrast, Shiraz Electricity argued, much of the 
infrastructure to support an expansion of the electrical grid was already in place, whether 
or not gas service began there would always be a need for electricity anyway, and as a 
source of energy it was much safer for all social classes to use.297 Others supported the 
use of gas in Shiraz and Fārs but proposed different means of distribution. In July 1962, 
the owner of a small liquid gas distribution company in Shiraz offered the services of his 
company to begin bottling gas from the Gachsārān-Shiraz pipeline for delivery to 
customers.298 While this approach would save the significant costs of creating a network 
of gas lines, the NIOC pushed back against the proposal, noting that it was “not practical” 
as the natural gas being transported through the line was predominantly methane whereas 
the gas cylinders used in Shiraz and around the country were largely filled with propane 
and butane.299 
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 Local authorities in Shiraz and Fārs remained committed to the use of piped 
natural gas despite the resistance of the NIOC and other energy distributers in the region. 
Throughout 1962, officials like the mayor of Shiraz continued to press the national 
government to make gas service a reality, asking that it be made part of the upcoming 
Third Development Plan and that the Ministry of Industry and Mines and the NIOC issue 
a license for the city to build a gas network.300 At a meeting called by the mayor of Shiraz 
in August of that year to discuss the “demand of the people for the use of gas energy” it 
was reported that while the NIOC was focused on delivering gas to industrial consumers, 
they were willing to consider requests for service in the remainder of the city. It was 
unlikely, however, that city residents would see the expansion of city gas service in a 
uniform way. It was the opinion of the assembled officials that the city’s southern 
neighborhoods—with their narrow, winding alleyways and mud homes, as had been 
highlighted by the Shiraz Electricity Company—were not candidates for gas service, 
being far too expensive and complicated to build networks for. It was thus agreed that gas 
service would be restricted to those newer areas of the city that experts had deemed as 
meeting the necessary requirements for gas delivery.301 
By November 1962, the NIOC had agreed to the possibility of gas service in such 
neighborhoods, though there remained significant uncertainty regarding the details and 
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costs of any such system.302 In response, it was decided that the Shiraz city government 
would press for gas systems to be installed in those areas of the city through which the 
region’s primary gas lines crossed. The NIOC, however, was still not ready to issue a 
license to the city to built a gas distribution system, arguing that the lack of 
knowledgeable and experienced personnel and organizations in the field of gas 
distribution rendered local governments, and any other non-technical institution, unequal 
to the task. Instead the company was considering issuing a contract to a European firm to 
build an experimental system of 500 gas connections in Shiraz, using it as a testbed to 
explore questions surrounding pipelaying, cost, and pricing.303 It would thus not be until 
1966 that the experimental plan was evaluated, and it would be a further year, until 
December 1967, until the first residential customers in Shiraz and the neighboring town 
of Guyim began receiving gas.304 Numbers were small in the first three years of gas 
service, with only 285 residential connections in 1968, a figure that grew to only 773 by 
1970. Commercial units—bakeries, shops, and other places of business—rose from only 
30 to 85 during the same period.305  
As had been the case for industrial gas use in the city, residents of Shiraz were the 
first in Iran to see piped natural gas service in their homes and businesses, and in the 
following years the city came to be seen as an example for successful gas use to the rest 
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of the country.306 In many ways the history of natural gas utilization in Shiraz anticipated 
the story of gas in Iran’s other major cities in the 1970s, particularly in the prioritization 
of major industrial consumers over the growth of city gas networks by organizations like 
the NIOC as well as the choice by governing authorities to extend service first to city 
neighborhoods that were technically and economically easiest to connect to the country’s 
long distance transportation network. In other ways, however, Shiraz’s early experiences 
differed from those of other cities. In contrast to cities that would be connected later as 
part of enormous systems conceived on a national scale, residents of Shiraz first came to 
use gas in large part due to the commitment of local and provincial authorities to the idea. 
Shiraz’s early experience with gas utilization was thus a product not only of the city’s 
relative proximity to the major oil and gas producing regions of Iran, but also because of 
the early and sustained efforts by local officials to overcome the prioritization of industry 
and on the part of national institutions like the NIOC. 
*** 
By the time Shiraz’s city gas network was being completed, however, the pipeline 
bringing natural gas from Gachsārān to the city was already reaching capacity. 
Recognizing the “daily growth” of natural gas consumption in the city, officials began 
looking for ways to increase the amount of available gas, ultimately adding equipment to 
the Gachsārān refinery sufficient to boost its output to some 30 million cu. ft./day. But 
with demand expected to reach 80 million cu. ft./day within ten years, eventually a new 
and larger pipeline would be needed. That is exactly what happened, and by the end of 
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1971 a new 16-inch line had begun operation and the existing 10-inch line converted to 
transport crude oil to the future Fārs Refinery.307 
Unlike with Shiraz’s original gas pipeline, the new line was not built as a regional 
project, but as part of nation-spanning gas utilization and export project referred to as the 
First Iran Gas Trunkline. Built in the late 1960s and opened early in the following 
decade, IGAT-1 became the backbone of Iranian natural gas exploitation in the following 
decades. Deeply international from its inception, the project began in the mid-1960s 
when the NIOC hired the British firm Iranian Management and Engineering Group, a 
subsidiary of Sir Frederick Snow and Partners, to evaluate the prospects of building a 
pipeline to move associated gas from the Consortium-operated fields to Tehran. IMEG’s 
report, completed in early 1966, envisioned a 28-inch pipe carrying 315 million cubic 
feet of gas per day between Ābādān and Tehran.308 The initial sole focus on domestic 
consumption quickly gave way to the prospects of a larger project that would combine 
the transport of gas to Iranian cities as well as to the Soviet border for export; priority 
would be given for delivery to Iranian cities along the pipeline’s proposed route.309 Part 
of broader policy decisions to diversify Iran’s international political and economic 
relations, the deal that the two countries concluded on 13 January 1966 would form the 
foundation for the entire project and consequently for the use of piped natural gas across 
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a large swath of Iran. The agreement stipulated that Iran would export natural gas to the 
Soviet Union for fifteen years in return for the latter covering the cost of a steel mill, 
machine factory, and a portion of the very pipeline that would carry gas to its border. 
The steel mill, far from incidental, was central to the desire of Iranian officials to 
undertake the project. As far back as 1935, Iranian officials had sought foreign assistance 
for the construction of a steel mill. Long frustrated by the unwillingness of the European 
and American governments to support the creation of an Iranian steel industry, a position 
rooted in the belief that Iran could never hope to compete with established players in 
field,  by the 1960s they had turned to the Soviet Union in order to realize the “long-
standing national goal.”310 Initial Soviet proposals in October 1964 offered aid in return 
for oil concessions in northern Iran, but the flat refusal of the Iranian government to 
consider such options311 prompted more “tempting” offers that took Iranian commodities, 
primarily gas, as payment.312 Negotiations between the two countries were undertaken in 
the fall of 1965 with the Iranian delegation basing its negotiating position on an earlier 
French study on the subject. A deal was concluded on 5 October 1965 in which Soviet 
advisers and workers would aid the Iranian National Steel Corporation to construct the 
mill.313 Construction began in 1967 at a site near Isfahan, coming online with a 
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production capacity of 550,000 tons per year in 1972. The mill’s success prompted plans 
for its expansion to a production capacity of 1.9 million tons per year, but problems in the 
supply of sufficient coal delayed them until 1983.314 
At the time of the pipeline deal’s conclusion in early 1966, there remained 
significant uncertainty surrounding the deal that was accompanied by a lack of consensus 
within the Iranian government as to the wisdom of the plan. While some Iranian officials 
were pleased with the large size of the promised Soviet steel mill and promised delivery 
date of 1971 (subsequently slipping to the following year), others argued that Iran was 
now beholden to the USSR for at least five years, comparing their potential predicament 
to Egypt’s dependence of the Soviet Union for the Aswan Dam project.315 Despite such 
reservations, IMEG was tasked by the NIOC with updating its existing pipeline plan to 
account for the new export requirement. The company quickly amended its original 
proposal to enlarge the pipeline and add a new segment to carry gas to the Soviet border. 
According to IMEG’s new design, each day 1.6 million cubic feet of associated gas 
would be collected from the oil fields at Gachsārān and Āghā Jāri and refined near 
Behbahān, a small city in Iran’s south lying in between the two fields. From there, the gas 
would be transported north via a 42-inch line, providing energy for the cities of Isfahan, 
Kāshān, and Qom before being divided at Sāveh. One branch would then carry gas to 
Tehran and the other to the Soviet border at Āstārā via Qazvin and Rasht. In addition to 
the branch line leading to Shiraz to supply the growing demand for gas among industrial 
314 Ibrāhim Razāqi, Eqtesād-e Iran (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1367), 408-409. 
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and residential consumers, the plan called for small spurs to feed the smaller towns and 
villages lying along the route of the main pipeline. This iteration of IMEG’s proposal 
would form the basis for the entirety of the IGAT-1 program, remaining remarkably 
stable in its overall form despite almost continual turmoil surrounding the particulars of 
its implementation in the following years. Indeed, this early stage was already marked by 
disputes within the Iranian government over different sizes and routes for the pipeline, 
with the Pahlavi Foundation, which represented the financial and business interests of the 
Shah, proposing in conjunction with Bechtel a 40-inch diameter pipe, Minister of the 
Economy Alinaghi Alikhāni suggesting at various times a 40- to 48-inch diameter, and 
still others suggesting the pipeline’s route be altered to run through Tabriz with a separate 
branch to Turkey as well rather than directly to the Soviet Union via Qazvin and Rasht.316 
Such disputes were reflective of the overall complexity of the IGAT-1 program. 
Far more than a single pipeline however large, the project’s fundamental viability was 
tightly woven within the broader industrialization of Iranian society and the requirements 
of foreign actors outside the government’s control. The project’s contours depended on a 
combination of both Soviet and Iranian natural gas needs. What those would ultimately 
be in Iran, however, rested upon complex interactions between broader industrialization 
programs, the possibility of which rested on revenues from an oil industry that was 
largely beholden to the requirements of the Consortium firms that operated it, and the 
availability and price of other fuels like kerosene in the following years. Nor was the 
supply of associated gas for the system a sure thing as it too was tied to a prediction in 
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steadily increasing production within the Consortium-operated fields. Even the ability to 
pay for the steel mill promised by the USSR was dependent upon the successful 
completion of the pipeline project and the ability to transport natural gas to the Soviet 
border; failure to deliver on schedule could necessitate other forms of payment and thus 
threaten other major infrastructure projects like the construction of new roads, 
manufactories, and communication systems.317 
Despite the centrality of the Soviet Union to IGAT-1’s genesis, left unclear was 
the extent of the country’s involvement in the actual design and construction of the 
pipeline and its associated facilities. While consulting engineering firms like IMEG were 
of the opinion that the project needed to be designed in its entirety by a single firm, the 
original announcement of the deal had indicated that “Soviet technical and economic 
assistance will be given…for the construction of parts of the pipeline” and the 
“engineering of the second section [from Sāveh to Āstārā].” The USSR was further 
expected to provide the gas compressors and pumps for the entirety of the main pipeline, 
though IMEG was doubtful of the quality of the equipment the country could provide, 
recommending that they be obtained from American or European firms instead.318 What 
was agreed upon by all, however, was that the Soviet Union would not be supplying the 
necessary pipe for the project because of its own shortages. American diplomats reported 
that instead a “firm policy decision” had been made within the Iranian government, based 
on the relative cost of importing steel versus finished pipe, to construct a mill of 
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sufficient size to produce the pipe needed for the IGAT-1 project. While IMEG and the 
Iranian government had already entered into discussions with the German firm 
Mannesmann regarding such a project, there were significant reservations surrounding 
the advisability of undertaking such a course of action, with some like the representative 
of Williams Brothers, a construction firm with branches both in the United Kingdom and 
Germany and future contractor on the project, arguing that the cost of building a factory 
of sufficient capacity was both cost prohibitive and likely to be underutilized in the years 
following the pipeline’s completion. Others like the managing director of the National 
Petrochemical Company doubted the whole concept of producing large-diameter pipes in 
Iran even in conjunction with a German firm, arguing that “everybody knows” that the 
only country truly possessing such a capability was the United States.319 Through most of 
1966, the question of how best to supply pipe for the IGAT-1 project would remain 
unsettled and in the end it proved to be one of the most significant factors in the 
successes and failures of the project.  
All told, the entirety of the project and all its ancillary factors was thought 
potentially to cost up to one billion dollars, of which only some $286 million was tied to 
promised Soviet credit in work and materials.320 There was no clear plan at the time of 
the initial agreement’s signing for how the Iranian government was to pay for it. The 
main pipeline alone was estimated by various segments of the Iranian government to cost 
somewhere in the range of $300 to $450 million,321 and there were significant other costs 
319 Ibid., 5-6. 
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including the gathering system in the oil fields and the refinery needed to purify the 
collected raw natural gas. The idea of floating national bonds had been proposed by the 
Ministry of the Economy, but there were fears that if Iranians did not embrace the project 
and buy them then that would be interpreted as a repudiation of the government’s 
policies.322 Thus, as would be true for much of the project, the contours of the IGAT-1 
project would be shaped by the need to find foreign financing, strongly influencing the 
firms and nations with which the Iranian officials would engage in their efforts to bring 
the program to a successful conclusion. 
 In March 1966, on the orders of the Shah, the Iranian parliament created the 
National Iranian Gas Company in order to centralize all affairs relating to natural gas in 
Iran and manage the IGAT-1 project. Through coordination with “stakeholder 
organizations” like the NIOC, the Ministry of Power, and the Ministry of Industry and 
Mines, the explicit goal of bringing together an office to manage the treatment, 
transmission, sale, and distribution of natural was to replace the use of oil fuels to the 
greatest extent possible, freeing up them up for export and revenue generation.323 The 
new company was founded as a subsidiary of the NIOC, though the Prime Minister also 
undertook direct oversight through his position as the head of the governing Assembly of 
Shareholders. Staffed by employees transferred from the NIOC as well as foreign 
consultants, the NIGC assumed responsibility for their country’s gas once it had been 
separated from the crude oil alongside which it was extracted, taking charge of mid- and 
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downstream operations.324 In the late 1960s their duties largely translated into negotiating 
and supervising the IGAT-1 project in the form market research, feasibility studies, and 
the choice of contractors for its construction.325 But IGAT-1 was so large and seen as so 
crucial to the development of Iran and the plans of the Iranian government that numerous 
ministries and official organizations were involved in both the negotiations and ultimate 
execution of the project. To coordinate their activities a “high commission for control of 
the plan” was organized to oversee the project, composed of the managing director of the 
NIOC, the chief executive of the Central Bank of Iran, and the managing director of the 
Plan Organization.326 Most major decisions regarding the planning and execution of the 




 One of the first and most significant decisions facing Iranian officials in the 
months after the signing of the January 1966 agreement with the Soviet Union was 
whether or not to produce the pipes needed for the IGAT-1 project domestically, a course 
of action that would necessitate the construction, for the first time, of a pipe mill 
somewhere within the country. Far more than a simple question of technical or financial 
maximization that American observers had alluded to when describing the project, 
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whether or not Iran should invest in the mill and to what extent it could or should be 
relied upon went directly to the heart of the sometimes conflicting motivations that drove 
Iranian officials and their organization when it came to the IGAT-1 program. At stake 
was every aspect of the project, from the pipeline’s carrying capacity to its financing 
arrangements to even the extent to which the project’s own best interests would be 
subordinated to the Iranian government’s broader industrialization goals. 
Within a few weeks of the signing of the agreement between Iran and the Soviet 
Union, officials had begun searching for a source for the pipe needed for the IGAT-1 
project. They concentrated their efforts in Europe, contacting firms in Austria,327 
Czechoslovakia, and Germany.328 Despite the interest of Austrian pipe producers in the 
project,329 the field was quickly winnowed down to German offers to produce the pipe 
within Iran even with persistent doubts on the part of some NIOC officials as to the 
wisdom of relying upon a single “foreign company.”330 The idea of a producing pipes at a 
mill inside Iran quickly became a powerful force and, with the Shah’s personal interest in 
the matter, a “comprehensive report” on the plan’s feasibility was “studied and approved” 
in late May 1966.331 By this point an American entrant, Torrance Machine and 
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Engineering of Los Angeles, a small firm specializing in the construction of pipe mills 
and equipment of their own design for the production of pipes, had also submitted a 
proposal. On. 15 June 1966 NIOC officials assembled in the office of the Prime Minster 
to discuss the competing offers. The German proposal, offered by a group comprised of 
Mannesmann AG and Thyssen AG, was considered a poor prospect, requiring an 
investment of $15 million to produce pipe costing a “very high” $228 per ton. The 
proposal from Torrance was significantly more attractive, requiring only an $8 million 
investment to be able to produce 311,000 tons of pipe per year at price of $199 per ton. 
Such a price was considered to be very competitive with the average price per ton of 
purchased pipe delivered to Bandar Shāhpur (now Bandar Imam Khomeini), the likely 
port of entry for any foreign purchases. With the oil industry’s interest in the project, the 
creation and management of the pipe mill was put under the supervision of the NIOC and 
it was decided that the company and Torrance would enter into negotiations and pursue 
financing through the Export-Import Bank of the United States.332 
Torrance’s proposal described a mill that would utilize imported sheets of steel to 
manufacture 20,000 tons of pipe18- to 42-inches in diameter per month at a site near 
Ahvāz where it could take electricity from the Muhammad Rezā Shah Pahlavi Dam (now 
the Dez Dam).333 The company estimated that the factory could be up and running within 
nine months, producing some 10,000 tons of pipe in its first month of operation before 
ramping up to full-rate production thereafter. The proposal set a target of 315,000 tons of 
332 Letter from Hoveydā to Shah, 4/1252, 25 Khordād 1345, p. 1; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
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pipe, with some 83 percent ($165) of the $199 per ton tied to the costs of steel and its 
transportation to Ahvāz; the remainder went to operating costs and the wages of the 260 
Iranian and 30 foreign employees. In addition to the lower costs associated with both the 
initial investment and the final product price as compared to the Mannesmann-Thyssen 
proposal, Torrance’s offer was deemed “more suitable” for its notably shorter timeline, 
nine months from groundbreaking to initial operation as opposed to twenty-one, a quicker 
ramp to full production, and the ability to produce longer sections of pipe, 65 feet rather 
than 40 feet.334 The nine-month schedule was seen as very ambitious by the IMEG 
evaluators, but confidence was built by Torrance’s established reputation for establishing 
facilities quickly and their willingness to take a twenty percent stake in the facility.335 
Mannesmann-Thyssen’s offer did have certain advantages, most notably a willingness to 
extend credit for the entirety of the project as well as a willingness to supply the 
necessary steel sheets directly.336 While Torrance was willing to invest twenty percent of 
the expected construction costs, they were not willing to extend a line of credit to the 
NIOC nor supply the raw steel from their own factories, leaving it to Iranian officials to 
find both.337 
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In the opinion of IMEG, however, which had been tasked with analyzing the 
proposals, the entire idea of establishing a pipe mill in Iran was suspect. It was their 
opinion that the 
installation of a pipe making factory in Iran, from the perspective of the IGAT-1 plan is 
not affordable (based on the purchase of pipe from abroad) and relying on domestically 
manufactured pipes will possibly delay the work program.338 
Nor were the analysts convinced that the pipe could be supplied for as low as $199 per 
ton, estimating that it might be some ten to fifteen percent higher, enough to make 
manufacturing the needed pipe in Iran more expensive than importing. With a domestic 
and regional market of unknown but likely limited size for large-diameter pipes, an 
additional investment of $2 million would be needed to transition the factory to produce 
for the more robust bazaar for medium-diameter pipes after the completion of the IGAT-
1 project. Therefore from “the perspective of the economy of the IGAT-1 plan,” IMEG 
wrote, “ordering the factory is not justified,” possibly being the cause of delays and 
higher costs. Nonetheless, if one of the goals of the IGAT-1 program was the 
“encouragement and advancement of industries,” as opposed to solely the transport of gas 
to Iranian cities and the Soviet border, and should “the government be willing to tolerate 
damage and danger to the project,” then the construction of a pipe mill in Iran could be 
“justified.” Should the Iranian government wish to move forward with the pipe mill, then 
IMEG estimated that an agreement would need to be reached with Torrance before the 
338 Ibid., 3; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
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end of June 1966 for the mill to be able to supply the majority of the material needed for 
the IGAT-1 project.339 
 At a meeting held amongst high-ranking Iranian officials340 on 16 June 1966, the 
decision was made that the difference in price between pipe manufactured in Iran versus 
purchases abroad was “marginal.” Thus, with  
 
attention to the government’s policy on encouragement of domestic industry and the 
creation of work for Iranian workers, it was decided that action be taken for the 
construction in Iran of the pipe factory proposed by the Torrance Company.341 
 
In response to this decision and the Shah’s order that “immediate action be taken for the 
establishment of the proposed factory” it was decided that ownership, minus the 20 
percent stake Torrance would hold, would be given to the NIOC.342 Production targets for 
the new factory were adjusted as well, with the goal becoming 200,000 tons of pipe 
produced in Iran. The expected remaining 100,000 tons needed for the IGAT pipelines 
would be sourced abroad.343 Two days later on 18 June, the order was given for a letter of 
intent to be signed between the NIOC and Torrance committing the latter to “fully 
construct, install, and commission” the mill within twelve months, which was signed 
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within three days, and a founding charter for the Ahvāz Pipe Mill Company be drafted 
and deposited, officially committing the Iranian government to the project.344 
The choice to establish a pipe mill in Iran was a crucial one for the IGAT-1 
project, one that carried significant financial and scheduling risk for the program as a 
whole. That the decision was made was reflective of the fact that IGAT-1 project was 
never solely about the provision of energy to Iranian consumers. It was embedded in a 
larger matrix of developmental ambitions on the part of Iranian officials and the 
governmental organization of which they were part. From conception as part of a deal for 
a steel mill to implementation through a pipe factory carrying significant risk, the years-
long unfolding of the IGAT-1 project was thus never divorced from the broader stakes of 
Iranian industrialization. 
 Those developmental ambitions quickly manifested themselves in a debate on the 
scope of the pipe mill project and the maximum size of pipes that it should be able to 
produce. While IMEG’s design for primary IGAT-1 pipeline called for a maximum 
diameter of 42 inches, further study of the pipe mill had found that with an extra 
$400,000 investment in the factory, machinery could be purchased that would enable the 
production of 48-inch diameter pipe.345 Senior Iranian leadership like Prime Minister 
Hoveydā was tempted by the prospect of possessing one of the few facilities able to 
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produce such large-diameter pipe346 and IMEG was again directed to evaluate the newly 
altered plans. The $400,000 price tag was not inclusive of the different tooling needed to 
produce such large pipes, but without firm orders for the material, the evaluators judged 
that delaying the additional expense for tooling was the most prudent course of action. 
Few orders were expected in the near future for the use of larger pipes was difficult for 
contractors and “experience in the use of pipe above 42” diameter” was “very 
limited…and the difficulties of handling it are considerable.”347 There was nonetheless 
thought that Iranian development projects would need very large diameter pipe in the 
future and acquiring the capability to produce such material could offer significant 
efficiencies.348 
Despite the worries of IMEG’s engineers regarding the advisability of expanding 
the pipe mill to handle large-diameter pipes, the Soviet delegation sent to negotiate the 
IGAT-1 project was pressing for the size of the main pipeline to be increased from 42 to 
48 inches, offering to take the extra gas that the line would transport. Soviet experts saw a 
48-inch pipeline as the most “suitable,” particularly as there was already discussion of
expanding the pipe mill. Since the original choice to use a 42-inch pipe had been rooted 
in part in the amount of gas to be exported to the USSR, Iranian officials were willing to 
consider the change, but their adoption of the modification would depend on 
346 Report from Nāser Manuchehri to Eqbāl, Meeting Minutes on “Construction of the Pipe Mill in Iran,” 1-
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1—The amount of investment for the government of Iran. 2—The supply of needed 
sheets of metal and the possibility of installation of large 48-inch pipes that would require 
importation of machinery from the West. 3—The period it would take to implement the 
plan and the date of the commencement of delivery of gas to the Soviet Union.349 
 
In any case, moving to produce 48-inch pipes would involve a considerable set of 
complications, not least that another round of study and engineering would be required. 
Nor was the necessary equipment for handling such large pipe present in Iran, 
necessitating the purchase of new equipment from abroad. Most significantly, no matter 
how much study was performed or where the equipment was obtained, the larger pipe 
was harder and more expensive to work with, potentially delaying the pipeline’s 
completion and putting the success of the entire project at risk.350 
 Delay was a significant worry for Iranian officials, and their efforts to avoid it 
extended to the search for financing for the pipe mill as well. In late June 1966 it was 
decided, despite the opposition of the Central Bank,351 that the original plan to obtain 
financing through the Export-Import Bank of the United States would take far too long 
and that working with American commercial banks was a better course of action.352 With 
Torrance providing some $800,000 and the NIOC $3.2 million in cash for the mill, that 
left approximately $7.5 million in needed financing.353 All told, the total cost of the 
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construction of the mill itself—at this point some $11 million, including the additional 
cost of the medium-pipe facilities—was a relatively small portion of the total amount 
needed for the IGAT-1 project and it was felt that even private banks would be able to 
accommodate the request.354 
Far more significant was the cost of the steel sheets needed to supply the pipe 
mill. Financing needs were expected to reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars for 
the steel, and Iranian officials were already negotiating with European and Japanese firms 
and governments on the matter.355 The expense of the sheeted steel meant that its 
purchase could not be separated from the broader financing of the IGAT-1 project and 
firms from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy quickly pushed their way to the fore of 
the bidding process largely because Iranian hopes to gain access to financing from their 
parent governments and the large amount of other material expected to be procured 
there.356 This ran counter to previous decisions to put bids out for tender, but the 
overwhelming need for financing overrode previous concerns.357 During a trip to the 
three countries in June 1966, Iranian negotiators met with representatives of both private 
firms and government officials, seeking not only the purchase of equipment but 
significant lines of credit lasting a decade or longer. Even with IMEG estimating that the 
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IGAT-1 pipelines would require 340,000 tons of pipe and hopeful that some 320,000 tons 
could be produced in Ahvāz, firms in the three nations were not interested in selling steel, 
preferring instead to try fruitlessly to convince the Iranian negotiators to abandon their 
plans for a pipe mill and buy pipes from them instead.358 
In the end, six different British, French, and Japanese firms would be contracted 
to supply steel for the plant359 and by the fall of 1966 the NIOC had chosen a site for the 
factory and was on the verge of purchasing it.360 But by October of that year significant 
disagreements had developed between the NIOC and Torrance. The American company 
had been refusing the NIOC’s request that their contract stipulate that failure on the part 
of Torrance to meet specified targets would be sufficient to invoke guarantees without 
going through legal or arbitration processes. While Iranian officials were concerned about 
their upfront payments of $4.27 million and sought assurances of their ability to recover 
it should the project go awry, they were more concerned that complications could delay 
the entire IGAT-1 program and wished to be able to easily replace Torrance should 
problems arise.361 Knowing that the Iranian government feared delay, Torrance resisted 
their demands by extending negotiations until the lines of credit that had been made 
available were about to expire and threatening to undo months of work. To avoid such an 
outcome, Iranian negotiators accepted Torrance’s position and on 25 October 1966 a 
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contract for the construction of the Ahvāz Pipe Mill was concluded, though later 
complaints to the American embassy prompted the U.S. State Department to pressure the 
company to amend the contract to the NIOC’s liking.362 
Despite the opposition of IMEG to the prospect of supplying IGAT-1’s pipe needs 
from a domestic manufactory, by the fall of 1966 Iranian officials, driven by broader 
developmental goals that extended beyond a natural gas pipeline, had fully committed to 
just such a course of action. The debates and negotiations that had led to Iran’s signing of 
a construction contract with Torrance were far from unconnected to those that would 
shape IGAT-1 in its totality. They instead demonstrated some of the most salient factors 
that would shape the project, including the importance of long term industrialization 
goals in the thinking of Iranian officials and their willingness to accept significant risk to 
achieve them; the deep dependence of the NIOC and other Iranian ministries on foreign 
expertise, credit, and manufacturing for nearly all aspects of the project; and the 
intertwining of technical and financial decision making.  
*** 
Design and planning for the primary IGAT-1 pipeline began soon after the initial 
agreement had been signed between Iran and the Soviet Union. During the spring of that 
year Iranian officials worked with IMEG consultants to devise a scheme by which to best 
manage what was understood to be a long and complicated process. This extended to 
their own design efforts, and by May 1966 it was decided that the “work will be divided 
into convenient sections,” as with a “project of this size it follows that the whole of the 
362 Ibid., 4-5. 
158 
 
engineering and preparation of specifications cannot possibly be finished in a short 
time.”363 Far from a mere convenience, the logical divisions chosen in these early stages 
would shape the entirety of how IGAT-1 would be contracted and constructed. IMEG 
determined that the pipeline project was best divided into sections related to the gas 
gathering system, the main pipeline, distribution networks, and ancillary services, each 
further subdivided into smaller units. The main pipeline, for example, had sections from 
the then-expected collection point of Behbahān to Isfahan, Isfahan to Sāvah, and Sāveh to 
Āstārā, with spurs running to Qom, Kāshān, and Tehran.364 While these sections were to 
be treated and let equally, there would quickly come to be a distinction made between the 
southern portion that ran between the southern gas fields and Sāveh and then a northern 
portion from Sāveh to the Soviet border, one that exactly mirrored the original plan to 
transport gas to Iran’s cities and the later extension of the line to carry exports to the 
Soviet Union as well. In practice the southern portion of the pipeline would be given to 
European firms for construction and the northern to the Soviet Union, a decision that 
would have important consequences in the following years. 
 The extensive foreign financing that was expected to be needed for IGAT-1 
exerted tremendous influence over the project’s planning because of the fact that “credit 
for construction and installation can only be generated in the country of origin of the 
materials involved.”365 This restricted the choice of suppliers to countries whose 
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governments were willing and able to extend credit worth hundreds of millions of dollars 
to Iran. While certain more complicated financing schemes not tied to countries of origin 
were deemed possible, they were felt too difficult to be worth pursuing. Furthermore, due 
to the size and complexity of the project, IMEG considered it “unlikely that any one firm 
would be considered qualified for both the supply and construction of any section” of the 
project and they therefore encouraged interested firms into national groups that combined 
suppliers and construction contractors.366 They proposed that the NIOC request bids from 
groups based in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, 
chosen because, unlike Japan which was also considered, there existed both competitive 
suppliers and firms that would “qualify for acceptance on the IGAT bid.”367 
 In early July 1966 it was decided that IMEG, as the primary designer of the 
pipeline, would inquire after its major components in the selected countries, aiming to 
find the lowest possible price.368 It was considered “essential to place certain critical 
material on order before installation and construction contracts can be let” as IMEG and 
the NIOC had chosen an ambitious schedule for the project.369 Pipe for the Behbahān to 
Isfahan and the Isfahan to Sāveh segments, for example, needed to be ordered by mid-
July 1966 in order to be available for construction scheduled to begin in December 1966 
and May 1967 respectively. Anticipated construction times were long as well, with the 
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369 I.J. Bowler, “IGAT – Note on Procedure to be adopted for the letting of construction and supply 
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line from Behbahān to Isfahan expected to take nearly two years to build and Isfahan to 
Sāveh nearly eighteen months. The northern portion of the line was no different, with 
initial orders needing to be placed quickly for a nearly two-year period of construction 
scheduled to begin August 1967. Similar timeframes for ordering and construction were 
expected for all aspects of the project, from gas treatment equipment to compressors to 
telecommunications. Rather than a strict sequential unfolding of the project’s 
construction, IGAT-1 and its associated systems of gas gathering, treatment, and 
distribution expected to be built with significant concurrency. Most portions were to 
begin construction some time in 1967, a few as early as the fall of 1966, and none later 
than mid-1968, all with an eye to bringing the system to life in 1970.370 
Through the summer of 1966 the careful attention to scheduling was accompanied 
by detailed analyses of potential vendors and contractors from the previously selected 
countries. By this point the IGAT-1 system’s physical structure was beginning to come 
into focus. The gathering system would encompass a network of pipes of varying size 
linking the well heads to a gas treatment plant before being compressed, via the “largest 
ever built” turbo compressor, and injected into the main line. As would be true for the 
majority of work on the system’s southern sections, most of companies being considered 
for this section were French and British.371 The pipeline was to be comprised of four 
major sections: two 42-inch diameter segments from Behbahān to Isfahan and the Isfahan 
370 IMEG, “Iranian Gas Trunkline for N.I.O.C.,” no document number, undated, p. 1-2; Attached to letter 
I.J. Bowler to Nikpey, no document number, 4 July 1966; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz.
371 “IGAT: Note on possible sources of materials and construction Contractors discussed by Project 
Stations,” no document number, 30 June 1966, p. 1-2; Attached to letter I.J. Bowler to Nikpey, no 
document number, 4 July 1966; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
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to Sāveh with spurs to Qom, Kāshān, and Isfahan; a 38-inch section from Sāveh to 
Āstārā; and a 28-inch spur from Sāveh to Tehran. European firms like Williams Brothers 
and Entrepose dominated the list of firms deemed potentially suitable for the construction 
of the gas gathering system and the main pipeline. The latter was particularly 
troublesome as there were “very few pipeline contractors with the necessary experience 
in large diameter high tensile pipe” able to handle the “considerable technical problems” 
that they presented. In many ways the main IGAT-1 pipeline was on the forefront of 
pipeline technology and engineering, being far larger than most and expected to cross 
hundreds of miles of very difficult and mountainous terrain. In the summer of 1966 only 
130 miles of high-pressure gas lines of 42-inch diameter had been built in the world, and 
those lengths ran over “easy country.”372 Not all of the work was expected to be given to 
firms based in Western Europe. Despite the opposition of IMEG to the prospect, rooted in 
perceived technical deficiencies,373 the Soviet Union remained the likely supplier of 
compressors for the primary pipeline. Further, while nearly every aspect of the major 
gathering, refining, and transmitting sections of the project were to be given to non-
Iranian companies, it was “recommended” that work on the city gate stations—the 
facilities where the high pressures used to transport gas very long distances through the 
primary pipeline network were released in order to make it ready for local distribution 
networks that used lower pressures—for Tehran, Isfahan, Kāshān, and Qom as well as the 
industrial distribution networks for those cities be given to domestic contractors with the 
372 Ibid., 3. 
373 Meeting minutes, no document number, 12 Tir 1345, p. 2; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
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cooperation of the NIGC.374 These were not the only Iranian companies that could see 
benefit from the construction of the project as it was expected that  
 
as much opportunity as possible should be taken of local manufacture for IGAT...[as 
there] are a whole variety of items such as structural steel work, low pressure vessels, 
tanks, plumbing components and perhaps heat exchangers and so on which with careful 
attention during the design stage could be fabricated in Iran.375 
 
All told, IMEG expected the construction costs for the IGAT-1 project to amount to 
$327.4 million376 and involve numerous suppliers and contractors from around the world. 
Largely unaccounted for in this analysis, however, was the Soviet Union. 
 Negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union were still ongoing come April 
1967. Despite the extensive work that had already been undertaken in the previous year 
regarding the design and planning of the IGAT-1 system, discussions regarding even the 
most basic of choices like the amount of gas to be delivered were still ongoing. Soviet 
and Iranian negotiators had already agreed to the delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of 
gas per year to the USSR but were still discussing whether to raise that figure by an 
additional 20 billion cubic meters per year, an amount that might necessitate the 
construction of a second pipeline to run alongside IGAT-1.377 Nor was the route of the 
main IGAT line settled, as Soviet negotiators pressed again for an alteration of the route 
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to run through Zanjān and Tabriz rather than Qazvin and Āstārā. Such would be far from 
a simple alteration. The shift would add approximately 295 kilometers to the distance 
traveled, a decision that would stress the project’s supply of pipes as well as the 
capability of the compressor stations on the line. Iranian negotiators resisted the 
alteration, arguing that it would significantly delay the line’s opening in 1970. They were 
more open to the idea of a second line, though they emphasized that “the construction of 
a second pipeline was not just for the transmission of gas to the Soviet Union,” but also 
for “future plans…that natural gas be used as fuel in the cities and villages along the 
route…in the west of Iran,” demonstrating that the logics that had originally inspired the 
IGAT-1 project continued to operate amongst Iranian decisionmakers.378 
*** 
Also remaining unsettled in 1967 was the precise source of natural gas for the 
pipeline. Despite Soviet efforts to push for gas prospecting in Iran’s northern regions, it 
was long expected that the system would be fed with associated gas produced in the 
Consortium-operated oil fields. While flared gas was believed to be capable of meeting 
the original demand associated with IMEG’s purely domestic design, it was not clear 
whether it would also be enough to supply the agreed upon amount to the Soviet 
Union.379 IMEG’s original plan had envisioned an internal Iranian demand of some 200 
million cubic feet per day in 1970 rising to 400 million in 1976, to which was added 1050 
378 Ibid. 4-5; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
379 American Embassy Tehran to Department of State, Telegram 66, 28 July 1966, p. 1-2; file INCO-IRON 
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million cubic feet per day for export.380 In order to meet the demand of some 1400 
million cubic feet per day, the Consortium firms considered three potential options, all 
employing associated gas from the Gachsārān, Āghā Jāri, and Mārun oil fields after it had 
passed through existing and planned liquid gas separation units. Distinguishing the three 
options were the number of such units at each field and, ultimately, the total volume of 
gas available daily, the amount of liquid gas produced, and the total costs. In all cases the 
remaining lean gas would be passed to an Iranian gas refinery for treatment and the 
excess flared. Deemed most suitable was a scheme that drew most heavily from 
Gachsārān, with Āghā Jāri and Mārun playing lesser roles.381 
The use of associated gas from the Consortium-operated fields posed some 
difficulties, for while the NIOC was legally entitled to the use of gas for domestic 
consumption, any export projects required Consortium approval. Nor was the 
consultants’ concern for the production of liquid gas a coincidence. While the 
Consortium companies were willing to consider accommodating the needs of the project, 
there were nonetheless disputes regarding Consortium desires to produce liquid gas from 
the associated natural gas that was expected to be fed into the main IGAT-1 pipeline. 
This did not sit easily with Iranian officials, who angrily responded that since 1954 
the NIOC had desired that the Consortium members use the southern gas resources for 
the production of liquid gas, and they had claimed that for lack of a sufficient market they 
380 Iranian Oil Exploration and Producing Company, “A Comparison of Three Proposals to Meet the IGAT 
Demand in 1970, Masjed-e-Suleyman, 14th March 1967,” no document number, 14 March 1967, p. 1-2; A 
Comparison of Three Proposals to Meet the IGAT Demand in 1970, Masjed-e-Suleyman, 14th March 1967 
(65067), BP Archive, University of Warwick. 
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would not undertake such action. Now that the [Iranian] government has found a market 
they now claim it.382 
IMEG supported their position, arguing that without any such oversight it would be 
difficult to know the exact chemical characteristics of the gas, something that might 
shorten the lifespan of the pipeline.383 Ultimately, IGAT-1’s gas gathering system was 
designed so that gas produced at the wellhead was piped to natural gas liquid separation 
units to remove heavier hydrocarbons like propane and butane which were in turn sent to 
facilities in Bandar Māhshahr for the production of liquid gas for both export and Iran’s 
domestic market. 384 The remaining gas, stripped of its heavier elements, was then 
transported to a natural gas refinery at Bid Boland. Constructed as part of the IGAT 
project between 1968 and 1970 by the British firm Costain & Press at a cost of $44 
million,385 Bid Boland would become one of the “largest and most modern” gas refineries 
in the world and the “central core of the Iranian gas industry,” dehydrating and treating 
the remaining sour gas to remove the acidic hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide.386 Once 
treated to specification at Bid Boland,387 the gas was then injected into the primary 
IGAT-1 pipeline for transport to Iranian cities and the Soviet border. 
382 Meeting Minutes, no document number, 12 Tir 1345, p. 2; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz va Enteqāl-e 
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*** 
By late November 1967, some 90 percent of the project’s design work had been 
completed, including the surveying, routing, and designing of the primary pipeline, 
gathering system, and gas treatment facilities. Also completed was the design for the 
compression system and the choice of necessary equipment, though significant alterations 
had been made to this subsystem. At the urging of Soviet experts, the decision had been 
made to install all the compressors at once rather than in stages as had been originally 
planned, a course of action that would pose significant challenges for completing the 
pipeline on schedule. Proceeding apace with the design work was the sourcing of 
materials, and some $108 million worth had been ordered to be delivered to the port at 
Bandar Shāhpur; from there agreements had been made with Iran’s railroad to deliver 
pipe to the construction sites and steel to the Ahvāz Pipe Mill.388 A large number of 
contractors had been chosen as well, most notably the French firm Entrepose for the 
construction of 400 kilometers of 42-inch primary pipeline between the Zagros 
Mountains and Kuh-e Namak near Sāveh, a 110 kilometer branch line to Kāshān and 
Qom, and 45 kilometer spur to Isfahan; Williams Brothers Germany for 147.5 kilometers 
of 16- to 42-inch pipe for the gathering system; Williams Brothers Great Britain for 169 
kilometers of 42-inch pipeline through the Zagros Mountains, an extremely difficult 
stretch; and Costain for the Bid Boland gas refinery. Contracts had also been concluded 
online edition, 2016, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/natural-gas-industry-in-iran 
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167 
with a host of other firms for various ancillary services, including Nesbi Naqsheh 
Bardāri, the first private mapping company in Iran, hired to survey the route between 
Kuh-e Namak and Āstārā. Conspicuous among the hired firms was IMEG, retained for 
services for the “design, engineering, logistics, management, examination, consultation, 
cooperation, and planning for the Iran Gas Trunkline” as well as the 16-inch branch line 
to Shirāz.389 With the exception of some important yet ultimately auxiliary services, Iran 
was entirely dependent on foreign firms for the IGAT-1 program. As true as that was for 
the actual construction of the line and its associated facilities, few firms were as central as 
IMEG to the project. From its initial conception as an endeavor aimed at purely meeting 
Iran’s growing energy needs to its adaptation for export delivery to all the scheduling, 
engineering, and design work entailed in meeting those goals, IMEG was given 
responsibility. As Iranian as IGAT-1 was in its motivations—from a desire to utilize a 
wasted national resource to a focus on domestic energy consumers to its role as an engine 
of industrialization—in terms of its actual engineering and design, the project was as 
much IMEG’s as anyone’s. 
Despite construction work already getting underway on the southern portion of 
the line by late 1967—Williams Brothers Germany had cleared 50 kilometers of pathway 
for the gathering system and Entrepose likewise for the main pipeline—negotiations 
between Iran and the Soviet Union had stalled. Even with “lengthy” and “detailed” 
discussions being held in both Moscow and Tehran, the expected contracts for the 
construction of the line between Kuh-e Namak and Āstārā and the provision of turbo 
389 Ibid., 2-4. 
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compressors for the pipeline’s pressurization had not yet been signed, causing Iranian 
officials to open up discussions with Entrepose to take over construction of the northern 
segment as well.390 As early as the spring of 1966, Iranian officials had repeatedly 
impressed upon Soviet negotiators that their desired schedule for the IGAT project was 
extremely tight, but as late as October 1967 Soviet delegates continued to refuse to 
advance final work plans or personnel requirements. At issue was the division of work. 
Early on it had been decided that NIOC, likely through the services of a third party later 
decided as Entrepose, would be responsible for “a large series of auxiliary tasks” that 
would accompany the construction of the line. Soviet equipment and personnel would 
only be tasked with actual installation and welding of the line, by this point enlarged from 
thirty-eight to forty inches in diameter.391 Delays further continued as the Soviet 
representatives sought to personally review the entire route with senior Entrepose 
engineers. In November 1967 negotiations almost broke down over the Iranian 
delegation’s flat refusal to accept Soviet demands regarding worker housing in Iran, 
including the construction of neighborhoods for workers and their families in cities like 
Qazvin and Rasht, the provision of air conditioners, and various accommodations to 
ensure the safety of families and “maidens.”392 
With such breakdowns threatening the entire project, in the following months 
negotiations were elevated to the ambassadorial level. By that point, Soviet delay had 
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thrown off the scheduled contract signing by nearly two years and the original agreement 
signed in January 1966 that had called upon the Soviet Union to perform advisory and 
training work as well as deliver equipment was scrapped in favor of negotiating a new 
one focused solely on the construction of the Sāveh-Āstārā and Sāveh-Tehran lines and 
the delivery of compressors for the entirety of the main pipeline.393 By February 1968 
talks were again deadlocked over costs. Iranian negotiators had offered $58.7 million 
while the Soviet delegates had been asking for $63.5 million, a difference large enough to 
prompt Iranian officials to begin thinking of alternative arrangements.394 At root the issue 
was whether Iranian payments for the work on the pipeline’s northern section would be 
tied to the amounts paid to Williams Brothers and Entrepose for their sections. Iranian 
negotiators considered their offer more than generous, as the original price negotiated 
with the European firms reflected their need to access credit, the expenses associated with 
using it, and a ten percent profit for the firms.395 For their part, Soviet representatives 
argued that the circumstances of the work were different, particularly the need to clear 
forests and cross rice fields. Eventually, however, the Soviet ambassador acknowledged 
that their original offer had been high due to their lack of experience in undertaking 
foreign contracts and that “friends of the Soviet Union” should not “pay the penalty” for 
such failings.396 The Iranians too altered their position, offering to add ancillary costs like 
393 Meeting Minutes, Document 4/4646, 1 Bahman 1346; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz. 
394 Memorandum from Eqbāl to Prime Minister, 1/gl/1784, 28 Bahman 1346, p. 1-4; Tarh-e Ehdās 
Shāhluleh-ye Gāz va Enteqāl-e Ān beh Shoravi (230-9079), Riāsat-e Jomhuri, National Archives of Iran, 
Tehran. 
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the construction of branch roads, the transportation of equipment within Iran, and the 
extra expenses associated with crossing 104 kilometers of rice fields and clearing 53 
kilometers of forest to the overall contract price.397 
 The overriding concern for Iranian officials remained that the negotiations be 
concluded quickly “since an important portion of the Fourth [Development] Plan,” 
meaning the steel mill and portions of the IGAT-1 system, was slated to be undertaken 
“with the cooperation of the Soviet Union.”398 There was a third obstacle to an 
agreement, however: the amount of foreign exchange Iran would need pay. Throughout 
the IGAT-1 planning and construction process Iranian officials had steadfastly sought to 
minimize the amount of payments that would need to be made in hard currency, 
preferring instead to use lines of credit wherever possible and minimize  the potential risk 
to the budgets of the country’s broader developmental initiatives.399 It was therefore the 
preference of Iranian officials that the Soviet Union assume responsibility for the 
northern portion of the line and subcontract portions of their work or, failing that, to 
reduce the amount of hard currency the Iranian would be required to pay.400 Soviet 
officials were unwilling to reduce the amount of foreign exchange they required, though 
in March 1968 they did agree to take payment for the line’s turbo compressors—34 of 
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them housed in eight stations, each generating 11,500 horsepower—in the form of 
credit,401 some $50 million to be repaid in the form of natural gas.402 
By the spring of 1968, however, with construction on the northern portion of the 
pipeline scheduled to begin in July rather than January of that year, the entire IGAT-1 
project had been delayed by some six to ten months, pushing the initial date of operation 
from January to October 1970. But delays in their negotiations with the Soviet Union 
were far from the only difficulty facing the IGAT-1 program. While it had been 
originally expected that only 25,000 tons of pipe would need to be imported for the 
project with the remainder produced by the Ahvāz Pipe Mill, delays in finalizing the 
contract with Torrance had raised the import requirement to 100,000 tons. The production 
machinery had only just arrived and was in the process of being installed as of March 
1968, but in any case it was the opinion of Japanese experts hired to address the facility’s 
problems that the factory would never produce more than 12,000 tons of pipe per month, 
far less than the 20,000 tons originally expected.403 The mill’s output hit early snags as 
well and it would not be until July 1968 that it could even hit its reduced production rate 
of 12,000 tons of pipe per month, putting it significantly behind schedule and increasing 
the foreign orders of pipe to some 242,000 tons.404 All told, the Ahvāz Pipe Mill 
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Company only produced some 70,000 of the approximately 500,000 tons of pipe needed 
for the IGAT-1 project, with the remainder imported from Europe and Japan at 
significant extra expense.405 Imported pipes were not without defect either, however, as 
“brittling” had developed “on three inches at the ends of 42” pipe supplied by Japan,” 
discovered only after 54 kilometers had already been laid, putting Williams Brothers 
behind schedule.406 
In the end, problems with scheduling and the pipe mill pushed the IGAT-1 project 
overbudget and behind schedule. Iranian officials and IMEG consultants had faced 
considerable challenges with the program. Difficulties included the “lack of any kind of 
stable foundation for the design,” uncertainty regarding the exact source of associated 
natural gas, the need to place orders for major components without having completed the 
design phase, the complicated financial arrangements of the project and the need to 
reduce outlays of hard currency, and the “integration and welding” of numerous 
stakeholders and contractors.407 One of the most significant was the decision to increase 
the size of the 500 kilometer section of the main pipeline from a 38- to a 40-inch 
diameter, a decision that greatly increased the costs of steel and pipe. At other times 
events beyond the control of Iranian officials played a role, as happened with the Suez 
ambiguity regarding when and how much pipe was ordered, I have chosen to accept the American 
diplomat’s reporting, knowing that the ultimate figure of imported pipe was neither. 
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Canal was shut due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pushing the price of importing steel and 
pipe higher than expected.408 Considering that unlike many large projects, IGAT-1 had its 
designing, materials ordering, and construction combined into a single “very compressed 
plan,”409 its successful completion in 1970 was reflective of the commitment of the 
Iranian government to the project. 
Growing from IMEG’s initial estimate of roughly $350 million, by early 1969 
IGAT-1’s total cost was estimated to have doubled to nearly $700 million dollars,410 a 
figure that would ultimately stand as the project’s final tally.411 Despite the reported 
anger of the Shah upon hearing this figure,412 the project was nonetheless considered a 
success by those who worked on it. Sa’id Naqavi, a senior NIOC engineer working on the 
project, wrote that “unlike what is common for plans similar to IGAT-1, from the 
beginning…[Iranian officials] point less to aspects of economics and profits and…more 
in the direction of correct implementation and timeliness.”413 The project’s significantly 
higher costs initially made the domestic gas market, where prices were set higher than 
those earned via export, much more important than originally envisioned for recouping 
the investment. Nonetheless, in the wake of the 1973 Oil Shock and the quadrupling of 
oil prices, the Iranian government successfully demanded an increase in the price that the 
 
408 Ibid., 5. 
409 Ibid., 1. 
410 Ibid., 14. 
411 Pirooz Ashraf, “Natural Gas Industry in Iran,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, online edition, 2016, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/natural-gas-industry-in-iran (accessed on 11 May 2020). 
412Ibid. 
413 Report from Sa’id Naqavi for the NIOC to Mehdi Sami’I of the Plan Organization, 2. 
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Soviet Union was paying for the gas it received, going from 30.8 to 57 cents per 1000 
cubic feet, and again to 76 cents in 1978. All told, between 1970 and the cessation of 
exports in 1980, Iran sent some 70 billion cubic meters of gas to the Soviet Union, 
earning approximately $1.2 billion.414 
*** 
From its start in the mid-1950s through the completion of the IGAT-1 pipeline in 
the early 1970s, the efforts of Iranian officials to utilize their country’s natural gas 
resources encompassed a broad array of initiatives including petrochemical plants, long-
distance gas transmission lines, and experimental distribution systems. Far from being a 
product of only the NIOC and NIGC, the broader developmental project of gas was the 
product of numerous governmental agencies. Institutions like the Ministry of the 
Economy and the office of the Prime Minister were instrumental in the decision making 
and negotiating processes of both national programs like IGAT-1 and regional ones like 
the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory. None of Iran’s grand natural gas projects, 
however, were entirely the product of Iranian institutions. Particularly for IGAT-1, where 
IMEG played an essential role in nearly every aspect of the program’s conceptualization, 
design, and implementation, Iran’s natural gas projects encapsulated the expertise and 
effort of dozens of firms from around the world. Far more than merely demonstrating 
Iran’s reliance on outside aid for its industrialization policies, objects like the IGAT-1 
pipeline and its attendant systems were the physical condensation of that expertise, the 
414 Pirooz Ashraf, “Natural Gas Industry in Iran,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, online edition, 2016, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/natural-gas-industry-in-iran (accessed on 12 May 2020). 
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finances of numerous banks, and the politics of numerous states from around the world. 
Ownership of these infrastructural systems and the motivations for their construction 
were fundamentally Iranian, born of a desire among Iranian officials to both capture and 
exploit the natural and national wealth of their country and further its industrialization, 
taking steps where decades of negotiation with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the 
later the Consortium firms had failed. They were also more than that, a way to link the 
prehistoric hydrocarbon deposits of Iran’s south to emerging urban polities hundreds of 
miles away hungry to partake in an energy-intensive future. 
As the story of natural gas consumption in Shiraz also demonstrated, the 
dynamics of gas utilization in Iran were strongly influenced by provincial and local 
actors. It was there that tensions first arose between the technically and economically 
efficient prioritization of urban and industrial consumers and the political and national 
claims of ordinary Iranians to the benefits of gas energy. It was only through the 
sustained efforts of figures like the governor of Fars and the mayor of Shiraz over years 
of time that the city finally saw Iran’s first city gas network. While national organizations 
like the NIOC focused heavily on the large-scale consumers like the fertilizer plant and 
other industrial units in the city, a pattern that would be repeated across much of Iran in 
the 1970s in the wake of IGAT-1’s completion, there was a parallel movement to bring 
the benefits of natural gas energy to a broader swath of the population. In later years, in 
response the pattern of gas distribution across Iran, that same tension between the large, 
nation-spanning projects that were emphasized by the Pahlavi state institutions and the 
desire of small-scale Iranian consumers to use gas would be a driver of important and 







Discursive Constructions of Gas in the 






In his 1961 book Mission for my Country, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of 
Iran, wrote that the “growing role of oil and gas presents us Persians with a great 
opportunity,” one that would enable Iranians to “help raise the standards of living both 
here [in Iran] and all over the globe” and reassert “our national sovereignty.”415 The 
Shah’s words, emphasizing the twin goals of development and national independence, 
reflected the significant hopes that many Iranians projected onto their country’s 
petroleum resources. Even more than oil, natural gas came to represent profound 
imaginings of Iran’s future. In the decades prior to the 1979 revolution, the country’s 
exploitation of natural gas and the technological systems that enabled its use became 
fertile grounds for political meaning making. Imagined by some of Iran’s most influential 
figures was a future powered by gas, one where Iranian industries and citizens drew 
 
415 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for my Country (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
1961), 289. 
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deeply upon the natural wealth that lay trapped under their country’s earth and burned it 
as fuel for an ever-intensifying modernity. 
In the speeches of Iranian officials, their interviews with the press, and the pages 
of publications from organizations like the Ministry of Petroleum and the National 
Iranian Oil Company, an imaginative tale about Iran was narrated. It was a dramatic story 
of national progress, one told through a lexicon of development that found consistent 
expression in a triumvirate of image, word, and statistic.416 Political performance 
underlay nearly every aspect of that imaginary. Whether it was the soaring rhetoric of 
quick progress, rapid economic growth, and increased living standards; the striking 
photographs of sophisticated technologies and towering constructions; or the presentation 
of the numerical embodiments of the enormous distances traversed and volumes moved 
by Iran’s gas system, the spectacle of gas was routinely tied to the Shah and his policies, 
serving as a potent legitimator for the imperial government.417 At root, the sociotechnical 
imaginary of gas that was at work within the Pahlavi government shaped what was built 
and when, while at the same time revealing a vision of what Iran’s social order should 
416 Saying that “every policy issue…has a culture,” William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani argue that 
different policy positions are expressed through “media packages,” collections of “metaphors, 
catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices.” Organized around a central idea 
or “frame,” packages offer “a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and 
positions in shorthand.” Regarding the policy issue at hand—whether Iranian natural gas should be used 
and how—several genres of photography, particular turns of phrase, and an almost rote repetition of 
important statistics served this purpose. For more see William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media 
Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach,” American Journal of 
Sociology 95, no. 1 (July 1989), 2-3. 
417 Ali M. Ansari has demonstrated that during the period of Iran’s White Revolution, running from 1963 
until the 1979 revolution, the imperial government sought to re-root the monarchy’s legitimacy in the 
promises of developmental modernism. In this reading, the modernization policies of the Pahlavi state were 
“fundamentally a political programme” (p. 2). In contrast, this chapter argues that such a disentanglement 
of developmental goals and political legitimacy is impossible. For more see Ali M. Ansari, “The Myth of 
the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ‘Modernization’ and the Consolidation of Power,” Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 37, no. 3 (July 2001): 1-24. 
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become in the modern age. Made largely invisible were those who labored to build the 
vast constructions that would produce and carry Iranian gas energy. Their absence was 
filled by the materiality of infrastructure itself, seemingly autonomous agglomerations of 
metal and concrete birthed and directed by Iran’s political leadership and expert 
classes.418 
For the experts who worked in Iran’s state ministries and petroleum sector during 
that time, gas was similarly more than a means to supply energy to Iranian society, 
serving political ends as much as it did technical. The edifices of steel and concrete used 
to capture, purify, and transport gas would be proof of the ability of the Pahlavi state to 
make Iranian prosperity, marking the modernity for which the technologists aspired as 
not only one of technical advancement, but also one created by Iranians for their own 
purposes. Iranian officials, and the foreign experts they employed, may have been 
constrained by the realities of geography and material property, but that did not stop their 
decisions and the systems they built from both reflecting and influencing a politically 
charged vision for Iranian society. In the sociotechnical imaginary that shaped the 
engagements of Pahlavi-era officials with their country’s petroleum, gas was seen as a 
way to simultaneously make and assert Iranian advancement. Petrochemicals and their 
short-term rewards may have been the beginning, but their relatively meager 
consumption of gas meant that other, even more ambitious, dreams of the energy source’s 
418 Rooting her thought in Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities and its adoption by various 
scholars housed under Science and Technology Studies, but also drawing on other thinkers as far afield as 
Machiavelli, Jasanoff argues that “performances of statehood in modernity are increasingly tied to 
demonstrations and to public proofs employing scientific and technological instruments.” In other words, 
the performance and splendor of technological development and scientific advancement can serve as a 
powerful source of legitimacy for governments and rulers. For a more detailed discussion see Jasanoff’s 
“Future Imperfect,” p. 5-14. 
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potential quickly became most prominent.419 Through their imaginaries of gas, the 
technologists of Iran’s state organizations tied their country to a vision of national 
progress that was measured in refinery capacity built, thousands of kilometers of pipeline 
assembled, and millions of cubic feet of gas produced and consumed. Gas and its 
infrastructure became monuments to development, highly visible and aestheticized 
expressions of the state-centered modernization projects of Pahlavi Iran.420 Though 
bound by the world’s physical realities, the designers of Iran’s gas system built it to 
further certain political and social goals, ends that found expression not as consequences 




 Official conceptions of Iran’s gas found extensive expression within the 
publications of the National Iranian Oil Company. In numerous periodicals and books for 
both company employees and the general public, Iranian gas projects were prominently 
imagined, described, and celebrated within a broader context of nationalist 
modernization. One of the most comprehensive was Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, “the 
 
419 George T. Ballou, “Natural Gas in the Eastern Hemisphere—Recent Developments,” in Proceedings of 
the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the 
ECAFE Region, pp. 27-30 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 29. 
420 The nexus of state power, developmentalist thinking, and aesthetic considerations has been explored 
most notably by James C. Scott. Through a series of case studies, Scott describes a high modernist impulse 
that not only seeks to make societies governmentally legible, but also aesthetically ordered. While the 
pipelines and refineries that comprised Iran’s natural gas infrastructure were not the utopian cities or village 
schemes that Scott focuses on they, their articulation through the official media of Iran’s state ministries 
and state-owned petroleum companies nonetheless evinced much of the same preoccupation with the 
“administrative ordering of nature and society” and the “self-confidence about scientific and technical 
progress” (p. 4). On a broader scale, much of Iranian developmentalism both before and after the 1979 
revolution, whether secular or Islamist, has demonstrated a commitment to the sorts of top-down, state-
driven policies that Scott describes. For more see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).  
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monthly journal of the personnel of the Iranian oil industry,”421 which reported 
extensively on the plans and projects of the Iranian petroleum industry between April 
1962 and the 1979 revolution. Always celebratory in nature, the mostly unsigned articles 
emphasized the achievements of the NIOC and its subsidiaries in areas as diverse as 
petroleum reserves discovered and worker education programs initiated. A global 
perspective was threaded throughout the magazine’s pages. Nāmeh not only continually 
assessed Iran and its petroleum industry in relation to those of other nations, but also 
published translations that described enviable qualities of industrialized societies or 
explained some amazing scientific advancement. Throughout its run, the magazine 
employed an implicit developmental hierarchy that cast highly industrialized Euro-
American nations as models to emulate and developing regions as potential beneficiaries 
of Iranian leadership and expertise. Particularly during the 1960s, the magazine described 
the widespread use of gas energy as something expanding rapidly in the world’s wealthy 
nations and all but absent in the remainder. Iran’s vast natural gas resources and the 
NIOC’s efforts to harness it thus differentiated Iran from the rest of the so-called Third 
World, enabling it to both catch up with the world’s wealthy nations and be a conduit of 
that same modernity to other underdeveloped regions. In this way, gas, according to 
Nāmeh, was the means by which Iran would both develop and prove its modernity. 
The magazine published one of its earliest articulations of natural gas’s promise in 
February of 1963. In an article on the then under construction Tehran oil refinery, natural 
421 This description of the publication appeared on the title page of the very first issue of the magazine, 
published in month of April 1962. It appeared in subsequent issues, changing over time, before 
disappearing entirely in later years.  
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gas was described as an important supplemental fuel and spur toward economic growth. 
In the early 1960s, the NIOC was grappling with a growing rate of oil consumption that 
was threatening to choke off Iran’s economic growth through endemic shortages. Iran’s 
oil utilization had more than tripled in the decade between 1949 and 1959, from 
approximately one million tons per year to 3.5 million tons, and working from the Third 
Five-Year Development Plan, they predicted that total Iranian oil consumption would 
reach 13 to 14 million tons per annum by the end of the decade.422 More than 90 percent 
of oil products consumed by Iranians were produced at the huge refinery in Iran’s 
southern city Ābādān at the time,423 before being loaded onto trains at Ahvāz and shipped 
north.424 While distribution shortages in Iran’s central and northern provinces loomed as 
the country’s oil transportation system reached saturation,425 even more worrying than the 
prospect of rationing for NIOC experts were the increasingly imbalanced consumption 
patterns of oil products. As was reported in Nāmeh, 
Analysis of the prior situation of the consumption of the four major products [diesel, 
kerosene, gasoline, and fuel oil] shows that the consumption of diesel primarily, and 
kerosene secondarily, have increased more than the other major products. This rapid 
increase has now made the proportion of products derived from crude oil unbalanced. In 
this context, if measures are not adopted…Iranian exports from Ābādān refinery will be 
fundamentally damaged.426 
422 “Pālāyeshgāh-ye Tehran [The Tehran Refinery],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 1, no. 10 
(Bahman 1341), 8. 
423 Ibid., 8. 
424 Ibid., 45. 
425 Ibid., 8-9. 
426 Ibid., 8. 
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Exposed here were the two basic and competing demands that the NIOC faced with 
Iran’s industrialization: it was expected to provide inexpensive fuel to meet the increasing 
needs of the country—“amongst the most important of duties that have been placed on 
the National Iranian Oil Company”427—while also facilitating the oil exports that paid for 
the government’s modernization schemes.428 To alleviate the crisis, the NIOC laid plans 
to reduce its dependence on the Consortium-operated fields in southern Iran and increase 
its own ability to provide oil products from outside the concession areas. Toward that 
end, the NIOC chose in the early 1960s the “economical” and “technically-correct” 
option of constructing a new refinery just south of Tehran to be fed by the NIOC-owned 
and operated Alborz oil field in the northern outskirts of Qom, a city some 125 kilometers 
south of the capital.429 First struck in 1952, the Qom field was without realistic prospects 
for export, potentially allowing the NIOC to fulfill its simultaneous duties of supplying 
the country’s growing energy needs while also freeing up southern oil for sale abroad. 
While it would be years before the refinery, designed and built by a consortium of 
European firms, would be completed,430 Nāmeh’s article signaled the budding of an 
initiative for the NIOC to independently supply much of Iran’s energy needs, one that 
was seen to go beyond the oil products that the new refinery was slated to produce. 
427 Ibid., 8. 
428 These exports were also effectively mandated by the Consortium oil firms and the governments that 
backed them. Attempts at nationalization in the early 1950s had already once triggered an international 
crisis and an American- and British-backed coup. 
429 “Pālāyeshgāh-ye Tehran,” 9. 
430 Husayn Mahbubi Ardekāni, Tārikh-e Moassesāt-e Tamaddoni-ye Jadid dar Iran [The History of 
Institutions of Modern Civilization in Iran], vol. 3, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Dāneshgāh-e Tehran, 
1376), 326-331.  
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Natural gas was included too, and the discovery near Qom of the 30 billion cubic meters 
of gas reserves at the Sarājeh field in 1958 was celebrated as “one of the greatest 
achievements of the NIOC.”431 Nāmeh saw gas as having numerous benefits, including 
that 
 
1) the air pollution of Tehran will be reduced; 2) a cheaper fuel will be available to 
consumers; 3) the life and durability of fuel-burning devices will be increased; 4) the cost 
of repairing and maintaining fuel-burning devices will be lessened.”432 
 
Work to make the gas resources into practical sources of energy had already begun, and 
the article further reported that feasibility studies had determined that constructing gas 
pipelines from the Sarājeh and Alborz fields to Tehran could mean significantly lower 
energy costs for the region, no matter if the gas was burned directly at industrial centers 
or converted into electricity at power plants. Whether that would also be true in the 
surrounding cities of Qom, Sāveh, Kāshān, and Isfāhān was still being determined.433 
Nāmeh’s article on the Tehran refinery demonstrated that even amidst the 
construction of new oil infrastructure, natural gas was still seen as having significant 
economic and environmental advantages over other fossil fuels, underlying the 
importance of the resource to the NIOC’s energy imaginary. In September 1964, a year 
after its piece on the Tehran refinery, the magazine made the point in even clearer terms 
with an article titled “The Breadth of the Domain of Natural Gas.” Employing “large 
industrial” countries like the United States as referents, Nāmeh articulated a vision of gas 
 
431 “Pālāyeshgāh-ye Tehran,” 9. 
432 Ibid., 45. 
433 Ibid., 45. 
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woven throughout the entirety of modern society.434 It described American uses like the 
heating of chicken coops, the firing of steel and glass furnaces, and as fuel for the ovens 
of industrial bakeries. Natural gas was the basis for numerous products of the chemical 
industry: plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fabrics, fertilizers, explosives, 
pharmaceuticals, and dyes. It had purified the interiors of people’s homes, for “in modern 
(jadid) kitchens the use of gas-burning stoves has eliminated the smoke and filth that 
accompanied older stoves and turned kitchens into clean and beautiful rooms.” Far from 
being a simple turn of phrase, the aesthetics of gas were fundamental to how it was 
understood in 1960s Iran. There was beauty in the cleanliness of a modern kitchen, as 
there was in the spectacle of conspicuous energy consumption. Nāmeh’s article marveled 
at the use of gas flames for the “ornamentation” of restaurants and shops in the United 
States and the use of gas for eruptions of fire and water in Hollywood productions. For 
the article’s anonymous authors, gas was not a source of energy to be hidden behind a 
mask of electricity or a raw resource to be tucked away in distant factories; it was to be 
celebrated as an embodiment of Iran’s national aspirations, its use both a goal and means 
of Iranian modernization.435 
Nāmeh’s lauding of gas was not confined to words. Media like illustration and 
photography, often allied with the text of articles but not always explicitly tied to their 
discussions, were also crucial means by which the NIOC’s hopes and expectations for gas 
434 “Vas’at-e Dāmāneh-ye Masraf-e Gāz-e Tabi’i [The Breadth of the Domain of the Consumption of 
Natural Gas],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 3, no. 4 (Shahrivar 1343), 8. 
435 Ibid., 9. 
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were communicated.436 Beyond mere visual aid, such work involved choosing how a 
substance that could not be seen with the naked eye would be rendered visible. Gas, 
largely intangible outside extreme conditions, came to be represented by both the final 
uses to which it could be put, and the technically advanced refineries and pipelines used 
to produce and transport it. The NIOC publications of the Pahlavi era were marked by 
this aesthetic condensation of gas, and massive assemblages of metal and expertise came 
to signal the presence of gas as both physical substance and modernizing impulse.437 By 
reading these images for the specific ways in which the technologies of gas were 
depicted, the implicit ideas about what modernity should mean for Iran that underlie them 
are also made legible. 
436 Eugene Levy has written on the history of electricity transmission lines and the aesthetic debates that 
surrounded their growing presence in the landscape of twentieth-century America. From being seen as 
“evidence of the technological advance of modern civilization” (p. 578) early in the period to blights on the 
natural landscape in the second half of the century, Levy describes the centrality of aesthetic concerns to 
the design of the physical infrastructure of the American electrical system. While his story is focused on the 
electrical industry’s efforts to craft transmission towers acceptable to the general public, Levy’s article 
nonetheless demonstrates how the debates about the appearance of electricity’s physical infrastructure were 
reflective of broader debates about the kind of society Americans wanted to live in. See Eugene Levy, “The 
Aesthetics of Power: High-Voltage Transmission Systems and the American Landscape,” Technology and 
Culture 38, no. 3 (July 1997): 575-607.  
437 Borrowing the term from Gilles Deleuze, Jane Bennet has argued that massive infrastructural systems 
are best understood as “assemblages:” a “material cluster of charged parts that have…affiliated, remaining 
in sufficient proximity and coordination to function as a (flowing) system.” Highlighting the “conceptual 
and empirical inadequacy of human-centered notions of agency” when examining such structures, Bennet 
draws on Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory to conceptualize infrastructure as networks that “while 
they include humans and their constructions, also include some very active and powerful nonhumans” (p. 
446). For more see Jane Bennet, “The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout,” Public 
Culture vol. 14, no. 3 (2005): 445-465. For more on  Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, see Bruno 
Latour, Aramis, or the Love of Technology, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 










advancement, and the intimate spaces of the home, the three photographs that 
accompanied Nāmeh’s 1964 article made extensive use of this visual idiom. Two 
photographs flank the opening two-page spread of the article and work together to 
portray gas as a clean and technically advanced source of energy. Dominating the first 
page is a photograph of the Ābādān refinery’s liquid gas (gāz-e māyeh) loading point, 
where road tankers would have their holds filled before beginning the long trek to Iran’s 
northern cities (Figure 1).438 Like the official representations of petroleum infrastructure 
 




around the world, the unadorned image emphasizes the technical infrastructure of gas, 
placing the 
gleaming storage 
tanks and ordered 
delivery lines at the 
front and center; in 
the background, the 
cracking towers and 
smoky flares of the 
refinery rise into a flat sky. Devoid of workers, 
the photograph leaves the industrial apparatus to 
stand alone and claim responsibility for the 
availability of gas in Iranian society. Through 
the medium of photography, the machinery of 
gas served not just its technical function of 
dispersing liquid gas to waiting tankers, but also 
to remind viewers of the sophisticated 




gas was the emerging lifeblood of modern societies, as the article argued, then Iran had 
already mastered the foundations of it. 439 
Opposite the image of the refinery at Abadan lies a photograph of a smartly-
dressed young woman sautéing sausages over a white kitchen stove (Figure 1).440 Her 
appearance—white skin, coifed hair, pressed knee-length dress, bare arms, and colorful 
apron decorated with the months of the Gregorian calendar—were evocative of 
contemporary notions of the prosperous domestic modernity of middle-class America. 
The graceful lines and groomed appearance of the model alongside the hygienic space 
she inhabited emphasized the cleanliness that gas could bring. In contrast to the imposing 
infrastructure at the Ābādān refinery, most of the stove itself is cropped out, projecting a 
message of invisible convenience within the home.441 “Modern” women preparing meals 
439 Graeme Macdonald, in his article comparing images of oil pipelines from around the world, writes that 
“official oil company representations typically betray a penchant for the Enlightenment visions of 
technological innovation” and that this “involves fetishizing futuristic, machine-cool images of efficiency 
and enablement” (p. 52). See Graeme Macdonald’s “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture” in 
Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture, eds. Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman (Montreal, 
Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 36-77. 
440 “Vas’at-e Dāmāneh-ye Masraf-e Gāz-e Tabi’i,” 9. 
441 The cultural or social “invisibility” of petroleum, or oil more specifically, has been something remarked 
upon within the field of the energy humanities. Amitav Ghosh probed the absence of oil in fiction in 1992, 
wondering if the wide geographic dispersal of petroleum and its infrastructures made it uniquely difficult to 
capture. In the years since, several scholars have taken up Ghosh’s question. Bob Johnson, in his book 
exploring how the “flood of prehistoric carbon calories” that fossil fuel energy allowed shaped American 
culture, argues that there has been a deliberate if unconscious act of suppression that has allowed modern 
bourgeois middle classes to ignore the social and environmental violence that fossil fuel use demands (p. 
xix-xx). Graeme Macdonald has compared images of oil pipelines taken around the world, finding that the
“invisibility” of oil is simultaneously “culturally ‘naturalized’ and internationally relative” (p. 39). He too
argues that the “toxic social relations and carbonizing effects of oil and the oil system” have been
“contained” and hidden away (p. 37). See Amitav Ghosh, “Petrofiction: The Oil Encounter and the Novel,”
The New Republic (2 March 1992), 29-34; Bob Johnson, Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels in the Making of
American Culture (Lawrence, KA: University of Press Kansas, 2014); and Graeme Macdonald,
“Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture.”
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in clean domestic spaces were a common trope in Nāmeh during the 1960s.442 They 
illustrated articles that discussed home gas use explicitly, as was the case for one with a 
drawing of a fashionable woman cooking at her stove and a photograph of a young girl 
manipulating the controls of another (Figure 2).443 Such depictions were also used to 
symbolize gas energy in broader contexts. One 1965 article on the Tehran refinery used 
the trope to represent liquid gas, placing it alongside images representing products like jet 
fuel, fuel oil, solvents, and more (Figure 3).444 No less than the photographs of gas 
energy’s machinery, these images, frequently employed to represent the everyday 
benefits that the domestic consumption of gas energy could bring for Iranians, 
telegraphed ideas about modernity and the NIOC’s ambitions for Iran in it. In this telling, 
gas energy was not only associated with the modernity of automobiles and jet aircraft, but 
also with a specific kind of domestic femininity and its labor. Encapsulated in the visual 
trope of a modern woman that found repeated instantiation in publications like Nāmeh, 
gas energy’s promised modernizing transformations were thus as much social as 
technical or industrial. The juxtaposition of young women with sleeveless dresses and 
 
442 In the decades after the Second World War, the Iranian government, working with initiatives like the 
American Point IV program, undertook extensive efforts to refigure cultures of domesticity in Iran to be 
more reflective of those idealized in places like the United States. Focused on the domestic lives of Iranian 
women, the programs worked to teach women about topics like hygiene, cooking, and aesthetic taste, all 
while also reorienting them, and the Iranian economy more generally, toward norms of mass-market 
consumerism. This reorientation shaped everything from women’s dress—away from the chador and 
toward uncovered hair and patterned aprons—to the architectural form of Iranian homes. For more see 
chapter three of Pamela Karimi’s Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolutions and the 
Modern Era (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
443 “Cherāgh-e Gāz va Re’āyat-e Nokāt-e Imani dar Khāneh [Gas Stoves and the Observance of Safety Tips 
in the Home],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 4, no. 9 (Bahman 1344), 34-35. 
444 “Ta’sisāt-e Pālāyeshgāh-ye Tehran [Installations of the Tehran Refinery],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e 
Iran, vol. 4, no. 6 (Ābān 1344), 6-7. The same drawing was used for a similar purpose three years later in 
“B’azi az Farāvardeh-ha-ye Pālāyeshgah-ye Tehran, Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 4, no. 6 (Ābān 
1347), 18-19. 
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uncovered hair with refineries and pipelines bridged the distance between domestic life 
and the monumental edifices of industry being erected around the country. In the same 
way, the two opening images of “Breadth of the Domain of Natural Gas,” bracketing the 
main text of the article between them, joined the huge industrial mechanisms of gas with 
the intimate spaces of homes and metaphorically underlined the interpolation of gas 
throughout a modern society. 
Overleaf, the third and final photograph of the article depicts a bespectacled man 
in a long white coat working amidst a crowd of 
young chickens. Described as one of America’s 
new gas-heated chicken coops, the technology 
was praised as allowing a more cost effective 
and quicker nurturing of the animals (Figure 
4).445  As with the article’s first image, this 
illustration emphasized the advanced nature of 
gas energy, and the economic benefits that 
expert mastery of it portended. But like the 
second, it obscured the infrastructure that made gas energy accessible, again casting it as 
a convenient, invisible aid. Combined, the three photographs articulate a top-down, state-
directed notion of gas energy, one where the NIOC deployed its expertise to build the 
monumental constructions of concrete and metal that were the foundations on which a 




new Iran of clean kitchens and precise temperature controls would be built. Proof came 
through an evidentiary combination of photography and statistic that would be repeated 
time and again throughout the pages of both Nāmeh and other official publications. 
Alongside its images, the article deployed statistics and citations of recent developments 
within the Iranian gas industry, describing the opening of a gas pipeline to Shiraz and its 
related industrial area; a 356 percent increase in natural gas consumption between 1960 
and 1964; and a 27 percent increase in liquid gas consumption, driven almost entirely by 
demand in Tehran and other large cities, between 1962 and 1963.446 More striking, 
however, was the “proof” that the article’s images provided, both that such a vision was 
possible, as it was being realized in places like the United States, and that the NIOC was 
already making it a reality in Iran. The photographs that Nāmeh presented in its articles 
on gas were “proof” because they were presented as such. On one level, the photographs 
“proved” that the installations existed as claimed, but their contextual embedding in a 
NIOC magazine alongside articles describing operations related to gas also served to 
“prove” that a gas-fueled modernity was possible through the work of the company and 
the Iranian government.447 
 
446 Ibid., 9-10. 
447 The tense relationship between photographs and the truthfulness of their depictions has been a subject 
much remarked upon. In his classic book Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes advanced the notion of a 
photograph’s considered studium—that which is perceived “as a consequence of my knowledge, my 
culture” (p. 25-28)—and its intuitive punctum, “what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless 
already there” (p. 55). For Barthes, meaning was created in the space between a photograph and its viewer, 
but there nonetheless existed an irreducible quality that such images depicted something that did, or at 
some point had, existed. Photography thus had an “evidential power” as a medium, and Barthes writes that 
it is in the “arrest of interpretation that the Photograph’s certainty resides: I exhaust myself realizing that 
this-has-been” (p. 106-107). But while uncritical acceptance of photography’s ability to capture reality is 
not warranted, it is necessary to recognize that, as Susan Sontag wrote in On Photography, “photography 
does not simply reproduce the real, it recycles it,” and that through “photographic images, things and events 
are put to new uses, assigned new meanings” (p. 174). Barthes and Sontag direct us to see photography as 
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Throughout the article, Nāmeh positioned the United States as a model worth 
emulating, a developmental orientation that found further expression in the words of the 
NIOC’s CEO and Chairman of the Board, Dr. Manuchehr Eqbāl. Born in Mashhad in the 
fall of 1909 and educated in Iran and France, Eqbāl had a long and illustrious career in 
Iranian politics as a close associate of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. A professor of 
medicine at Tehran University early in his career, he began his rise through government 
ministries in the chaotic years following the expulsion of Reza Pahlavi in 1941, 
eventually coming to serve as Iran’s Prime Minister between April 1957 and August 
1960. A trusted associate of the Shah, Eqbāl spent much of his tenure overseeing and 
inaugurating developmental projects within Iran, often clashing with Abu’l-Hasan 
Ebtehāj, head of the Plan Organization, on the allocation of needed oil revenues. Named 
executive director of the NIOC on November 7, 1963, Eqbāl would remain in that 
position until his death in 1977, a period that saw the conceptualization and 
implementation of Iran’s first major gas projects. While major contracting, price 
negotiations, and foreign relations were conducted under the direct supervision of the 
Shah during Eqbāl’s tenure, he still oversaw day-to-day operations of the NIOC and 
 
inhabiting an uncomfortable space between naïve assumptions about unmediated access to other times and 
places and, what T. Jack Thompson terms in Light on Darkness?, a fully “viewer-centered hermeneutics” 
(p. 249) that equally assumes all meaning is created in the minds of viewers. A photograph gains its power 
in the interplay between the image, its subject, the viewer, framing devices like text and captions, and even 
“the context in which it [the image] is seen” (On Photography, 106). For more discussion of photography 
see Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1981); Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973. Reprint, 
New York: Picador, 1977); and T. Jack Thompson, Light on Darkness?: Missionary Photography of Africa 
in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2012). 
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regularly represented the company, giving word to its ambitions through speeches and 
wide-ranging interviews with the press.448 
In the mid-1960s, natural gas was central to those ambitions. In an interview 
given in June 1965, Eqbāl discussed a 45-day trip to the United States, France, and 
Norway that he had taken with the Shah. Proposed and managed by the Pan-American 
Corporation, an oil company then operating in Iran’s Persian Gulf waters, Eqbāl and the 
Shah met with government and petroleum industry representatives of all three countries. 
Eqbāl found his trip to be “profitable,” and expressed admiration for both the impressive 
pipelines and refineries of France as well as the sophisticated administrative and technical 
practices of Pan-American.449 Visits were paid to the “immense” Lacq gas field in 
southern France and the gas-consuming petrochemical plants of Norway.450 Eqbal was 
both impressed and upset by what he saw. He was impressed by the productive uses the 
three countries had put their natural gas resources to and upset by the lack of similar 
application for it in his own country, going so far as to lament the “32 million cubic 
meters of gas” that Iran “wasted daily.”451 
Eqbāl’s discussions of the countries he toured were more than factual reports, for 
they also worked to cast the highly industrialized nations as sources of inspiration for Iran 
and the NIOC. From his talk of Europe and the United States, Eqbāl quickly moved to 
448 Ahmad Ashraf, “Eqbāl, Manuchehr,” Encyclopedia Iranica, vol. VIII, fasc. 5, pp. 515-517; available 
online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/Eqbāl-manucehr (accessed online on 21 June 2018). 
449 “Mosāhebeh-ye Matbu’āti [Press Conference],” Akhbār-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran, Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-
e Iran, vol. 4, no. 2 (Tir 1344), 3-4. 
450 Ibid., 3. 
451 Ibid., 4. 
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painting an image of a near future where Iranians too reaped the benefits of their gas 
resources. Beginning with the establishment of the National Iranian Petrochemical 
Company in 1963, in accordance with the wishes of the Shah and bills passed in the 
Iranian Parliament and Senate, and his declaration of the Iranian year of 1344 (1963-
1964) to be the “Year of the Petrochemical Industry of Iran,” Eqbāl underlined the 
NIOC’s plans to use the country’s gas resources to feed a chemical fertilizer industry in 
southern Iran452 and thereby “send [fertilizer] to the world.”453 But his ambitions did not 
end there. Drawing explicitly on the example of France, Eqbāl went on to describe an 
expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry into the realms of synthetic rubber, 
plastic, nylon, and, especially, sulfur. To be sited near the active southern petroleum 
fields, these manufactories rested on the same commercial logic as the regionally-
oriented chemical fertilizer industry: that the combination of the area’s near-limitless 
supply of inexpensive natural gas and the ease of ocean-borne transport to nearby regions 
would position Iran to supply the ravenously growing demand for petrochemical products 
in south and east Asia. Announcing an aspiration to compete with France to become one 
of the world’s top suppliers of sulfur,454 Eqbāl underscored that the amount that could be 
produced from the sour gases of Gachsārān and Kharg Island rivaled that of the Lacq 
field. This hope was telling of Eqbāl’s ambitions for Iran. He may have imagined his 
country following in the footsteps of those in the world’s industrialized regions, but it 
 
452 This was the same plan that was presented at the ECAFE summits. 
453 “Mosāhebeh-ye Matbu’āti,” Akhbār-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran, Nāmeh (Tir 1344), 4. 
454 At the time, France was the world’s second largest producer, using gas from the Lacq field to produce 
1,400,000 tons of sulfur per year. See “Mosāhebeh-ye Matbu’āti,” Akhbār-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran, Nāmeh 
(Tir 1344), 3. 
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would do so as a potential competitor and rival, one positioned not only to emulate, but to 
surpass. 
Eqbāl’s vision for Iran went well beyond the production and export of chemical 
products to embrace gas as a source of energy. Building on his scheme for a 
petrochemical industry, Eqbāl expressed hope that Iran would be able to begin producing 
liquid gas for both export and domestic consumption within a few years. Animating this 
simple desire were the twin ambitions of economic development and Iranian self-
sufficiency that animated Iran’s engagement with gas. In the early 1960s, as had been 
promoted in magazines like Nāmeh, Iranians had begun to make use of liquid gas as a 
source of fuel. Supplies, however, came entirely from imports and the excess of the 
foreign-owned and -operated Ābādān oil refinery. Though liquid gas was an inevitable 
byproduct of petroleum production, it competed with other oil products for production 
priority, a reality that left Iran’s liquid gas infrastructure vulnerable to the shifting 
priorities of the Consortium companies. The international majors that operated Ābādān 
refinery and Iran’s southern fields had their own pressing demand—to feed foreign 
markets—and often responded to domestic Iranian needs only when obliged to do so. 
Eqbāl’s desire for the NIOC to produce liquid gas was thus not only a way to meet the 
needs of a growing domestic market, but to also wrest control over the supply of energy 
Iran needed for its own developmental ambitions. 
Eqbāl’s plans were exemplary of a current of thinking within 1960s Iran that 
sought to leverage international opportunities to finance and spur development within the 
country. From the proposed networks of fertilizer and petrochemical plants through the 
pipeline projects that would appear in the late 1960s and early 1970s, foreign markets 
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were crucial to Iranian plans for gas. But officials like Eqbāl never conceptualized their 
efforts as piggybacking Iran onto projects fundamentally conceptualized and created for 
international customers. Instead, from the start, their ambitions prioritized Iranian needs. 
In his June 1965 press conference, Eqbāl described a “very important plan” under 
evaluation that was intended to transport natural gas north from Gachsārān to the cities of 
Isfahan, Kashan, Qom, and Tehran. Potentially “one of the greatest successes of the 
Iranian petroleum industry,” Eqbāl anticipated gas powering “all the factories of Isfahan” 
and being burned for cheap electricity in the villages that lay alongside the pipeline’s 
proposed route.455 Nowhere in his description of what would come to be known as the 
Iran Gas Trunkline (Shāhluleh) was the possibility of gas exports to the Soviet Union or 
any other country. Eqbāl instead emphasized the potential benefits that the plan held for 
both Iranian industry and citizens, its primary value not in selling Iran’s natural resources 
abroad for profit, but in furthering Iranian development. When considered within the 
context of Eqbāl’s words, publications like Nāmeh were doing more than reporting when 
their articles stated that “the consumption of natural gas in highly-industrialized countries 
grows daily,” that “in America, the importance of natural gas is now greater than that of 
coal and second only to oil in supplying fuel and power,” or that the United States “had 
constructed 687,000 miles of pipelines for the transportation of natural gas.”456 They 
were instead positioning the American gas industry as something to be admired and, 
eventually, surpassed. 
455 Ibid., 47. 
456 “Vas’at-e Dāmāneh-ye Masraf-e Gāz-e Tabi’i,” 9. 
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In a speech given in January 1966 to assembled government and industry officials 
at the inauguration of the second oil pipeline between Ahwaz and Tehran, Eqbāl made 
clear the NIOC’s ambitions to see Iran build its way into the ranks of major world 
nations. Constructed to supply the then-unfinished Tehran refinery with crude oil, the line 
would, in the meantime, be used to increase the NIOC’s capacity for transporting 
products like liquid gas from Ābādān to the northern provinces. Referring to it as one of 
the country’s “vital arteries” and hailing it as the “ultimate cause [mojeb-e nahāyat] of 
honor and glory,” he declared that “another step in the direction of the nation’s economic 
development” had been taken.457 Eqbāl went on to draw a connection between the ability 
of a country to transport petroleum on a large scale and its standing within the world, 
saying that, 
 
With the implementation of this plan, the length of pipeline in the country assigned only 
for…the supply of domestic consumption is over 3600 kilometers. Iran, in terms of its oil 
and gas pipeline network, stands in the same rank as several important countries of the 
world. 
 
With his statement, Eqbāl laid bare the developmental hierarchy that underlay his 
thinking, using the new pipeline as evidence that Iran was busy claiming a seat amongst 
the world’s “important countries.” Eqbāl reinforced the significance of pipelines by 
highlighting the NIOC’s planning for “another big and impressive step” for Iran’s 
development: a cross-country (sarāsar) gas pipeline, one that would allow “1000 to 1500 
million cubic feet daily” of gas that was then being “burned and wasted” to supply 
“inexpensive fuel and power for cities, their rural environs [ghasabāt], and…along the 
 
457 “Goshāyesh-e Khat-e Dovvom-e Luleh-ye Naft-e Ahvaz-Tehran,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 
4, no. 8 (Dey 1344), 3. 
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path” of the pipeline itself.458 For Eqbāl, the NIOC’s pipeline network, stretching 
thousands of miles across the Iranian landscape, was a means by which Iranians could 
both further their country’s development and demonstrate proof of their own 
advancement. 
*** 
Coming in the mid-1960s, Eqbāl’s words were reflective of a larger political 
narrative then taking shape in Iranian society. A far-reaching program of modernization 
and reform known as the White Revolution was getting underway, shifting the basis of 
the Iranian monarchy’s legitimacy to new foundations. Though there were competing 
understandings of what the White Revolution should be, the fundamental goal that the 
Shah settled upon was a reconciliation of the reformist impulses of “modernism” and the 
“tradition” that the monarchy represented. This would be accomplished by embodying 
the idea of national progress in himself and his policies, thereby coopting the 
“revolutionary nationalism” of the Iranian political Left and National Front.459 In this 
way, the position of the monarchy could be preserved while the power base of the 
traditional elites, their property holdings, was attacked with rhetoric decrying “feudalism” 
and a program of land reform. This top-down “revolution,” it was hoped, would forestall 
the possibility of a bloody communist revolution while also furthering the reforms the 
Shah felt Iran needed in order to become the utopian “Great Civilization” he dreamt of, 
one where Iranians enjoyed standards of living comparable to the highest in the world. As 
458 Ibid., 3. 
459 Ali M. Ansari, “The Myth of the White Revolution,” 2-3. 
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was the case for Eqbāl, the crucial referents for the Shah were the “advanced” and 
“modern” societies of Europe and North America.460 While some of the most visible 
aspects of the White Revolution were focused on social relations, land reform, and 
education, just as important were Iran’s industrialization and mechanization, two 
processes that were central to the Shah’s understanding of progress and modernity.461 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi possessed a fondness for the monumental edifices of 
modern society—airports, hydroelectric dams, pipelines, advanced warplanes—and they 
were crucial to his vision for Iran’s future.462 More than mere personal rhetoric, the 
Shah’s preoccupation with the monumental found its way into how Iran’s ministries and 
national companies described their ambitions and the steps they undertook to achieve 
them. In no case was this truer than in the relationship between the NIOC and its 
subsidiaries and the capacity for gas energy to unlock Iran’s industrialized potential. The 
promises of figures like Eqbāl that the NIOC and the Iranian state could provide Iranians 
with cheap energy were thus layered with potent political meaning. “Inexpensive fuel” 
and the pipelines that carried it were figured as more than drivers of economic progress, 
they were also important legitimators of Iran’s ruling hierarchy. Time and again Eqbāl 
cast his country’s petroleum infrastructure not only as indicative of the country’s 
development, but also as a vast monument to the benevolent leadership of the Shah.463 He 
460 Ibid., 7-8. 
461 Ibid., 12. 
462 See Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
1961 for more on the Shah’s vision for his society. 
463 See “Mosāhebeh-ye Matbu’āti [Press Conference],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 5, no. 8 (Dey 
1345), 4-6  
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hailed the NIOC’s role in Iran’s “rapid economic progress” but also took pains to link his 
organization, the Shah, and petroleum into a structure dedicated to providing for the 
welfare of Iranians. In his telling, it was the NIOC, in cooperation with the other 
apparatuses of the government, that worked to heed the “managerial leadership” of the 
“vigilant leader of the nation of Iran” and make real his “eloquent idea” for harnessing 
the country’s petroleum resources to provide “happiness and a better life for the general 
public.” As Eqbāl said,  
The efforts and labor I and all the personnel of the Iranian oil industry are ever [focused] 
on implementing the commendable orders [of the Shah] to make the best use of the 
largest source of Iran’s natural and God-given wealth. With the extension of the 
distribution network of oil and gas pipelines, the vital stuff [mādeh] of oil and its 
essential derivatives will, with ease and abundance, reach the hands of our compatriots in 
the farthest points of the country.464 
Eqbāl’s speech ended with the cutting of a tri-color ribbon and the pressing of a button to 
start the pipeline, but the sentiments he had expressed—that Iran’s petroleum reserves 
were her greatest source of wealth, and that the skillful stewardship of the Shah and the 
hard work of the NIOC would see it utilized for the benefit of all Iranians—would 
continue to echo throughout Iranian society. 
Few projects rivaled the first Iran Gas Trunkline (IGAT-1) for its centrality in the 
NIOC’s imaginary of progress and development or for its importance for Iran’s 
industrialization. Stretching approximately 1100 kilometers from the Bid Boland gas 
refinery in Khuzestān to the Soviet border at Astara, the pipeline was conceived and built 
in the late 1960s to deliver natural gas to both the Soviet Union and Iran’s northern cities. 
464 “Goshāyesh-e Khat-e Dovvom-e Luleh-ye Naft-e Ahvaz-Tehran,” 3. 
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While the IGAT-1 project was firmly planted in the desire to transport southern gas 
northward, its roots ran deeper, connecting to developmental ambitions of decades-long 
standing. While the Shah, in response to pressure from American diplomats to be wary of 
Soviet intentions, stated in June 1965 that the decision would be made on the “pure” basis 
of economics,465 a month later Ahmad Mirfendereski, Under Secretary of the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry, emphasized the deep well of feeling on the subject within Iran. On July 
6, 1965, Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveydā had given remarks in a press conference 
that led the American Charge d’Affaires in Tehran, Stuart W. Rockwell, to believe that 
an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union for a steel mill in exchange for 
Iranian gas. In remarking to Mirfendereski that he “hoped he [Hoveydā] had a long 
spoon” if he wished to “sup with the devil,” Rockwell queried whether the Prime 
Minister’s remarks had been a “trial balloon” to test public opinion. Rockwell reported 
that 
Mr. Mirfendereski replied that if this had been Mr. Hoveydā’s purpose, he would find 
public reaction overwhelmingly favorable to a Soviet-built steel mill. In Iran, as in other 
underdeveloped countries, a steel mill is a symbol of prestige and national independence, 
and ‘the people’ want one very badly and don’t care who builds it. If Egypt and Turkey 
can have a steel mill, why should not Iran?’ The people, said the Under Secretary, are 
getting tired of the fact that nothing is done about a steel mill except talk about it. The 
government has to take some account of this widespread feeling. The people don’t care 
whether a steel mill is economic or not—they just want one. 
In Mirfendereski’s view, for many Iranians, a steel mill, or the lack thereof, carried 
meanings that went well beyond the economic or industrial benefits it might bring. It told 
465 U.S. Embassy Tehran to Department of State, Telegram 1447, 18 June 1965; file INCO-IRON IRAN, 
1964-66 Subject-Numeric File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National 
Archives [hereafter NARA]. 
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a story about their country and themselves, one that left them backward and small. As 
Rockwell noted, 
Throughout the conversation Mr. Mirfendereski stressed the emotional aspect of the 
Iranian people’s desire for a steel mill, saying that it was not a reasoned or reasonable 
thing. The lack of steel mill is one of the things that makes Iranians feel inferior and 
under the thumb of foreign nations. The acquisition of a steel mill would be a sign of 
independence and coming of age. Many people in the government have the same attitude 
and that is why, although it has been delayed and delayed, the project for a steel mill does 
not die but keeps coming closer to possibility. 
Without a steel mill, Iranians felt “inferior” to other peoples of the world, left stranded 
while their neighbors forged ahead. Whether or not Soviet aid came bundled with strings 
and threats—and Mirfendereski noted that “the majority” felt it to be “insulting” that 
American officials worried that a few hundred Soviets technicians could destabilize 
Iran—the potential danger was of secondary importance to the chance to build a 
functioning steel industry. Even more attractive was the prospect of obtaining a steel mill 
in exchange for natural gas. As Mirfendereski said in his conversation with Rockwell, 
It is likely that the Soviet offer will be much more attractive than anything the West can 
come forward with, and the people will not be able to understand it if the Iranian 
Government turns down an arrangement whereby Iran could acquire a steel mill in 
exchange for natural gas which is now being wasted by burning.466 
With the gas-for-mill accord, Iranian officials stood to fulfill their twin goals of obtaining 
a long-desired steel mill and putting Iran’s flared gas to productive use. But significant as 
well was Mirfendereski’s tying of the mill and its payment scheme to the wishes of the 
“Iranian people” in his discussion with the American diplomat. Whether or not many 
466 Stuart W. Rockwell, Charge d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. Embassy Tehran to Department of State, 
Airgram A-27, 8 July 1965; An Official Iranian Attitude Toward Possibility of Soviet-built Steel Mill; file 
AID 6 IRAN, 1964-66 Subject-Numeric File, NARA. 
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Iranians longed for their country to possess a steel mill in any real way, and whether or 
not Mirfendereski truly possessed the knowledge that they did, he nonetheless linked the 
project to the political legitimacy of the Iranian government. In his telling, the ability of 
the Iranian state to bring development to the country was fundamental to its acceptance, 
and like fledglings ready to leave their nests, Iranians longed for the industrial 
advancement that would enable them set out on their own. Gas was the engine that 
promised to drive Iran’s advancement, whether articulated on Eqbāl’s developmental 
hierarchy or Mirfendereski’s scale of maturity, one that would work to cement the new 
modernizing legitimacy of the Iranian monarchy. 
*** 
In January 1966, the IGAT-1 deal between Iran and the Soviet Union was 
preliminarily struck and work commenced. Like the steel mill that it was constructed to 
pay for, IGAT-1 and the gas it carried became key pillars in an official NIOC narrative 
that linked natural gas, Iran’s development, and the country’s political leadership. As part 
of that process, the pipeline itself came to be layered with meanings rooted in, but 
nonetheless transcending, the materiality of its existence. That materiality began to take 
shape on December 4, 1967 near Āghā Jāri, at a ceremony attended by government and 
industry dignitaries. There the Shah himself spoke on the importance of the project, 
described his hope for its quick completion, and cut a ribbon to set the “heavy 
bulldozers” to work.”467  
467 “Shāhānshāh Āryāmehr Ta’sisāt-e Nowin-e San’at-e Naft ra dar Khuzestān Eftetāh Kard,” Nāmeh-ye 
San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 6, no. 8 (Dey 1346), 7. 
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Across dozens of articles published between 1967 and 1978 in Nāmeh, the NIOC 
celebrated the IGAT-1 project, using it as a vehicle to make claims about what kind of 
gas-energy future Iranians would enjoy. It would be a technical and quantifiable one, 
where Iranian experts designed and directed a society built upon a base of advanced 
technology. Central to this claims-making process was the use of numbers and statistics, 
and in many articles appeared an almost formulaic recitation of the size and scope of the 
project.468 One article, published a month after construction began, used an unrestrained 
flow of figures to cast the project as a sophisticated technical undertaking aimed at 
bringing the benefits of natural gas energy to large swaths of Iranian society. It explained 
how the finished project was intended to operate, decomposing the complex system into 
distinct sections and then describing them with exacting numerical detail. The pipeline 
was to be 1100 kilometers from Behbahān to Āstārā, divided into a section of 610 
kilometers of 42-inch diameter and 0.53-inch thick pipe from Behbahān to Sāveh/Kuh-e 
Namak and a section of 495 kilometers of 40-inch diameter and 0.477-inch thick pipe 
from Sāveh/Kuh-e Namak to Āstārā; an “extremely dangerous and arduous” crossing of 
the Zagros Mountains began 25 kilometers outside Gachsārān where the terrain sloped 
steeply from 500 to 2200 meters altitude; a second difficult section began in the Alborz 
Mountains where the path went from 1650 to “a few” meters above sea level near the 
Sefid Rud Dam; ten gas-burning compressor stations of 13,400 horsepower each would 
 
468 Theodore M. Porter has written on the relationship between pursuits of objectivity in science and how 
such constructions have come to be used as an “answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness” in 
public life as well (p. 8). Rather than rely on expert judgement or an appeal to authority, the use of 
quantification has become “a way of making decisions without seeming to decide” (p. 8). In this way, the 
force of evidence flows from the numbers themselves, obscuring the human and political subjectivities that 
might otherwise weaken the claims being made. For more see Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The 
Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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be required to move the gas through the pipeline at 1160 pounds per square inch for the 
first 125 kilometers and 1030 thereafter; the amount of energy needed to power the 
compressors was approximately equivalent to one quarter of the total output of the 
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (now the Dez Dam). The branch lines that siphoned 
portions of the gas for use within Iranian cities were described in similar ways: a 16-inch 
pipe to Shiraz transporting 70 million cubic feet of gas per day to the city (5 percent of 
the total) and 2.4 million to the towns and villages along its path; another 16-inch line 
would transport 100 million cubic feet of gas daily to Isfahan and the steel mill (6 
percent); two 6-inch diameter pipes to Kashan and Qom for the transmission of 6.5 
million cubic feet (0.35 percent) and 7 million cubic feet (0.4 percent) of gas daily; a 30-
inch diameter pipe to Tehran for 276 million cubic feet per day (20 percent); Qazvin 
would receive 22.9 million cubic feet per day, Rasht 23.7 million, Bandar-e Pahlavi (now 
Bandar-e Anzali) 5.9 million, Tabriz 47.5 million (a total of 4 percent for the “northern 
cities”), and smaller northern towns and villages would get 1.1 million cubic feet per day 
(combined with the supply for southern villages for an amount equal to 0.25 percent of 
the total). A further 3 percent would be used as fuel for the compressor stations, leaving 
61 percent of the gas for export to the Soviet Union.469  
The gas that IGAT-1 transported became part of the numerical rhetoric employed 
by the article. Nāmeh reported how the pipeline project was designed to make use of the 
1.35 billion cubic feet of associated gas being produced in Iran’s Khuzestān region per 
day, roughly 450 to 1000 cubic feet per barrel of oil extracted. The Āghā Jāri, Fārs, and 
469 “Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz-e Sartāsari-ye Iran [The Design of IGAT-1],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e 
Iran, vol. 6, no. 8 (Dey 1346), 42. 
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Mārun oil fields would be tapped first as they were “ready for utilization,” but, if 
necessary, the collection network could be extended to the fields of Gachsārān, Naft 
Sefid, Bibi Hakimeh, and Pāzenan, the latter on standby to offset temporary shortfalls 
until planned underground storage facilities could be completed.470 Natural gas collected 
by a spider’s web of small lines fanned out across the oil fields was to be sent to a 
refinery at Bid Boland where heavier hydrocarbons471 would be removed before the 
remainder was purified,472 dehydrated, and injected into the main pipeline. Nāmeh 
highlighted the tight specifications that the gas would adhere to—83 percent methane, 12 
percent ethane, 3.5 percent propane, and 1.5 percent butane at a dew point of -10 degrees 
Celsius and 1060 BTUs of energy per cubic foot473—a series of figures that betrayed the 
unnatural character of “natural” gas. Each day, approximately 600 million cubic feet of 
processed gas (rising to 1000 million cubic feet by 1974) was to be sent to the Soviet 
border alongside 200 million cubic feet (rising to 650 million cubic feet per day by 1979) 
for consumption within Iran.474 More than a reporting of empty statistics, the prominent 
recitation of these figures simultaneously announced the ambitious scale of the IGAT-1 
project and underlined the techno-scientific expertise needed to make it a reality. The 
underscoring of the extensive expertise and intervention necessary to produce the 
470 Ibid., 13. 
471 Propane and butane, the primary components of liquid gas, chief among them. 
472 Impurities to be removed were COS, R-SH, CO2, N2 and, especially, H2S. It was predicted that by 1970 
seventy tons of sulfur, itself a valuable commodity, could be produced from the hydrogen sulfide (H2S) 
scrubbed from the gas intended for the IGAT line. See “Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz-e Sartāsari-ye Iran,” 13. 
473 “Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz-e Sartāsari-ye Iran,” 42. 
474 Ibid., 13. 
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“natural” gas that Iranians would use worked to cement the NIOC’s claim to the technical 
mastery needed to produce a gas-powered future for Iran. 
Huge numbers like those describing the dimensions and carrying capacity of the 
network—thousands of kilometers of pipeline, hundreds of millions of cubic feet of 
gas—reinforced the monumentality of gas infrastructure that publications like Nāmeh 
created with their photographs. It was a monumentality that went beyond a sense of scale 
to embrace the physical embodiments of 
gas infrastructure, effacing much of the 
human and social factors present. In what 
would become a consistent characteristic 
of Nāmeh’s coverage of the IGAT-1 
project, the work and presence of people 
were minimized. Nāmeh portrayed the 
IGAT-1 scheme as an almost autonomous 
system, springing forth from the ambitions 
of Iranian officials and operating with self-
managed efficiency. At stake in the article 
was not the directing of the numerous 
organizations and thousands of people that had a hand in planning, designing, building, 
and operating the pipeline. Rather, it was the command of its physical and technological 
manifestation. It was the rolled steel of the pipes, the gleaming towers of the refinery at 
Bid Boland, the turbines to generate compression force, and the land to be blasted, 
gouged, and smoothed into submission that was the stuff of concern. The article promised 
Figure 5 
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a near future of technical mastery, one defined not by fashion or democracy or religion, 
but by the ability to tame rock and metal in order to erect the “vital arteries” that would 
deliver Iran’s new energy source. 
Central to the NIOC’s claims was the assertion of the supposed inherently Iranian 
character of the IGAT-1 project. The same article in Nāmeh that introduced the pipeline 
in early 1968 scarcely mentioned the deep involvement of foreign states and firms in the 
design and construction of the system,475 and despite explicitly stating it once, 
downplayed the fact that 61 percent of the pipeline’s gas was destined to be exported to 
the Soviet Union. Encompassing nearly three-quarters of the article’s first page, a map of 
the pipeline’s route exemplified the tendency. Titled “The Route of IGAT-1 from Āghā 
Jāri to Āstārā and the Branch Lines of the Cities,” the map is carefully labeled with the 
collection fields, compressor stations, and the Iranian cities to be served (Figure 5).476 
While it ventured no claim to accuracy, the route, drawn in white over a black 
background, nonetheless approximated the eventual path of the pipeline and its branches, 
symbolically linking Iranian cities to the vast natural wealth lying beneath Khuzestān. 
Left conspicuously unlabeled and unacknowledged, however, was the Soviet Union, 
despite its crucial role in the financing, design, and construction of the pipeline. The map 
475 Williams Brothers Germany was responsible for the gas collection system in the oil fields as well as a 
portion of the line following purification at Bid Boland; Costain & Press would build and install the gas 
purification apparatus at Bid Boland; Williams Brothers UK would be responsible for the pipeline across 
the Zagros Mountains, considered one of the most inhospitable regions in the world for pipe laying; 
Entrepose would build the pipeline after it crossed the Zagros until it reached Sāveh/Kuh-e Namak as well 
as the branch lines to Isfāhān, Kāshān, Sarājeh, and Qom; Soviet experts would be responsible for the line 
between Sāveh/Kuh-e Namak and Āstārā as well as the branch line from Sāveh/Kuh-e Namak to Tehran. 
Soviet experts would also be responsible for 32 compressors of 15000 kilowatts each for eight of the ten 
compressor stations on the main IGAT-1 line. See the sidebar on pg. 5 of “Pishraft-e Sari-ye Sākhtemān-e 
Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz” in Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 7, no. 2 (Tir 1347), pp. 4-6. 
476 “Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz-e Sartāsari-ye Iran,” p. 12. 
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depicts a network of pipes that linked Āghā Jāri and Āstārā but goes no further, erasing 
one of the largest players in the whole project. Nāmeh, Eqbāl, and the NIOC may have 
seen pipelines as a crucial measure of modern civilization, but it was equally important 
that Iranians themselves lay claim to their creation. IGAT-1 was poised to bring Iran a 
step closer to the modernity Eqbāl and the Shah saw as embodied in the “highly-
industrialized countries” of the world, and it would be the experts housed in organizations 
like the NIOC and the Plan Organization that would lead it there. The first Iran Gas 
Trunkline—measured, mapped, photographed, and described in all of its physical 
imposition—would be a monument to that success. 
The 
rendering of 
IGAT-1 as a 





the years of the 
pipeline’s construction. In mid-1968, six months after the start of construction, when 
Nāmeh provided an overview of the line’s pipelaying operations, in the process 
reiterating the Shah’s “emphatic” order that gas, “this great source of fuel and energy,” be 
Figure 6 
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put to good use.477 The work that Nāmeh described not only emphasized the materiality 
of the pipeline, but also its intimate connection to the terrain it traversed. From initial 
surveys, to the leveling of the land, to the digging of a trench and the creation of a sand-
based substrate for the pipe, the geography of Iran was a crucial feature of IGAT-1’s 
story. Iran’s topography determined the pipeline’s physical manifestation in both extreme 
and mundane circumstances, from the hazardous crossings of the Zagros and Alborz 
mountain chains to the straight sections in Iran’s plains. A photograph illustrated this, 
depicting a stretch of pipe, described by the caption as being a section of 36-inch pipe 
intended to transport gas from Mārun to the refinery at Bid Boland, dipping and curving 
across rough terrain before disappearing amongst dry hills, seemingly dwarfing the small 
figures standing near it (Figure 6).478 The pipeline itself, its sections of pipe welded 
together but not yet buried, and the landscape—scraped, gouged, and trod-upon by heavy 
machinery, marked by the work of human hands yet ultimately defining the course of 
their project—assert their primacy in the image. According to Nāmeh and the NIOC, this 
was IGAT-1: a thing of steel and dirt and rock, a sprawling system joining northern and 
southern Iran, a marriage of technology and land that proved their mastery of the former 
and their ability to conquer the latter.479 
477 “Pishraft-e Sari-ye Sākhtemān-e Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz” in Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 7, 
no. 2 (Tir 1347), 4. 
478 Ibid., 5. 
479 This stands in contrast to the norm of pipeline visualizations in countries like the United States and 
Canada. Graeme Macdonald writes that in the “regulatory environments of highly developed states…the 
pipeline generally appears solo: efficient, remote from human habitation, and ostensibly noncontaminating” 
(p. 60-61). Macdonald’s findings mirror those of Eugene Levy, who found that American society became 
notably less tolerant of the aesthetic impositions of transmission lines during the 1960s and 1970s. While 
Iran’s relationship with the IGAT-1 line may thus seem out of step, Levy provides clues as to why this 
might be so. Earlier in the twentieth century Americans celebrated their new high-voltage lines as 
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In thousands of places the IGAT-1 pipeline was forced to curve and bend, and 
each one of those twists and turns was a point of risk for the line’s integrity. With failure 
potentially resulting in leakages or explosions, great care and dedicated machinery were 
necessary to ensure that the steel pipe sections were not compromised by the need to 
bend them. Nāmeh illustrated that expert work with two uncaptioned black-and-white 
photographs, the first showing a large section of pipe gripped by a specialized machine 
and bent skyward, projecting above Iran’s rough terrain while an unnamed worker, 
standing in one-quarter profile, manipulates its controls (Figure 6).480 Adjacent is a 
second photograph, wherein a worker, covered in protective clothing and a welding 
mask, works to join two sections of pipe. The welding wand and the two sections of pipe 
dominate the photograph. The worker himself is marginalized, partially cropped by the 
photograph’s edge (Figure 6).481 All three images, while depicting the work necessary to 
build IGAT-1, nonetheless prioritize the line’s materiality. The workers depicted are 
anonymized and reduced, taking roles subordinate to the pipeline and the machinery of its 
construction. In this way, Nāmeh simultaneously elevated the status of the line itself and 
manifesting an advanced modernity, much as was happening in regard to Iran’s natural gas pipeline in the 
late 1960s. Again, see Macdonald “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture” and Levy “The Aesthetics 
of Power: High-Voltage Transmission Systems and the American Landscape.” 
480 “Pishraft-e Sari-ye Sākhtemān-e Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz,” 4. 
481 Ibid., 4. 
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reduced that of the workers who built it,482 an 
assertion that what defined the IGAT-1 project, 
and the Iranian future it had come to represent, 
was embedded with the materiality of the line 
itself. All the skill and labor and effort that 
workers had put into the creation of pipes, the 
preparation of the land, and the assembly of 
components, was eclipsed the moment the 
pipeline came into being. 
482 The relative invisibility of Iranian petroleum workers was not something unique to the country. In his 
book Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell has noted how the consumption of oil in places like North 
American and Western Europe has depended on erasure of much of the dirty and oppressive characteristics 
of the world’s oil complex through pushing them into regions like the Middle East. Robert Vitalis, in his 
work America’s Kingdom, has shown how racialized systems of labor underpinned the work of oil 
extraction in places like Saudi Arabia. By paying heed to eras predating the Second World War, Bob 
Johnson has noted how the American middle classes suppressed the painful experience of fossil fuels 
workers by making the consumption of coal and oil culturally and socially invisible. Kaveh Ehsani has 
noted how that project of making petroleum labor invisible has largely extended to academia as well, 
leading to a notable lack of studies concerning those laboring as part of the world’s petroleum industry. For 
more see Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011); 
Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007); Bob Johnson, Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels in the Making of American Culture 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2014); and Kaveh Ehsani, “Disappearing the Workers: How 
Labor in the Oil Complex has been Made Invisible,” in Working for Oil: Comparative Social Histories of 
Labor in the Global Oil Industry, eds. Touraj Atabaki, Elisabetta Bini, and Kaveh Ehsani, 11-34 (Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
Figure 7
213 
The diminution of 
workers in the photographs of 
Nāmeh’s article stands in 
sharp contrast to its depiction 
of NIOC leadership and the 
Shah. One photograph, a 
recycled image first shown 
six months earlier in the pages of the magazine,483 depicts the Shah, dressed in 
a dark suit and tie, marking the start of IGAT-1’s construction as more than a dozen 
similarly-attired, clean-shaven men look on (Figure 6).484 The image hinges on the Shah 
as he cuts the inaugural ribbon, rendering him identifiable as an individual and, through 
the adjacent text describing the Shah’s desire to reduce the “waste” of Iran’s natural gas, 
as the impetus for the entire project.485 A similar visual vocabulary animates the article’s 
remaining two photographs, both also depicting besuited and clean-shaven men. One 
483 See “Shāhānshāh Āryāmehr Ta’sisāt-e Nowin-e San’at-e Naft ra dar Khuzestān Eftetāh Kard,” Nāmeh-
ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 6, no. 8 (Dey 1346), 7 for its first appearance. 
484 “Pishraft-e Sari-ye Sākhtemān-e Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz,” 4. 
485 Ibid., 4. 
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image shows Eqbāl, seated beneath 
photographs of the Shah and his consort, as 
he met with Soviet representatives to discuss 
the construction of IGAT-1’s northern half 
(Figure 6),486 while the other depicts Sa’id 
Naghavi, Supervisor of the IGAT project, concluding a contract with a 
British firm for the supply of equipment for the Bid Boland refinery (Figure 7).487 Named 
in the article and highlighted as individuals, both the Shah and the NIOC men are not 
forced to compete with the visual gravity of the IGAT pipeline as they carried out their 
work. In Nāmeh’s perspective, IGAT-1 was the product of their vision and expertise; they 
decided that Iran’s natural gas should be harnessed and determined how that goal should 
be won. Together, the six photographs of 
Nāmeh’s article defined the IGAT-1 project, 
and the modernity that the magazine 
carefully embedded in the pipeline, as 
determined by the materiality of the pipeline 
project and the high-level leadership that 
had called for its creation. In this telling, the future of Iran was fundamentally 
one of technology and expertise, the stuff of managers and engineers and not the workers 
who labored to build it. 
486 Ibid., 5. 




The gas pipeline running from Gachsārān to Āstārā was the centerpiece of the 
entire IGAT project, but the grammar of technological monumentalism that defined it in 
the worldview articulated by the NIOC radiated outward to touch other all other facets of 
the enterprise. Whether it was in the photographs and descriptions of the Ahvaz Pipe 
Mill, built to produce the pipe needed for the IGAT line itself, or the gas refinery at Bid 
Boland, the same preoccupation with size and technical sophistication manifested itself. 
Natural gas and its exploitation animated the entirety of the IGAT-1 scheme and its 
taming would reverberate throughout Iran as a symbolic step in the promise of 
modernization, part of a conscious strategy of legitimation on the part of the Shah and his 
government. Comparisons to highly developed societies were inevitable, and both NIOC 
officials like Manuchehr Eqbāl and publications like Nāmeh welcomed them, going so far 
as to invite Iranians to witness how quickly their nation was catching up to, and 
sometimes surpassing, the “modern” countries of the world. Such was the case in one 
article published in early 1969 in Nāmeh that marked the start of the Bid Boland gas 
refinery’s construction. The piece framed the IGAT project, and the Bid Boland gas 
refinery specifically, as points of pride for the Iranian nation, comparable to the famed oil 
refinery at Abadan. As it says, 
When speakers from the oil industry come, ordinary people normally imagine the 
refinery at Abadan…[as] the existence of the great installations of Abadan is one of our 
national glories and all Iranians honor it. But in recent years, other glorious installations 
and bases (baniān-ha) of this venerable industry have been founded, including the 
loading terminal at Kharg, the IGAT-1 line, and the Tehran refinery. Now, with the start 
of the gas industry in Iran, another center of operations named Bid Boland, the location 
for the construction of the great installations for the purification of gas, increases in 
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stature (ghad bar miafzāyad) and in that same first step, will encompass the largest and 
most modern purification units in the world.488 
While natural gas and its infrastructure were part of a broader trend of expansion and 
increased sophistication within the Iranian petroleum industry in this view, they 
nonetheless stood apart as notable achievements. The gas refinery at Bid Boland not only 
brought Iran to the level of advanced nations in having a gas refinery, it propelled the 
country ahead of them. The refinery did not just exist, it was “the largest” and “the most 
modern” too. But as with the IGAT-1 pipeline, the importance that attended being large 
and modern was manifested in a quantified way. A long series of numbers proved the 
greatness of the Bid Boland refinery: five purification units, to later rise to nine; 240 
million cubic feet of gas refined per day; “giant” 32-meter purification towers, each 
weighing 200 tons; 150,000 kilowatts of electricity consumed; and much more.489 The 
familiar genres of photographs appeared here as well, with one photograph showing a 
group of dignitaries inaugurating the refinery’s construction and two others depicting 
massive towers and refining units dwarfing the miniscule workers that appeared near 
them (Figure 8).490 As with the IGAT-1 pipeline, the significance of the Bid Boland 
refinery for the NIOC went beyond its utilitarian role in the provision of natural gas in 
Iran. In its numerical and photographic monumentalism, Bid Boland was not just proof of 
its own existence as a piece of functioning infrastructure, but of the NIOC’s ability to 
produce it, making the dream of Iranian progress a reality. 
488 “Āghāz-e Sākhtemān-e Tasfiyeh-khāneh-ye ‘Azim-e Gāz-e Bid Boland,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e 
Iran, vol. 7, no. 9 (Bahman 1347), 14. 
489 Ibid., 15. 
490 Ibid., 14-15. 
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*** 
The textual and 
photographic idioms 
employed by Nāmeh to 
describe Iran’s gas 
infrastructure were 
mirrored in other 
petroleum industry 
publications. Often book-length, these works offered broader perspectives on 
the Iranian gas industry than did the articles of Nāmeh, but nonetheless evinced similar 
preoccupations with monumentality, numerical evidence, and Iran’s political leadership. 
They went so far as to deploy the same statistics 
and, sometimes, even the same photographs. 
Published in the mid-1970s, the NIOC’s San’at-e 
Gāz-e Iran (The Iranian Gas Industry) epitomized 
in its sixty colorful pages the rhetorical currents at 
work. Aimed at making “visible” the “great and 
brilliant phenomenon” of the White Revolution to 
the Iranian public,491 the text fielded an impressive 
array of statistics, descriptive text, and full-color 
491 National Iranian Oil Company, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye 




photography to demonstrate the integral role of gas in the country’s ongoing economic 
and industrial development. The metal and concrete of projects like the Bid Boland gas 
refinery and its associated pipeline again took center stage, rising into the air and crossing 
rivers (Figure 9, 10, and 11).492 They were essential in order to process and move the 
huge quantities of gas needed to supply, as the publication predicted, nearly a fifth of 
Iran’s energy needs by 1977,493 a prediction it 
dramatized via the inclusion of graphs with 
spiking trend lines (Figure 12).494 The book 
described plans that would make this new 
energy source available to the citizens of 
Tehran,495 Shiraz,496 Mashhad,497 Ahvaz,498and 
countless towns and villages,499 a new future of 
“happiness and prosperity for the Iranian 
people,” as Manuchehr Eqbāl stated in his 
foreword, “born only [through] the steadfast 
492 Ibid., 11-17. 
493 Ibid., 8. 
494 Ibid., 10. 
495 Ibid., 29-33. 
496 Ibid., 36-38. 
497 Ibid., 45-51. 
498 Ibid., 41-44. 
499 Ibid., 38-39. 
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will and awesome effort of the great leader of the country” and “accomplished at the 
hands of the experienced and tested personnel” of the NIOC.500 Even this rare 
acknowledgement of the work undertaken by NIOC employees was overshadowed by the 
association drawn between Iran’s gas projects and its political and managerial leadership. 
Two black-and-white photographs depict laborers, shown filling liquid gas canisters and 
loading them onto the back of a truck for delivery, a number exceeded by images of the 
Shah alone  (Figure 13).501 The book’s final section discusses labor only in terms of 
“human resources,” emphasizing the programs the NIGC had undertaken to train its 
workforce and reporting aggregate figures via charted statistics.502 Discussions 
surrounding the potential provision of piped gas to cities and towns followed a similar 
script, emphasizing city-wide maps and photographs of urban gas gateways503 rather than 
the system’s endpoints within homes and businesses. While lacking the monumentalism 
depicted in the publication’s array of color photographs of the IGAT-1 system, these 
discussions continued to prioritize the material aspects of gas infrastructures, linking 
them into a bipolar arrangement with the country’s leadership and casting Iran’s future as 
one created by its political and managerial classes. 
Nor was unreality a barrier to the employment of these rhetorical techniques by 
NIOC media. Projects that existed only on paper were often described in similar terms in 
500 Ibid., 1. 
501 Ibid., 33. 
502 Ibid., 55-59. 
503 Generally sited on the outskirts of urban areas, these gateways sat as intermediaries between the cross-
country network of arterial, high-pressure pipelines and the low-pressure capillaries of urban gas networks. 
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books like Naft va Zendegi (Petroleum and Life), published by the NIOC in 1972 as part 
of the International Book Year,504 a United Nations initiative aimed at helping close the 
“serious imbalance between the developed and the developing countries” in book 
production.505 The work was a compilation of four talks given by “experts of the Iranian 
oil industry” at NIOC public events506 and aimed at “the lovers of study and research” 
(deldādegān-e motāl’aeh va tahqiq), “academics,” “educators,” and “all the people of 
Iran.”507 Addressing Iranian oil and gas in both domestic508 and international 
perspectives509 and aimed at non-specialist audiences, the talks compiled in Naft va 
Zendegi were lavishly supported by maps, charts, and photographs. Facts and figures 
were interwoven throughout, giving what were, in many cases, descriptions of planned 
but not-yet-built pipelines, refineries, and gas networks a sense of solidity they otherwise 
did not yet possess. The maps and measures presented did more than describe the plans of 
organizations like the NIOC and NIGC: they temporarily condensed an imagined future 
into something almost tangible, providing readers a sense not only of possibility, but 
inevitability. 
504 National Iranian Oil Company, Naft va Zendegi (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e 
Naft-e Iran, 1352), foreword by Manuchehr Eqbāl, n.p. 
505 René Maheu, “Books for All!,” UNESCO Courier (January 1972), p. 4. 
506 Naft va Zendegi, foreword by Manuchehr Eqbāl, n.p. 
507 Naft va Zendegi, introductory poem “Dar Sāl-e Jahāni-ye Kitāb” by Amir Navidi, n.p. 
508 See Jahānbakhsh Zamāniān’s “The Role of the Distribution of Energy in the Economy of Iran” (p. 5-35) 
and Mahmud Peydāyesh’s “The Plan for Gas Delivery to Cities” (p. 54-121) in Naft va Zendegi. 
509 See ‘Ali Tābānafar’s “The International Position of the Ābādān Refinery” (p. 123-156) and Mas’aud 
Modir’s “Iran’s Petroleum from an International Perspective” (p. 157-183) in Naft va Zendegi. 
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Even books written for children traded in the same developmental vernacular. 
Gāz—published in 1973 as part of the tenth anniversary of the inauguration of the White 
Revolution by the Iranian 
Ministry of Education 
and Training as part of a 
series of books aimed at 
elementary school 
students and printed to 
the tune of 50,000 
copies—explained 
natural gas and its utility in a simple language suitable for young readers.510 Devoid of 
the kinds of numerical proof that Nāmeh often employed, the book nonetheless promoted 
the same monumentalism, prioritization of physical infrastructure, and elevation of Iran’s 
political leadership that were the hallmarks of official discussions of gas. Gāz focused its 
attention on the huge systems that refined and transported Iran’s natural gas, explaining 
that prior to the creation of the IGAT-1 system “all of Iran’s natural gas disappeared” and 
that “the design of IGAT-1 prevents the waste of gas.”511 It described the Bid Boland 
refinery as “one of the world’s largest gas refineries” and the “center of Iran’s gas.”512 It 
told a tale of the Shah traveling to the Soviet Union to make a deal with the Soviet Union 
510 Ministry of Education and Training, Gāz; Kitāb-hā-ye Khāndani barāye Dāneshāmuzān-e Dabestān 
(Tehran[?]: Vezārat-e Āmuzesh va Parvaresh, 1351). 
511 Ibid., 10. 
512 Ibid., 11. 
Figure 14
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so that “the great wealth that had for long years gone to waste, after Iran’s White 
Revolution, was placed in the service of the country’s economy and development.”513 
From the cover through the five black-and-white photographs appearing in the work, the 
edifices of the IGAT-1 project rose into the sky and crossed rivers, their imposing 
physicality enhanced by photographic composition to the detriment of the few faceless 
workers that appeared in them (Figure 14).514 
*** 
As with Manuchehr Eqbāl’s press interviews and general-audience NIOC 
publications, Gāz worked to disseminate beyond industry circles a particular 
understanding of what Iran’s gas should mean for its future and its politics. Through the 
end of the Shah’s era in 1979, they continued to articulate a vision of gas energy that 
emphasized its technical modernity and huge scale, presenting the expansion of gas use 
within Iran as a crucial step in the pursuit of a modernity on par with even the most 
advanced nations of the world. It was a model of development rooted in the belief that 
Iran could and should be made modern through the leadership of Iran’s upper echelons. It 
was a new strategy of legitimation for the Iranian monarchy, but it was also reflective of 
a preoccupation with the technological manifestations of the modern world and the 
expertise needed to master them. The industry’s special status as the economic engine of 
the country, its place as a major point of contact between Iran and the outside world, and 
as an object of particular attention from the Shah, meant that developments within it 
513 Ibid., 9. 
514 Ibid., 7, 12-13. 
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reverberated far and wide within Iranian society. Influential figures like Eqbāl and the 
Shah did not shy away from hailing the ability of natural gas to transform Iran. Time and 
again they proclaimed its importance: lamenting the tragedy of its waste, underlining the 
potential of Iran’s huge reserves, and hailing the steps taken toward its exploitation 
through both their words and policies. Gas energy was Iran’s future, for it was abundant, 
cheap, and clean, and perhaps more important than all, modern in a way that other fuel 
sources were not. 
But the sociotechnical imaginary represented by Nāmeh and other NIOC 
publications was not universal. Hegemonic though it may have been in official discourse, 
a differing current ran through Iranian society during the same period. Quickly becoming 
intertwined with revolutionary feeling, that stream was focused more on the distribution 
of gas and who would benefit from it, a perspective that interrogated issues of citizenship 
and belonging through the contours of gas provision in Iran. Such views would find 
increasing expression as the 1970s came to a close and would fully flower in the wake of 
the 1979 revolution. 
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Chapter 4 
A Ghoul at the Gates: 
Natural Gas and Urban Air Quality in Iran 
On 27 November 1973, Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād, commanding officer 
of Iran’s Imperial Guard, issued a memorandum to Javād Shahrestāni, the Minister of 
Roads, and Gholāmrezā Nikpey, the mayor of Tehran. Hāshemi-Nezhād reported that 
while descending into Mehrābād Airport on November 18, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the 
Shah of Iran, had noted the clouds of smoke produced by the asphalt workshops lying to 
the west of the airfield. Concerned that the pollution emitted by these factories could 
affect the air quality of “all of Tehran,” the Shah ordered that “these workshops and 
furnaces will change location.”515 Responding the next day via urgent letter, Nikpey 
promised to oversee a reduction in the factories’ emissions and reported that he had 
already gone to visit the sites that morning. Rather than move, the factory owners pledged 
515 Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād to Javād Shahrestāni, 508-14-21-10, 6 Āzar 
1352, attached to letter m/2080, 7 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht-e Kureh-hā-ye Ājorpazi-ye Atrāf-e 
Tehran beh Gāz (340-72), Shahrdāri-ye Tehran, National Archives of Iran, Tehran [hereafter Tabdil-e No’-
e Sukht, NLAI]. 
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to install exhaust scrubbers; switch from fuel oil to diesel;516 and, eventually, as the 
owners themselves pursued in requests to the National Iranian Gas Company less than 
two weeks later, to convert their facilities to use natural gas.517 
This brief episode took place against a backdrop of growing concern among 
Iranian elites over the worsening air quality of Iran’s urban areas. While many Iranian 
commentators wrote of “the environment” (mohit-e zist) and increasingly dire threats to 
it, their thinking was more often focused on a particular concern for air pollution. Seeing 
the polluted cities of Europe and North America as dire warnings for Iran’s future, many 
Iranians came to see environmental degradation and the air pollution that most 
powerfully symbolized it as threatening the fundamental validity of their country’s 
modernizing project. Iranians experienced the period between 1945 and 1980 very 
differently from much of the world. While many cities in industrialized countries saw 
dramatic improvements in their air quality during that period, particularly after 1970, 
Iran’s urban areas experienced the opposite. The substitution of oil for coal in the world’s 
wealthy nations, combined with new air quality regulations that largely began to come 
into force in the 1960s, produced a substantial clearing of urban air.518 Iranian cities, 
however, had seen comparatively little coal use. The widespread introduction of oil fuels 
was thus experienced not as a reduction in atmospheric pollution, but as a sharp increase.  
516 Letter from Gholāmrezā Nikpey to Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād, m/2080, 7 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e 
No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
517 Letter from the Mayor of Tehran to Moqadessi, m/2108, 20 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e No-e Sukht, NLAI. 
518 For a succinct discussion of the global history of air pollution see chapters three and four, particularly 
pages 58 through 81, of J.R. McNeill’s Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 
Twentieth-Century World (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000). 
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In response, during the 1960s and 1970s, Iranians working in state institutions and 
the national petroleum companies began to aggressively seek ways to address the 
increasingly visible air pollution that cloaked their skies. Many focused their attentions 
on the capital Tehran for both its political and social significance, as well as the 
particularly intense blanket of pollution that often lay above it. Iranians stressed the 
human experience of living within a polluted environment, decrying the contamination 
that blotted the sun, irritated the eyes, burned the lungs, and caused cancer. Residents of 
Tehran remembered their city’s past, expressing nostalgia for its clear skies and mountain 
vistas, contrasting their memories with rhetorical and photographic idioms of pollution 
that emphasized smoke, haze, and threat. For Iranians, air pollution was as much a 
sensory and aesthetic experience as one rooted in intellectual notions of contamination 
and health. Its tragedy lay not only in the physical ailments that accompanied its 
presence, but in the spiritual ones as well, where feelings of ugliness had replaced those 
of beauty. 
Tehran’s particular vulnerability to air pollution was rooted in a mix of social and 
environmental factors. The city’s rapid growth and disproportionate share of Iran’s 
industrial development mingled with its arid climate and location in the foothills of the 
Alborz Mountains to produce comparatively strong concentrations of pollution that could 
linger for days and weeks. In emphasizing Tehran’s highly visible struggles with smoke 
and smog—as opposed to other pollutants like dust—Iranian experts and policymakers 
were drawn to remedies that prioritized the reduction of pollutants produced by the 
combustion of fossil fuels. In this they sought safe harbor not in a retreat from their 
industrialization and modernization policies, but in an intensification of them through the 
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provision of natural gas fuel. Particularly for the factories and workshops that heaved 
black clouds over the city, natural gas quickly became the solution of choice, a way to 
replace what Iranian commentators saw as dirty oil fuels with an energy source that was 
“cleaner” and would, supposedly, require a minimum of modification to existing systems 
and policies.  
Efforts to move Iranian industry to gas thus began in the early 1970s in the cities 
of Tehran and Shiraz. It would not prove to be an easy road. Marked by significant delays 
and uneven progress, the project repeatedly foundered on the shoals of cost and the need 
to import most of the necessary equipment. Nonetheless, the persistence of institutions 
like the National Iranian Gas Company, the municipality of Tehran, and the Fars 
provincial government, often spurred by directives emanating from the office of the Shah, 
assured slow progress. Factory owners played an important role, and while some were 
either deeply invested in the work or wholly resistant, most were cautiously supportive, 
backing the environmental goals of the initiative while also expressing reservations about 
the costs of conversion and delivery volumes they felt were too low. The ultimate 
contours of Iranian industry’s gasification—an alternately cooperative and combative 
process that resulted in significant financial support to factory owners from the 
government—was strongly shaped by this final group.519 
519 Cooperation between industry and state institutions on environmental issues was not unique to Iran. In 
his book Age of Smoke, a work detailing the development of environmental policy in Germany and United 
States, Frank Uekoetter demonstrates that such collaboration was essential to the success of policies for 
smoke abatement in the two countries. In contrast to the belief that dealings between industry and 
regulators are necessarily either adversarial or corrupt, Uekoetter shows that such cooperation was 
instrumental for the successful implementation of smoke mitigation policies. For more see Frank Uekoetter, 
The Age of Smoke: Environmental Policy in Germany and the United States, 1880-1970 (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009). 
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Until the very end of the twentieth century, Iranian concern for the environment 
was largely an elite phenomenon, reaching as high as the royal family in the years before 
the 1979 revolution. As was true elsewhere, the environment began to be seen as a 
potential area of government responsibility in Iran during the mid-1960s.520 In 
prioritizing solutions that depended on the national petroleum companies, Iranian 
officials and experts interwove their understandings of the potential environmental 
benefits of natural gas with the rhetoric of state-directed triumph and sovereign 
development so important during the Pahlavi dynasty’s final two decades. Commentators 
articulated a vision of the environment that prioritized the effects of its degradation on the 
health of the Iranian people as an undifferentiated whole, in the process establishing the 
state and its political, managerial, and expert classes as the only avenue by which a future 
of pain and ill health could be avoided. While foreign assistance was important to early 
gasification efforts, they quickly came to be defined most strongly by the opinions and 
perspectives of Iranian experts. Often trained in both Iran and abroad, many undertook 
original research to both describe what polluted the air of their cities and define potential 
solutions. Their efforts were supported by organizations like the National Iranian Oil 
Company and the University of Tehran through their establishment of air quality 
monitoring stations in Tehran. Iranian experts were not working in isolation. Through 
their publications and participation in international conferences and symposia, many were 
part of global conversations on air pollution, the environment, and natural gas. They did 
520 Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sörlin note this in their intellectual history of the idea of “the 
environment,” as well as the reality that from the beginning the “intrusion of the environment into politics 
did not come from a marginalized position” (p. 35). For more see Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker 
Sörlin, The Environment: A History of the Idea (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018). 
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more than passively consume knowledge and opinion produced abroad, instead working 
as part of a world-spanning effort to mitigate the environmental violence of fossil fuel-
based civilization. Natural gas energy and the environmental cleanliness it promised to 
bring were core parts of the modernity that Iranians imagined, not only for their own 




 Though alarms had begun to sound over Iranian cities’ air quality at least a decade 
earlier, widespread anxiety over the issue began to take root only in the mid-1960s. Early 
commentators focused their attention on Tehran and at a meeting of government officials 
held in December 1963 it was decided that commissions would be established to study 
the city’s growing problem with air pollution. Despite the Supreme Council of City 
Safety declaring the next month that “Tehran’s air was not fit for respiration” and two 
months later that pollution had “become the cause of a drop in the average age of the 
city’s residents,” little action was taken for another three years.521 In late 1966, Dr. 
Jahānshāh Sāleh,522 at the time head of the University of Tehran, addressed the 
meteorological and medical “experts” assembled at the Tehran Medical College for the 
Air Pollution Seminar and spoke at length about the “Great Threat” of air pollution. A 
 
521 “Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt (20 Tir 1350). 
522 Dr. Jahānshāh Sāleh was an Iranian physician, senator, and three-time Minister of Health. Born in 
central Iran in 1903-1904, Sāleh was educated at the American College in Tehran and then recruited by the 
Ministry of Finance for his language skills. He would later earn his medical degree at Syracuse University 
before working for a number of years in New York-area hospitals. Returning to Iran in 1933-1934 with his 
American wife, he became a senior medical doctor in Tehran hospitals. In 1953 he became Minster of 
Health as part of the new government following the fall of Muhammad Mossadeq and head of the 
University of Tehran in 1963. After his removal from the post of university leader he was tapped by the 
Shah to serve in the Iranian Senate. 
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longtime Cassandra on the issue of Tehran’s deteriorating air quality—ten years prior 
newspapers had printed “fekr-e nān kon keh kharbozeh āb ast”523 below photographs of 
him— Sāleh despaired that pollution had fallen victim to the “ten days” attention that all 
major problems in Iran received. Already, he said, “if you watch Tehran’s daybreak or 
dusk from a high point, instead of the clear and beautiful sky Tehran was famous for all 
over the world, you will only see a black layer of smoke that makes breathing difficult.” 
Declaring the smoky haze to be “one of the manifestations (mazāher) of civilization,” and 
destined to increase by “however much civilization advances,” Sāleh spoke of the 
“dangerous” and “deadly” pollutants the cloud contained, warning that, as had taken 
place in cities like London, New York, and Pittsburgh, poor air quality was on the verge 
of taking the lives of scores of people.524 He argued that “if action is not taken right now 
for the prevention of the danger of smoke in Tehran and other cities, within the next ten 
years smoke will carry us into the sky we will be destroyed (nābud khāhim shod)!”525 To 
prevent the “affliction of people with cancer,” he said, the “sources of smoke” that fouled 
523 The saying is an old Iranian idiom regarding the wise application of one’s time and effort. In the story 
from which it is derived, two friends work side-by-side at some task requiring hard, physical labor. Each 
day they go together to buy bread for lunch. One day, they decide that only one of them would go so that 
the other could continue working and earn them more money. On the way to buy bread, however, the first 
friend comes across a merchant selling kharbozeh (a type of melon). Tempted by their refreshing 
sweetness, he uses all of their money to buy a melon before returning to his friend. Rather than being 
delighted, the second friend is upset, for though kharbozeh is delicious, it would not sustain them over a 
long afternoon of hard work. Expressing his displeasure, the second friend says “fekr-e nān kon keh 
kharbozeh āb ast” (“think of bread because kharbozeh is water”). The idiom has come to be used to say 
that some activity or pursuit is empty or inconsequential and that one should spend their time in a more 
worthwhile manner. 
524 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt (15 Āzar 1345), 13. 
525 Ibid., 1-13. 
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Tehran’s air—the “factories, asphalt works, bakeries, public baths, burning of waste, 
and…automobiles”526—would need to be addressed.527 
Sāleh was not alone, and other seminar participants reiterated his description of 
Tehran’s air pollution and his sense that Iranian society faced an impending catastrophe. 
Dr. Ātafi, the managing director of the Health Society of Tehran, warned that  
the blue and beautiful sky of Tehran pollutes this city’s land. If no action is taken to 
prevent an increase in the level of air pollution, it will not be long before life in this city 
will be impossible.528 
Seven weeks later, at the first meeting of the national Committee to Combat Air 
Pollution, attended by Sāleh, government ministers, parliamentarians, and the mayor of 
Tehran, the senator Dr. Sādeq Rezāzādeh Shafaq voiced the committee’s consensus that 
“the city of Tehran has quickly become industrialized” and that the “smoke” of factories, 
public baths, and motor vehicles had “polluted and poisoned the city’s air…[and] made 
breathing intolerable.”529 Such views were not confined to expert symposia. In their 
reporting on these meetings, newspapers like Ettelā’āt, a national daily, underlined such 
dramatic depictions through headlines like “The Air of Tehran is Intolerable” and “The 
Air of Tehran Threatens.” Other publications like Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, “the 
monthly journal of the personnel of the Iranian oil industry,”530 printed articles 
526 “Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt (20 Tir 1350). 
527 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt, 13. 
528 “Sukht-e Tehran Bāyad Taghir Konad,” Ettelā’āt (17 Āzar 1345). 
529 “Havā-ye Tehran Qābel-e Tahamol Nist,” Ettelā’āt (4 Bahman 1345). 
530 This description of the publication appeared on the title page of the very first issue of the magazine, 
published in April 1962. It appeared in subsequent issues, changing over time, before disappearing entirely 
in later years.  
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introducing the concept of air pollution to their readers and advocated for its 
containment.531 A 1968 story, illustrated by a two-page sketch of great clouds of smoke 
pouring from factories, homes, and vehicles, compared the need to control air pollution to 
the necessity of ensuring potable water.532 It too called for action, writing that while the 
task would be difficult, Iranians “must not accept it as a type of pain without possibility 
of remedy, and give in to it.”533 
Unlike in the mid-1950s when Sāleh first began speaking about the potential 
problem of air pollution, a decade later the subject received far more than “ten days” 
worth of attention. Between late 1967 and the summer of 1971 more than one hundred 
meetings and seminars were held on the issue of Iran’s air quality.534 During the same 
period, Iranian officials began giving increasing amounts of attention to Iran’s natural 
environment and they took a series of legal and administrative steps to protect various 
aspects of it. In 1956 Iran’s first conservation law was enacted, providing legal protection 
for threatened wildlife and establishing the Game Council of Iran to issue and control 
licenses for hunting in protected regions. The focus on wildlife continued through 1967 
when the Majlis passed the Game and Fish Law, creating the Game and Fish Department 
in order to further establish and manage protected areas and inland fishing.535 Despite the 
early focus on the conservation of land and wildlife—by September 1975 there were 
 
531 “Āludegi-ye Havā va Āb va Zamin,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Ābān 1347), 30-31. 
532 “Mobārezeh ba Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Bahman 1346), 14-16. 
533 Ibid., 15. 
534 “Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt. 
535 Eskandar Firouz, “Environmental Protection,” Encyclopedia Iranica, online edition, 2011, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/environmental-protection (accessed online on 6 May 2019). 
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fifty-seven protected areas in the country with plans for more536—from the beginning 
commentators proposed employing the state’s authority to help Iran’s air quality. The 
American Clean Air Act, passed in 1963 in order to control levels of air pollution across 
the United States, often inspired proposed remedies in Iran. During his speech at the 1966 
seminar, Jahānshāh Sāleh claimed that the issue of air pollution had the attention of 
Prime Minister Amir ‘Abbās Hoveydā, and that he had “no doubt” the government would 
implement whatever proposals were made. Sāleh went on to suggest that the seminar 
participants write and submit a “Clean Air” law, and that if the government “gave him the 
authority” he would first tackle the large amounts of visible smoke.537 ‘Abdul Rezā 
Ansāri, the Minister of the Interior during the mid-1960s, reinforced Sāleh’s claim, 
saying that “the prevention of severe air pollution has the attention of the government” 
and that the issue was “connected to the health of the people.”538 Advocates for state 
intervention argued that it was the “duty of the government and responsible authorities” 
to undertake “detailed” study and analysis in order to set forth regulations governing the 
location of factories, the quality of fuel, the proper height of smokestacks, the 
construction of bakeries and baths, and the regulation of gasoline- and diesel-powered 
motor vehicles.539  
536 Eskandar Firouz, “Environmental and Nature Conservation in Iran,” Environmental Conservation, vol. 
3, no. 1 (1976), 40-42. 
537 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt, 13. 
538 “Havā-ye Tehran Qābel-e Tahamol Nist,” Ettelā’āt (4 Bahman 1345). 
539 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul dar Movarrad-e Āludegi-ye Havā-ye 
Tehran (Tehran: n.p., 1346), 2-3. 
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With the establishment of the Department of Environmental Conservation and 
Enhancement as an adjunct to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1971, measures to 
combat air pollution began to be institutionalized alongside broader attempts to prevent 
the degradation of Iran’s natural environment. The new institution incorporated the duties 
of the old Game and Fish Department supplemented by a more expansive mandate to 
guard against the fouling of Iran’s environment. As with many Iranians writing about the 
environmental challenges their country faced, those working within the Department of 
the Environment saw pollution and environmental degradation as intimately linked to the 
“progress” of human “civilization.”540 A report on the department’s planned activities 
during Iran’s upcoming Fifth Development Plan541 stated that while humanity was 
“shackled” to the “issue of pollution,” it was important for people to better understand the 
necessity of the “protection and preservation of these precious resources [the natural 
world],” something the authors felt was more important than “any other factor of their 
health and joy and recreation.”542 In this Iran had advantage, as “fortunately,” they wrote, 
540 Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, Barnāmeh-ye Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist dar Durān-e Barnāmeh-ye 
‘Omrāni-ye Panjom-e Keshvar (n.p.: Sāzman-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, n.d.), 2. Though the report is not 
dated, it was clearly written early in the 1970s as the Fifth Development Plan was taking shape. 
541 Running from March 1973 to March 1978, the Fifth Development Plan was marked by a sharp rise in 
government revenues due to the 1973 Oil Crisis. Accelerating many of the modernization policies of the 
monarchy—particularly the promotion of industrialization and the creation of large agribusinesses that 
pushed rural people off their land and into urban slums—the increasing economic inequality and broad 
social disruptions of the period are often seen as being contributions to rise of revolutionary turmoil in the 
late 1970s. For a brief discussion of these trends see Nikki Keddie’s Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive 
History of Modern Iran (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 160-182. 
542 Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, Barnāmeh-ye Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist dar Durān-e Barnāmeh-ye 
‘Omrāni-ye Panjom, 3. 
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“in most places…[pollution] has not yet reached the horrifying level that fully 
industrialized countries face.”543 
The Department sought to address everything from the contamination of the 
country’s fresh water supplies—“the source of sickness, poisoning, and suffering”544—to 
the overuse of pesticides,545 the establishment of national parks,546 and even the 
“protection of the beauty of the natural environment.”547 Most significant for the report’s 
authors was air pollution, the “irritating poisonous clouds and polluted vapors” that had 
developed in Iran’s urban areas, and they dedicated a significant portion of their text to 
describing its sources and effects.548 But it was only in 1974, when the Majlis passed the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, that the department was given a specific 
writ to protect the quality of Iran’s air and water, handing it—in the words of two men 
working in the Department of the Environment—a goal of the “preservation, restoration, 
or enhancement of the quality of the ambient air in Iran for optimum social and economic 
benefit.”549 
While concern for air quality was folded into broader environmental initiatives, 
there continued to be calls for a comprehensive air pollution law through the early 
 
543 Ibid., 6. 
544 Ibid., 3 for the quote and 18-30 for the discussion. 
545 Ibid., 42-58. 
546 Ibid., 59-66. 
547 Ibid., 67-70. 
548 Ibid., 15. 
549 Zerbonia, R. and B. Soraya, “Air Pollution Control in Iran,” Journal of the Air Pollution Control 
Association vol. 28, no. 4 (1978), 335. 
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1970s.550 That push would come to fruition in 1975 when the National Clean Air 
Regulations were passed as an addendum to the Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act. The new law empowered the Department of the Environment in areas 
like “the establishment of national air quality standards, the control of the composition of 
fuel and the conditions for its use in Iran” and the creation of emissions standards for 
industry and motor vehicles.551 The new regulations did not prove to be as reliable as had 
been hoped, however, as the work of the Department was hampered by a lack of reliable 
“local data” on air quality in much of Iran, something that forced the establishment of 
principles and standards “based on…general experiences” rather than observations.552 For 
that reason, the Department declared that the optimum course of action would be to 
protect Iran’s air quality with the “best 
practicable technology to prevent emissions at the 
source.”553 In Iran, that would come to mean, in 
theory and in practice, gas energy. 
*** 
That Iranians should so quickly and so 
strongly turn toward gas energy was reflective of 
550 Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt. 
551 Eskandar Firouz, “Environmental Protection,” Encyclopedia Iranica, available online at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/environmental-protection (accessed online on 6 May 2019). 
552 Zerbonia, R. and B. Soraya, “Air Pollution Control in Iran,” 336. 
553 Ibid., 335. 
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their understandings of and experiences with air pollution. “Air pollution” held a 
particular and tangible meaning for Iranians during the 1960s and 1970s, one rooted in 
the “smoke” of fossil fuel combustion.554 All the complexity of air pollution, its causes, 
and its effects notwithstanding, Iranian commentators articulated understandings of it that 
prioritized the human experience of living within a polluted atmosphere. In the summer 
of 1971, Ettelā’āt wrote 
In the not-so-distant past, old Tehran…had pleasant and 
attractive weather. It could even be said that until four or five 
years ago it was possible to feel the different climate above Seh 
Rāh-ye Zendān and the gentle climate of Shemirān. But today 
the domain of air pollution has reached there as well. 555 
Ettelā’āt’s passage was reflective of the emphasis that 
observers put on the tangible experience of air quality. The 
“gentle climate” of northern Tehran, once so palpable, had 
been erased by the spread of polluted air. “Smoke” 
threatened to “suffocate” Tehran, a description that echoed 
the sorts of physical sensations Iranians were beginning to experience. The article went 
on to describe the “strange” and “alarming” state of the air, writing that 
In San Francisco, an hour spent walking in the streets is equivalent to smoking one 
unfiltered cigarette. But if you wander for an hour in Tehran, it is just as if you smoked 
554 The smoke of fossil fuel combustion, particularly that of coal, had long been a concern for people 
around the world. In places like Germany and the United States, beginning in the late-19th century, targeted 
social movements against the coal smoke that blanketed many urban areas began to form. Focused on 
smoke’s unremittent filth and contrasting it to the “cleanliness” emerging bourgeois values demanded, such 
activists were instrumental in bringing what had been seen as a strictly local problem to broader attention 
and, ultimately, resolution. For more again see Frank Uekoetter’s The Age of Smoke. 




two unfiltered cigarettes! This is the actual face of Tehran, a city that for most of the 
provinces is a visionary (ruyāyi) one, but visionary for smoke!”556 
 
As something that could be seen, smelled, and felt burning in the lungs, time and again 
the shifting, heterogeneous, “gloomy” clouds that lay over Iran’s cities were described by 
observers as “smoke” (dud). Magazines and 
newspapers reinforced that understanding with 
photographs of smoggy haze, smokestacks 
discharging fumes, and black exhaust pouring 
from motor vehicles. Underlining Ettelā’āt’s 
formulation of the “domain of air pollution,” 
the article was accompanied by a black-and-
white photograph of a thick haze smothering 
the city. Captioned “Tehran is drowned in 
smoke,” the image, taken from a vantage point 
high above the city, showed that “the domain of air pollution” was not an 
abstract notion of invisible gaseous mixtures, but a conspicuous presence in the lives of 
Tehran’s residents (Figure 15).557  
The visual idiom of smoke was a common presence in the reporting on Iran’s air 
quality. One 1972 photograph captured a bus spewing a cloud of thick exhaust as it 






behind (Figure 16).558 Similar currents of threat and danger animated many of the images 
used to illustrate Iran’s growing trouble with poor air quality. One striking image, in a 
1971 Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran article on the National Iranian Oil Company’s 
efforts to prevent air pollution, foregrounded notions of impending peril through its 
stylized composition. Shot directly into a low, haze-distorted sun and employing shades 
of crimson interposed between areas of inky darkness and white brilliance, the 
photograph depicts a factory’s “fumes” and “flares” coiling across the image and upward 
into a pitch-black sky, the ominous mood transmuting the image from visualization into 
depiction of dire threat (Figure 17).559 Nāmeh’s image employed a visual grammar for 
representing air pollution— the use of smokestacks, plumes of smoke and fire, and 
murky clouds that blocked eyesight—that found repeated expression in Iranian media. A 
year later, as part of a piece on a symposium dedicated to air pollution, the magazine 
again employed this graphical idiom, creating a sense of filth with an image of five 
smokestacks belching murky smoke and soot into a sickly yellow sky that was almost 
entirely obscured by ashen clouds (Figure 18).560 Through its images, Nāmeh conjured a 
world defined by industry and its hazardous byproducts, one where the blue and beautiful 
sky of Tehran and the “gentle climate of Shemirān” had been destroyed.  
558 “Paykār bā Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Farvardin 1351), 18. 
559 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e 
Naft-e Iran (Tir 1350), 31. 
560 “Paykār ba Āludegi-ye Havā,” 35. 
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Notions of impending danger and preoccupations with the tangible experiences of 
poor air quality were combined in the attention given to air pollution’s agonizing 
illnesses. In its reporting on Jahānshāh Sāleh’s 
1966 speech to the Air Pollution Seminar, 
Ettelā’āt highlighted that “smoke and air 
pollution cause cancer;” Sāleh himself, under 
the subheading “It Kills,” stressed how many 
people had died from air pollution in places 
like London, New York, and Pittsburgh.561 One 
report, prepared in late 1967 by a group within 
the NIOC and published as a “warning” to the 
“responsible authorities,”562 forecast that 
without significant measures Tehran’s air 
quality would continue to deteriorate. While people had “slowly become habituated to 
inhaling dirty and polluted air,” it was causing increased incidences of diseases like 
pneumonia, acute swelling of the lungs, chronic bronchitis, and cancer.563 For the report’s 
authors, air pollution was a complex phenomenon produced by an ensemble of specific 
substances: sulfur oxides, described as having an “extremely bad effect” on the human 
561 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt, 1-13. 
562 The exact provenance of the report, titled “A Warning to the Responsible Authorities about the Air 
Pollution of Tehran,” is unclear. It appears to have been produced by or for a committee within the NIOC 
for internal circulation. Found within the NIOC Information Center and Central Library. 
563 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 11. See also “Tehran dar Dud Khafeh 
Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt (20 Tir 1350). 
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respiratory system; nitrogen oxides, major contributors to haze and possessing a strong 
odor; and un- and incompletely-burned hydrocarbons, compounds that react with sunlight 
to create ground-level ozone, a major component of smog and a cause of respiratory 
ailments like coughing, choking, and shortness of breath.564 Discussions of specific 
pollutants and their effects made their way into mainstream publications as well. In July 
1971, Ettelā’āt highlighted many of the same pollutants in many of the same ways, 
describing carbon dioxide as an “asphyxiating” gas and one of the “most important” 
pollutants affecting Tehran; sulfur oxides as destroying plant life and eroding the exterior 
of buildings; nitrogen oxides as irritants for the respiratory system and a major 
component of smog and haze; and benzopyran, created in the presence of incompletely-
combusted hydrocarbons and reported to be a cause of heart trouble and cancer.565 
Like the smoke that so captured the attention of Iranian commentators, all such 
pollutants were significant byproducts of fossil fuel combustion, primarily the oil fuels 
that powered Iran’s accelerating industrialization. With Iranian modernization policies 
intensifying during the 1960s and 1970s, it was becoming increasingly difficult to escape 
the toxic cocktail of pollutants that loomed over the country’s cities.566 Many saw air 
pollution as a profound challenge for the Iranian nation as a whole, often implicitly 
constructing an understanding of air pollution that prioritized the experiences of those 
living in Tehran and extending it to other locales. Others understood air pollution in 
profoundly local, even individual, terms. The authors of the NIOC warning on the 
564 Ibid., 5-8. 
565 “Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt. 
566 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 7-9. 
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contamination of Iran’s air saw pollution’s compositional complexity as causing it to be 
manifested in varied ways depending on locale, season, time of day, and even people’s 
differing first-hand encounters with it. Whereas a pilot might see air pollution as the 
smoke and haze that obscured their view of an airfield, or a farmer might experience it as 
the acid rain that killed their crops, for urban residents “polluted air” was understood in 
terms of human health and physical sensation, as something that was part of a person’s 
“2200 breaths per 24-hour” period and the “cause of irritation of the eyes and the 
respiratory system.”567 They thus argued for a more localized approach, writing not only 
that “the way of combating smoke and soot is in each country connected to particular 
conditions of geography, cultural progress, [and] the state of the economy and society” 
but also that “few” regions faced a knot of causes as complex as Tehran.568 
The Alborz Mountains, within the southern foothills of which Tehran nestles, 
featured prominently within accounts 
of air pollution. When combined with 
the visual grammar of smoke and 
industry, the mountain chain became a 
powerful exemplar of what Iranians, 
and most especially the residents of 
Tehran, stood on the cusp of losing. For 
those like Dr. Ātafi, who spoke of “blue 
 
567 Ibid., 3-4. 
568 Ibid., 11. 
Figure 19 
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and beautiful sky” Tehran disappearing behind clouds of smoke and haze, the arrival and 
expansion of the “domain of air pollution” in the capital had already altered for the worse 
their perceptions and experiences of the city in which they lived. The sentiment found 
clearest expression in visual form. In the spring of 1972, Nāmeh published a photograph 
of a low-hanging cloud of smoke sitting over Tehran (Figure 18).569 Shot northward, the 
image creates a studied contrast between the beauty of the snow-capped Alborz rising 
into a bright blue sky and the polluted cityscape below. In the photograph, not only were 
Tehran’s inhabitants enveloped by a cloud of smoke and filth, but their everyday 
connection to the dramatic natural beauty that surrounded them was also contaminated. 
The cover of a 1978 statistical collection from the Ministry for Environmental Protection 
made the point in even starker terms through its illustration of the Alborz Mountains and 
their foothills (Figure 19).570 In the scene, Mount Damavand rises above the lower peaks 
to stand prominently amidst a robin’s egg-blue sky. Lower down, the clean air and 
natural beauty of the mountain range gives way to a polluted industrial landscape. An 
unsightly cloud of gray smoke and haze rises from smokestacks to sit between the city 
and the beautiful vista of Damavand and its snows. In this telling, air pollution stands 
between the residents of Tehran and Damavand, one of the most potent symbols of their 
city and country, weakening their connection to the land of Iran.571 There was a deep 
569 “Paykār ba Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh, 35. 
570 Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, Āmār-e Āludegi-ye Havā-ye Tehran, Seh Māheh-ye Sevvom-e Sāl-e 
1357 (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, 1357[?]), cover. 
571 There is a long and powerful history of Iranians embedding their country’s lands in their national 
identity, something Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has explored in her book Frontier Fictions. Beginning in the 
19th century, Kashani-Sabet examines the connections between Iranian conceptualizations of Iran as a 
geographical entity and modern notions of Iranian nationhood and citizen belonging, ultimately showing 
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aesthetic quality to the loss depicted, a harm rooted not in the physical danger or medical 
effects of smoke and pollution, but in a humanistic desire to live amidst beauty. A collage 
of three photographs on the back cover, two depicting industrial smokestacks and their 
emissions wafting through the air, reinforced the point. The images highlighted the 
ugliness of industrial landscapes with their structures of corrugated steel alongside 
mounded, blasted, and heaped earth baking in the sun.572 Gone was the Tehran of 
“pleasant and attractive weather,” of majestic mountains and clear skies, of the joys of 
breathing and living in a city with clean air. In its place had come choking fumes, 
obscuring haze, and rent earth. Air pollution thus threatened not only the physical health 
of Tehran’s residents, but also their spiritual wellbeing. 
The connection between the Alborz and the state of Tehran’s air was both forceful 
and bidirectional, as the mountain chain exerted a powerful influence on the character 
and intensity of the city’s air pollution. In 1966, Jahānshāh Sāleh, basing his opinion on 
ten years of observation, noted that the mountains prevented the easy movement of air 
through Tehran, enabling noxious gases and particulates to accumulate above the city.573 
The author of the 1967 NIOC warning noted that even though Tehran’s winds were 
highly variable, the strongest and most sustained moved from west to east; any pollutants 
swept up would become trapped above the city as the mountains, lying primarily to the 
north and east of the city, thwarted the movement of the air and impeded the dispersal of 
how closely interwoven they were. See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions” Shaping the Iranian 
Nation, 1804-1946 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000). 
572 Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, Āmār-e Āludegi-ye Havā-ye Tehran, rear cover. 
573 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt, 13. 
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the city’s emissions. There were ways to mitigate the issue, and the report recommended, 
following the advice of several consulting engineers from the United States, that the 
establishment of factories and workshops to the south and west of the Tehran be 
henceforth forbidden.574 But the presence of the Alborz range was not the only 
environmental factor involved. The city’s overall climate also played a significant role, 
and Iranian experts within both governmental ministries and the national petroleum 
companies quickly began to take note. Often trained both in Iran and overseas, such 
experts worked to introduce existing knowledge regarding air pollution, apply learned 
techniques, and undertake and publish575 original research on the state of Iran’s air 
quality. As early as 1948 the NIOC had begun to establish temporary observation points 
around Tehran to monitor pollutant levels in the city.576 By 1978 six permanent 
monitoring stations had been created, variously operated by ministries, universities, and 
the NIOC.577 Manuchehr Olfat, an employee of the NIOC with a degree from the 
Technical College of Tehran and further training in the United States, published a 1972 
article in Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, the journal of the Iranian Oil Society, on 
574 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 14-15. 
575 Iranian experts often published both home and abroad. For example, see Badakhshan, A., S. Shaibani, 
and M. Olfat, “Techniques and Experiences of Measurement and Observation of Major Atmospheric 
Pollutants in Iran,” The Bulletin of the Iranian Petroleum Institute, no. 54 (1st Quarter 1974), 13-20. This 
article, printed in the English-language section of Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, reports the findings 
of continued observations of Tehran’s air quality. Badakhshan presented the findings at WMO-WHO 
Technical Conference on Observation and Measurement of Atmospheric Pollution in Helsinki, July 30 – 
August 4, 1973. Institutions like the Environmental Protection Organization also published statistical 
collections of air quality observations. For example, see Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist, Āmār-e Āludegi-
ye Havā-ye Tehran, 
576 “Paykār bā Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh, 34. 
577 Zerbonia, R. and B. Soraya, “Air Pollution Control in Iran,” 335. 
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methods for the detection and measurement of air pollution.578 Olfat began by 
introducing the major pollutants that plagued the world’s urban areas, but he quickly 
turned to discussing his own research into their concentrations in Tehran. Basing his 
work on thirty days of data collected in January 1972, he noted that concentrations of 
pollutants tended to be highest at night and in the early morning. With his results, Olfat 
highlighted the frequent presence and effects of one of the most significant factors 
influencing Tehran’s air quality: the atmospheric inversion.579 
Linked to the city’s semi-arid climate and mountainous topography, atmospheric 
inversions, more than any other factor, manifested the powerful environmental context 
that surrounded and interpenetrated Tehran and the lives of its residents. Inversions 
develop when cold air is trapped at a low altitude by a layer of warmer air above it, a 
reversal of normal conditions where warmer, less-dense air rises through cooler, more-
dense air. Such rising air, gathered in convective currents, carry any suspended pollutants 
upward and disperse them across wide areas. Writing in the same issue of Nashriyeh as 
Olfat, ‘Alirezā Moshref Razavi, an expert in meteorological engineering and weather 
forecasting for the Iranian government, presented five years’ worth of observations of 
atmospheric inversions in Tehran. Using equipment sited in Mehrābād between 1967 and 
1971, Moshref Razavi observed inversions on roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of 
days.580 Most were surface-level radiation inversions, a phenomenon connected to city’s 
 
578 “Āludehkonandeh-ha-ye Mohem-e Havā – Tashkhis va Sonjesh-e Ānhā,” Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-
e Iran no. 47 (Khordād 1351), 9-15. 
579 “Āludehkonandeh-ha-ye Mohem-e Havā – Tashkhis va Sonjesh-e Ānhā,” 14. 
580 “Tasir-e Inverzhun dar Tarākam-e Āludegi-ye Havā va Vaz’-e Inverzhun-e Tehran,” Nashriyeh-ye 
Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran no. 51 (Khordad 1351), 32-33. 
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climate and its frequently sunny days and cloudless nights.581 Such inversions form at 
night, after the sun has heated the surface of the earth and, in turn, warmed the layer of 
air adjacent to it. The absence of nighttime cloud cover allows the accumulated surface 
heat to be rapidly radiated away. The temperature of the air directly above the ground 
thus cools much more rapidly than the air above it, causing an atmospheric inversion to 
form. Tehran’s emissions are thus trapped against the city until such inversions dissipate 
or are dispersed by wind.582 Tehran’s mountainous terrain influences these events as well, 
as the becalming effect of the Alborz on the city’s winds— rarely blowing with much 
strength to begin with—often prevent the quick dispersal of inversions and the pollutants 
they have collected. Thus while most of Tehran’s inversions disappear in the late 
morning or early afternoon as the earth’s surface warms and the inversion process is 
reversed, they can persist indefinitely if conditions permit.583 With inversions an 
immutable fact of Tehran’s topographic and climatic contexts, Moshref Razavi argued 
that if nothing was done to reduce emissions, the city risked becoming like Pittsburgh, 
London, and Belgium’s Meuse Valley, all famous incidents of inversion-induced smog 
that had killed hundreds.584 
*** 
581 Ibid., 33. 
582 Ibid., 16-37. 
583 Ibid., 33-34. 
584 Ibid., 20-21, 31. 
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 Technical solutions to the country’s urban air quality crisis were proposed as soon 
as the issue began to be discussed in public. Alongside proposals for air quality standards 
and the mandated use of exhaust scrubbers585 and catalytic converters,586 the potential 
harnessing of gas energy was seen as crucial to any effort to fight air pollution. Sāleh, 
head of the University of Tehran, expressed a desire to replace Iran’s fuel oil 
consumption with gas, saying that “in this country that is everywhere full of gas, why do 
our factories and workshops consume fuel oil and on what principle have they not 
brought gas to Tehran?”587 But even before his speech in 1966, Iranians had begun to 
note to the energy source’s relative cleanliness. As early as 1961, articles in Nāmeh-ye 
San’at-e Naft-e Iran noted a comparative lack of smoke as a major benefit of gas 
energy,588 and over the next decade the claim would also become a recurring theme in 
other NIOC publications.589 In the summer of 1971, Sa’id Shaybāni, head of the 
petrochemical research group at the NIOC’s Research Center, placed gas energy at the 
center of the company’s efforts to prevent air pollution.590 Speaking to an assembled 
crowd of “academics, educators, and experts,” Shaybāni described air pollution as a 
 
585 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 15 
586 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 31-32. 
587 “Dud-e Tehran Tahdid Mikonad,” Ettelā’āt, 13. 
588 See “Az Khatarāt-e Ojāgh-ha-ye Gāz Cheh Midānid?,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Mordād 1341): 
20-21; “Pālāyeshgāh-ye Tehran,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Bahman 1341): 8-9, 45; “Vas’at-e 
Dāmaneh-ye Masraf-e Gāz-e Tabi’i,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Shahrivar 1343): 8-10; “Cherāgh-e 
Gāz va Ro’yāt-e Nokāt-e Imani dar Khāneh,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Bahman 1344): 34-35; and 
“Sukht-e Āshpazkhāneh az Qadim tā Hāl,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Mordād 1345): 17. 
589 See Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran, Naft va Zendegi (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye 
San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1350) and Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-
e Omur-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1352). 
590 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 12. 
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“chronic complication that often befalls rich…societies with a high level of 
industrialization,” one that knew “no borders” and threatened the “body and soul of 
humanity.”591 Shaybāni, his speech appearing in both Nāmeh and as a standalone 
publication,592 was one of the first to address the potential of gas as an aid to 
environmental protection in a systematic way. Rather than focusing on the relative lack of 
smoke produced by gas stoves as most others had, Shaybāni envisioned gas as having the 
potential to alter the fundamental relationship of humanity with the natural world. 
Shaybāni saw the natural world as a fragile and carefully articulated system, arguing that 
the great “chain” of the earth’s biosphere, huddled in a narrow band at less than 3000 
meters altitude, had been “ruptured” by the toxic byproducts of human activity.593 “Direct 
or indirect individual responsibility for the creation and increase of air pollution is the 
incontrovertible truth,” he said, and a growing population would inevitably intensify 
environmental degradation if nothing was done.594  
Shāhpur ‘Abdul Rezā Pahlavi, half-brother of the Shah and noted proponent of 
wildlife and environmental conservation, made similar arguments in his opening remarks 
to a 1975 meeting of the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
 
591 Ibid., 12. 
592 For the printed version of the speech see Sa’id Shaybāni, Mas’aleh-ye Āludegi-ye Havā va Barnāmeh-
hā-ye Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran dar in Zamineh (Tehran[?]: Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e Naft-e 
Iran, 1350). 
593 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 13. 
594 Ibid., 12. 
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Association595 that was held at the NIOC’s Tehran headquarters. Remarking that the 
“protection of our natural environment and the quality of life of the present and future 
generations” rested upon the actions of those assembled, Pahlavi argued that humanity 
and the natural environment were closely intertwined, saying that while the environment 
“effects our lives,” it was also true that “each aspect of [human] life” had consequences 
for the environment.596 He continued, declaring that “all human resources…are mobilized 
and harnessed in opposition to the needs of the environment,” including the “industrial 
resources” which were “potentially considered the most important danger for the 
environment” but “also supply the technology of environmental protection.”597 
Pahlavi’s belief that human technical ingenuity was both a cause of and solution 
to environmental degradation was not unique in Iranian society. The idea that the answer 
to the challenge of air pollution was not a retreat from industry and technology but a 
tighter embrace of them was one held by many. While Iranian commentators saw their 
country’s deteriorating air quality and poisoned cities as the dark underbelly of the rapid 
transformations taking place, they nonetheless affirmed a desire for further 
industrialization and the developmental policies that drove it. While the “progress…of 
the new industries did not have any other aim than providing …[for] a better life for the 
people,” the author of the 1967 NIOC warning on air pollution wrote, Tehran risked 
becoming like the “large cities” of Los Angeles, Chicago, and London, where air 
595 Founded in 1974 and headquartered in London, the IPIECA brought together all major international 
petroleum firms as members. The organization effectively operates as a lobbying group for the industry 
within the United Nations. 
596 “Naft va Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Spring 1354), 7. 
597 Ibid., 7. 
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pollution had “created multiple problems and put the health of residents…in danger.”598 
The metropolises of the world’s wealthy nations—with their bustling density, busy 
airports, long ribbons of highway, and prosperous industries—were in this telling 
refigured into tragic specters of modernity gone wrong. “There is no doubt that in our 
country a rise in the standard of living of people and the industrialization of the country 
that is the natural goal of the White Revolution is the wish of all patriotic people,” they 
report stated, “but regard must be given by the authorities…because right now we see 
that the great country of America is captive to the problem of pollution.”599  
Manuchehr Eqbāl, chief executive of the NIOC, speaking in early 1972, made an 
even more explicit connection between industrial civilization and pollution, saying that 
humanity, who today with the aid of its own knowledge and amazing technology has set 
foot beyond the earth (koreh-ye khāk) and stepped into the sweep of the cosmos, now 
faces an unfavorable environment that was unsought and unwittingly gained via the same 
excellent technology.600 
Eqbāl argued that it was crucial to quickly address the “terrible abyss” that yawned 
before Iranians, and, quoting the Shah’s words on the subject, said that “one fundamental 
problem [for which] we must right now look for a solution is a problem which for us 
would not be as complicated to solve as for the industrial countries, [and] that problem is 
air pollution.”601 It was the failure of humanity to understand how the “needs” of modern 
daily life had affected the natural environment, the head of the Oil Society of Iran said 
598 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 1-2. 
599 Ibid., 12. 
600 “Simpozium-e Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Esfand 1350), 13. 
601 Ibid., 14. 
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following Eqbāl, and “it is only when we face unwanted conditions in our own 
environment do we discover the existence of such an issue” as air pollution. “Anywhere 
you bring technology,” he added, “humanity has also rushed to bring as a gift new 
problems for the environment.”602 But for the chief of the Oil Society of Iran,603 
“technology” was also the solution, as it had been for Pahlavi. As he said, “confronting 
industrial pollution is not possible except through the increase of the level of investment 
and use of the latest scientific and technological innovations.”604 Animating these 
comments was a fundamental belief in the possibility of a technological fix, a seamless 
answer of energy substitution that demanded few, if any, changes to Iranian 
developmental policies. “Technology” may have brought the problems of air pollution 
and environmental degradation into being, but it also promised in newer and better and 
more modern forms to be their solution as well. 
 More than many in Iran,605 Sa’id Shaybāni connected the issue of air pollution to 
the concept of energy, saying that the “economic progress and industrial development of 
a society is always accompanied by an intensification and propagation of energy 
consumption” and that “the expansion of the production and consumption of energy is 
 
602 Ibid., 14. 
603 Established in the late 1950s in the wake of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis of early that decade, 
the Oil Society of Iran is a private organization that works to facilitate and promote Iranian research and 
expertise in the scientific, technical, legal, and commercials aspects of the Iranian petroleum industries on 
both domestic and international levels.     
604 “Simpozium-e Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 14. 
605 The anonymous author(s) of the NIOC warning on air pollution also drew the link, writing that “we 
know that the rise in the living standards of people has a direct relationship with the production and 
consumption of energy in country, and in our country the domestic consumption of oil has [risen] 270 
percent within ten years.” See Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 16. 
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frequently joined with the creation or increase of air pollution.”606 For Shaybāni, Iran’s 
long-term project to harness the “immense wealth” of its gas reserves promised to be far 
more than a spur to economic growth, but as a way to fundamentally reweight the balance 
between industrialization and the environment in Iran.607 Both globally608 and in Iran, 
fossil fuels accounted for most of the energy consumed by people, and Shaybāni reported 
that between 1958 and the mid-1960s, Iranian consumption of “oil fuels” had grown at an 
average yearly rate of 11.3%—to a total of 6,102,000 tons per year,609 half of which were 
consumed in and around Tehran—and would continue to do so for at least the next ten 
years.610 Unique among Iranian writing on issues of air quality, Shaybāni noted that the 
widespread combustion of fossil fuels had altered the world’s atmosphere in ways that 
were not obvious to the casual observer. He reported that while there had been no 
“tangible” change in global oxygen levels (dropping from 20.846% to 20.800%), 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels had increased sharply over the previous century, rising 
some fourteen percent.611 Shaybāni dismissed such changes as insignificant and 
606 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 14. 
607 Ibid., 33. 
608 Shaybāni reported the world’s fossil fuel mix as being 39% coal, 39% oil products, and 16% natural gas. 
See “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 14. 
609 Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 16. 
610 “Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 14-15. 
611 While striking that Shaybāni recognized the global rise of CO2 levels, a gas we now know to have potent 
greenhouse effects and a major driver of climate change, he does not seem to have appreciated the 
significance of the increase, describing CO2 as “fortunately” not possessing any “harmful properties.” 
Further, it appears that few others in Iran, if any, did so, as this is the only specific reference to atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels that the author has found. Despite this mention, then, the concern for air quality 
remained rooted in an understanding of pollution that saw it as the cause of specific social and medical 
maladies, the “tangible” effects in Iranian lives, rather than broader and more abstract global trends. See 
“Eghdāmāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 13. 
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maintained a focus on the palpable experiences of air pollution. Reflecting that concern, 
he too highlighted measures that addressed local air quality, championing the use of 
natural gas above all else.612 Gas was “one of the cleanest and most-desirable” of fuels 
and the key to “preventing air pollution,”613 he said, a solution that would require a 
dedicated program for the production, distribution, and consumption of gas, but was 
nonetheless “the simplest way of preventing air pollution.”614 
Shaybāni’s conviction that natural gas energy was the “simplest” solution to air 
pollution despite the huge infrastructural undertaking its use would require pointed to the 
hope that Iranians placed in technological solutions to the challenge of air pollution. As 
early as 1966, Dr. Ātafi of the Health Society of Tehran had declared that while it was no 
longer possible to radically alter the industrialized life of Tehran’s citizens, it was instead 
“possible to convert from the type of fuel that is destroying the human race…[and it is] 
proposed to the government and the NIOC that in the city of Tehran, gas fuel replace oil, 
diesel, gasoline, fuel oil, and coal.”615 Mohsen Shirāzi, the chief executive of design and 
study of the National Iranian Gas Company, expressed similar views in late 1974. Shirāzi 
too focused on fossil fuels and the tangible pollutants produced by their combustion. 
Saying that the “ghoul of pollution” was banging at the “gates of…health,” he declared 
 
612 Besides the use of gas, such measures included crude oil being scrubbed of its naturally-occurring sulfur 
during the refining process; smokestacks being built to a height sufficient to prevent the accumulation of 
sulfur compounds in the air of industrial regions;  also equipping smokestacks with the means to capture 
sulfur dioxide; leaded gasoline being phased out; the use of coal limited or forbidden; and motor vehicles 
being redesigned and fitted with catalytic converters to capture carbon monoxide. See “Eghdāmāt-e 
Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran barāyeh Jelugiri az Āludegi-ye Havā,” 30-32. 
613 Ibid., 15. 
614 Ibid., 30. 
615 “Sukht-e Tehran Bāyad Taghir Konad,” Ettelā’āt (17 Āzar 1345). 
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that the experiences of industrialized societies had shown that “only one way for the 
reduction of environmental pollution has been accepted by all experts of the world…[and 
that is] the use of natural gas.”616 For both Shirāzi and Shaybāni, easier than imagining a 
modern society that consumed less energy or allowed environmental considerations to 
constrain its industrialization was to double down on the fossil fuel use that had brought 
Iran to the point of environmental catastrophe. The widespread adoption of natural gas 
would thus be less an energy transition than an energy intensification,617 one rooted 
deeply in the materiality of the compositions of fossil fuels themselves. The methane and 
ethane that comprised the bulk of natural gas offered themselves as combustible 
substances that produced less soot, less ozone, less sulfur dioxide, and less of nearly all 
the pollutants that the combustion of oil-based fuels created. For officials and experts 
concerned about the poisoning of Iran’s air, gas offered itself as a way to avoid such a 
fate, all without having to undertake a fundamental rethinking of the country’s fossil fuel-
based industrialization and development policies. 
*** 
There was often a great deal of slippage between local and national perspectives 
in Iranian discussions of air quality. No locale received more attention than Tehran, the 
administrative and economic capital of the country, and the city’s quickly worsening air 
616 “Naqsh-e Gāz dar Taqlil-e Āludegi-ye Mohit-e Zist,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Winter 1353), 18-
20. 
617 On Barak has pointed to the fact that new forms of energy rarely replace preexisting forms entirely and 
certainly not in one fell swoop. Energy “transitions” are often very contingent, and new forms of energy 
can even spur increases in demand for older ones. For more see On Barak, “Three Watersheds in the 
History of Energy,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East vol. 34, no. 3 (2014): 
440-453.
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quality captured the attention of influential personages within state and state-affiliated 
institutions. Many of the ideas that were formulated in response to its particular 
conditions became the foundation on which policies for the entirety of the country rested. 
The use of gas energy for industrial applications was no different, and one of the first and 
most important manifestations of the push for Iran’s gasification was the effort to 
“convert” (tabdil) furnaces and factories to the new fuel source. This did not mean, 
however, that Tehran was always the first to see practical steps taken toward an 
expansion of gas use, a reality dictated by the city’s location hundreds of miles north of 
Iran’s primary oil and gas fields. Though the first Iran Gas Trunkline had made gas 
available across a broad swath of the country by the early 1970s, including in Tehran, the 
relative proximity of Shiraz to Iran’s centers of gas production meant that before factories 
in the capital had started the process of converting to gas, those in Shiraz had already 
begun to tackle the issue. 
Beginning in the summer of 1972, a concerted effort was made by the Fars 
provincial government to have a number of the factories near Shiraz switch to gas. The 
endeavor was in direct response to the opinions of the Shah, who upon seeing the effects 
of industry in Shiraz’s sky had ordered that all of the “smoky machinery, particularly the 
brickmaking kilns,” to be converted to gas.618 Manuchehr Piruz, the governor of Fars, 
wrote to the mayor of Shiraz to express hope that factory owners would “quickly” 
convert their workshops in the interests of the “prevention of air pollution.” He indicated 
618 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to Manuchehr Eqbāl. No document number, no document date; 
Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Mantaqeh-ye Shiraz (293-32994), Ostāndāri-ye Fars, National 
Archives of Iran, Tehran. [hereafter Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI]. 
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that the National Iranian Gas Company was ready to supply not only the gas needed, but 
also, significantly, any “technical guidance” that might be required.619 The promise of 
expert support reflected the experiences of one company, the Brickmaking Corporation of 
Shiraz, that had run into considerable hurdles in their own attempt to switch to gas fuel 
three years earlier. As described in a letter to the provincial government, the company 
had hired several “Italian engineers” to design and install a gas system for their factory. 
Quickly, however, the intense heat of the furnaces had melted the equipment imported 
from Italy at considerable expense, causing the factory to take a three million rial loss and 
forcing them revert to the “old materials of oil and smoke.”620 
The failure of the Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz’s voluntary initiative 
demonstrated that the task of converting Iran’s industry to use natural gas would not be 
straightforward. Even the expensive importation of expertise and equipment had not 
guaranteed against catastrophic breakdown and financial loss. Rather than denounce the 
project as a waste, however, the owner of the company professed to be writing to warn 
the others of the potential pitfalls of gas conversion, offering his story not as a protest 
against the provincial government’s initiative, but as a way to help others succeed.621 
Other factory owners—while broadly supportive of the effort to move to gas with some 
 
619 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to ‘Atārad, 7847, 12 Tir 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, 
NLAI. 
620 Letter from Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ajorfeshāri-ye Shiraz to the Provincial Government of Fars, 24, 17 
Khordād 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. Their experience was reiterated eleven days 
later. See letter from Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ajorfeshāri-ye Shiraz to Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran 
Mantaqeh-ye Shiraz, 32, 28 Khordād 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
621 Letter from Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ajorfeshāri-ye Shiraz to the Provincial Government of Fars, 24, 17 
Khordād 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
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lamenting that Shiraz was “dense with the smoke of crude oil”622—responded by 
demanding support sufficient to avoid such disasters. In response, the NIGC dispatched 
an “expert” from Pakistan to evaluate the laying of gas lines in the summer of 1972. His 
“promising” examination of the kilns of the Shabānkāreh company led to a request that 
more specialists be sent.623 But at a meeting held in late July between the mayor of Shiraz 
and the “majority of the owners of the brickmaking furnaces of Shiraz,” the offer of 
expert analysis was deemed insufficient.624 Worried about the financial implications of 
even a successful program to convert their factories, the owners also demanded monetary 
support in the form of fee waivers and equipment grants.625 No promises regarding 
financial assistance were offered, and in any case, confusion reigned on the part of the 
NIGC. As late as January 1973, the company had failed to dispatch the promised 
experts626 despite having once again ordered the factory owners to switch to gas.627 
In Tehran, the gasification of the city’s industry was rooted in a broader effort to 
curb the smoke of area asphalt producers in the 1970s. Referring to the municipality’s 
duty “to curb factories, workshops… and all businesses and trades that create noise and 
622 Letter from Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ajorfeshāri-ye Shiraz to Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran Mantaqeh-ye 
Shiraz, 32, 28 Khordad 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
623 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to Manuchehr Eqbāl. No document number, no document date; 
Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
624 Letter from Iraj ‘Atārad to Manuchehr Piruz, 11967, 5 Mordād 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye 
Gāz, NLAI. 
625 Transcript of Committee Meeting held 5 Mordād 1351, no document number, no document date; 
attached to Document 11967; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
626 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to NIGC, 26570, 7 Bahman 1351; Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, 
NLAI. 
627 Letter from Taqi Moqades to Manuchehr Piruz, 1744, 18 Ābān 1351, attached to 19902, 10 Dey 1351; 
Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz, NLAI. 
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disturbances or produce smoke and/or putridity (‘ofunat),” the Tehran government 
ordered the factories, many “with their unsuitable and unprofessional smokestacks” to 
install filters and come into compliance with the “provided specifications.”628 Even with 
the Shah issuing personal order to address the smoke polluting Tehran’s air, the 
importance of the asphalt producers to the region’s economy complicated matters. With 
the mayor of Tehran warning that “their closing will stop asphalt work in and around the 
city as well as likely stop work on the 100,000-person stadium [Āryāmehr, now Āzādi, 
Stadium],”629 they were given a one-month grace period.630 The owners acquiesced, but 
requested a further month’s delay as none of the necessary equipment was produced in 
Iran, promising to voluntarily “stop their factories” should the revised deadline be 
missed.631 
The use of natural gas quickly began to be considered for Tehran’s factories, 
particularly as the emissions of industries other than asphalt production began to be 
tackled. With the completion of the IGAT-1 line in 1970, Tehran, like Shiraz, was seen as 
a locale where gas energy could be quickly brought into use.632 Just a few weeks after the 
asphalt producers were ordered to scrub their emissions, a group of spool-makers were 
628 Letter from Ahmad Nāser to heads of Felesh-Melāvi, Senā, and Chakosh asphalt companies, no 
document number, undated; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
629 This is referring to Āryāmehr Stadium, built in the early 1970s to host the 1974 Asian games. Later 
renamed Āzādi Stadium in the wake of the 1979 revolution. 
630 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Āghā-ye M’ayniān, no document number, 28 Ābān 1352; Tabdil-e No’-
e Sukht, NLAI. 
631 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Āghā-ye M’ayniān, no document number, 29 Ābān 1352; Tabdil-e No’-
e Sukht, NLAI. 
632 Letter from Muhammad Sām to Nikpey, m/13974, 18 Esfand 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
260 
 
instructed to reduce their emissions by coordinating with the NIGC.633 As in Shiraz, 
many of Tehran’s industrialists proved to be active participants in the effort to protect the 
city’s air quality. Some had made gestures towards gas energy and had already 
“requested the formation of an expert committee composed of representatives from the 
health ministries, social affairs and work, the economy, the steel organization, and the 
capital municipality” to discuss the best way to address smoke and its harms, a proposal 
the city municipality considered reasonable.634 With the Shah taking a personal interest in 
the matter,635 municipal officials both maintained their pressure on factory owners and 
implored the NIGC to prioritize owner requests and quickly move to provide any needed 
equipment to factories sited near existing gas lines.636 In late December 1973, the mayor 
of Tehran, Gholāmrezā Nikpey, personally inspected the progress of the asphalt factories 
in their efforts to curb their smoke production. Arriving at 6:30am on December 20th, the 
deadline given, Nikpey found uneven compliance. Three workshops had installed exhaust 
filters and from them thick steam rose in place of smoke. Two others were in the process 
of installing their filters while a third had stopped its work entirely. Proposing that yearly 
inspections be instituted to build “confidence” that smoky emissions were not increasing, 
 
633 Letter from Nāser of Region 11, no document number, 7 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
634 Letter from Ahmad Nāser to Dr. Nikpey, mm11/49, 11 Āzar 1352, pg. 1; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
635 Letter from head of the Special Office of the Shah to Qolāmrezā Nikpey, m/400-45, 18 Āzar 1352; 
Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
636 Letter from the Municipality of Tehran to Āghā-ye Moqadesi, m/2108, 20 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e 
Sukht, NLAI. 
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Nikpey further “communicated [to owners] that in addition to the installation of exhaust 
filters, at the first possible opportunity they must obtain a gas connection.”637 
The project of bringing gas to Shiraz’s industry made very slow progress in 1973, 
little enough that the Shah was forced to reiterate his order to address the city’s air 
quality. Prompted by an early-1974 report from the Ministry of the Economy on Shiraz’s 
air pollution and its relationship to the furnaces on the city’s outskirts, the Shah scolded 
the region’s authorities for having access to natural gas but failing to make use of it, 
again saying that “the government must give the necessary attention so that all furnaces 
across the country that consume fuel oil will be converted to gas.”638 Flowing through the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Fars provincial government, the regional branch of the NIGC, 
and then to factory owners, the Shah’s directive spurred a flurry of new activity. Some 
factory owners wrote to express their satisfaction with the order and encouraged further 
activity by the provincial government. Mostafā Qahremāni, chief executive of the 
Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz, the very same company that had voluntarily 
attempted to switch to gas, wrote to Management and Economic Administration of Fars 
to express his “satisfaction” with the order from the perspectives of both “quality of 
production” and “prevention of air pollution.”639 Qahremāni noted that many of Shiraz’s 
637 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Āghā-ye M’ayniān, m/2348, 1 Dey 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
638 Letter from Muhammad Sām to Manuchehr Piruz,, m/13974, 18 Esfand 1352; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh 
Kureh-ha va Kucheh-ha va Khiābān-ha va Hazineh-ha-ye Tarh-e Mazbur (98-293-4335), Ostāndāri-ye 
Fars, National Archives of Iran, Fars Document Center, Shiraz. [hereafter Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, 
NLAI]. 
639 Zamānzādeh to the Supreme Governor of Fars, 7995, 29 Esfand 1352; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, 
NLAI. 
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furnaces continued to use mazut640 and that these, in particular, had drawn the Shah’s ire 
during his previous trip to the city. To help address the issue, he had joined a commission 
organized by the head of the Ministry of the Economy that sought to facilitate “positive 
cooperation” between factory owners and the NIGC. They aimed to have gas lines laid to 
factories by March 1974 and Qahremāni volunteered to have his own facilities converted 
first. In response and “without any waste of time,” the NIGC dispatched equipment and 
“technically-experienced officers” from Tehran, again under the leadership of a Pakistani 
expert. With the cooperation of the NIGC’s local officials and via “their own obstinacy,” 
the team successfully installed Qahremāni’s gas lines “during the intense cold and heavy 
snow of the winter season.” By the time of writing, his factory had been using six kilns to 
produce 180,000 bricks per day for ten days, and Qahremāni expressed satisfaction with 
the result, writing the NIGC’s work would “liberate the country from air pollution and 
provide a better natural environment.”641 
While over seventy factories were operating near Shiraz at the time, the area’s 
forty-two brick kilns came under special scrutiny.642 Understood to be far more polluting 
than other industries, converting the fuel source of these facilities was seen as a 
fundamental first step to any effort to fight air pollution in the city. Most of Shiraz’s 
brickmakers were not as proactive as Qahremāni, a fact that come to light in an April 
640 Mazut is a heavy, low quality form of fuel oil used primarily in power generation. Used most frequently 
in the Soviet Union, the fuel pollutes heavily and is today produced in few places besides the former Soviet 
sphere. 
641 Mostafā Qahremāni to the Management of the Economic Administration of Fars, 350, 23 Esfand 1352, 
attached to document 7995; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
642 In addition to the brickmakers there were nineteen plaster makers, one cement factory, one licorice 
factory, six rock cutters, and two sand and gravel factories. See list from the Shiraz gendarmerie attached to 
letter t401-77-8-52-12, 20 Khordād 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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1974 meeting between owners and Manuchehr Piruz, the provincial governor. At the 
meeting,643 Engineer Behzād, the head of the NIGC’s Shiraz branch, said that only a few 
of the more than a dozen644 brickmakers in the city had converted their facilities to use 
gas fuel. He offered the remainder an opportunity to conclude conversion contracts with 
the NIGC, a process that demanded the owners pay for the cost of the gas network 
upfront in order for necessary materials to be ordered. Rather than pay the NIGC, the 
owners offered to buy and import the necessary equipment on their own, a position they 
favored “from the perspective of efficiency and value.” The NIGC accepted their 
counteroffer, but also issued, for the first time, a threat: failure to follow through would 
see the forcible closure of those who had not complied.645 Two days later the threat was 
reiterated when the provincial Office of Environmental Health sent notice that while four 
of the nine owners had already concluded contracts, the remaining five had one month, 
beginning the next day, to do likewise. If they did not, the commission would “pursue” 
the issue, and “those factories whose names are not among the applicants for natural gas 
and had not signed an agreement will straightaway be closed and their continued 
operation prevented.”646 
 
643 Also attending were representatives of the Office of Sanitary Engineering, the director of the Work and 
Social Affairs Office, and the local Chamber of Commerce (otāgh-e asnāf). 
644 The documents give conflicting information regarding the number of brickmakers in Shiraz, with 
estimates varying between a low of a dozen and a high of sixteen. Still more unclear is the number of actual 
discrete kilns they operated, with the most consistent estimate being approximately forty-two. 
645 Proceedings of meeting, no document number; 31 Farvardin 1353, pg. 1; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-
ha, NLAI. 
646 Letter from Javād Haqān to Managers of Brickmaking Factories, 1934, 4 Ordibehesht 1353, attached to 
document 6/6321; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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Despite the official pressure on Shiraz’s brickmakers, the project to convert their 
facilities quickly ran into delays rooted not in the inaction or resistance of factory owners, 
but in the NIGC’s inability to fulfill the commitments it had made. Responding to a letter 
from the Work and Social Affairs Administration of Fars that demanded fuel conversions 
for the “protection of the health of workers and the cleanliness of the natural 
environment,”647 a July 1974 letter from the Syndicate of Ceramic Employers of Shiraz to 
the provincial Economic Administration shifted blame for the lack of gas to the NIGC. 
Pointing to the successful conversion of Qahremāni’s facilities, the letter writers 
complained that other brickmakers had “applied” for service and had “given an amount 
[of money] for the right to a gas connection,” but that the NIGC “had postponed the 
laying of gas pipes” until March 1975. Demanding that the NIGC “take action,” the 
syndicate deployed the language of environmentalism and social welfare that had been 
used against them, writing that they stood “ready for the execution of the order [to 
provide gas] that the majority of the public and their own workers consider beneficial to 
have from the perspective of the absence of air pollution.”648 Though the NIGC itself 
concurred, they reported that even though three facilities were “ready to make use of 
natural gas” and that “the owners of nine [other] furnaces” had “requested natural gas 
647 Letter from Shirāzi to Feruzān, Āryā, Kāzerun, Hāfez, and Golriz brickmakers, document 6060, 24 Tir 
1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
648 Letter from the Syndicate of Ceramic Employers of Shiraz to the Economic Administration of Fars, 18, 
25 Tir 1353, attached to 12648; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha va Kucheh-ha va Khiābān-ha va Hazineh-
ha-ye Tarh-e Mazbur (98-293-4335), Ostāndāri-ye Fars, National Archives of Iran, Fars Document Center, 
Shiraz. 
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networks,” “paid the cost of the networks,” and “concluded formal contracts,” they could 
not promise the commencement of service in less than eight months.649 
By the spring of 1974, the NIGC was in the process of laying gas pipes across 
Tehran, giving priority to the “large factories” of the city.650 Nāmeh reported in the fall of 
the same year that gas energy had been delivered to some of its first consumers: the 
heavily-polluting brick, plaster, and lime kilns of the city.651 Brick producers were 
singled out for special attention. Many workshops were built “without any attention to 
notes of engineering and safety” and often used extremely cheap and dirty fuels like old 
engine oil, raw crude oil, mazut, sawdust, and trash. Such kilns produced enormous 
amounts of smoke, soot, and other tangible air pollutants, and in the mid-1970s it was 
estimated that there were some five hundred along the route of the IGAT-1 pipeline that 
“due to their inappropriate design and construction…pollute[d] intensely.” The project of 
converting them to gas came “under the direct supervision of the NIGC” and by the fall 
of 1974 the company was in the process of “gradually” bringing gas to the industry by 
laying lines to twenty-two kilns near Tehran. Another nine had signed contracts 
stipulating that they would be responsible for their own gasification.652 Fuel alterations 
were not always straightforward, and it took the “studies and efforts of…specialists” to 
resolve the “multiple safety and technical issues” that had prevented some of the first 
649 Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Fars Provincial Government, pf/shz/1354, 24 Tir 1353, attached to 11310; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
650 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Ministry of the Interior, document h/52, 13 Farvardin 1353; Tabdil-e 
No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
651 “Naqsh-e Gāz dar Tabdil-e Sukht-e Kureh-ha-ye Ājorsāzi,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Fall 1354), 
11-19.
652 Ibid., 11. 
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kilns converted from becoming operational. The technical difficulties of moving to gas 
fuel, the mounting costs of the conversions, and the cessation of operations that they 
required, combined to render both the owners and employees of many of Tehran’s brick 
kilns unenthusiastic about the project. As in Shiraz, owners “showed worry and a lack of 
confidence” in the project, and doubts were significant enough to put the entire project in 
jeopardy. Many worried about the cost, and despite NIGC arguments that initial 
investments would be recouped via lessened fuel costs, it took a significant program of 
financial assistance from the NIGC to overcome their concerns. To help alleviate the risk, 
the NIGC agreed to pay for the cost of kiln conversion in “cash” and accept amortized 
repayment over a thirty-month period.653 
Others argued against the concerns of the factory owners by pointing to potential 
benefits unrelated to the environment and the emissions of kilns. The authors of an article 
on the issue in Nāmeh believed that the “importance” of the plan lay not only in the 
reduction of environmental pollutants, but also in the benefit it could bring to the kilns’ 
production capacities. The poor design and inefficient fuel use of many kilns not only 
produced of a great deal of smoke but also significant numbers of faulty bricks, estimated 
as some five percent of those available on the market. The authors of the Nāmeh article 
argued that via “analyses and explorations that are only possible via government 
organizations,” it was possible to “raise the profitability” of kilns, and predicted that 
converted workshops could reduce their loss rate by some fifty percent due to the more 
precise control of temperature that gas allowed. Factory owners were not the only ones 
653 Ibid., 19. 
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hesitant about potential changes in fuel supply and Nāmeh reported that the employees of 
the kilns were also nervous. In contrast to the sympathy expressed for owner concerns, 
however, the magazine and the NIGC were not nearly so understanding of their worries. 
While the magazine recognized that workers had legitimate concerns reflective of the fact 
that their pay depended on monthly output of the kilns, and the fact that the conversion 
process would result in a “probable diminishment of production” for at least a period of 
time, it nonetheless described them as “mostly from the illiterate classes” and “resistant 
to learning the gas system even though the changes in comparison to the previous system 
are insignificant.” This was reflective of the broader preoccupation with the country’s 
political, managerial, and expert classes often that was often displayed by publications 
like Nāmeh.654 Tellingly, no accommodations were reported as having been made by 
factory owners, the NIGC, or any level of government to alleviate their worries.655 
In both Tehran and Shiraz, the fundamental issue for the NIGC was that they 
exercised little control over their own supply of equipment, needing to import much of it 
from Europe. In particular, there was no domestic source for the gas network’s 
“necessary terminals” and thus any promised start dates at best “approximately 
corresponded” to when the NIGC expected to take delivery of the equipment.656 This was 
not an isolated issue. Throughout the process of converting Shiraz’s industry to gas, the 
promises and deadlines demanded by political and administrative leaders often ran 
654 The erasure of labor was a core part of the legitimating function that gas served for the Iranian state and 
its political leadership. This theme is discussed further in other chapters of this dissertation. 
655 Naqsh-e Gāz dar Tabdil-e Sukht-e Kureh-ha-ye Ājorsāzi,” Nāmeh, 19. 
656 Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Fars Provincial Government, 1755, 25 Shahrivar 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni 
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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headlong into such irreducible technical and economic realities. Despite the powerful 
nationalist claims that had become embedded in natural gas and its technologies during 
the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was simply not self-sufficient in meeting the industry’s needs. 
Both the NIGC and its potential customers found themselves at the mercy of forces and 
timelines largely beyond their control. Shiraz’s industrialists may have been broadly 
supportive of gas energy as a potential source of environmental benefit, but many were 
wary of the demands placed on them because of the great uncertainties that surrounded 
the NIGC’s actual ability to provide service. Thus despite the threat of being shut 
down,657 some owners expressed their wariness through a continual resistance to the 
prospect of conversion, refusing “to take action for the ratification of contracts” as they 
were “not ready to pay the cost of fuel conversion.”658 As their compatriots could attest, 
there could be months- or even years-long delays between the signing of contracts and 
the start of service, delay that seemingly promised to extend indefinitely despite the 
significant investment of factory owners. 
In the spring of 1975, the program’s slow pace came to the attention of national 
authorities. Both the office of the Prime Minister659 and the Special Office of the Shah 
wrote to the Fars provincial government to demand updates on the status of the project.660 
657 Letter from Mahmud Nāji to Fars Provincial Government, pf/shz/2391, 27 Āzar 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni 
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
658 Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Provincial Government of Fars, m/9417, 25 Ābān 1354; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
659 Letter on behalf of the Minister of the Interior to Manuchehr Piruz, m/309, 18 Farvardin 1354; and 
Letter on behalf of the Minister of the Interior to Manuchehr Piruz, m/3236, 2 Tir 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni 
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
660 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to NIGC, 8024, 10 Tir 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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They commanded an “acceleration” of the conversions and complained that the governor 
of Fars “had said that by the end of the year 1353 [March 1974], twelve brickmaking 
furnaces would make use of natural gas while so far only 4 brickmaking furnaces had had 
their fuel converted.”661 The delay prompted the Minister of the Interior to demand an 
“investigation” into what had happened,662 one that came to little but succeeded in 
spurring further action. In response, the NIGC organized a meeting for 21 July 1975 that 
was attended by company representatives and six brickmakers. Saying that they were 
under pressure from both the provincial and national government, the NIGC 
representatives declared that they were ready to install gas connections as soon as the 
factories reconfigured their internal systems to receive them. As it had done in Tehran, to 
overcome the expected resistance of the owners, the NIGC offered, for the purposes of 
the “coordination and acceleration of the work,” loans of some 1.2 million rial “in cash” 
to each of the owners for the necessary conversion work.663 The loans would be repaid in 
“installments” that began only when gas started flowing.664,665 This alleviated some 
owner concerns, and by the end of the year the NIGC reported to the governor that four 
 
661 Letter from Minister of the Interior to Manuchehr Piruz, p/4365, 4 Mordād 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh 
Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
662 Letter on behalf of Mortezā Sālehi to Manuchehr Piruz, m/12311, 5 Bahman 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni 
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
663 Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Provincial Government of Fars, m/9417, 25 Ābān 1354; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
664 Proceedings of meeting held at 11:00am on 30 Tir 1354, no document number, pg. 1-2; attached to 
Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Governor Piruz, document pf/shz/843, 20 Mordād 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni 
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
665 The estimated cost for the system was 300,000 rial, either payable in cash at the time of signing or in 
15,000 rial installments spread across eighteen months with a 30,000 rial down payment. See Letter from 
NIGC to Abbās Golshen owner of the Reza Brickmaking Factory, 125, 20 Esfand 1352, attached to letter 
sent 14 Mehr 2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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brickmakers were “currently making use of natural gas,” the “conversion of the internal 
systems” on a further ten had been completed, and “it is therefore predicted that in the 
summer of the year 1355 [summer of 1976] those furnaces that have contracts with the 
NIGC666 will be able to make use of natural gas.”667 This was a significant delay, 
particularly for those who had imported equipment on their own, a point the owners 
repeatedly emphasized in their negotiations with state authorities.668 
 But there remained an even more fundamental problem for the city’s operators: 
the contracts that had been concluded with the NIGC had overlooked the factories’ 
production histories and the amounts of energy needed to achieve them. The original 
agreements had stipulated that the NIGC would provide for a maximum gas utilization of 
145 cubic meters per hour.669 Those terms became a sudden point of contention in the 
winter of 1975 when the Pressure Brick Corporation of Shiraz, writing that “everyone is 
proud” to carry out the orders of the Shah and the provincial government, declared that 
they had received their shipment of “torches” (mash’al) from the Lingel company of 
Germany and requested that gas lines be installed. To match their existing output of 110 
tons of bricks per 24-hour period, each furnace would needed approximately 350 cu. 
 
666 In the intervening years two new brickmakers had opened for business, bringing the region’s total to 
sixteen. These new businesses seem to not have contracted with the NIGC. See letter from Ahmad Behzād 
to the Governor of Fars, pf/shz/21996, 3 Esfand 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
667 Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Governor of Fars, pf/shz/1690, 12 Āzar 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh 
Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
668 Proceedings of meeting held on 8 Khordād 2535 between factory owners the head of the Office of 
Environmental Sanitation, no document number, attached to 49/8848, 07 Mordād 2535, pg. 1-2; Tarh-e 
Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
669 Letter from NIGC to Abbās Golshen owner of the Reza Brickmaking Factory, 125, 20 Esfand 1352, pg. 
1, attached to letter sent 14 Mehr 2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
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m./hr., a figure that was more than double the NIGC pledge.670 Shiraz’s brickmakers 
submitted an official request that gas deliveries be raised to their desired 350 cu. m./hr., 
but the NIGC declared that such modifications would require “contractual adjustment and 
renewed plan[ning] for the primary gas network.” “As a result,” they wrote, “the 
implementation of the plan would be delayed by [a further] nine months.” Nonetheless, at 
a meeting held on 4 May 1976, it was decided that “after a complete survey of the various 
technical aspects” the NIGC would “provisionally increase” the rate of consumption to 
250 cu. m./hr. Any who still desired a higher rate would need to negotiate new contracts 
and assume full responsibility for their own internal conversion processes.671 Again, even 
with such a pledge, as late as October 1976 brickmakers were complaining that gas 
delivery had still not begun.672 
In Tehran, despite the early successes of industrial gasification and the attention 
of the Shah and the Prime Minister to the issue,673 by September 1975 only a small 
number of the city’s brick kilns had made any progress toward using gas. Delays were 
significant, and many owners that had converted the internal mechanisms of their kilns 
had yet to receive any gas.674 As in Shiraz, the “intense” smoke produced by brick kilns 
670 Letter from the Pressure Brick Corporation of Shiraz to NIGC, Shiraz Region, 120, 01 Dey 1354; Tarh-e 
Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI. 
671 Letter from Ahmad Behzād to the Governor of Fars, pf/shz/1801, 2 Mordād 2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh 
Kureh-ha, NLAI Shiraz. 
672 Letter from Muhammad Qahremāni to NIGC, 774418, 15 Mehr 2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, 
NLAI. 
673 Letter from Minister of the Interior to the Municipality of Tehran, m/3592, 21 Khordād 1353; Tabdil-e 
No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
674 This assertion is derived from the reports of regions 4 (38 kilns) and 7 (47 kilns) of Tehran. These are 
not the only relevant regions, but the information contained in the archival file is scattered. Unfortunately, 
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had brought the facilities under particular scrutiny,675 but as had also been the case in that 
southern city, there proved to be a long wait between the beginnings of the fuel 
conversion process and the moment when gas would become available. The cause of such 
delays rested among both private factory owners and the state-owned NIGC, and while 
pressure from both national and local leadership often spurred flurries of activity, it did 
little to truly accelerate the process. Still, government ministries maintained their 
pressure, and factory owners continued to sign contracts with the national gas company676 
and install new equipment677 through the end of the 1970s.678 In August 1976 it was 
reported that while all furnace owners had been “warned” that they must take action to 
convert their facilities to gas and that most had complied, the “lack of a primary [gas] 
network” meant that most still could not make use of the new energy source. Again, the 
municipality did not rescind its orders, instructing the owners to maintain their readiness 
and await service.679 As of March 1978, they were still waiting.680 
 
this author is not aware of any comprehensive listing of Tehran’s manufacturers during the period. At this 
time, it can be confidently held that there was slow, uneven progress in the project of converting Tehran’s 
industrial facilities to gas. See Letter from Nāvi, the mayor of Region 4, to Kamālzādeh, document 1653, 1 
Farvardin 2535 and Letter from Muhammad Zāyefi to Kamālzādeh, document 1570, 21 Farvardin 2535; 
Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
675 Letter from Muhammad Zāyefi to Kamālzādeh, 1570, 21 Farvardin 2535; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
676 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Deputy for Development Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, 
h/378/362, 8 Ordibehesht 2535; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
677 Letter from Kolāhi to Kamālzādeh, 1239, 25 Esfand 2535; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, NLAI. 
678 Letter from Mortezā Sālehi to Qolāmrezā Nikpey, m/622, 21 Farvardin 2535; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht, 
NLAI. 
679 Letter from the Municipality of the Capital to Mortezā Sālehi, 91344, 7 Shahrivar 2535; Tabdil-e No’-e 
Sukht, NLAI. 
680 “10 Kureh-ye Ājorpazi Bemanzur-e Tabdil-e Sukht T’atil Shod,” Ettelā’āt (10 Esfand 1356). 
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The project of natural gas was one driven primarily by officials within 
government ministries and state-owned enterprises, but it was not one marked solely by 
the overbearing power of modernizing authorities.681 The independent pursuit of gas 
energy by the owners of the Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz was reflective of a social 
interest in the environment that existed separately from official concerns. A flowering of 
organized social movements for environmental protection may have come to the country 
decades later,682 but a current of concern for Iranians’ changing environment nonetheless 
animated people who experienced the smoke and haze of pollution firsthand. The 
powerful roles that state and state-owned institutions played in Iran’s petroleum 
industries meant that the project of gas energy was often driven, or held hostage, by their 
policies and failures, but the concerns and interests of Iranians—from early and 
independent attempts to make use of gas to deep concerns for the financial demands of 
energy transitions—nonetheless shaped its trajectory in significant ways. The experience 
of fuel conversion among the brickmakers of Shiraz points to not only the complex 
interplay between state institutions and potential consumers of natural gas, but also the 
importance of going beyond questions of domination, resistance, and revolution in the 
history of Pahlavi-era Iran. In Shiraz in the 1970s, some factory owners were more eager 
 
681 Cyrus Schayegh has pointed to ways that the historiography on Pahlavi Iran has often over-privileged 
the role of the state, recreating the top-down perspective of the “dynastic nationalism” of the Pahlavi shahs 
and their “bureaucratic and technocratic elite” (p. 37). While the Iranian state was indeed a powerful driver 
of modernization and development during the 1960s and 1970s, Schayegh points to the fact that officers 
and institutions were nonetheless governing people and communities that just as often influenced the final 
shape that official policies took. For more see Schayegh’s article “’Seeing Like a State’: An Essay on the 
Historiography of Modern Iran” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (Feb. 2010): 
37-61. 
682 Organized environmental movements in Iran are largely a product of the late-1990s and early 2000s. See 
chapter four of Simin Fadaee’s book Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society (New 
York: Routledge, 2012) for more. 
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and more flexible than even the NIGC in the effort to exploit natural gas energy. Others 
were more hesitant, worried about the financial cost of the move, and their caution 
exerted a powerful influence on the policies that were ultimately pursued by the NIGC as 
well as the final form that gasification took. In practice, the orders and initiatives of 
Iran’s national government, even those emanating from the Shah directly, often found 
extensive complication and delay. But such lags were not generally the result of 
deliberate resistance. Just as often, they were the result of impediments created by the 
unrealistic promises, ill-considered plans, and hasty decisions of state and state-affiliated 
institutions. 
*** 
Though more than a decade of work had gone into building distribution networks, 
in the early 1980s gas was not yet available across wide swaths of Iran. That reality often 
pushed factory owners to revert to or continue using highly polluting sources of energy, 
especially in the face of oil fuel shortages caused by the destruction of Iran’s largest 
refinery at Ābādān during the early days of the Iran-Iraq War. In the context of revolution 
and war, the Department of Environmental Protection found its work of combatting 
industrial emissions to be less welcome than it had once been. In the chaotic wake of the 
revolution and the rise of the Islamic Republic, many of the environmental regulations 
and policies imposed by institutions like the Department of Environmental Protection 
were weakened in local courts, ignored by the Iranian public at large, or increasingly 
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opposed by interested parties.683 In one instance, in September 1980, Sayyid Ahmad 
Nasari, Deputy Governor of Zanjān, a city lying some 200 miles to the northwest of 
Tehran, wrote to the Office of Environmental Protection of Zanjān to report that he had 
received complaints that a brick kiln of several years’ presence in nearby Khodābandeh 
had been closed for the reason that it “created pollution.” Nasari asked that an 
“investigation” be undertaken “because the aforementioned furnace was outside the city” 
and its production of bricks provided “pivotal help” to the region.684 While the 
Department of Environmental Protection did not shy away from shuttering offending 
kilns due to their “irredeemable destruction of the environment,”685 throughout the 1980s 
and into 1990s the department seemed to make little permanent progress. In the summer 
of 1994, three brickkilns in Varāmin were closed when they returned to burning crude oil 
after allowing their natural gas bills to enter arrears. The head of the department’s local 
office declared that “brick kilns of the township of Varāmin that make use of natural gas 
fuel do not have the right to use other fuels”—especially mazut and crude oil—"unless 
their gas was cut off through [the fault of] the NIGC.”686 A year later in Hamadān, in the 
west of Iran, the department closed eight small kilns and declared that up to a thousand 
more “threatened” the people of the province by not adhering to environmental 
683 Eskandar Firouz, “Environmental Protection,” Encyclopedia Iranica, online edition, 2011, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/environmental-protection (accessed online on 22 July 2019). 
684 Letter from Sayyid Ahmad Nazari to Office of Environmental Protection on Zanjān, 13926, 11 
Shahrivar 1359; Ehdās-e Kureh-ha-ye Ājorpazi, NLAI. 
685 “Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist Dalā’el-e T’atil-e Kureh-ha-ye Ājorpazi-ye Shahrak-e Qarchak 
Varāmin rā A’lām Kard,” Ettelā’āt (3 Āzār 1363). 
686 “Beh ‘Ellat-e Āludeh Kardan-e Mohit-e Zist 3 Kureh Ājorpazi va 2 Vāhed-e Tolid Movād-e Shimiāi dar 
Varāmin T’atil Shod,” Ettelā’āt (23 Khordād 1373). 
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regulations.687 Likewise, in the winter of 1996, the kilns of Tuyserkān were also shut688 
and again in Hamadān in the spring of 1997.689  
While the Islamic Republic’s regulators only had limited success in clamping 
down on polluters,690 their efforts were indicative of a steady commitment to 
environmental protection in at least some circles of the new government. Beginning in 
the early 1990s, officials within all levels of the Iranian state began tackling the country’s 
environmental issues with renewed vigor, both reviving and building upon the work 
undertaken in the final decade of the Pahlavi era. In 1993, the government marked 
Tehran’s continued struggle with air pollution as “a high priority environmental and 
health issue.”691 That same year, as part of a burgeoning effort to combat air pollution, 
the municipality of Tehran established the Air Quality Control Company to monitor 
atmospheric pollutants and oversee mitigation efforts in the city. Two years later, the 
Iranian parliament enacted a new Clean Air Act in an attempt to address urban air 
pollution. The new legislation prompted two studies in Tehran that ran between 1995 and 
687 “8 Kureh-ye Ājorpazi-ye Gheyr-e Mojāz dar Ostān Hamadān T’atil Shod,” Ettelā’āt (21 Tir 1375). 
688 “Tamāmi Kureh-ha-ye Ājorp"azi-ye Āludehkonnandeh Tuyserkān T’atil Shod,” Ettelā’āt (18 Āzar 
1375). 
689 “Beh Dalil-e Āludeh Kardan-e Havā Kureh-ha-ye Ājorpazi-ye Sonati dar Ostān Hamadān T’atil Shod,” 
Ettelā’āt (10 Khordād 1376). 
690 Many such producers remained active across the country. For examples, see “Mas’ul-e Setād-e 
Sālemsāzi-ye Mohit-e Zist-e Ostān-e Qom: Kureh-ha-ye Ājorpazi-ye Qom har Sāl 7 ton Gāz-ha-ye 
Ālāyandeh dar Havā Parākandeh Mikonand,” Ettelā’āt (6 Shahrivar 1376) and “Beh Dalil-e Āludehsāzi-ye 
Mohit-e Zist 53 Kureh-ye Ājorpazi dar Qom T’atil Shod,” Ettelā’āt (19 Mordād 1376). 
691 Global Environment Facility, Tehran Transport Emissions Reduction Project (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1993), 6. 
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1997,692 both of which would eventually inform an air pollution control master plan that 
was passed by the Iranian cabinet in 2000.693 By the 1990s, industry’s contribution to 
total air pollution figures had declined. In 1997 it was estimated that industrial sources 
accounted for approximately a fifth of Tehran’s total air pollution,694  most coming from 
the automotive,695 cement,696 and refining industries.697 By that point, a rapid rise in 
population and motor vehicle use had led the transportation sector to become the single 
largest contributor of air pollution in the city.698 Still, despite increasing levels of 
attention to vehicular sources of pollution, action continued to be taken to address 
industrial sources. As had been true for decades, the expanded provision of natural gas 
fuel would play an essential role.699 With the continued spread of Iran’s natural gas 
network in the three decades after the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq War, gas energy became 
692 One was a joint venture between the AQCC, the United Nations Development Program, three Swedish 
institutions, SWECO (a consulting firm), the Motor Test Center, and the Swedish Meteorological and 
Hydrological Institute. The other was funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and carried 
out by the Municipality of Tehran. 
693 For more details on these developments as well as discussion of the mixed success of the master plan 
see Farhad Atash, “The Deterioration of Urban Environments in Developing Countries: Mitigating the Air 
Pollution Crisis in Tehran, Iran,” Cities 24, no. 6 (2007): 399-409. 
694 Vahid Hosseini and Hossein Shahbazi, “Urban Air Pollution in Iran,” Iranian Studies 49, no. 6 (2016), 
1037. 
695 Hamed Vava-Arani, Salman Jahani, Hossein Dashti, Jafar Heydari, and Saeed Moazen, “A System 
Dynamics Modeling for Urban Air Pollution: A Cast Study of Tehran, Iran,” Transportation Research 31, 
Part D (2014), 22. 
696 Nastaran Ansari and Abbas Seifi, “A System Dynamics Model for Analyzing Energy Consumption and 
CO2 Emission in Iranian Cement Industry under Various Production and Export Scenarios,” Energy Policy 
58 (2013), 75. 
697 A.R. Karbassi, M. Abbasspour, M.S. Sekhavatjou, F. Ziviyar, and M. Saeedi, “Potential for Reducing 
Air Pollution from Oil Refineries,” Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 145, no. 1-3 (2008): 159-
166. 
698 Global Environment Facility, Tehran Transport Emissions Reduction Project, 2. 
699 Hosseini and Shahbazi, “Urban Air Pollution in Iran,” 1035. 
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available in ever larger sections of the country, something that would enable more and 
more industries to embrace gas, even outside of major urban areas like Tehran. 
*** 
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing in subsequent decades, Iranian 
engagements with natural gas as a source of energy were shaped by a growing awareness 
of how their society’s accelerating industrialization was undermining the quality of their 
air. Air pollution meant something very tangible to Iranians, and the noxious gloom and 
hazy sun of their cities came to symbolize a dangerous turn in Iran’s development. 
Though spurred by the growing use of fossil fuels, the rapid worsening of the country’s 
air quality was not caused by human activity alone. Intensified by inescapable and 
“unfavorable”700 topographic, climactic, and atmospheric factors, particularly in Tehran, 
the smoke, soot, and haze that lay suspended in the air were both unsightly stains on 
beautiful panoramas and frightening specters, promising disease and death for Iran’s 
people and natural world alike. The ability of natural gas to mitigate the concentrations of 
those products of fuel combustion was central to its appeal. Gas seemingly offered itself 
as an easy fix, a different form of fossil fuel energy that required minimal changes to 
Iran’s path of modernization but nonetheless produced much less of the pollutants that 
clouded sky, irritated the eyes, and burned the lungs. Gas energy’s environmental 
potential thus found champions among the elite of Iranian society, up to and including the 




royal family, as it simultaneously offered continued “progress” and affirmation of 
developmental choices already made. 
The story of bringing natural gas to Iran’s industry was not one of easy 
achievement. In contrast to the triumphalist narrative of gas energy that formed much of 
the Pahlavi state’s official rhetoric, the reality was one of fitful stops and starts, delays 
and controversies. Nor were the dynamics of industrial gas conversion uniform across the 
country, with factory owners in Shiraz being more welcoming than those in Tehran. In all 
cases, however, there was significant interaction and negotiation between industrial 
consumers and the state and state-owned institutions that supplied gas and mandated its 
use. While officials and experts working with or for the Iranian state were the primary 
drivers of gas energy’s penetration within Iranian industry, the ultimate contours of gas 
consumption reflected the desires and concerns of its industrial consumers as much as it 
did any official plans and ambitions. For many industrialists, particularly the larger ones 
near urban areas, the story was not one of an overbearing state imposing its 
environmental will on resistant industries; rather, it was one where a largely elite but 
longstanding concern for the most tangible forms of air pollution met a group of 
industrialists who variously embraced, rejected, and negotiated how gas would come to 
their facilities. Some factory owners dragged their feet, resisting contracts with the NIGC 
even when threatened with closure. Other owners embraced gas energy with fervor, 
attempting to convert their furnaces and kilns before any official effort was underway. 
Most, however, were cautiously accepting but concerned over its costs, the ability of the 
NIGC to deliver gas in sufficient amounts, and the subsequent financial viability of their 
businesses. This last group ultimately did the most to shape how gas came to be used in 
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Iran’s industries: with de facto public-private cooperation where, supported by 
government monies, owners assumed responsibility for the conversion of their own 
facilities while the NIGC’s obligation stopped where their network met factory gas 
terminals. 
The project to bring natural gas energy to Iranian industry was deeply reflective 
not only of how Iranian commentators thought about environmental pollution, but also 
how it was connected to their national aspirations and the future they imagined for their 
country. Elite though much of the rhetoric may have been, the officials and experts who 
advocated for the adoption of gas energy in order to address environmental concerns 
were not the uncomplicated, gharbzadeh compradors that they have often been portrayed 
as, at least not in this arena. Many embraced the potential of gas energy not in imitation 
of Euro-American modernity, but in an intentional attempt to surpass it. They looked at 
what had befallen the polluted cities of the industrialized world and took specific, 
informed attempts to build a society that would avoid the same fate. In their eyes, air 
pollution and environmental degradation threatened the entire modernizing project of the 
Pahlavi state, but their answer was never to back away from pursuing Iran’s further 
development. Instead, it was to intensify their embrace of it and substitute a cleaner, more 
modern sources of energy for the oil fuels they saw as choking their society. In this way, 
through their participation in global knowledge networks, Iranian policymakers, 
engineers, and scientists positioned themselves as active participants in the construction 
of a cleaner fossil fuel-based civilization not only for their own country, but also the 
world. The ultimate failure of gas energy to reduce the fouling of Iran’s urban air, 
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Natural Gas Distribution, 1970-1985 
In the 1970s, natural gas began to take on an increasingly central role in the lives 
of urban Iranians across the country. Even considering the role of industrial gas networks 
in mitigating Iran’s rapidly worsening air quality, Iranian planners never intended those 
built in places like Shiraz and Tehran to stand alone. They were instead imagined as part 
of larger initiatives to develop and then supply domestic markets for natural gas. 
Beginning their decades-long work as part of the first Iran Gas Trunkline project in the 
late 1960s, the National Iranian Gas Company was responsible for evaluating Iran’s 
urban gas markets as well as overseeing the construction of any eventual natural gas 
networks that would be built. Far more than was true for the main IGAT-1 pipeline and 
its associated facilities, Iran’s urban gas networks were the products of the NIGC, its 
employees, and their objectives. Though foreign consultants and engineers were integral 
to the success of these projects, the fundamental market research and design decisions 
were made by NIGC personnel, sometimes in opposition to the recommendations of 
experts hired from abroad. It was their judgements that would drive the implementation 
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of distribution systems within Iranian cities, from their fundamental technical 
characteristics to the geographic and social priorities of construction. NIGC engineers 
and managers worked to build gas systems that both reflected the contemporary realities 
of Iranian cities and would be able to support their long-term hopes for widespread use of 
natural gas within Iranian society. Far from straightforward, choices abounded for these 
officials, and their decisions would have significant social and political effects in later 
years. 
By the middle of the 1970s, cities served by the IGAT-1 pipeline system like 
Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz were beginning to see the slow construction of new natural 
gas networks. As had been true in Shiraz a decade earlier, priority was given to industrial 
consumers and the significant volumes of gas they were expected to consume. City gas 
networks were not built uniformly, instead being constructed piece by piece, 
neighborhood by neighborhood, with some areas receiving service years or decades 
before others. Their order of precedence reflected broader decisions about the physical 
and economic suitability of urban neighborhoods, supposedly objective characteristics 
that in practice largely favored middle- and upper-class residents of Iran’s cities. Largely 
left behind were the residents of towns and villages across Iran, even those which lay 
very close to the major natural gas pipelines that had begun to tie the country together. 
For the people of such areas, the lack of piped gas service became symbolic of a 
perceived neglect by the national government, and late in the decade their frustrated 




 Natural gas and access to it became politically potent issues during the 1979 
revolution. Though the gas networks left partially completed at the end of the Pahlavi era 
would become the foundations upon which expanded access to gas energy would later be 
built, the monarchy’s slow connection of Iran’s residential and commercial consumers to 
the national system became a significant means by which the nascent Islamic Republic 
could demonstrate its commitment to economic and social justice. The intermingling of 
natural gas and developmental politics thus continued in the 1980s, as the prioritization 
and celebration of grand infrastructural achievements that had been the hallmark of the 
Pahlavi state was seemingly reversed by the government in its emphasis on efforts to 
extend gas service to towns and villages, residential neighborhoods, and other areas 
where small consumers predominated. This turnabout, however, belied the significant 
continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary eras with respect to natural gas 
policies. Far from the sharp break that the organs of the Islamic Republic presented it as, 
both the fundamental aims and the operations of institutions like the NIGC remained 
broadly similar to the pre-revolutionary era. As had been the case under the monarchy, 
natural gas was portrayed as embodying a modern future of clean and convenient energy, 
a crucial pillar of a prosperous and independent Iran made manifest by the actions of the 




As befitted its status as the administrative and manufacturing capital of Iran, 
Tehran received significant and early attention from the NIGC. The city’s gas network 
was largely devised by the employees of the national gas company, IMEG, and the 
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NIOC, with the last to a much lesser extent after duties relating to gas were eventually 
transferred to the NIGC.701 This was in sharp contrast to the original gas network that had 
been built in Shiraz, something reflecting the different circumstances of the projects. 
Whereas the Shiraz network had been built as part of a regional project primarily 
intended to deliver gas to the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Company, Tehran’s system was 
pursued as part of a national project intended to supply natural gas as a source of energy 
in urban areas across a broad swath of the country. Other differences marked the project 
as well. Local authorities in Tehran were not as supportive as the city’s government 
balked at the large number of streets that would need to be torn up for gas pipes to be 
laid. The resistance of Tehran’s city government counted for little, however, and work 
commenced as the IGAT-1 pipeline and its branch to Tehran were being completed. 
Early designs for the city’s gas system were developed by IMEG, which proposed a 
system divided into two sections, one aimed at supplying major industrial units on the 
city’s outskirts, particularly in the south and west, and another the small-scale residential 
and commercial consumers within the city limits. The design called for the industrial 
network to begin at the city gas network gateway, lying approximately a dozen 
kilometers south of Tehran near the town of Rey. At the city gateway, the 30-inch branch 
pipeline built to connect Tehran to the main IGAT-1 pipeline at Sāveh some 111 
kilometers away was terminated and the very high pressures used to transport natural gas 
through the main pipeline were stepped down from 1000 psi to an intermediate 300 psi. 
701 Mohsen Shirāzi, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran: Az Āghāz tā Āstāneh-ye Enqelāb, Part 2, interview by Gholāmrezā 
Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1999), available online at https://fis-
iran.org/fa/resources/development-series/gas/part2 (accessed 20 April 2020). 
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From there the gas would be injected into local lines to feed industrial consumers along 
the roads of Khorāsān, Khāniābād, Āb’ali, and Sāveh as well as the old and new roads to 
Karaj. The system would then connect at two separate points to a system of residential 
networks spread throughout the city. In this way, as had been true in Shiraz in the mid-
1960s, natural gas distribution plans in Tehran prioritized service to large-scale industrial 
consumers over the more numerous but individually less-significant residential 
consumers of the city.702 There were sound technical and economic reasons for this, 
including the ability to exploit relatively large volumes of gas through many fewer 
connections and a desire of many Iranian officials to use gas energy to mitigate industrial 
air pollution in the capital. It also reflected the more general emphasis on industry and 
scale that drove Pahlavi-era natural gas policies, a perceived neglect of ordinary citizen 
consumers that would influence the views of people across Iran. 
Though significant aspects of IMEG’s work would become part of the city 
network’s final design, particularly the spatial arrangement of the system, some of the 
detailed but arguably more significant decisions would be made by Iranians officials in 
the NIGC. The company’s work in Tehran was significant, combining technical, 
economic, and political choices, and provided a template for their work on gas systems in 
Iran’s other urban areas. One of the first major decisions made by the NIGC was 
technical. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were two prevailing views regarding 
the best general design for city gas networks: one favoring high gas pressures and the 
other preferring low. In most countries that had made use of gas networks, notably France 
702 Ibid. 
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and the United States, high-pressure systems had been chosen, deemed “more 
economical” than the alternative. British companies like IMEG, on the other hand, had 
historically favored low-pressure systems, though in recent years they had also begun to 
construct high-pressure ones as well. Such low-pressure networks generally carried gas at 
two pounds per square inch, or roughly one-seventh of atmospheric pressure at sea level. 
IMEG proposed just such a system for Tehran’s gas delivery network, suggesting a large 
40-inch pipe running from the city gateway along the Old and New Shemirān Roads
before terminating at Tajrish Square and feeding smaller networks of pipes that fanned 
out across the city. NIGC officials opposed this plan, viewing the low-pressure systems 
as unnecessarily hampering the long-term prospects for the growth of gas use in Iranian 
cities. The high-pressure systems they favored instead moved gas at 60 pounds per square 
inch, allowing them to deliver nearly thirty times more gas through a pipe of a given 
diameter. With the proven ability of high-pressure networks to deliver more gas in mind, 
it was feared that if a low-pressure system was chosen for Tehran not only would it 
“suffer from shortages of gas” in the future but would also set the pattern for other 
Iranian cities and doom them to the same fate.703 
IMEG defended their choice not on economic principles, an argument they could 
not win, but on concerns for the system’s safety. They argued that a high-pressure 
network was more dangerous should a leak occur, as the greater volumes of natural gas 
transported could more easily cause an uncontrollable fire. NIGC officials countered by 




in a high-pressure system a break or leakage would be immediately apparent and was 
thus in practice safer as compared to a low-pressure system where a leak might allow gas 
to “creep” into areas surrounding the pipes. From there the released gas could migrate 
and accumulate, creating explosive conditions in spaces far from the compromised pipe. 
In the end, the debate between NIGC engineers and managers on the one hand and IMEG 
consultants on the other became deadlocked and the choice was not made on technical, 
economic, or safety concerns at all. Senior leadership in the NIGC ultimately made their 
choice based on the fact that one day IMEG would leave Iran and Tehran’s gas networks 
and their own engineers would remain, asking only that they “guarantee” that their 
position was “correct and holds no danger for the country and the people of Tehran.”704 
 Despite the rejection of IMEG’s design, the final shape of Tehran’s industrial gas 
network was similarly oriented around the “status and location of [the city’s] industrial 
units” in a manner similar to that proposed by the British firm initially.705 Gas lines were 
largely installed in the early 1970s, and by 1974 the city’s industrial outskirts were served 
by three primary branches emanating from the city gas gateway. In the areas west of 
Tehran, a 22-inch line stretched for 23 kilometers in a northwesterly direction, carrying 
gas at 250 psi before being stepped down at the junction of the road to Sāveh to 150 psi 
and terminating at Shahyād Khatam Square near to Mehrābād airport. Branching off this 
line were subsidiary spurs running along the old and new roads to Karaj, the route to 
Qom, and the road to Sāveh. The eastern section of the city was broadly similar, with a 
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22-inch line running gas at 250 psi for 27 kilometers between the city gateway and the
suburb of Tehrānpārs and 44 kilometers of branching lines running along the Khorāsān 
and Varāmin Roads in the southeast. A second smaller branch of five kilometers’ length 
carried gas at 60 psi for industrial units near to Tehrānpārs. South of Tehran a single 20-
inch pipeline ran near to the Tehran Refinery and then directly to the Farahābād power 
plant with a much smaller 8-inch spur feeding industry directly south of the city. Far from 
incidental, the system was designed specifically to serve Tehran’s existing industrial 
areas. Planning for the conversion of industrial units began as the network was being 
constructed and first began drawing gas alongside the opening of the IGAT-1 pipeline in 
October 1970.706 Experts from Pakistan were an important part of this process, being 
invited in the wake of a visit by NIGC officials to the country. Senior NIGC officials 
considered Pakistan’s experience with natural gas utilization to be some ten or fifteen 
years ahead of their own, a product of their neighbor’s inability to pay for the services of 
foreign consultants and contractors.707 With their help and driven by official concerns 
over Iran’s energy mix as well as desires to mitigate the capital’s worsening air quality, 
by 1974 more than two dozen manufactories were making use of gas—from the Tehran 
Refinery to Farahābād power plant to cement works to tire factories to many others—
with plans to rapidly grow that number over the following few years.708 Within a few 
706 Ibid, 29-31. 
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years the city’s industrial areas were considered fully served, and by 1977 some 120 
producers were making use of natural gas in their operations.709 
 Construction of gas networks for Tehran’s residential neighborhoods lagged those 
of the city’s industrial areas significantly. Even as the industrial system was substantially 
complete and operational in 1974, official studies of city gas networks were still being 
undertaken. Despite the NIOC independently building a small network near Mehrābād 
airport in the Tehrānsar neighborhood in that year, the more significant plans that 
organizations like the NIGC had for city residents were slated to unfold over decades of 
time, with it expecting to take some ten years to reach 100,000 residential consumers in a 
city of millions.710 A significant portion of that delay was rooted in the NIGC’s decision 
to embrace a high-pressure network and invalidate much of IMEG’s design, a choice that 
had significant effects on the subsequent work undertaken by the NIGC. Lamenting their 
own reflexive turn toward Europe and North America, some NIGC officials saw the 
Pakistani experience as an example, and not only sought to learn from them in the 
specific case of gas network design, but also the more general lesson to undertake on 
their own as much work as could be feasibly done.711 With IMEG out of the picture it 
largely fell to the NIGC to undertake a comprehensive study of the potential market for 
natural gas in Tehran, a task that was subsequently performed as part of broader decisions 
surrounding the city’s natural gas network and its construction. Complicating matters was 
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the fact that the company was unable to find maps that adequately covered the entirety of 
Tehran; not even the water department had sufficiently accurate maps for the entirety of 
the city. In response, the NIGC divided the city into four groups and assigned teams to 
analyze the city’s potential for gas service. The teams worked from the 25-year master 
plan for Tehran and coordinated their work with Tehran’s city government and the 
electricity and water departments. The four divisions were not geographic, instead being 
decided by size of dwelling. One team took homes of 200 square meters or smaller, 
another looked at residences up to 400 square meters in size, and a third all those 400 
square meters or larger. The final team surveyed potential large-volume consumers like 
hotels, restaurants, government offices, baths, bakeries, hospitals, and educational 
facilities. The teams undertook “door to door” surveys, in the process generating some 
500 new or updated maps that marked all homes and business across the city.712 
The NIGC teams quickly found, as had been the case in Shiraz, that “due to an 
urban fabric [of] tight and narrow alleys, and largely unsuitable residences,” large 
sections of the older parts of southern Tehran were not suitable for gas delivery.713 This 
reality was reflective of the deep social inequalities of Tehran and their manifestation as 
part of the city’s urban fabric. Tehran is marked by a stark north-south divide, with the 
middle and upper classes largely living in the northern half of the city. In addition to the 
more pleasant climate associated with the sharp rise in altitude caused by the city’s 




marked by its wealth: more trees and green spaces, larger homes, smaller families, and 
lower housing density. In contrast, the southern areas of the city, sitting in the hot 
flatlands below the mountain foothills, were populated by people of poorer and 
marginalized social status, crowded into older and significantly denser housing. Though 
rooted in the late nineteenth century and the nascent integration of Iran into world 
markets, government policies favoring capitalist accumulation and the boom in the 
country’s oil rents in the decades after the Second World War accelerated and intensified 
these socio-geographic divisions as waves of rural immigrants settled in city’s south.714  
To determine the order in which Tehran’s neighborhoods would receive gas 
service, the NIGC employed a “mathematical template” that considered the existing level 
of consumption of oil products like kerosene, the overall potential for gas consumption, 
population density, and other factors. While this process did not automatically select 
Tehran’s high-income areas, it did largely direct the NIGC to neighborhoods of recent 
vintage. Though most such areas of the city were in Tehran’s well off northern reaches, 
two low income residential suburbs in Tehran’s south—Nāziābād and Kuy-e Nohom-e 
Ābān (today Kuy-e Sizdah-ye Ābān)— were chosen as first to receive gas on this basis. 
Both had been built in relatively recent years, with construction in Nāziābād beginning in 
1941 and Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān in 1953. Two among a number of planned residential 
developments built in the decades during and after the Second World War, the 
neighborhoods were inspired by contemporary urban development in Europe and North 
America and constructed along ordered lines with wide streets, detached single family 
714 For more see Ali Madanipour’s Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and 
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homes, and low-rise apartment buildings.715 In contrast to persistent rumors that they 
were chosen as experimental spaces due to the social marginalization of their 
inhabitants,716 the NIGC decision to prioritize these neighborhoods for gas service 
reflected both the comparative ease of pipelaying in them and their relative proximity to 
the Tehran gas gateway. Despite the relatively early connection of these two areas, 
construction in Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān began in 1974 and Nāziābād shortly thereafter, the 
decision to favor neighborhoods exhibiting similar characteristics of new construction 
and wider streets generally favored wealthier sections in the northern parts of Tehran, and 
next in line were northern areas like Sahābqarānieh, Niāvarān, and Z’afarānieh. 
The actual engineering of Tehran’s gas network was contracted to Sofregaz, 
affiliated with the state-owned gas company Gaz de France, but even with the NIGC and 
the French company working together progress was slow. This was in part because of 
Sofregaz’s desire to redo the entire mapping and market analysis work that the NIGC had 
already undertaken,717 but even with their eventual acquiescence to Iranian insistence 
they use the existing maps, work on Iran’s residential gas network proceeded slowly as 
progress on its industrial sector moved quickly. As was true in Shiraz in the mid-1960s, 
ambitions were both relatively modest and rarely met. Initial plans in 1974 for Kuy-e 
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Nohom-e Ābān called for approximately 3500 residential and commercial customers to 
receive natural gas service. Slated to begin construction after the completion of networks 
in Tehrānsar and Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān, Nāziābād was slated to receive connections for 
some 10,500 customers.718 Three years later, however, in 1977, NIOC workers had only 
connected 120 of the expected 200 residential units in Tehrānsar. In Kuy-e Nohom-e 
Ābān and nearby ‘Aliābād, only some 2000 units had been connected. Farther north, 
distribution networks for 54,000 units were still in the design stages for most of the 
neighborhoods, with only Gishā, in north central Tehran, seeing service to some 115 
residents. All told, between the start of the IGAT-1 project and 1977, some 460 
kilometers of gas distribution lines had been laid in Tehran to feed a few thousand 
residential consumers.719 
Tehran was not the only Iranian city to see new or expanded gas service in the 
1970s. The NIGC was responsible for gas distribution in Iran’s other major urban areas 
as well, and members of the Tehran survey teams became the “nucleus” of groups that 
would undertake similar work in cities and neighborhoods around the country. Alongside 
them worked a separate national group created to undertake economic evaluations and 
“convince” Iran’s industrial energy consumers to utilize gas as well.720 Building on the 
early industrial and residential networks that had been built in the 1960s, Shiraz saw 
significantly expanded service that accompanied the opening of a new 16-inch branch 
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line from the IGAT-1 system that replaced the original 10-inch line. The new line ran 
some 300 kilometers between Bid Boland and the Shiraz city gateway, largely mirroring 
the established pattern set by the city’s earlier system. Shiraz’s industrial sector continued 
to draw significant amounts of gas with major consumers including the chemical fertilizer 
plant, a power plant, cement works, sugar loaf factories, and a pasteurization unit. As had 
been true with the original line, also served by this regional network was the town of 
Guyim, which the NIGC treated as a testbed for the planned future gasification of some 
440 towns and villages along the route of the main IGAT-1 pipeline.721 Guyim would be 
the only town connected to the IGAT-1 line during the Pahlavi era,722 a fact that would 
come to have significant political repercussions within Iran. 
 Progress within Shiraz itself had continued steadily but slowly in the intervening 
years. The NIGC was still very much in the process of learning to predict and control the 
balance of supply and demand for the city as well as preparing to lay gas lines along 
Shiraz’s streets. While residential gas consumption had risen sharply between 1968, the 
first year of operation, and 1973, going from some 130,000 cubic meters to 3.56 million, 
this slow progress was reflected within the numbers of consumers, with total residential 
and commercial consumers failing to reach 3000 in that same period.723 Isfahan too had 
prioritized industrial consumers over residential and commercial. Construction of the 
city’s industrial network had been completed quickly, taking no longer than five months 
721 Ibid. 
722 Pirooz Ashraf, “Natural Gas Industry in Iran,” Table 3, Encyclopaedia Iranica, online edition, 2016, 
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at the beginning of 1972. As of 1974, seven industrial units were making use of gas, most 
especially the Āryāmehr Steel Mill that had been so integral to the IGAT-1 program and 
consumed some 15.5 million cubic feet of gas per day.724 Over the next four years the 
industrial network expanded to include an additional thirteen manufactories while the 
beginnings of a residential and commercial network were also laid with 887 units being 
served, still a far cry from the 4300 that was the target for the looming end of the Fifth 
Development Plan in 1978.725 
Natural gas was also supplied via the IGAT-1 system to the Alborz Industrial 
City, founded in 1967 as a “modern city” on 1100 hectares of land some 130 kilometers 
northwest of Tehran and 12 kilometers south of Qazvin. Planned in accordance with the 
“world’s most modern standards and principles,” the area was managed by the Alborz 
Industrial City Company which was in turn owned by the Ministry of Water and 
Electricity, the Ministry of the Economy, and the Bank of Industrial Development. The 
city was built to foster industrial development and land and utilities were sold to 
industrial concerns at bargain prices, quickly prompting the construction of “great 
factories” with more in development. The NIGC accepted responsibility to supply the 
city with gas in early 1971, shortly after the completion of the IGAT-1 project, aiming to 
provide the “clean and inexpensive fuel and…to prevent the pollution of the air of the 
industrial city.” By fall of that year, planning would begin, and by 1974 an 8-inch spur 
line connecting to the Qazvin IGAT-1 compressor stations had been completed. While 
724 Ibid., 34. 
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industrial consumers were already making use of gas in 1974, no action had yet been 
taken to supply the residential areas of the planned city.726 Though the number of 
industrial units making use of natural gas rose steadily in the following years, as late as 
1977 no residential or commercial consumers had been connected to the gas network.727 
Smaller areas were also beginning to be supplied by the IGAT pipeline, including the 
power plant in Manjil, and industrial consumers in Kāshān,728 Ābyek, and Lushān.729 
*** 
Though the IGAT-1 project quickly became the backbone of Iranian natural gas 
exploitation after its completion in the early 1970s, even substituting for the regional 
network constructed in Shiraz in the late 1960s, two smaller projects were also taking 
shape during that decade. Smaller in scope than the IGAT-1 project, these systems 
nonetheless exhibited many of the same traits, particularly the reliance on foreign 
contractors and the prioritization of industrial consumers over residential. Despite its 
relative proximity to Bid Boland and the IGAT-1 gas gathering system, Ahvāz, lying 
astride the Kārun River in the middle of Iran’s southwestern oil-bearing region, would 
come in the 1970s to be supplied by a separate gas system. The city was home to a 
number of facilities central to Iran’s oil and gas industry, not least the Ahvāz Pipe Mill 
that had played such an important and dubious role in IGAT-1 program. As was true 
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across the country, the NIGC’s project to delivery gas to consumers in Ahvāz was 
motivated by a desire to prevent the “waste” of the “ideal” source of energy and a need to 
provide increasing amounts of fuel to residential, commercial, and industrial consumers 
in addition to the same concern for air quality, particularly as was related to its brick 
kilns, that had motivated industrial conversion in cities like Tehran and Shiraz.730 To 
supply gas to Ahvāz, a small natural gas refinery was built seven kilometers outside the 
city near the oil facilities that would feed it nearly 30 million cubic feet of gas per day via 
a 12-inch line. Constructed over the course of a year, by May 1971 the system was 
operational. As was true elsewhere, the overall contours of Ahvāz’s natural gas network 
were shaped most strongly by the geographic spread of its industry. Once refined, the gas 
traveled via a 16-inch line at 400 psi the twenty kilometers to Kut-e Abdollāh south of the 
city. From there a 10-kilometer branch line carried gas to industrial consumers to the 
west of the Kārun River while a second carried gas just over than thirteen kilometers to 
the city’s brick kilns. A third branch, only six inches in diameter, carried gas to the 
Ahvāz city gateway where its pressure was reduced to the standard 60 psi and an odorant 
was added before being injected into the roughly 22 kilometers of pipe that made up the 
city network. Residents began making use of gas late in the spring of 1972, and by 1974 
some 23 industrial and 1070 residential consumers were consuming 3 million cubic feet 
of gas per day.731 By 1977 the amount of gas consumed had risen to approximately 30 
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million cubic feet per day, the vast majority by the city’s industry with relatively little 
increase in residential demand.732 
 Far to the northeast in Iran’s Khorāsān region, near to the country’s borders with 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (now Turkmenistan), a significant regional project to 
provide gas for the city of Mashhad and the Nekā power plant in Māzandarān was also 
underway. Lying in the Ālādāgh Mountains, 22 kilometers west of the city of Sarkhas 
and 120 kilometers northeast of Mashhad, the Khāngirān field was discovered and 
deemed commercially viable by the NIOC in the 1960s. The find was of significant 
importance to the company. Lying far outside the southern oil concession area, the field 
was seen as both a way to supply energy to the Khorāsān region without incurring the 
significant expense of transporting oil products from Khuzestān and as a source of gas 
that was not dependent on the operations or decisions of the Consortium companies. With 
the field estimated to have some 21.5 trillion cubic feet of gas in two primary rock 
formations, one containing 3.5 trillion cubic feet of sweet gas and the other nearly 18 
trillion of very sour gas, construction began in 1971 on a 16-inch pipe to bring gas at 
1000 psi more than 120 kilometers from the dehydrating and refining facilities, with daily 
capacities of 45 million cubic feet and 60 million cubic feet respectively, built at 
Khāngirān to the Mashhad city gateway. By 1974 the gas treatment and transmission 
systems had been completed and were beginning to operate. In the years prior, the NIGC 
had prepared plans for the supply of natural gas to industrial, residential, and commercial 
consumers in Mashhad and its surrounding areas. As had been true for distribution 
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systems across Iran, industrial consumes were prioritized in the construction of 
Mashhad’s gas network. One 6-inch branch ran some 23 kilometers to feed a nearby 
cement factory and another through the city directly to the Ābkuh sugar loaf factory. 
Where the latter intersected Khājeh Rabi’ Road, pressure reduction facilities were located 
in order to supply gas to the surrounding neighborhoods.733 By 1977, Mashhad’s 
industrial gas network had been completed and was being fully used while those 
supplying city neighborhoods were still in the process of being built, with ten industrial 
units and some 700 residential and commercial consumers making use of gas.734 
Supplying Mashhad was not the only use of Khāngirān’s gas that Iran’s national 
petroleum companies pursued in the 1970s. As part of the Fifth Development Plan that 
began in 1973, it was proposed that the Nekā power plant, then under construction in 
Māzandarān, and the northern cities of Shirvān, Bojnord, Quchān, Gorgān and Gonbad-e 
Kāvus be fed with natural gas from the Khāngirān field. Rather than the nearby oil 
refinery that had originally been envisioned,735 Nekā would be supplied by a 30-inch 
pipeline running some nearly 700 kilometers from Mashhad to the powerplant. To purify 
the highly acidic gas that would be used, a refinery with a daily capacity of 22 million 
cubic meters of gas was planned. Of the nearly 8 billion cubic meters of gas that the 
pipeline was supposed to transport per year, some 7 billion was slated for industrial 
applications like the Nekā power plant while the remainder was dedicated to residential 
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and commercial consumers in the five northern cities.736 Foreign experts and contractors 
were crucial to the project, with the design work for the gas treatment plant undertaken 
by the British firm Davy Power Gas and its construction entrusted to three Italian 
companies, Saipem, CIMI, and Technipetrol. The pipeline running between Mashhad and 
Nekā was designed by Williams Brothers UK and constructed by Butler-Culvern 
Construction, an American company. Construction began in 1976 but was interrupted 
three years later by the revolution. The project would thus not reach initial operational 




By the end of the 1970s, the NIGC had undertaken market studies and design 
work in 25 cities and for some 600 industrial units.738 Approximately 9.5 billion cubic 
meters of gas were exported to the Soviet Union in 1977 versus the nearly 3 billion that 
had been consumed domestically. While exports had remained largely steady over the 
course of the 1970s, domestic consumption had grown substantially, more than doubling 
between 1973 and 1977.739 At over 1 billion cubic meters, Tehran alone accounted for 
roughly one third of Iran’s domestic natural gas consumption in 1977, followed by Shiraz 
and Isfahan at just over 500 million cubic meters and 450 million cubic meters 
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respectively.740 Most of that consumption, nearly 80 percent in 1976 and substantially 
similar amounts in other years, had gone to replace fuel oil and diesel, two oil products 
used most heavily in industry.741 This reflected not only the significant amounts of 
natural gas that consumers like power plants and factories could burn, but also their 
prioritization in Iranian distribution schemes. Consistently across Iran, the construction of 
natural gas networks prioritized connecting and servicing industrial consumers. While all 
cities and towns across Iran were thus slated to see significantly expanded service as part 
of the aborted Sixth Development Plan, residential and commercial consumers were 
therefore asked to wait years after industrial networks were operational to be able to use 
natural gas.742 
By the end of the 1970s, only limited progress had been made in building gas 
distribution networks able to serve non-industrial consumers, and then almost entirely in 
a few urban locales. Indeed, rural areas residents were particularly underserved as the 
NIGC made extremely limited investments in rural gas distribution during the five years 
of the Fifth Development Plan, some 200 million rial as opposed to the nearly 96.5 
billion rial spent on major new production and distribution projects during the same 
period.743 In the mid and late 1970s, amid the context of growing revolutionary fervor in 
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Iran, the uneven spread of access to natural gas became a significant issue for Iranians 
living in areas left underserved. Inequalities of wealth and access to the fruits of Iran’s 
developmental programs were keenly felt in Iranian society during the period. Land 
reform measures begun in the early 1960s, primarily aimed at breaking the power of old 
aristocratic families, had largely failed to create landholdings large enough for newly 
empowered peasant families to maintain themselves. The damage was compounded by 
policies that favored urban populations over rural, particularly the agricultural price 
ceilings that suppressed agrarian earnings. Such policies—accompanied by the 
simultaneous promotion of mechanized agriculture that damaged the relatively delicate 
topsoil in many areas, continued efforts at nomadic settlement, and the failure to invest 
significant sums in rural infrastructure and services—both undermined traditional ways 
of life and failed to incorporate the majority of rural dwellers into the new economy. 
Despite state investment in rural cooperatives and programs like the Literacy Corps, 
many were left largely without adequate means to support themselves. 
With the majority of developmental investment flowing to Iran’s urban areas and 
the greatly expanded network of services offered, there was a significant migration of 
landless people from the countryside into Iran’s cities. Life was often no easier for them 
there, however, as there were often few major avenues for social advancement on offer. 
While government import substitution policies were largely successful in helping foster 
new industries, they also tended to favor politically connected families and foreign 
corporations who obtained business contracts and investment through both legitimate and 
corrupt means, their exorbitant profits and hoarded wealth justified as necessary spurs for 
investment and economic growth. Though the new professional salaried middle classes 
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also grew rapidly during this period, few former rural dwellers had the social connections 
or educations needed to joint their ranks. The traditional middle classes, largely bazaar 
merchants and members of the clerical hierarchy, were similarly closed off to them. 
Though some of the migrants found employ in the economy’s expanding industrial 
sectors, far more were left as impoverished members of the urban poor, crowded in 
inadequate housing in neglected city neighborhoods.744 
Nowhere was this more true than in Tehran, which had received the lion’s share 
of investment activity and had become the country’s manufacturing capital as well as its 
administrative one. Thrown into sharp relief were the increasingly comfortable standards 
of living of those who had benefited from the changes in Iranian society. Aside from the 
lives of luxury that Iran’s social elite enjoyed, many others acquired modern living 
spaces, private automobiles, state-backed insurance plans, and the ability to travel abroad 
on holiday. Mainly residing in areas like Tehran’s northern neighborhoods, such people 
were the primary market for the increasing amounts of consumer goods and modern 
appliances produced in Iran and imported from overseas. Despite the previously 
unimaginable levels of wealth found in the city by the end of the 1970s, Tehran still 
lacked significant public infrastructures like a functioning sewer and mass transit system. 
While it was thus true that life had improved for most Iranians in an absolute sense, 
though for lower income groups standards remained well below those of industrialized 
nations, over the course of the 1970s the gap between rich and poor accelerated at an 
 
744 For more on land reform in postwar Iran see Eric J. Hooglund’s Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), Afsaneh Najmabadi’s Land Reform and Social Change in 
Iran (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1987), and Mohammad Gholi Majd’s Resistance to the 
Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2000). 
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even faster pace. Between inequalities in housing, employment, income, and living 
standards, for many it was plain to see that there was a significant lack of regard for the 
everyday needs of most Iranians on the part of their government. It was also just as clear 
to those outside Tehran, especially those living in rural areas, that the capital city and its 
denizens had and would continue to reap outsize benefit from Iran’s changing economy. 
For many Iranians, the rising expectations they had for their lives were being increasingly 
disappointed.745 
 The relative deprivation of such people, their inability to taste the benefits of 
Iran’s vast oil revenues or partake of the material comforts of Iran’s changing economy, 
became impossible to ignore in the 1970s. Popular media like newspapers and film had 
long been filled with discussions of the issue, sometimes allegorical, while members of 
parties like the largely suppressed communist Tudeh and Fadāiyān-e Islāmi were known 
to attack foreign, particularly American, workers as both emblems and causes of Iran’s 
growing social problems. Over the course of the decade, such socioeconomic issues 
became a core part of Iran’s revolutionary movement. Spreading much farther than Iran’s 
leftist and secular nationalist parties, the ideas, positions, and rhetoric of figures like 
Ayatollāh Khomeini were suffused with ideas about the struggle between Iran’s 
mostaz’afin (oppressed) classes and the wealthy and powerful mostakbarin (oppressors) 
who tormented them. Though often expressed most powerfully through Twelver Shi’a 
imagery and perspectives, questions of economic and social justice became the animating 
 
745 For more on the economic, social, and political history of Iran in the 1960s and 1970s see chapters 9, 10, 
and 11 of Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1982) as well as chapter 7 of Nikki Keddie’s Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981). See also chapter 3 of Pamela Karimi’s Domesticity of 
Consumer Culture: Interior Revolutions of the Modern Era (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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force of the revolutionary movement in Iran, coming to encompass disputes over 
industrial profit sharing, housing standards, medical care, energy prices, and much 
more.746 
It was within this context that the efforts of the NIGC to build natural gas 
distribution networks were situated. Throughout Iranian society, gas became enmeshed in 
how people understood their own communities, taking on great symbolic import in ways 
that ran counter to the triumphalist narratives found in articles of industry publications 
and the speeches of Iranian officials. For many, gas was significant as both a source of 
energy and an emblem of Iran’s developing modernity, becoming an object of interest not 
only for its utility as resource, but also for what the presence of natural gas distribution 
systems seemed to imply about the status of people and communities. Across the country, 
Iranians petitioned their local governments and pressed representatives of the NIOC and 
NIGC to be connected to their country’s growing natural gas network. Nowhere was this 
truer than in the regions that lay near the passage of major gas transmission lines like 
IGAT-1, and the availability of natural gas became notable topics of discussion within 
their local governments. 
746 For more on the ideological content and orientation of Khomeini’s views, see Ervand Abrahamian’s 
Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 
particularly chapters 1 and 2. For more on Khomieni’s thought and its contextualization within the work of 
seven other major revolutionary thinkers, see Hamid Dabashi’s essential Theology of Disconent: The 
Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993. 
Reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008). For more on lesser known Iranian thinkers 
writing within this context as well as the post-revolutionary evolutions, see Mehrzad Boroujerdi’s Iranian 
Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1996). See also Said Amir Arjomand’s The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), though his argument has a heavily teleological tenor based on conflict 
between the state and what he terms the clerical hierocracy. 
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In the middle of June 1976, the administrative council for the county of 
Sepidān—comprised of the county governor, heads of governmental offices, and the 
members of the “democratic council”—gathered for their first meeting in the office of the 
county governor (farmāndār). An elongated rural county at the northern end of Fars 
Province, the region lay nestled in the Zagros Mountains a few dozen miles north of 
Shiraz. The governor opened the meeting with a panegyric to the Shah, hailing the “quick 
and progressive advancements that have taken place in all corners of our dear country 
Iran under the leadership of His Imperial Majesty” before turning to matters at hand.747 
Alongside discussions of other “difficulties” like poor roads and the need for a continual 
supply of electricity, a call was made for the country to be supplied by piped natural gas. 
The desire of residents for gas was rooted in a practical understanding of gas’s potential 
as a fuel source. The area’s long and snowy winters, with “heavy snows of six to seven 
meters [that] fall for more than half the year,” meant that residents suffered from “very 
short supplies” of fuel and warmth during the much of that time. Traditional forms of fuel 
from the town’s surroundings had become less accessible due to the Office of Natural 
Resources and Forestry limits on the use firewood (hizom) and forest wood (chub-hā-ye 
jangali). Believing that a major gas pipeline would cross “within at most twenty 
kilometers of Ardakān,” council members proposed a “possible arrangement” with the 
NIGC to lay gas pipes for the cities and villages of the county.748 The call by the council 
 
747 Proceedings of the Administrative Council of the County of Sepidān, 23 Khordād 2535, attached to 
Memo 464, 31 Khordād 2535, attached to Memo, Political and Law Enforcement Office of Fars Province 
to Shiraz Regional Gas, 16 Tir 2535, p. 1; Omur Marbut be Rāh va Tarābari-ye Ostān Fārs az Jomleh-ye 
Rāhsāzi va Marmat Rāh-ha va Lulehkeshi-ye Gāz-e Sepidān (293-12649), Ostāndāri-ye Fārs, National 
Archive of Iran, Tehran [hereafter Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun]. 
748 Ibid., 2. 
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for the supply of natural gas to their region was rooted in a belief that it would help 
alleviate the winter-time shortages their constituents faced. Unlike other forms of fuel 
that were either restricted by government decree or subject to the difficulties of 
transportation along poor roads, gas pipes could operate year-round, providing warmth at 
the twist of a knob or the opening of a valve. Natural gas as a source of energy, for all the 
symbolism it had been imbued with, bore that meaningful weight because it was, at root, 
a robust form of energy. Of equal significance in the Sepidān council’s statement, 
however, was their observation that natural gas pipelines would be passing within close 
proximity to their region. The assumption that underlay their words, that a small branch 
off the main line for their towns and villages was relatively insignificant undertaking, was 
one that would be expressed time and again in such areas. Whether true or not, it was a 
belief that came to take on great political import, becoming intertwined not only with 
revolutionary politics, but the very idea of what it meant to be an Iranian citizen. 
 In May 1978, at a meeting between the county governor and the Kāzerun county 
board, a conflict over natural gas and the right of Iranians to make use of it began to 
brew. The county board, headed by one Abdullāh Hushdārān, noted that the IGAT-1 
pipeline would pass within five kilometers of Kāzerun city, situated roughly sixty miles 
west of Shiraz. Because of that proximity, they requested that the creation of a center for 
gas transmission and distribution for the city become part of the larger project.749 In 
contrast to the Sepidān council that had praised the “advancements” of the Shah in 1976, 
by 1978 the mood within Fārs province had begun to change, and local leaders like 
 
749 Proceedings of the Kāzerun County Board, no. 58, 30 Ordibehesht 2537, attached to Memo 1087, 17 
Khordād 2537, p. 1; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
309 
Hushdārān had begun to criticize the developmental polices of the Shah’s government. In 
late June of that year, Hushdārān used an article published in Kayhān, a national daily, to 
send a veiled but nonetheless pointed message to Manuchehr Āzemun, the governor of 
Fars province. The article, titled “The Roots of the Chaos in Qom and Tabriz and the 
Political Vacuum in Iran,” described a report issued by the Group for the Study of the 
Problems of Iran (Gruh-e Barrasi-ye Masā’al-e Iran) that analyzed the Shah’s 
developmental revolution and the extent to which Iranians had accepted it. Hushdārān 
had attached a copy of the article and highlighted a section where it was argued that while 
the Shah had pursued real reforms in the country, they were often invisible to the public. 
Referring to his highlights, Hushdārān noted that these points were “the same thing” he 
had brought up in a previous, confidential, letter. He then went on to “beg” that the 
governor pay heed to the list of complaints of his community, central to which was that 
action be taken on gas lines for the city of Kāzerun.750 Unlike previous requests for 
access to Iran’s natural gas network, Hushdārān’s remarks went beyond the practicalities 
of the matter to embrace the politics of it. For years officials from the government and the 
national gas and oil companies had been promising that natural gas would be the energy 
source of Iran’s future. Hushdārān argued that like Iranians across the country, the 
residents of Kāzerun were eager to see evidence of their country’s advancements in their 
daily lives, but that they were becoming increasingly impatient with what seemed like a 
lack of progress. For people like Hushdārān and those he claimed to represent, the end of 
the 1970s became a moment when they began to demand that the future finally be made 
750 Letter from Abdullāh Hushdārān to Manuchehr Āzemun, Document 364, 2 Tir 2537; Omur Marbut be 
Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
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real. For them, piped natural gas had moved from being an aspirational hope to an 
unfulfilled promise. 
 The efforts of Hushdārān and the Kāzerun county board to bring natural gas to 
their region found only limited success. In a meeting of the board in late August 1978, 
Hāj Ahmad ‘Abāri, a board representative, asked that the governor take action regarding 
the laying of gas pipes because the chief executive of the NIGC had “promised” (va’deh 
farmudand) that natural gas pipes would be laid for Kāzerun “at the proper time.”751 
Frustrations boiled over several weeks later when one member openly denounced the 
priorities of the NIGC in a board meeting. Noting once again that “gas pipes have been 
laid within seven kilometers of Kāzerun,” he demanded that the “authorities in the 
matter” not be “indifferent” to the city’s people. Why should the people of Shiraz have 
access to this resource and those of Kāzerun not, for he argued that  
 
all Iranians have a right to equally (mosāvi) and justly (ādelāneh) make use of the 
developmental benefits of this property (molkat). Why is piped gas (gāz-e lulehkeshi), at 
a minimum, to be consumed in one city, and in another like Kāzerun, because pipes have 
not been laid, people must consume liquid gas at an expensive price incomparable to 
piped? This very issue (jariyānāt) is, and will be, the cause of people’s unhappiness 
(nārāzi) and they will become burdened (oghdeh-dār mishavand) by these various 
discriminations (tab’aizāt-e gunāgun). Whatever correspondence they send, entreaties 
they make, [or] moans they give, no one listens…[and] people are upset and unhappy 
because Kāzerun is not intended to be part of the project of laying gas pipes.752 
 
The ability to consume natural gas carried significance far beyond whatever practical 
advantages it might have had. The residents of Kāzerun felt themselves to be 
 
751 Proceedings of the County Board of Kāzerun, Document 66, 2 Shahrivar 2537, attached to Letter 2698, 
20 Shahrivar 2537, attached to Letter 19238/22, 26 Shahrivar 1357, p. 1; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e 
Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
752 Proceedings of the County Board of Kāzerun, Document 68, 22 Shahrivar 2537, attached to Letter 
21022/2, 4 Mehr 2537, p. 2; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
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discriminated against and rendered second-class by the actions of the NIGC. As Iranians, 
they expected to be able to take full advantage of the “developmental benefits” of Iran’s 
modernization policies; to be denied such services was not merely the misfortune of 
geography, but unjust, and seemingly willful, discrimination. As the board member 
asked, “how is it that it is possible for the NIGC to lay pipes from the gas production 
region to Āstārā,753 but for a distance of seven kilometers they bring excuses and 
objections?”754 
 The dissatisfaction of the residents of Fārs province was rooted not in the 
complete inability to obtain gas energy, for they could and did use canisters of liquid gas, 
but in the differences between technologies of distribution. They desired to consume gas 
delivered to their homes via pipes linked to the national gas network, not via canisters 
hauled in the back of trucks. The people of Kāzerun complained that canisters of gas 
were much more expensive, and those of Sepidān longed for the reliability of supply that 
piped gas could provide their snowy homes. As with the story of gas told by official 
publications like Nāmeh, their notions of what gas could and should be were tied 
intimately to the technologies that enabled its use. Rather than a story of monumental 
“arteries” measured in thousands of kilometers and hundreds of millions of cubic feet of 
gas transported, their concerns were spoken in the vernacular of the system’s capillaries, 
the threads of pipe that moved gas the final few meters to their homes. For those like the 
members of the Kāzerun county board, to be denied access to the national gas network 
 
753 A distance of some 1100 kilometers. 
754 Proceedings of the County Board of Kāzerun, 2. 
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was to be cut off from the blood of the Iranian nation, rendered inferior to those whose 
communities were vitalized by it. Their anger lay not in the idea of a natural gas future, 
but in the reality of being denied it. 
The residents of Kāzerun and Sepidān never did receive the answers they sought 
from the Shah’s government. Several weeks after the outburst at the board meeting, the 
response of the NIGC was relayed to members of the provincial government. 
Acknowledging the considerable effort that had been made to secure gas lines, the letter 
declared that 
gas delivery (gāzresani) to the various cities and points that exist along the route of the 
cross-country natural gas pipeline [IGAT-1] must be qualified on technical and economic 
criteria and principles. The passage of regional gas pipes does not alone justify gas 
delivery. Therefore, as soon as gas delivery to the county of Kāzerun can be justified 
from the perspective of conformity with [those] criteria, the necessary action will be 
taken.755 
Repeated attempts by local officials to press the NIGC further over the next two months 
only met with frustration,756 and by early 1979, members of the Kāzerun county board 
seem to have accepted the finality of the decision. Acceptance did not mean appreciation, 
however, and Hushdārān vented his anger at a board meeting held on 10 January 1979. 
After reading the letter that had laid out the NIGC’s position on the subject, he spoke, 
saying 
755 Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Javād Imāmi, Document 4094, 23 Mehr 1357, attached to Letter 5195, 26 
Dey 1357, attached to letter 29839/22, 15 Farvardin 1358; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e 
Kāzerun. 
756 See Letter from Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document 21022/22, 16 Mehr 1357; Letter from 
Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document 23300/22, 8 Ābān 1357; Ahmad Behzād to NIGC-Fars 
Region, Document 26820/22, 6 Āzar 1357; Letter from Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document 
26494/22, 7 Āzar 1357; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
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for years in this country the law of the jungle operated and was enforced, and the people 
were strangled and suffocated by the injustice and oppression of the governments of the 
time. But the height of unfairness, and counter to human principles, is that the gas that is 
one of our natural and national resources is for us forbidden (harām)…but for foreigners 
overseas (khārejiān-e māvarā behār) and others who are thousands of kilometers distant 
from Iran’s borders, it is lawful (halāl). With complete indifference (bā kamāl-e bi-
e’atenāi), [they] lay a pipe within five kilometers of this city in the direction of 
Gachsārān and Āstārā so they can put cheap gas (gāz bā qeymat-e nāzel) at their disposal 
and provide for their welfare.757 
 
In Hushdārān’s view, being denied the ability to participate in the exploitation of Iran’s 
natural gas was one of the harshest injustices perpetrated by his government. He 
considered it the right of Iranians to partake of the “natural and national resources” that 
lay within their country and believed that their welfare should be prioritized over that of 
“foreigners.” Though both Hushdārān and the officials of the Iranian government wanted 
“Iran” to benefit from the construction of the IGAT-1 pipeline, they did not agree on a 
single definition of what “Iran” was to mean. In their efforts to find productive uses for 
Iran’s gas, NIOC officials prioritized large-scale industrial applications like the chemical 
fertilizer factory at Shiraz and the pipeline to the Soviet Union. As was shown in their 
rhetorical constructions of gas over the years, their “Iran” was a monumental one, a 
rapidly industrializing country of advanced technology, vast distances, and huge scales. 
But such monuments to the expertise of government technocrats meant little to 
Hushdārān and his fellow residents. Their “Iran” encompassed their homes, their 
community, and they themselves, none of which were benefitting from the wealth that lay 
under its soil as they felt they should. They, as Iranians, were the true owners of the 
 
757 Proceedings of the County Board of Kāzerun, Document 79, 20 Dey 1357, attached to Memo 4480, 9 
Bahman 1357, p. 1; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
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country’s gas, and the fact that it could come so close yet still be inaccessible while 
foreigners at far remove made use of it was a fundamental injustice. As Hushdārān said, 
 
But we who are the original owners of this God-given wealth, plea that the people of this 
city are ready to render a claim to a branch [of the pipeline] and fulfill any other 
conditions. They answer that the laying of the cross-country gas pipe does not alone 
justify the laying of pipes to deliver gas to the city of Kāzerun. …Consider [that] the 
workers (ommāl) of the autocratic (khudkāmeh) government are prepared for a county of 
200,000 people to face hardship (mazifeh) and discomfort (nārāhati) for the protection of 
the interests of foreigners and several gas distribution and sale companies. …There are no 
rules and regulations for this extortion and injustice because the plunderers were all 
companions, but the stretching of one strand of gas pipe five kilometers wants technical 
and economic principles. But the day of reckoning (ruz-e hesāb) approaches and the time 
has come that the wealth of Iran be for Iranians.758 
 
For Hushdārān, the prioritization of the needs of foreigners was nothing less than an act 
of willful plunder. Neither distance nor difficulty seemed to be an obstacle for sending 
gas to them, but a litany of excuses cloaked in the rhetoric of “technical and economic” 
expertise was brought forth by officials to avoid providing it for the people of Kāzerun. 
This struck at the heart of the government’s legitimacy in Hushdārān’s eyes, and 
speaking amidst an intensifying revolution, he declared that the failure of the Shah’s 
government to meet the needs of Iranians like those in Kāzerun would eventually lead to 
a “day of reckoning.” One way or another, the vast wealth that lay under the earth whould 
be for the “Iran” of residential homes and provincial towns, not that of advanced 




 When Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fled his government’s fall in early 1979, 
Abdullāh Hushdārān would see his prediction come true. The county board that provided 
 
758 Ibid., 1. 
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him his public voice would be dissolved with the rise of the Islamic Republic,759 but his 
concern that the “wealth of Iran be for Iranians” continued to echo within the new 
government. In few arenas was this more the case than Iran’s petroleum sector, and the 
ability of ordinary Iranians to make use of their country’s gas reserves became an 
important pillar of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. As had been true under the Shah, 
such pillars were in large part raised through the official publications of institutions like 
the Ministry of Petroleum. Pitched for both specialized groups and general audiences of 
all ages, these books, magazines, and pamphlets articulated a vision for gas energy that 
resembled that of the Shah’s era in many ways. But just as Hushdārān had foreseen, 
rather than erecting new monuments that reveled in the epic scope and size of Iran’s 
arterial gas infrastructure, the Islamic Republic instead created new rhetorical markers 
that, while remaining rooted in the politics of the numbers and materiality of gas, gave 
symbolic priority to the capillaries that fed the homes and businesses of all Iranians. 
Published in the spring of 1985 by the Ministry of Petroleum’s Department of 
Public Relations and Islamic Guidance, the pamphlet “The National Iranian Gas 
Company in the Service of the Oppressed” (Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar Khedmat-e 
Mostaz’afin) was a seven-page, black-and-white pamphlet that epitomized the early 
Islamic Republic’s articulation of what gas energy should mean for Iran. Beginning with 
an ode to God and praise for the “prophetic leadership (rahbari-ye payāmbarguneh) of 
our great Imām [Khomeini],” the pamphlet went on to state that a duty had been placed 
“on the shoulders of the Muslim nation of Iran” to bring “dignity” to the “oppressed of 
759 Letter from Abdullāh Hushdārān to the Governor of Kāzerun County, Document 2, 19 Farvardin 1358, 
attached to Memo 1945/2, 2 Ordibehesht 1358; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun. 
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the world.”760 While on one level this rhetoric was merely reiterating a significant 
political theme of Iran’s revolution, it nonetheless formed a key organizing principle for 
the narratives that institutions like the Ministry of Petroleum constructed around gas 
energy during the early Islamic Republic. They cast themselves as part of a “government 
of servants (dolat-e khedmatgozār),” one whose success, made possible by its 
“committed workers,” in bringing the “blessing of gas for many fellow urban and rural 
countrymen” scarcely needed introduction.761 Yet describe it they did, and the remainder 
of the pamphlet was dedicated to explaining, for the “encouragement” of the company’s 
workers and the “satisfaction” of public, the NIGC’s accomplishments in supplying 
natural gas to the people of Iran. 
 Central to the piece’s strategy was a comparison between activities of the NIGC 
before and after the revolution, seeking to demonstrate to Iranian readers that the Islamic 
Republic, as Hushdārān had demanded, prioritized their wellbeing over that of foreigners. 
As it says, 
 
The National Iranian Gas Company…was created under the previous regime with the 
goal of extortion for the eastern superpower [the Soviet Union] and the protection of 
global imperialism. During the years [13]49 [1970] to [13]58 [1979], a total of 
approximately 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas was exported to the Soviet Union at 
a meager price (qaymat-e nāchiz). With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the 
severing (gosasteh shodan) of the binds of tyranny, colonialism, and exploitation, gas, 
this great blessing of God, and its expansive industry, in both concept and actuality, was 
placed in the service of the people of our homeland…[with] the cutting of the export of 
gas to the Soviet Union as the first change [made].762 
 
 
760 Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Islami-ye Vezārat-e Naft, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar Khedmat-e 
Mostaz’afin (Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Islam-ye Vezārat-e Naft, 1363), 3. 
761 Ibid., 3. 
762 Ibid., 4. 
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In stark contrast to previous claims that the gas exports would be simultaneously 
advantageous to Iran’s citizens and foreign partners, under the Islamic Republic the 
interests of the two parties were posed as being at odds. In this new view, it was 
unconscionable that so much effort could be spent to transport gas thousands of 
kilometers to foreign markets while so many Iranians, like those living in Sepidān and 
Kāzerun, were left wanting. In reality, however, the decade-long cessation of exports to 
the Soviet Union that began in April 1980 was rooted more in an inability of the new 
government and the Soviet Union to agree on a suitable price than any principled 
opposition to the shipments.763 In any case and much more significantly, a much larger 
distribution program was needed to provide natural gas to residential and commercial 
consumers. Claiming allegiance to the broader policies of the Islamic Republic and the 
Ministry of Petroleum, the NIGC sought to both substitute gas for “middle distillate 
fuels” like kerosene and diesel and expand delivery to “industries, power plants, cities, 
and major centers of consumption where the supply of liquid fuel faces difficulties.”764 
Some success had already been achieved in bringing the “great blessing” of gas to more 
Iranians, and the pamphlet emphasized that the NIGC had already increased the 
consumption of natural gas in Iran from 9.6 million cubic meters in 1979 to 26.1 million 
at the time of publication in 1984.765  
763 Pirooz Ashraf, “Natural Gas Industry in Iran,” Table 3, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 
764 Vezārat-e Naft, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar Khedmat-e Mostaz’afin, p. 5. 
765 Ibid., 5. 
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Despite its claims that a new era had 
arrived for Iranian gas, the NIGC continued 
to rely on much of the same legitimating 
criteria as it had before the revolution. Like 
the NIOC articles in Nāmeh-ye San’at-e 
Naft-e Iran so often did, the basis of the 
NIGC’s claims to mastery and expertise was 
deeply rooted in the recitation of numbers 
and statistics. The cutting of exports to the 
USSR and the increase in daily consumption 
were just the beginning, as the NIGC’s pamphlet went on to list five other key 
statistics measuring its post-revolution success: five cities were connected to the gas 
network before the revolution, and 23 after; one village was connected before, and 48 
after; there were 50,000 gas connections before, and 310,000 after; 27,000 customers at 
the end of the Shah’s era, 257,000 by 1985; and 270 industrial units used gas before the 
revolution, and 602 after.766 Presented in a table, such statistics did more than merely 
assert that under the Islamic Republic the NIGC cared more for the people of Iran. Posed 
side by side, they prompted readers to reflect that the new era was 260,000 gas 
connections, 230,000 customers, and 18 cities better than the old. Future plans were 
delivered in the same way: 255,000 meters of pipe were in the process of being laid to 
 




supply nearly 28,000 residential and commercial connections in a further ten cities.767 As 
had also been exhibited by official publications during the Pahlavi years, this was a 
politics of numbers, a way to give the imprimatur of fact and rationality to the 
fundamentally political claims the pamphlet was advancing. 
The pamphlet’s photographs too demonstrated significant continuity with pre-
revolutionary themes and tropes. As with Nāmeh’s images of the Shah and his ministers, 
dignitaries were a common subject of the NIGC’s post-revolutionary publications, and 
Gāz dar Khedmat-e Mostaz’afin was no exception. One image in the work depicts a 
familiar scene: a crowd of men, all with beards and without ties, have assembled around 
three figures grasping the handle of a large lever (Figure 20).768 The caption describes the 
scene as  
  
“Hojjat al-Islam [Abbas Vaez] Tabasi, representative of the Imam [Khomeini] and 
Custodian (towliyat) of Āstān-e Quds Razavi and Engineer Dāvidi Shamsi at the 
inauguration ceremony for the gas delivery network of Chenārān.769 
 
In their grooming and their sartorial choices these men may have distinguished 
themselves from their supposedly gharbzadeh monarchical forebears, but their presence 
at such inauguration ceremonies nonetheless made similar claims regarding the 
relationship of the country’s leadership to gas energy. It was a representatives of Iran’s 
new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was opening a new flow of gas, symbolically 
claiming ownership over the provision of its benefits.  
 
767 Ibid., 6-7. 
768 Ibid., 7. 
769 Ibid., 7. 
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But there was a crucial difference 
between the photograph of Hojjat al-Islam 
Tabasi and those published during the Shah’s 
era: the choice of location. Rather than a large 
refinery or huge cross-country pipeline, the 
image depicts the inauguration of a small 
city’s gas network. It was a shift in subject 
from the monumental complexes of gas 
production and transmission to the residential 
and commercial distribution networks that sat 
alongside Iranians as they went about their 
everyday lives. This change of subject was also represented within the pamphlet’s 
remaining two photographs. On the cover is an image—reproduced later in the piece with 
the caption “gas delivery, a basic step on the path of fuel supply”770—that depicts an 
assembly of pipes and gauges situated in rural setting (Figure 21).771 There are no people 
shown in the black-and-white photograph, allowing the mechanism of gas to dominate 
the image’s foreground. Behind, a cluster of low buildings and trees squat before a small 
mountain. A very similar photo appears a few pages later, where a knot of pipes and 
gauges, perhaps the same as those shown earlier, stand above a caption describing it as a 
“section of the gas delivery network of Nurābād of Mamasani” (Figure 22).772 
 
770 Ibid., 4. 
771 Ibid., cover. 
772 Ibid., 6. 
Figure 21 
321 
Together the three photographs mark a shift toward the small end of Iran’s gas 
system, a move away from the monumental edifices of the Shah’s era to the human-scale 
benefits that it could bring for Iranians. Technology was highlighted and celebrated all 
the same, but on a different scale. What the NIGC’s new pamphlet hailed was not that 
which towered over people, dwarfing them with its awesome scale and enduring heft, but 
the modest pipes that delivered gas to people’s home and the gauges that measured gas in 
thousands of cubic feet rather than billions. All the huge physical infrastructure of the 
Shah’s era was still there, forming the foundations of the gas system now operated by the 
Islamic Republic, but it was deemphasized, 
ceding place in a vision of Iran’s future that 
emphasized the needs of small consumers in 
their everyday lives. It was a modernizing 
vision all the same, one still built on the 
indigenous mastery of sophisticated 
technological systems, but now pitched at a 
human scale. 
The emphasis on human scale extended 
to a greater recognition of the workers who 
built Iran’s gas network. While the pamphlet’s 
photographs continued to emphasize Iran’s political and managerial leadership, its text 
did much more to acknowledge the contributions of those who labored to build and 




night activities” to extend Iran’s gas system to new communities.773 Despite this 
recognition, the pamphlet’s content continued to cast Iran’s gas network as a system 
primarily defined by its materiality and association with the political leadership. If gas 
was the fuel of Iran’s future, and the piece promised that more was to come, then that 
future would continue to be one imagined through the work of engineers and managers. 
Explicit comparison between the achievements of Iran’s natural gas industry 
before and after the revolution became a staple of both the public literature of the NIGC 
and the Ministry of the Petroleum in years after the revolution and their own internal 
documents.774 Another 1985 publication from the Ministry of Petroleum reinforced the 
seemingly new prioritization of domestic consumers of Iranian natural gas over foreign. 
“Before the governance of the Islamic Republic,” the office of public relations wrote, 
“when Iran was the arena of invasion of international colonialists and plunderers, this 
valuable substance [natural gas]…was looted” and it was “put at the disposal of the 
eastern superpower” for a “negligible price.” But “with the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution and the eviction of the eastern and western colonialists and the start of the 
revision of the mistaken policies of the Pahlavi puppet regime, the export of gas to the 
Soviet Union was also halted” and this “stuff of energy” would be redirected for use 
 
773 Ibid., 6. 
774 As an example of this language in internal reports see the introduction to Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, 
“Tarh-e Chahār Marhaleh-ye Gāzrasāni beh: 180 Shahr – 1380 Rustā – 71024 Makān-e Tejāri va ‘Omumi 
va 7312 Vāhed-e San’ati-ye Motevaset – Bozorg va Sangin-e Keshvar,” Bahman 1359, p. 5-7; Central 
Library of the Ministry of Energy, Tehran, Iran. 
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within the country so that the “deprived people of our homeland could also enjoy welfare 
and comfort.”775 
The highly charged rhetoric notwithstanding, there was significant truth to the 
claims of the new government. In the wake of the revolution the NIGC was committed to 
expediting the extension of natural gas service to some 97 percent of Iranian cities plus 
more than 1200 villages and 7000 medium and large industrial units.776 In practical terms 
the major aim of the Islamic Republic’s new distribution projects was the replacement of 
oil fuels and liquid gas to the greatest extent possible. Building on the “demonstrative and 
very incomplete” urban gas networks of the Pahlavi era, the Islamic Republic expanded 
access to gas at a rapid and accelerating clip. Between the spring of 1978 and the fall of 
1984, the number of residential and commercial gas connections had grown nearly nine-
fold. In addition to the additional eighteen cities that had begun to see gas networks built 
within them, the number of villages served had grown from one to approximately fifty.777 
All told, in that period, the NIGC and its domestic contractors had laid nearly 3500 
kilometers of pipe for natural gas distribution systems, more than half that total in the 
previous two years, and as of 1984, there were also a further twenty cities in the early 
 
775 Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran: Shesh Sāl B’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e 
Islāmi (Tehran[?]: Ravābat-e ‘Omumi va Ershād-e Vezārat-e Naft, 1364), 7-8. 
776 Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, “Tarh-e Chahār Marhaleh-ye Gāzrasāni beh: 180 Shahr – 1380 Rustā – 
71024 Makān-e Tejāri va ‘Omumi va 7312 Vāhed-e San’ati-ye Motevaset – Bozorg va Sangin-e Keshvar,” 
Bahman 1359, p. 5; Central Library of the Ministry of Energy, Tehran, Iran. 
777 Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran: Shesh Sāl B’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e 
Islāmi, 33-35. 
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stages of receiving gas networks and another seventy undergoing market research and 
system design.778 
*** 
Despite the revolution and the altered rhetorical emphases of Iranian state 
institutions that it prompted, what was not in question was the sociotechnical imaginary 
that placed natural gas energy at the center of a “modern” Iran. Iranians, both elite and 
not, monarchist and revolutionary, embraced gas energy as the means by which their 
country could become sovereign, modern, and clean. The desire of people like Abdullāh 
Hushdārān to make use of piped natural gas was reflective of both the politics of access 
and the technical characteristics of natural gas as a source of energy. Natural gas was 
seen as superior to both oil products and liquid gas. It was understood to be more 
convenient, less expensive, and more modern. To be denied the ability to use natural gas, 
particularly in a region where it passed so close at hand through enormous pipelines that 
stretched to the borders of faraway lands, was, in essence, to be denied their full rights as 
Iranians. The provision of natural gas to all Iranians for that reason became part of the 
new Islamic Republic’s commitment to economic justice.  
The National Iranian Gas Company’s emphasis on the distribution of natural gas 
to small consumers under the Islamic Republic did not wholly erase their accompanying 
work to expand service to industrial consumers, but the latter was largely deemphasized 
within the public materials of government ministries and the national petroleum 




companies.779 This was true in spite of the fact that industrial applications and power 
generation accounted for the vast majority of gas consumption in the country. Indeed, in 
1984 some 97 percent of all gas consumed within Iran, approximately 25.3 million cubic 
meters per day, went to fuel either industrial production or electricity generation.780 There 
was significant stability in the goals and plans of Iran’s gas industry between the late 
Pahlavi and early Islamic Republican eras. Beyond a straightforward and inevitable 
building on what had come before, the fulfillment of projects like the Khangirān-Nekā 
pipeline and the commitment of the NIGC to the continued expansion of industrial gas 
use demonstrated that the new government’s orientation toward domestic natural gas 
utilization was, but one of acceleration, expansion, and intensification. Even the post-
revolutionary publications of institutions like the NIGC and the Ministry of Petroleum 
that sought to contrast the achievements of the two regimes so strongly in the arena of 
natural gas exploitation displayed marked continuity with those of the 1960s and 1970s. 
It was not true that the new emphasis on small-scale consumers and the distribution 
networks that supplied them wholly eclipsed the depictions of nation-spanning pipelines 
and towering refineries that had marked the Pahlavi era. Depicted again were the 
landscape-conquering gas pipelines, their scale and sophistication stretching into the 
distance, rendering the anonymous workers comparatively small and subordinate. In this 
way, the sociotechnical imaginary that shaped Pahlavi-era approaches to gas remained 
influential after the revolution. Through materials like this, those working for the 
 
779 In Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran: Shesh Sāl B’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e Islāmi, for example, it was 
given only a single paragraph. See p. 39-40 of the book. 




Ministry of Petroleum articulated a desire to distinguish themselves and their work and 
their aims from those of the Pahlavi dynasty. Nonetheless, through their rhetorical and 
artistic choices, they re-inscribed the fundamental principles of the imagined natural gas 
future that had been articulated thirty years earlier: a view of gas energy that prioritized 
its technical elements, independently created; was preoccupied with large, quantifiable 
scale; and cast the energy source as a blessing for the people of Iran, made possible by 



















Gas Energy and Motor Vehicles in Iran, 
1970-1995 
Quoted in an article published on 31 December 1989 in Ettelā’āt, Amir ‘Azadi, 
director of the Traffic Organization of Tehran, noted that “Tehran’s air pollution is a 
problem that in recent years has been considered repeatedly and with various 
explanations,” but that while experts had “offered solutions…the problem still remains in 
force and each day finds wider and more worrisome dimensions.”781 Though the 
conversion of Iran’s industrial sector to the use of gas energy had been underway for 
nearly two decades by this point, ‘Azadi’s statement pointed to the reality that the effort 
had largely failed to bring about a significant improvement in Tehran’s air quality. While 
the success of efforts to convert energy-intensive and polluting sectors like cement and 
brick production to gas seemed to promise a future of cleaner skies for cities like Tehran, 
the thick blanket of smog and haze that continued to cover Iran’s urban areas pointed to 
the growing significance of another source of many of the same pollutants they had 
worked so hard to fight: the exhaust of motor vehicles. Driven by the rapidly increasing 
781 “Otomobil-hā-ye Shakhsi Sāli 1,300,000 Ton-e <<Mono’oksid Karbon>> va Chand Gāz-e Sami-ye 
Digar ra Vāred-e Havā-ye Tehran Mikonnand,” Ettelā’āt (10 Dey 1368). 
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numbers of automobiles on their nation’s roads, Iranians working in government 
ministries, the national petroleum companies, and local and provincial administrations 
launched an equally ambitious, but initially much less successful, project to similarly 
bring gas energy to the country’s transportation sector. 
The provision of gas energy to Iran’s motor vehicles required traveling a long and 
fraught road, one much less clear than the largely contemporary effort to bring gas to the 
country’s manufactories. It would not be until the late 1990s that Iran vehicles but be 
using the new fuel in any significant numbers. Despite the long delay, the decisions made 
in the 1970s by Iranian experts working in the context of the Pahlavi state and its 
development policies laid many of the foundations that would be built upon by those 
working under the Islamic Republic. Despite the careful erasure of Pahlavi policies by 
those working under the Islamic Republic, there existed significant continuity in the 
kinds of programs that intended to convert taxis and city buses in cities like Tehran and 
Shiraz to the use of gas fuel. Though many such efforts received significant support from 
state institutions and influential members of Iranian society, for decades they failed to 
expand beyond their pilot stages, foundering on unresolved technical issues and a lack of 
clarity on what, exactly, “gas fuel” meant. Unlike with the supply of natural gas energy to 
Iran’s factories and workshops, there was great controversy over the exact form—
compressed natural gas or liquid gas—that gas fuel should take. Drawing on the 
experiences of other nations, anecdote, photography, and calculation, whether of real or 
imagined scenarios, debaters clashed over the best system of gas fuel for their country. 
For decades the various merits of both were analyzed and dissected, and many programs 
were begun that used one form of fuel or the other. More than an argument over the 
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technical merits of the two fuels, the debates reflected differing views of the social 
contexts within which vehicular gas fuel would function. Different forms of gas fuel 
demanded different systems of infrastructure, and debates over their merits turned on 
questions of cost, complexity, and most significantly, safety. 
With motor vehicles becoming an increasingly significant source of air pollution 
in Iranian urban areas after the late 1960s, converting cars and buses to use gas was seen 
as a desperately needed way to fight against a rising tide of pollution. Air pollution and 
its mitigation were core concerns of those who advocated for gas fuel use in the 
transportation sector. Through their anxieties they reiterated much of the same 
preoccupation with the most tangible aspects of air pollution—smoke and smog chief 
among them—that had animated champions of industrial gas use. Gas promised to help 
alleviate air quality concerns in the same way: by substituting one fossil fuel with 
another, cleaner, more “modern” form of fossilized carbon. In this way, as had been the 
case with industrial gas use, the experts and officials that promoted gas energy sought to 
simultaneously advance Iran’s development as an energy intensive fossil fuel-based 
society while also mitigating some of its most violent effects on human health and the 
natural world.  
The sustained pursuit of gas fuel was rooted in the materiality of fossil fuels and 
their properties of combustion, but its successes and failures as an environmental aid 
were determined more by the social and technological contexts in which it was burned. In 
Iran, environmental motivations quickly became intertwined with nationalist ones as 
well, particularly after the revolution and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War. With Iran’s 
ability to both produce and import fuels like gasoline and diesel hampered by conflict, the 
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extensive availability of domestic gas energy took on an added attractiveness as a 
domestic fuel source able to step into the breach. More fundamentally, the use of gas in 
automobiles represented an area of opportunity for Iranian industrialization. Though 
foreign firms were heavily involved in early attempts to gasify Iranian vehicles, many 
within the country saw the ability to produce both the gas fuel and the necessary 
conversions kits—the sets of equipment used to transform a gasoline-powered vehicle 
into one able to accept gas fuel as well—as an important drivers of Iranian industrial 
development. But while the domestic production of conversions kits was celebrated as an 
expression of Iranian independence, it would also eventually proven to be something at 
odds with the environmental motivations underlying the push for gas fuel. Ultimately, the 
failure of experts and officials to significantly improve Iran’s urban air quality despite the 
successes of their fuel conversion programs demonstrated that gas energy would not be 
the easy technical fix to environmental problems that many Iranians hoped it would be. 
*** 
In early 1975, Mohsen Shirāzi  ̧the chief executive of design and study of the 
National Iranian Gas Company, as part of his broader analysis of the role of natural gas in 
fighting air pollution, both noted the significance of motor vehicle emissions to Iran’s 
struggle with poor air quality and proposed that gas fuel be employed to counteract that 
contribution. Repeating statistics used frequently by Iranians writing on the subject of air 
quality, Shirāzi reported that on average each of Tehran’s 600,000 vehicles traveled thirty 
kilometers a day and produced some sixty grams of “damaging materials,” altogether 
more than a thousand tons per day. “Fortunately,” Shirāzi also wrote, Iran was endowed 
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with “abundant” and “inexpensive” natural gas resources that could be used in motor 
vehicles. While the conversion of automobiles to make use of gas fuel as their primary 
energy source was a possibility, there were also less aggressive options. Shirāzi argued 
that Iran was a pioneer in the experimental mixing of liquid gas with diesel—at the time 
of writing the system had been tested on ten buses in Tehran and was expected to be 
rolled out to a thousand more—and he claimed the relatively easy and inexpensive 
approach could reduce a converted engine’s emissions by roughly half.782 
 In actuality, Shirāzi’s description of Iranian buses using a combination of diesel 
and liquid gas glossed over what had been a contentious episode in the history of the 
United Bus Company of Tehran.783 In the mid-1960s, the NIGC had purchased a 
thousand “torque toppers”— supplementary devices installed on diesel engines to boost 
their power via the injection of liquid gas into the motor’s fuel—from an American 
company for installation on Tehran’s buses.784 It was hoped that a new 80-20 mix of 
diesel fuel and liquid gas would enable city’s buses to “better burn diesel and curb their 
smoke” and more easily navigate Tehran’s streets.785 There were significant reservations 
regarding the technical soundness of the plan, but over the objections of both the 
 
782 “Naqsh-e Gāz dar Taqlil-e Āludegi-ye Mohit-e Zist,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft Iran (Winter 1353), 21. 
783 The United Bus Company of Tehran was founded in the 1950s as a public system of bus transportation 
for the citizens of Tehran and its surrounding suburbs. 
784 Letter from Major General Husayn Razm-Ārā, Deputy to the Mayor of the Capital and Chief Executive 
of the United Bus Company of Tehran, to Feyli, Deputy Prime Minister and Supervisor of the 
Environmental Protection Organization, p. 1, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to letter 22717; 
Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz (340-460), Shahrdāri-ye Tehran, National Archives of Iran, Tehran 
[hereafter Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz]. 
785 Ibid., p. 1. 
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municipality of Tehran and the United Bus Company itself,786 the buses were modified 
by the NIGC and put into service using temporary fueling stations in the Nārmak and 
Nāziābād neighborhoods.787 
Many of the concerns that people held regarding the complexity and reliability of 
the modified buses proved to be well founded, and “technical complications” eventually 
caused some of the private suppliers of parts to withdraw from the project. More 
significant were the worries surrounding the safety of using torque toppers on city streets, 
concerns that were sharpened by the relative ease with which a small incident could 
become catastrophic. In one instance, a modified bus had seen its newly installed torque 
topper damaged and its reserves of liquid gas spilled when the vehicle’s bottom and tank 
of liquid gas scraped across a set of train tracks running along one of Tehran’s southern 
streets. Had the bus been stopped, officials fretted, something as small as a “spark from a 
purveyor of [roasted] corn” could have caused a deadly explosion in the middle of a busy 
city street. The dispute raged and soon the Shah was forced to involve himself. After an 
“inspection” of the project, he decreed that if a bus’s diesel engine was powerful enough 
and in good enough repair, then a torque topper was not necessary. On the Shah’s orders, 
the existing program was scrapped in favor of one that would see torque toppers installed 
at a more gradual and careful pace. Under the new approach, much of the United Bus 
Company’s fleet would eventually receive the new equipment, and they put their 
strengthened engines to good use operating in the famously hilly city while also emitting 
 
786 Letter from Taqi Mossadeqi to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, document 1-56/3384/g, 10 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
787 Memorandum from Mayor of Tehran to Mossadeqi, Chief Executive of the NIGC, document 
33184/19353, 21 Esfand 2535; attached to report 2601, 31 Mordād 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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fewer pollutants.788 Unlike what would come later, however, this early use of liquid gas 
by the United Bus Company explicitly positioned the new fuel as an supplement to rather 
than a wholesale replacement of diesel. Liquid gas was thus layered upon an existing 
energy system and charged with the specific goals of increased vehicular performance 
and lowered emissions. This dual fuel arrangement, whereby both gas- and oil-based 
fuels were used in the same vehicle, sometimes simultaneously sometimes alternately, 
would become a hallmark of Iranian efforts to bring gas energy to the transportation 
sector. 
Spurred by the toll environmental pollution was taking on Iranians, vehicular use 
of gas energy was nonetheless animated by the same desire to both accelerate Iran’s 
industrialization and mitigate its downsides that was concurrently driving the move 
toward natural gas use in factories and workshops. Writing in the mid-1970s, Muhammad 
‘Ali Mostofizādeh, head of the Office of Standards and Regulations at the NIGC, 
published one of the earliest and most comprehensive analyses of Iranian vehicular gas 
use. Possessing a degree in Petrochemical Engineering from the Technical University of 
Abadan, earned in the mid-1950s, and a twenty-year veteran of the Ābādān Oil Refinery 
and the NIGC,789 Mostofizādeh evinced an understanding of the relationship between 
civilization, industrialization, and the natural environment much like that described by 
788 It is not entirely clear whether the incident described by the chief executive of Tehran’s bus company 
actually happened or is a description of his concerns. Nonetheless, what matters most is that fear of these 
sorts of incidents was animating opposition to the new buses within certain circles. See letter from Major 
General Husayn Razm-Ārā, Deputy to the Mayor of the Capital and Chief Executive of the United Bus 
Company of Tehran, to Feyli, Deputy Prime Minister and Supervisor of the Environmental Protection 
Organization, p. 1, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to letter 22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye 
Gāzsuz. 
789 ‘Ali Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e Naqlieh be Gāz,” Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran 
(4th Quarter 2534), 19. 
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Shirāzi and Shaybāni in their discussions of industrial air pollution. He wrote that 
pollution, particularly that of gasoline-burning engines, had “today endangered most of 
our cities” and that the “progress of civilization and technology and the development of 
industry that has a need for the consumption of energy” had “brought forth air that is 
harmful for respiration of humanity, animals, and even plants.” Like other many other 
Iranian commentators, Mostofizādeh did not advocate for gas energy purely for its 
environmental benefits. He also saw gas energy as being a potential economic boon, 
writing that the use of gas fuel in motor vehicles “did not only possess benefits and 
advantages from the view of economics…but also provided effective help for the 
cleaning of the environment.”790 
Using the United States as a warning of the dangers of unchecked air pollution,791 
Mostofizādeh argued that the existing programs for converting industry to use gas energy 
were insufficient for addressing Iran’s air quality problems. He wrote that “right now in 
Tehran and the majority of the cities along the route of the [IGAT-1] gas line, most 
industries and powerplants have been converted to gas,”792 but the “rapid expansion of 
the number of vehicles, especially in Tehran”—rising from roughly 347,000 to 660,000 
vehicles between 1970 and 1974—made further action necessary.793 Around the world, 
various methods of controlling vehicular emissions had been tried, but despite the success 
 
790 Ibid., 9. 
791 Ibid., 9-10. 
792 This was, as we have seen, not true. The program for the industrial use of gas was an incomplete and 
slowly ongoing process. 
793 Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e Naqlieh be Gāz,” 10. 
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of catalytic converters and tighter manufacturing standards, Mostofizādeh believed the 
“most suitable and practical path for confronting this problem” remained “the conversion 
of the fuel of vehicles to gas.”794 He reported that gas-fueled engines had been found to 
consistently produce less pollutants than those powered by gasoline, even when the latter 
had been modified with pollution-control mechanisms. He illustrated his argument with 
vivid rhetoric, echoing the preoccupation with the tangible forms of air pollution that so 
animated observers of Iran’s deteriorating air quality. As he wrote, 
 
If 3 pieces of filter paper…are placed in front of the exhaust of three different types of 
vehicles, the first of which would be for an uncontrolled gasoline engine, it would 
become completely black; the second of which would be for a controlled gasoline engine 
that has a catalyst [catalytic converter] embedded in its exhaust…for the absorption of 
harmful substances, the color [of the filter paper] would be dark gray; and the third one, 
which is held in front of the exhaust for a gas-burning engine would remain completely 
white.795 
 
With his illustration, Mostofizādeh highlighted just how powerful gas fuel could be for 
fighting air pollution. Two crucial questions nonetheless remained: what would a gas fuel 
system look like in practice and what form would be best suited for a city like Tehran? 
In the 1970s, the three forms of gas energy available for use in motor vehicles 
were liquid gas, liquified natural gas, and compressed natural gas. Focused on Tehran, 
Mostofizādeh evaluated each option in turn, exploring how their particular advantages 
and drawbacks were attenuated or mitigated in that particular urban context. According to 
Mostofizādeh, liquified natural gas was still in an experimental state and there were no 
existing systems in practical use anywhere in the world, making it an impractical 
 
794 Ibid., 11. 
795 Ibid., 12. 
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choice.796 Liquid gas, while it had the advantages of being easier to handle and requiring 
less investment in both conversion devices and fueling stations than compressed natural 
gas, was nonetheless a poor option because “the amount of production of this gas is not 
enough in Iran to provide fuel for all vehicles” and “its price…is relatively expensive—if 
not more expensive than gasoline then no cheaper.”797 There also remained lingering 
safety concerns for liquid gas, as people feared its heavier-than-air nature and potential to 
pool around vehicles and explode. Compressed natural gas, on the other hand, had many 
of the advantages of liquid gas while also being able to make use of the network of 
natural gas pipes already beginning to be built in the city. Like a liquid gas system, 
installing a CNG system on a vehicle did not necessitate the removal of the existing 
gasoline engine. Modifications were also relatively simple. Mostofizādeh described ten 
major components to such systems, but fundamentally all that was needed was a tank to 
store the compressed gas, a gas-air mixer to enable combustion within the existing motor, 
and a means by which the operator could switch between gas and gasoline.798 Beyond the 
functioning of motor vehicles themselves, one of the primary advantages of CNG was 
that any area connected to the city gas network could easily host a fueling station. The 
natural gas transported through the city’s networks of pipes could be compressed and 
pumped into cylinders for consumers’ vehicles, eliminating the need for the separate 
production facilities and transport tankers that the other two forms required. CNG was a 
796 Ibid., 13 
797 Ibid., 13. 
798 This is exactly how most CNG cars in Iran operate today, a system made standard some decades after 
Mastufizādeh  published his article. For more on the workings of a CNG see Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e 
Sukht-e Vasāyat-e Naqlieh be Gāz,” 14-15. 
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proven system as well, and Mostofizādeh cited the “more than 100,000” such vehicles 
that traveled the roads of Italy and the “more than 30,000” that did so in California.799 
But while Mostofizādeh promoted CNG as the best option for Tehran, he 
recognized that the lack of piped gas networks in other Iranian cities made the choice 
much less feasible outside the capital. For other areas he recommended the use of liquid 
gas, claiming that the use of dual fuel vehicles burning both gas and gasoline would help 
mitigate the inevitable fragmentation of the fuel supply that such a policy would create. 
Under Mostofizādeh’s plan, while travel within urban areas could eventually be powered 
by gas energy, movement between cities would remain dependent on the existing oil fuel 
infrastructure that supplied gasoline and diesel to the country.800 In effect, Mostofizādeh 
was advocating of for a policy that would require the maintenance of not one or two 
systems of fuel supply, but three. Mostofizādeh believed the environmental benefits of 
gas energy to be so great as to be worth nearly any cost to the efficiency of Iran’s fuel 
infrastructure. But only in urban areas. As had been true for many others, Mostofizādeh’s 
perspective was one that prioritized the environment of Iran’s cities, deeming the tangible 
smog and smoke of the country’s urban areas to be of greater priority than the air quality 
of the towns and villages that sat in between. His vision focused not on the totality of 
emissions, but on the ways in which they eddied and collected in particular areas. This 
 
799 Ibid., 13. 
800 This potential complication was recognized by government officials as well. In the late 1970s the 
Minister of Industry and Mines noted that converting vehicles to gas would require the construction of 
fueling infrastructure that extended well beyond Iran’s cities. Distribution points must be spread “not only 
in suitable points…in the country’s cities…but also throughout the entirety of the country’s roads.” 
Without that ubiquity, intercity transportation would be “disrupted” even if all vehicles could use both gas 
and gasoline. See Letter from the Minister of Industry and Mines to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, Inspector for the Prime 




understanding of pollution was deeply social in nature, rooted not only in the material 
realities of fossil fuels and the byproducts of their combustion, but also in the 
agglomerations of humanity that gave meaning to poor air quality with their suffering. 
Mostofizādeh selection of CNG as Tehran’s best option was also rooted in his 
deep concerns for the potential danger of gas as a fuel. The density of Tehran was critical 
for Mostofizādeh’s understanding of the hazards of gas fuel’s different forms, and he 
rejected the use of liquified natural gas and liquid gas in Tehran in part because of how 
their mechanics of distribution would interact with the urban space. Both systems would 
require fuel to be distributed around the city by a fleet of tanker trucks, something 
Mostofizādeh argued would make Tehran’s notoriously bad traffic worse and pose a risk 
for deadly explosions in the event of accidents.801 Compressed natural gas, on the other 
hand, did not pose this same hazard. By drawing upon gas that had been transported by a 
network of underground pipes, there would be no need for tankers full of highly 
flammable material to traverse Tehran’s streets and put residents in danger. The danger 
that Mostofizādeh pointed to was one that existed within and was exacerbated by the 
capital and its unruly traffic. Just as the urban setting demanded gas fuel as a means to 
mitigate the growing danger of air pollution, it also militated against particular forms of 
it. In Mostofizādeh’s view, the social fabric within which any new gas fuel infrastructure 
would be embedded was as important as the material and functional potential of the new 
technologies. Different contexts could enable different solutions. In other Iranian cities, 
smaller in size and not as overwhelmed by traffic as Tehran, Mostofizādeh judged the 
 
801 Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e Naqlieh be Gāz,” 13. 
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urban fabric to be sufficiently different that the risk of transporting liquid gas by tanker 
was low enough to be worth the potential environmental benefits. 
The safety of gas fuel was a significant worry for many Iranians, and in what 
would become a major theme in the literature on gas vehicles, Mostofizādeh went on to 
expend considerable effort reassuring readers that having a tank of compressed natural 
gas in their automobile was not akin to sitting on a bomb. While continuing to emphasize 
the environmental and automotive benefits of gas fuel, Mostofizādeh claimed that 
“automobile CNG systems are much safer and less dangerous than other fuels,” a 
statement he recognized that people found hard to believe because gas “has the 
possibility of explosion and is kept under great pressure in the tank of an automobile.”802 
Punctuating his argument with numerical evidence, Mostofizādeh described a system that 
was engineered well above the minimums needed to control and burn compressed natural 
gas: storage tanks built to withstand 10,000 psi holding gas at 2,400 psi; flexible piping 
also built to withstand 10,000 psi; safety valves made to trigger at 3,600 psi; and many 
more. He told of placing storage tanks in the trunk, behind and attached to the rear seats, 
mitigating their risk of damage during an accident. Employing the evidence of narrative, 
Mostofizādeh wrote of a test undertaken where a gas-powered automobile was hoisted 
forty feet in the air and dropped, destroying the car but leaving the gas system “without 
the smallest flaw.” He told of an incident of a gas tank surviving unscathed in an accident 
that saw it ripped from its mounts and flung across the road.803 Fundamentally, 
802 Ibid., 15-16. 
803 Ibid., 16-18. 
340 
 
Mostofizādeh’s argument was rooted in the “proof” of engineering schematics and 
loosely connected but vivid anecdotes. In formulating his claims in such a way, 
Mostofizādeh utilized the evidentiary force of numbers in much the same way as official 
discussions of Iranian gas energy more broadly. The systems that Mostofizādeh described 
did not exist, at least not in Iran, and to declare CNG to be “much safer” than gasoline 
was to substitute expectation for reality. Rather than by luck or chance, Mostofizādeh 
claimed with his numbers, the tanks of gas at the heart of his stories had survived by 
rigorous and repeatable design. 
Mostofizādeh’s opinions were built on research and planning already begun by 
the NIGC. As part of broader efforts to improve urban air quality through the use of gas 
energy, “in cooperation” with organizations like the Environmental Protection 
Organization and the University of Tehran, the NIGC had analyzed “comprehensive 
programs for the fuel conversion of several kinds of diesel and gasoline vehicles.”804 
After also settling on compressed natural gas being the best option for Tehran, the NIGC 
had signed contracts with an Italian and an American firm to begin pilot efforts to 
“familiarize public opinion with gas fuel” and its “welcome advantages” in the city. 
Toward that end, an experimental program to convert two thousand automobiles was 
conceived. Three-quarters of the vehicles modified would be taxis as they traveled 
approximately three hundred kilometers a day rather than the thirty that personal vehicles 
averaged. Five fueling stations were to be established. At each station, natural gas from 
the city’s gas network would be compressed and stored in fifty-eight large tanks before 
 
804 Ibid., 18. 
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being dispensed into cars from four fueling pumps.805 With land for the fueling stations in 
the process of being purchased and orders being placed for the vehicle equipment, it was 
hoped that by the end of the summer of 1976 the first of the two thousand automobiles 
would be able to use gas fuel.806 In the end, however, the NIGC’s program in Tehran did 
not come to fruition. While the system of fuel distribution performed well during tests,807 
it was eventually decided that the conversion of two thousand automobiles to gas was 
insufficient to make any real contribution to controlling Tehran’s air quality problems. 
With that, the experiment was suspended, and the ordered equipment was shipped south 
to Shiraz, another city beginning to experiment with gas.808 
In October 1975, around the time of Mostofizādeh’s writing, Manuchehr Piruz, 
the governor of Fars Province, sent a letter to the chief executive of the NIGC in which 
he expressed enthusiasm for the company’s program to bring gas fuel to Tehran’s 
automobiles. Saying that a “number of Tehran’s taxis and, probably, buses will be 
converted to gas-burning for free,” something that would “certainly” have “a 
considerable effect” on the quality of the city’s air, he requested that the “good national 
project” be implemented in Shiraz as well. As a city where “one thousand seventy-five 
 
805 Fueling stations were to be placed on Ārāmgāh Road, near the homes of many taxi drivers, on the road 
to the southern suburb of Rey where many also lived, in Shahyād Square for the taxis and residents of the 
west and the airport service vehicles, along Āb’ali Road across from Tehran Pārs Street, and at the 
intersection Shāhānshāhi Highway and Pahlavi Boulevard. See Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e 
Naqlieh be Gāz,” 18. 
806 Ibid., 19. 
807 Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), Matn-e Sokhanrāni-ye Āghā-ye Mohandes Ashrāqi dar 
Avalin Seminār-e Barrasi-ye Prozheh-ye Gāzsuzkardan-e Khodro-ha dar Iran (Tehran: Vāhed-e 
Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1362), 10. 
808 Letter from Taqi Mossadeqi to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, p. 1, document 1-56/3384/g, 12 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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taxis and forty-five buses and approximately 80 minibuses” were “at work”809 and as a 
domestic and international “tourist” destination in need of protection,810 Shiraz was seen 
by Piruz as being a natural candidate for the program once it completed its work in the 
country’s capital.811 In Shiraz, while many agreed that gas vehicles and their reduced 
emissions would benefit the city, there was considerable disagreement as to whether 
liquid or compressed natural gas should be used. In negotiations held on 14 November 
1975 between the provincial government and the Environmental Protection Organization, 
a plan took shape with the aim of converting the city’s public vehicles to use gas. The 
agreement, “inseparably part of the plan for the clearing of the air of Shiraz,” decreed that 
one thousand taxis and one hundred buses would be converted to use liquid gas. In 
support, the provincial government would provide three plots of land appropriate for 
fueling stations in the city and would work with the Environmental Protection 
Organization to obtain a customs exemption for needed equipment. The NIGC was called 
upon to provide the liquid gas and all three institutions would share the cost of the 
809 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to Mossadeqi, document m/626, 28 Mehr 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh 
Kureh-ha va Kucheh-ha va Khiābān-ha va Hazineh-ha-ye Tarh-e Mazbur (98-293-4335), Ostāndāri-ye 
Fars, National Archives of Iran, Fars Document Center, Shiraz [hereafter Tarh-e Gāzresāni] 
810 Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to Mossadeqi, no document number, undated but probably late 1354; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
811 The region of Fars, of which Shiraz is the capital, was the cradle for Iran’s two major pre-Islamic 
empires: the Achaemenids (550 – 330 BCE) and the Sassanids (206 – 651 CE). Their remains, most 
notably Persepolis, Naqsh-e Rostam, and the tomb of Cyrus the Great, lie within driving distance of Shiraz. 
Shiraz itself, founded in the eighth century CE, became known as a significant place of Iranian culture, 
with the city being the home of significant and revered scholars, mystics, and poets, including Sa’adi and 
Hāfiz whose tombs have become major tourist attractions. For more on Shiraz’s importance to Iranians’ 
understandings of their country and their culture, see Setrag Manoukian’s City of Knowledge in Twentieth 
Century Iran: Shiraz, History and Poetry (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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project.812 Agreeing to the request, the NIGC promised a supply of liquid gas priced at 
3.6 rial per kilogram and the aid of their “experts” for the “installation” of fueling stations 
around the city.813 The plan was to begin small, with a single vehicle converted to be dual 
fuel, though even with such modest beginnings, the effort stumbled before even it even 
truly began. While the plan’s credit needs were submitted to the Planning and Budget 
Organization “under the special protection of the Queen of Iran” and on the “orders of the 
Prime Minister,”814 little action815 was taken over the following six months. With no 
progress made despite the repeated attempts of officials in Fars to spur the national 
authorities, by the summer of 1976, the same year that the experiment in Tehran was 
terminated, Shiraz’s project was “suspended” despite the “promising” operation of the 
single converted taxi.816 
While the first Shiraz plan called for the use of liquid gas, the NIGC itself favored 
an approach that would convert a thousand taxis to use compressed natural gas supplied 
from two CNG refueling stations. Contracted to the American firm Dual Fuel Co., the 
NIGC’s plan quickly foundered as well.817 While Shiraz’s existing network of natural gas 
 
812 Report on negotiations held 23 Ābān 1354, no document number, undated; attached to letter 61-6798; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
813 Letter from Taqi Mossadeqi to Iskandar Firuz, document 1-56/2698/g, 15 Dey 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
814 Letter from Iskandar Firuz to Nasr Isfahāni, document 61-6798, 30 Farvardin 2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
815 Letter from the provincial government of Fars to the mayor of Shiraz, document 18-157, 8 Ordibehesht 
2535; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
816 Letter from Abdul Husayn Shamszādeh to the governor of Fars, document 609, 04 Mordād 2535; Tarh-e 
Gāzresāni. 
817 Taghi Ebtekar, “The Prospect for Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Iran: An Environmental Assessment,” 
Proceedings of the 28th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, vol. 2, 893-897, 
(Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1993), 895. 
344 
 
piping was tapped to supply the new fueling stations, its operating pressures were too 
high for the compression equipment, a development that necessitated the use of 
regulators that added to the complexity and cost of the system’s operation. Even worse 
were the poorly designed and excessively heavy conversion kits supplied by the 
contractor. Deemed both unsafe and unsuited to the light motor vehicles that employed 
them, the deficient kits dealt a mortal blow to consumer confidence in the project, leading 
to its cancelation in 1976 as well.818 Even the infusion of equipment from Tehran’s 




Iran’s state institutions and national petroleum companies were not the only 
organizations interested in the effort to bring gas energy to the country’s transportation 
sector. As was true in many sectors of the Iranian economy during the 1970s, private 
firms, both inside Iran and overseas, quickly took note of the new initiatives and began 
promoting their own involvement in the hopes of procuring lucrative contracts from a 
state flush with oil revenues.820 In December 1975, the chief executive of the Jonub Gāz 
Company, a small firm that distributed liquid gas in the region of Shiraz, wrote to the 
 
818 Taghi Ebtekar, “Reconstruction of Shiraz CNG Project,” in International Congress Exhibition on the 
Use of Methane in the Transport Sector (Bologna, Italy: Fedormentano, 1986), 212-213. 
819 Letter for Taqi Mossadeqi to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, document 1-56/3384/g, 10 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-
ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
820 While the Iranian state had begun receiving oil rents in the early 20th century and had begun receiving a 
higher percentage after Mossadegh and the Oil Nationalization Crisis of the early 1950s, the 1973 oil crisis 
and the rapid rise in the price of oil poured money into the coffers of the Pahlavi government. This touched 
off a feeding frenzy among private firms in nearly all sectors of the Iranian economy, from, notably, 
defense to transportation to aerospace and even to healthcare and education. For an overview of the subject 
see Chapter 5 of Ervand Abrahamian’s A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
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governor of Fars offering his company’s services in support of the Shah’s “excellent 
goals” of bettering the city’s air quality through the conversion of taxis to gas fuel.821 
Despite following up with another letter several months later, his offer was not accepted. 
Much more involved was a January 1976 proposal from the Instituut voor 
Wegtransportmiddelen (Institute of Road Transport) of the Dutch TNO research 
organization.822 Writing that two of their employees had noted in the “public media” that 
Iranian cities were considering the “conversion of cars and buses to gaseous fuels” during 
a visit to Tehran, the writers offered TNO’s services as experts in the field.823 Invoking 
the “worries” that Iranian authorities held for the cleanliness of their country’s air and the 
“full attention of his Majesty the Shah” in the subject, the authors proposed a pilot study 
for the conversion of taxis and buses in Shiraz. Explicitly rejecting the compressed 
natural gas that the NIGC had been using in Tehran,824 TNO proposed the use of liquid 
gas in both taxis and buses. Presenting arguments and goals remarkably similar to the 
torque topper program experimented with a decade prior, TNO saw liquid gas as offering 
several advantages over the incumbent oil fuels for Shiraz’s diesel buses, claiming that 
they could be much more powerful and produce less noise and pollution than it could 
821 Letter from ‘Abulnabizādeh to Governor Piruz, document 120, 8 Dey 1354; attached to letter 24772; 
Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
822 The Instituut voor Wegtransportmiddelen (The Research Institute for Road Vehicles) was part of the 
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek (the Netherlands 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research), “one of the largest organizations for applied research and 
development in Europe.” An independent research institute founded in 1932 and with some 4700 
employees at the time, the TNO often engaged in specialized consulting contracts in areas dealing with 
applied science. For more see Letter from Ir.P. Tiedema and J. van der Weide to the governor of Fars and 
its first attachment, document 76-1073, 26 January 1976; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
823 Letter from from Ir.P. Tiedema and J. van der Weide to the governor of Fars, p. 1, document 76-1073, 
26 January 1976; attached to document 25-10974; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
824 Ibid., 1. 
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with diesel alone. There were trade-offs, increased fuel consumption and volume chief 
among them, and TNO predicted that the weight of the vehicles would increase by some 
two hundred kilograms.825 
Beginning with the relatively easy conversion of automobiles and seemingly 
ignorant of the experimental projects already undertaken in Iran, the authors suggested a 
single “prototype [taxi] conversion carried out by TNO” followed by fifty further 
conversions undertaken by Iranian workers under the supervision of Dutch experts at a 
cost of roughly 7930 rial. A single “good garage…equipped with an LPG filling station” 
would be enough for the initial experiment, though broader conversion programs would 
require many more. Fuel would be supplied by the NIGC making deliveries with its own 
trucks, a system similar to what already existed in the Netherlands.826 Adding the ability 
to burn gas to the diesel engines of buses was a more complicated task, and TNO 
proposed that it first undertake experiments at its Dutch facilities before “completing the 
prototype vehicle in Iran with tanks, etc.” and “delivering all components necessary for 
the conversion” of ten more buses. “Rough” costs for the total project, understood as 
being modifications to a thousand taxis and two hundred buses, were estimated to be 13 
million rial including the salaries of Iranian workers; costs could be brought down if the 
vehicles were built to be dual fuel from the beginning rather than being modified later.827 
Even though TNO also pledged to transfer their own expertise and teach Iranian workers 
 
825 Ibid, Attachment 2 and Appendix 4. 
826 Ibid., 2-3. 
827 Ibid., 3-4. 
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how to perform the modifications,828 their proposal was never accepted by Iranian 
authorities of Fars and Shiraz despite repeated entreaties.829  
TNO’s proposal was an exemplar of many of the engineering and financial trade-
offs that such projects grappled with in Iran. One of the most significant was a concerted 
1974 to 1978 effort in Tehran to create a system of city buses fueled exclusively by gas. 
Set in motion by a royal order to study a proposal from the Butane Gas Company for gas-
powered buses in the spring of 1974, the project was organized as a collaborative effort 
between the United Bus Company of Tehran, the NIGC, the Butane Gas Company, and 
several Iranian universities.830 While experts within Iranian universities undertook their 
own research, Iranian officials also explicitly looked abroad to learn from other countries, 
cities, universities, “specialized institutes,” and the manufacturers of various gas 
motors.831 Tokyo was one of the most important referents for those involved, going so far 
as to capture the attention of the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, as it was a city 
where “buses and taxis…use gas instead of consuming gasoline…[and] the level of air 
pollution of the city” had been “tangibly reduced.”832 While the Foreign Minister 
overstated the extent to which Tokyo’s buses were using gas—at the time only a few 
 
828 Ibid., 1-2. 
829 Letter from Ir.P. Tiedema and J. van der Weide to the governor of Fars, document 76-1315, 14 April 
1976; attached to document 25-10974; Tarh-e Gāzresāni. 
830 Those universities included the University of Tehran, Polytechnic College (now the Amir Kabir 
University of Technology), the Āryāmehr University of Technology (now Sharif University of 
Technology), and Technocom College. See Letter from Ibrāhim Zahadi to the Special Office of the Shah, 
document t/873, 11 Esfand 1352; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
831 Ibid. 
832 Letter from ‘Abbās’ali Khel’atbari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Prime Minister Amir’abbās Hoveydā, 
document 10/13114, 5 Bahman 2535; attached to letter 4/4821; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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were being used on an experimental basis833—there were still some thirty thousand taxis 
in the city employing liquid gas as a fuel source.834 The experiences of other locales were 
studied as well. In early 1978 it was noted that modified buses were in use for athlete 
transportation at the Munich Olympics, and were being tested in both the United 
Kingdom and Austria.835 Nonetheless, as Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā, a mayoral deputy 
and chief executive of the United Bus Company of Tehran, noted a month later, “in no 
country in the world were gas-powered buses in practical use.”836 While that statement 
was technically true by the end of the 1970s, the implication that buses fueled by liquid 
gas were purely experimental was not. In the early 1950s, the city of Chicago had ordered 
some five hundred propane-fueled buses after a period of experimentation beginning in 
1949.837 Motivated by the relative inexpensiveness of propane when compared to diesel 
at the time,838 by the early 1960s the Chicago Transit Authority was employing some 
1500 propane-powered buses on their transit lines.839 By the mid-1970s, however, the 
833 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Hedāyati, Advising Minister and Deputy Executive of the Prime 
Minister, p. 2, document h/4016, 18 Bahman 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
834 Attachment “LPG Car” to Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Hedāyati, Advising Minister and Deputy 
Executive of the Prime Minister, document h/4016, 18 Bahman 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
835 Letter from Major General Husayn Razm-Ārā, Deputy to the Mayor of the Capital and Chief Executive 
of the United Bus Company of Tehran, to Feyli, Deputy Prime Minister and Supervisor of the 
Environmental Protection Organization, p. 1-2, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to letter 
22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
836 Letter from Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā to Khādemi, document 22717, 17 Esfand 2536; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
837 Butane-Propane News Incorporated, Propane in America: The First 100 Years, 1912-2012 (Arcadia, 
CA: Butane-Propane News Incorporated, 2012), 59. 
838 “Chicago, Transit Metropolis,” National Museum of American History, Behring Center, accessed 5 July 
2019, https://americanhistory.si.edu/america-on-the-move/essays/chicago-transit-metropolis.  
839 Calculated from appendices to Arthur D. Little, Inc. and Chicago Transit Authority, Comparative 
Economics of Propane and Diesel Buses: Report to Chicago Transit Authority (Chicago, IL: Little, 1960). 
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Chicago fleet had been entirely phased out as new diesel buses were significantly more 
economical.840 
 Chicago’s early embrace notwithstanding, the use of gas-powered buses by mass 
transit systems was not common during the mid-20th century. It thus remained true that 
Iranians faced deep uncertainties in their pursuit of this new undertaking. Though 
countries and firms around the world claimed some experience in building such systems, 
without a set of common international standards to draw upon, Iranian officials were 
imagining much of their new system from scratch. Chief among the decisions to be made 
were both the form of gas fuel to be used as well as the expected workload of the buses 
and, consequently, the necessary size of the fleet.841 While many were enthusiastic about 
the prospect of gas fuel, there was a deep well of concern for the potential costs of 
building a new system of public transit. Taqi Mossadeqi, the Chief Executive of the 
NIGC, expressed frustration that earlier episodes like the use of torque toppers had not 
been seized upon, forcing the city to confront a greater and more expensive 
undertaking.842 Others worried about the cost of gas fuel, at the time significantly more 
than diesel, and the precise fuel consumption of different models of buses was scrutinized 
closely.843 Still more feared the costs of modification for the vehicles. The mayor of 
 
840 Chicago Transit Authority, “cta 2016 Historical Calendar,” (Chicago, IL: Chicago Transit Authority, 
2016), accessed 5 July 2019, 
https://www.transitchicago.com/assets/1/6/15JD_072_historic_calendar_2016.pdf.  
841 Memorandum from Taqi Mossadeqi, Chief Executive of the NIGC, to Nikpur, Mayor of Tehran, 
document 3-56/3387/g, 112 Esfand 2535; attached to report 2601; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
842 Letter from Taqi Mossadeqi to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, p. 2, document 1-56/3384/g, 10 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
843 In early 1977, for example, diesel was being delivered to the bus company for  2.4 rial per liter, while 
butane, a form of liquid gas, was being provided at 3.5 rial per liter, an amount almost forty-six percent 
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Tehran, while writing that the “consumption of gas, whether natural or liquid, is in every 
sense preferable to the consumption of diesel or gasoline,” harbored significant 
reservations regarding the proposed course of action. He worried that Iranian 
manufacturers like Iran National and Leyland were continuing to produce gasoline- and 
diesel-powered vehicles that would soon have to be modified at significant expense. The 
municipality consequently proposed that the Ministry of Industry and Mines as well as 
the Ministry of Commerce obligate the companies to produce only dual fuel vehicles, 
saying that it was “not correct” for “permission to be given for the production and 
importation of diesel- and gasoline-burning vehicles” only for the municipality to turn 
around and deny licenses until gas systems were installed844 “at great cost.”845 This was 
not an idle concern. By the late 1970s, nearly two thousand buses city buses were 
operating on Tehran’s streets846 and the municipality was planning to add a thousand 
more in the following three years.847 For that reason, in early 1977 the purchase of new 
 
higher. See Memorandum from Hamid Khazāri and Abolfatah S’aidi to Chief Executive of the United Bus 
Company of Tehran, no document number, no date; attached to report 2601; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye 
Gāzsuz. 
844 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Hedāyati, Advising Minister and Deputy Executive of the Prime 
Minister, p. 1-2, document h/4016, 18 Bahman 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
845 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, document h/5792, 21 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-
ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
846 That figure included 700 to 800 Leyland double-decker buses and 1000 to 1100 Benz single-decker 
vehicles, all working up to twenty hours a day. See Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Mossadeqi, document 
33184/19353, 21 Esfand 2535; attached to document 2601; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
847 Record of meeting held 10 Ordibehesht 2536, p. 2,  document 3927, 10 Ordibehesht 2536; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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buses was “forbidden” until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had “inquired of all the 
producer countries about the possibility of deals for gas buses.”848 
Though there were reservations as to the total cost and the need for sufficient 
fueling stations,849 the United Bus Company of Tehran eventually moved to test the 
performance and operations of gas-fueled buses. Unlike the taxis that had been slated to 
make use of CNG,850 Tehran’s buses would double down on the liquid gas that was 
already employed by their torque toppers. While the first test took place in May 1974,851 
more comprehensive and better recorded experiments were conducted several years later. 
Taking possession of a Mercedes-Benz 305 City Bus on 14 April 1977,852 Tehran’s bus 
company began a roughly four-month testing regime on several of the city’s existing bus 
lines.853 Powered by butane and accommodating forty-four seated passengers or sixty-one 
standing riders, during its first test on a warm spring the day the bus wound its way 
between Seyyed Khandān and Darband along the hilly streets of north Tehran, carrying a 
848 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Hedāyati, Advising Minister and Deputy Executive of the Prime 
Minister, p. 2, document h/4016, 18 Bahman 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
849 Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Hedāyati, Advising Minister and Deputy Executive of the Prime 
Minister, document h/4016, 18 Bahman 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
850 With the original figure of 2000 taxis deemed insufficient and the equipment sent to Shiraz, a new round 
of studies for the conversion of 10,000 taxis was underway by March 1977. Letter for Taqi Mossadeqi to 
Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, p. 1, document 1-56/3384/g, 10 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
851 Letter from Ibrāhim Zahadi, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive of the United Bus 
Company of Tehran to the Mayor of Tehran, document th/167, 24 Khordād 1353; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye 
Gāzsuz. 
852 Report prepared by the Technical Office of the United Bus Company of Tehran, p. 1, document 2601, 
31 Mordād 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
853 Letter from Mostafā Sultāni, Deputy Mayor and chief executive of the United Bus Company of Tehran, 
to Shahrestāni, Mayor of Tehran, document h/403, 14 Shahrivar 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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total of 105 passengers some forty-five kilometers.854 The bus performed well, and the 
Technical Office of the United Bus Company reported “no major troubles” with the 
vehicle, though there were complaints that its windows were sealed, standard in Europe, 
but potentially uncomfortable for passengers in Tehran’s warmer climate. The bus had 
other advantages, including that its engine possessed “significant pull,” low “oil 
consumption,” and stayed clean of soot for longer. There was also less noise and 
vibration from by the engine, and most importantly, it did not produce nearly as much 
“smoke.”855 There were also disadvantages. Some were minor, like the smell of gas near 
the vehicle’s rear, the use of a manual transmission that the drivers did not care for, and 
mudguards that interfered with the ability to attach winter chains to the tires. Others were 
much more serious. The liquid gas that the bus used was relatively expensive, and while 
the engine produced less smoke, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide than comparable 
diesel engines, if it was not tuned properly it produced much more of the particularly 
poisonous and smog-forming nitrogen oxides. As had so preoccupied Mostofizādeh, most 
worrying to those evaluating the trials was the issue of safety. They underlined refueling 
as a particularly dangerous moment, and while they could keep one bus under “complete 
control,” they worried that as more were brought into service alongside an increasing 
number of fueling stations there would be a concomitant loss in the ability to maintain 
safe refueling practices. Despite these issues, they nonetheless recommended that if the 
 
854 Memorandum from Hamid Kharāzi and Abolfatah Sa’idi to Chief Executive of the United Bus 
Company of Tehran, no document number, undated; attached to report 2601; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye 
Gāzsuz. 
855 Report prepared by the Technical Office of the United Bus Company of Tehran, p. 2-3, document 2601, 
31 Mordād 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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identified issues could be addressed then a sufficient number of new buses should be 
purchased to serve the city’s Tajrish bus line.856 
With the initial tests deemed successful, a meeting was held in April 1977 to 
make final decisions regarding the purchase of the gas-fueled buses. Attended by 
government ministers, the mayor of Tehran, the head of the NIGC, representatives of the 
United Bus Company of Tehran, and others, the assembled group charged the city’s bus 
company with the “creation of a better system of city transportation” in order that “people 
will be encouraged to reduce their use of personal automobiles as much as possible.”857 
While those assembled confirmed that new buses would burn liquid gas, there 
nonetheless remained significant question marks surrounding the price at which the 
NIGC would deliver gas, the extent to which the buses might help Tehran’s air quality, 
and the details of their day to day operations. It was thus decided that since such vehicles 
were 
 
in a state of experimentation and study in most of the world’s nations, and their 
disadvantages and difficulties were not yet fixed…only 60 gas-powered buses, meaning 
20 yearly, would be purchased for experimentation. After the acquisition of enough 
experience and the attainment of a satisfactory result, an order will be placed for a greater 
number.858 
 
Despite worries about the cost of converting any new diesel buses purchased, it was also 
decided to reverse the ban on the purchase of new diesel-fueled buses and fulfill the 
city’s remaining transit needs promptly. With each bus estimated to be the equivalent of 
 
856 Ibid., 3-4. 
857 Record of Meeting held 10 Ordibehesht 2536, p. 2, document 3927, 10 Ordibehesht 2536; Kharid-e 
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
858 Ibid., 2-3. 
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seventy passenger cars, even the attenuated environmental benefits of diesel in 
comparison to gas were deemed to be helpful to the goals of a “reduction of air pollution” 
and an “improvement in the state of traffic” in Tehran.859 
Over the following year, officials within the Tehran municipality and the city bus 
company met frequently with the representatives of Mercedes-Benz and other 
manufacturers, weighing carefully the specifications of different models.860 As maker of 
the buses subject to early tests, Mercedes-Benz remained the frontrunner, despite the 
efforts of representatives from MAN SE of West Germany repeatedly trying and failing 
to win the contract with promises of quick delivery, long warranties, and the presence of 
“German specialists” for the “teaching and guidance” of Iranian technicians.861 By 
November 1977, Mercedes-Benz’s lead had been assured and engineers from the United 
Bus Company met with representatives of Mercedes-Benz and the Iran National 
Company—an Iranian firm that in addition to producing the ubiquitous Paykān passenger 
car also made buses and trucks under license from the West German manufacturer—to 
work out some of the finer details of the new vehicles, everything from the precise 
position of springs to the manner in which passenger seats would be attached.862  
Nonetheless, while work proceeded apace, there remained concern surrounding 
the new fuel systems within the United Bus Company. Company employees worried that 
859 Ibid., 2. 
860 Memorandum of meeting between Leyland Motors and the United Bus Company of Tehran, no 
document number, 12 Ābān 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
861 Letter to Shahrestāni, document 34345, 10 Esfand 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
862 Report on meeting between engineers from the United Bus Company, Mercedes-Benz Germany, and the 
Iran National Company, no document number, 23 Ābān 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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the slow adoption of liquid gas fuel for buses around the world was indicative of serious 
safety issues, something they particularly feared in a city famous for a “lack of regard for 
regulations by drivers” fueling “frequent accidents.”863 Others balked at what an already 
overburdened public transit system would be required to implement in order to properly 
support the new gas-fueled buses. Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā, deputy to the mayor of 
Tehran and chief executive of the United Bus Company of Tehran, wrote that  
 
in no [other] country does the number of buses centralized on each garage exceed two 
hundred, where under the existing conditions [in Tehran] approximately 500 to 600 buses 
are based at each garage…[and] the number of garages and repair shops must be 
increased as soon as possible. With this, the allocation of an available repair shop for the 
service and repair of gas-powered buses was not feasible and a new repair shop adequate 
for the repair and service of gas-powered buses must be prepared and its personnel 
recruited and trained. 
 
Tehran’s bus service was already having trouble meeting the public’s demand for 
adequate service despite already running a nearly unsustainable number of buses. Razm-
Ārā wrote of the “frequent complaints” they received regarding the number of buses in 
service and stated that the company was already “obligated” to put a “significant” 
number of new buses in operation and replace some three hundred that had surpassed 
their legal lifespan.864 Nonetheless, he supported the small initial purchase of Mercedes-
Benz buses, declared his organization “absolutely ready” for the issuance of orders to 
 
863 Letter from Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā to Feyli, p. 2, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to 
letter 22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
864 Letter from Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā to Khādemi, deputy to the mayor of the capital, p. 1, document 
22717, 17 Esfand 2536; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
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fight air pollution through the use of gas-fuel buses,865 and wrote that “the time had 




 Despite nearly a decade of planning and experimentation by a wide array of actors 
and institutions, with the coming of the 1979 revolution and the Iran-Iraq War shortly 
thereafter, the early promise of Iran’s programs for vehicular gas fuel went largely 
unfulfilled during those chaotic years. Still, with the production of both natural and liquid 
gases expected to increase after the war, initiatives for the gasification of Iran’s 
transportation sector began to take on new life in the mid-1980s.867 Despite the 
revolutionary change in government and the new Islamic Republic’s systematic 
distancing of itself and its policies from its predecessor, there was significant continuity 
between the projects of the 1970s and those that took shape in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
some cases, the very same programs were revived. Such was the case in 1982, when the 
NIGC’s Shiraz compressed natural gas-powered taxis project was restarted under the 
leadership of Taghi Ebtekar.868 Blaming the failure of the initial effort on the greed of the 
 
865 Ibid., 1-2. 
866 Letter from Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā to Feyli, p. 2, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to 
letter 22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz. 
867 See Chapter 6 of Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani’s book Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and 
International Implications (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
868 Ebtekar, a mechanical engineer trained first at the University of Tehran (B.S., 1958) and later the 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute (M.S., 1964) and the University of Pennsylvania (PhD ME, 1967), focused 
much of his work on the intersection of motor vehicle fuel and environmental protection throughout his 
long career. Onetime director of the Environmental Protection Organization, at the time of his appointment 
to head the Shiraz CNG project he was an associate professor at the University of Tehran. As a researcher, 
Ebtekar possesses a meaningful presence in English-language publications. As such, I have chosen to 
maintain the transliterated spelling of his name (rather than Taqi Ebtekār) as it appears on his published 
papers and in the proceedings of international conferences. 
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American contractor Dual Fuel Company and their prioritization of short-term profits 
over long-term sustainability, Ebtekar saw regaining consumer confidence as key to the 
project’s ultimate success, and he ordered the importation of new lightweight Italian 
conversion kits to use in place of the heavy and poorly designed kits of the original 
program.869 While Ebtekar’s approach was effective and the Shiraz CNG program was 
successfully reconstituted, at only one-tenth of the cost of the original effort,870 in the end 
it had still only converted 1300 taxis by the mid-1990s.871 A 1985 pilot project to convert 
taxis was launched in the northeastern city of Mashhad stumbled in similar fashion. Its 
growth rate was even slower than in Shiraz and by 1993 only six hundred of the proposed 
three thousand gasoline-powered taxis had been converted and only one of the three 
fueling stations installed.872 In general, during the 1980s there failed to be much progress 
toward the use of gas fuel by Iranian automobiles as many of the new and revived 
programs launched in the 1980s remained similarly small in scope and largely failed to 
generate significant momentum.  
Disagreement remained over the best choice of gas fuel—compressed natural gas 
or liquid gas— as well. While the initiatives in Shiraz and Mashhad, under the direction 
of the NIGC and the Ministry of Petroleum, focused on the use of CNG, there remained a 
contingent, largely centered in the by-then nationalized Iran Gāz Company, that 
advocated for the use of liquid gas. Founded in the late 1950s by two Danish companies 
 
869 Ebtekar, “Reconstruction of Shiraz CNG Project,” 212-213. 
870 Ibid., 213. 
871 See Ebtekar, “The Prospect for Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Iran,” 895-896. 
872 Ibid., 896. 
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and an Iranian industrialist by the name of Habib Sābet, the Iran Gāz Company became 
one of the largest suppliers of liquid gas in Iran over the course of the next several 
decades. Famous for their yellow cylinders of gas, the company began by serving the 
Khuzestān region from a filling station near the refinery at Ābādān before expanding to 
the Tehran market a decade later. Along with other liquid gas companies during the 
Pahlavi era, Iran Gāz both built and supplied numerous consumer markets with butane 
and propane. Nationalized in the wake of the 1979 revolution due to Sābet’s Bahā’i faith 
and the controlling interest of the Danish companies, Iran Gāz soon became part of the 
National Iranian Liquid Gas Company in the mid-1980s.873 
Iran Gāz was interested in creating and supplying a market for liquid gas in motor 
vehicles. Speaking to the Taxicab Organization of the City of Tehran in June 1983, 
Engineer Eshrāqi of the company laid out a new program for converting Iran’s motor 
vehicle fleet. Many of the justifications he articulated echoed those of the Pahlavi era, 
among the most important being “to help with solving the problem of air pollution” as 
“vehicles have been one of the important polluters of the environment” and “gasoline 
vehicles…create approximately 60% of all environmental pollutants.”874 Like the 
Pahlavi-era experts who focused their attention on aerial pollutants that were most 
tangible to urban inhabitants, Eshrāqi emphasized the carbon monoxide, unburned 
hydrocarbons, nitrous oxides, and soot that formed smog and caused the eyes to water 
873 For an account of the history of the Iran Gāz Company, see Seyyed Gholāmhusayn Hasantāsh and 
Mikāyil ‘Azimi, Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran (Tehran: Kavir, 1394), 91-110. 
874 Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Sherkat-e Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), Matn-e Sokhanrāni-ye Āghā-ye Mohandes 
Ashrāqi dar Avalin Seminār-e Barresi-ye Prozheh-ye Gāzsuzkardan-e Khodro-ha dar Iran (Tehran: Vāhed-
e Mohandesi-ye Sherkat-e Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1362), 3. 
359 
 
and the lungs to burn. Gas promised to reduce those figures, and Eshrāqi, illustrating his 
claim in the same numerical and statistical style so strongly associated with officials 
discussions of gas energy in Iran, constructed a hypothetical scenario wherein 20,000 
taxis were converted from gasoline to liquid gas, thereby reducing the daily production of 
carbon monoxide by one hundred tons, unburned hydrocarbons by four tons, and nitrous 
oxides by two and a half tons.875 
Additional potential benefits abounded, included the ability “to help with the 
problem of automobile noise,”876 an “increase in the useful life of [vehicle] motors,”877 
and the ability to use the great domestic availability of gas fuels. Reviving the powerful 
economic nationalism that spurred much of the Pahlavi push for the harnessing of the 
country’s natural gas resources during the 1960s and 1970s, Eshrāqi emphasized Iran’s 
ability to produce gas fuels domestically, naming three primary sources: the “production 
from natural gas liquids associated with crude oil,” which netted about one kilogram of 
propane-butane mix per barrel of crude; the “production of liquid gas from the refining of 
oil” at refineries in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz; and the “production 
of liquid gas from petrochemical operations.”878 While reminiscent of justifications first 
posed prior to the revolution, economic motivations for vehicular gas fuel took on added 
importance under the early Islamic Republic. In 1979 it had been estimated that the 
growth in consumption of middle distillate fuels, especially gasoline, in Iran would 
 
875 Ibid., 3-5. 
876 Ibid., 5. 
877 Ibid., 6-7. 
878 Ibid., 7. 
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necessitate the addition of 100,000 barrels per day of new refinery capacity every two 
years.879 The onset of the “Imposed War [Iran-Iraq War]” in September 1980, however, 
had spurred the “development of fuel difficulties” in Iran, “caused by the stopping of 
work of some refineries,”880 notably the almost complete destruction of the enormous 
Ābādān Refinery along Khuzestān’s Iraqi border. This had caused a “lack of conformity 
between the pattern of consumption of fuel” and “the pattern of its production” in the 
country. Not only did gas promise to fill the breach, but it was also poised to do so in a 
far more economical manner. With liquid gas some twenty rial cheaper than gasoline at 
the time, Eshrāqi again dreamed up a numerical example, calculating that the conversion 
of 22,000 taxis in Tehran burning thirty-five liters of gasoline a day would save 15.4 
million rial daily or 5.55 billion rial yearly, money that was “worthy of attention” because 
of the “current economic war” that was being waged between Iran and the United 
States.881 Even more than the impulses of sovereignty and development that had driven 
Pahlavi decisionmakers, it was the war, “with those wide military, political, and 
economic dimensions” that “emphasized the necessity of the greater and better use of 
domestic facilities” like gas.882 In Eshrāqi’s view, plans to replace gasoline and diesel 
with gas fuel may have long been the “subject of study and examination,” but until the 
879 Ibid., 8. 
880 Ibid., 1. 
881 Ibid., 5-6. 
882 Ibid., 1. 
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coming of the Islamic Republic and the circumstances it found itself in “nowhere has 
there been the opportunity for a plan to reach the level of practice.”883 
Unlike Mostofizādeh and the NIGC who envisioned the use of CNG within 
Tehran, Eshrāqi sought to promote liquid gas for motor vehicle use. As one of the 
country’s largest distributors of liquid gas for domestic and commercial use, Iran Gāz 
would have been well positioned to support and benefit from any expanded use of liquid 
gas as fuel. In his analysis, Eshrāqi did not shy away from not only advocating for liquid 
gas as fuel, but also the specific infrastructural formulations that were most aligned with 
Iran Gāz’s capabilities. Eshrāqi described two potential systems for modifying 
automobiles and supplying them with liquid gas. The first would create a system that 
mirrored what was already in use for oil fuels, involving the installation of fixed tanks in 
automobiles that would be filled at dedicated fueling stations. Eshrāqi considered this 
option to be needlessly complex and expensive, writing that the installation of permanent 
tanks on vehicles would necessitate a prolonged and expensive undertaking to build the 
needed network of fueling stations. Arguing from hypothetical example as well, Eshrāqi 
calculated that 200,000 gas vehicles in Tehran would require one hundred stations, each 
costing roughly six million rial to build; eighty tankers, each also costing some six 
million rial, would deliver 350-ton loads of liquid gas for storage in some 200,000 fixed 
cylinders produced at four thousand rial each. In total, he estimated that the fixed cylinder 
option would require 1.88 billion rial and five years to implement. He further argued that 
 
883 Ibid., 2. 
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it would be difficult to convince consumers to make use of gas fuel before a substantial 
number of fueling stations had been built.  
Eshrāqi favored a second option, one that played to the existing expertise of the 
Iran Gāz company. In this scenario, vehicles would make use of removable cylinders of 
gas. Consumers would connect filled canisters of gas to their vehicles and when they 
were empty exchange them for new full cylinders, much like was already done to supply 
gas appliances in Iran’s urban areas. Using the eleven-kilogram cylinders that Iran Gāz 
already produced and filled at dedicated facilities, delivering fuel around the city would 
be “exactly like the distribution of cylinders to homes and businesses” and could leverage 
the existing system of distribution that Iran Gāz and other companies already operated. 
Eshrāqi claimed that option would use 300,000 cylinders each costing approximately 
1300 rial, thirty-five tankers to transport liquid gas from refineries to facilities for filling 
the canisters, and 120 small trucks to move cylinders from the filling facilities to 
distribution centers within the city itself. Total cost was calculated to be 700 million rial, 
or roughly thirty-nine percent of the cost of the fixed-cylinder option Eshrāqi had 
described earlier. Rather than the five years to implement that the first option was 
estimated to take, Eshrāqi claimed that the removeable-cylinder plan could be built 
within three months by using the gasoline filling stations already existent in Tehran.884 
Despite nearly a decade passing since the first efforts of the 1970s, Eshrāqi’s 
words make clear just how much work remained to be done if gas was to be made a 
practicable fuel for Iranian automobiles. Aside from the choice between liquid and 
884 Ibid., 9-13. 
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compressed natural gas and the concomitant need to build associated infrastructure, there 
were also open questions regarding the precise design of an automobile’s gas fuel system. 
Working to establish their own experimental laboratory and workshop to support research 
activities,885 Iran Gāz was in the process of testing three distinct carburetor designs, 
attempting to balance the desire to produce the equipment domestically, maximize the 
engine power,886 and mitigate any adverse effects of using gas fuel that might arise.887 In 
a striking parallel to the work undertaken prior to the 1979 revolution, Eshrāqi reported 
that Iran Gāz was ready to undertake wider studies involving hundreds of converted taxis 
in Tehran under the “supervision” of experts from the NIGC.888 This proposal was an 
almost identical one to the studies undertaken in the last decade of the Pahlavi state 
where between one and a few thousand motor vehicles were slated to be given gas 
equipment on an experimental basis. Half a decade after the revolution, Iranian experts 
were still conducting pilot studies involving relatively small numbers of vehicles, still 
debating whether CNG or liquid gas was preferable, and even still explaining the 
potential benefits of using gas fuel in motor vehicles. 
A year after Eshrāqi’s speech was published, in the introduction to a book on 
liquid gas translated into Persian, the Research and Training Section of Iran Gāz further 
advocated for the use of liquid gas in motor vehicles. Repeating word for word much of 
Eshrāqi’s speech, the text extolled the ease with which liquid gas equipment could be 
 
885 Ibid., 17. 
886 Ibid., 14-18. 
887 Ibid., 18-20. 
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installed on automobiles. It reiterated the extent that the Iran Gāz Company’s gas 
ganisters and ancillary equipment had been standardized around the country and the 
importance of harnessing that infrastructure to support a system of gas fuel involving 
removeable cylinders. The booklet went further still, describing the progress the company 
had made in selecting a suitable carburetor, predicting that in less than a year Iran Gāz 
would have the ability to produce “one hundred percent in Iran” two to three thousand of 
the devices per year.” There was great ambition in this claim. For many years Italy, 
Japan, and the United States had been the only real producers of the technology needed to 
employ gas fuel in motor vehicles. Though other nations would develop their own 
industries in the late 1990s,889 had Iran Gāz’s work come to fruition then Iran would have 
been one of the few nations to possess the ability to supply their needs domestically. Iran 
Gāz further claimed significant improvement over existing equipment, declaring that 
their new carburetors would mitigate much of the power loss associated with gas fuel, 
limiting it to only five percent of the “ideal” operation of a gasoline-fueled engine.890 As 
was true for many before and after the 1979 revolution, for the authors of the text gas 
energy functioned not only as a way to help further Iran’s development and 
industrialization, but as a space to assert Iranian ambitions for independence and self-
sufficiency. For years foreign firms had been deeply involved in the project to power 
Iran’s transportation sector with gas energy, a reality that the employees of Iran Gāz 
 
889 Sonia Yeh, “An Empirical Analysis on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles,” Energy Policy, vol. 
35 (2007), 5867. 
890 The authors further stressed that gasoline engines “never” operated at their ideal while also glossing 
over the fact that such would also likely be true for gas engines. See the Introduction to Vāhed-e 
Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), Dāyereh-ye Tahqiq va Āmuzesh, Tabdil-e Sukht-e Envāh-ye 
Otomobil-ha-ye Benzini va Gāzoili be Gāz (n.p.: Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1363?). 
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implicitly chafed against. In response, they sought to build an Iran where not only was 
gasoline no longer imported, but the equipment that would make such a scenario true 
would be produced domestically as well. 
The advocacy of the Iran Gāz Company extended to publications targeted toward 
everyday consumers. In the mid-1980s the company released a booklet that asked and 
answered, in “simple language” suitable for a general audience, questions about the 
utility, cost, and safety of gas automobiles.891 Beginning with an explanation of the 
differences between liquid gas and CNG, the booklet claimed that there was little 
functional discrepancy between forms of fuel; nonetheless, the anonymous authors said, 
only liquid gas would be considered in the following sections as they considered it the 
most practical solution. Iran Gāz’s choice was not rooted in the technical operation of 
motor vehicles, but in the infrastructural context in which they would operate. As had 
been made increasingly clear over the course of Iran Gāz’s publications, the company 
was committed to a system employing liquid gas not because of its material or technical 
properties as a fuel, but in large part because the company was already a national leader 
in bottling and distributing liquid gas. Their famous yellow-colored canisters were a 
common sight in Iran, and from Iran Gāz’s perspective, building upon their existing 
networks seemed to make a great deal of sense. But there were, perhaps, other contextual 
motives. Both the Pahlavi state and the new Islamic Republic had made the extension of 
residential and commercial natural gas lines an important goal of their developmental 
policies. While a truly countrywide network was still many years away, the creation of 
891 Ibid., 1. 
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these new gas networks would inevitably supplant the system of canistered liquid gas use 
of which Iran Gāz was an integral part. If, however, liquid gas could be made a standard 
fuel of Iran’s motor vehicle fleet, then the company could shift to new pastures as it was 
slowly squeezed out of its existing markets. 
Despite writing that around the world people had been experimenting with using 
gas in vehicles for nearly fifty years at that point, the authors made no mention of the 
Pahlavi-era programs that had existed in Iran. The booklet instead cast vehicular gas use 
as something that had been taking form outside of Iran’s borders, in countries like West 
Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. At the time of writing, it reported 
that there were some four million gas-powered vehicles on the world’s roads and in some 
countries like Spain and Japan the “overwhelming” majority of public vehicles made use 
of gas fuel.892 The booklet articulated many familiar benefits, including being an “aid to 
the solving of the problem of air pollution,” reducing noise pollution,893 and reducing the 
wear and tear on vehicles.894 Seemingly most important for its authors, however, was the 
“prevention of the importation of fuels like gasoline and diesel,” particularly because 
“one of our major fuel products…are the liquid and natural gases,” and the “prevention of 
their export to foreign countries.”895 Together with the comparative inexpense of liquid 
gas in comparison to gasoline896 the authors argued that moving to gas would be a “very 
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efficient measure” in the “economic war” Iran was embroiled in.897 From its beginnings 
in the 1950s, the use of Iran’s natural gas resources had carried strong notions of national 
independence, a way for Iranians to take control of their own industrialization and 
development. But during the 1980s, as the Iran-Iraq War ground on and the Islamic 
Republic’s relationships with world grew increasingly strained, those same notions of 
sovereignty took on extra weight as Iranians fought not only for the course of their 
country’s future development, but also for its survival in the present. Gas would come 
from Iran’s earth and the “gas-burning equipment,” previously expected to be obtained 
abroad, were, “God willing,” now expected to be produced “using the experiences of the 
majority of countries involved” in a factory owned by Iran Gāz.898 
For any new program of gas fuel to make a significant difference would require 
the support of a broad swath of the Iranian public. Most of Iran Gāz’s booklet was 
dedicated to convincing readers that liquid gas was both a reliable and a safe source of 
energy for their automobiles. Basing their claim on a long discussion of research 
undertaken in Chicago during the late 1960s, readers were assured that gas would not 
cause any damage to their engines so long as they properly maintained and tuned them.899 
The ease of conversion, in as little as an hour, and inexpensive nature of liquid gas were 
again emphasized, and the authors were careful to acknowledge that questions of 
comparative expense and practical driving range were greatly affected by both how the 
questions were framed and by a large array of variables that were difficult to control. 
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Defining equivalence between liquid gas and oil fuels was not easy given their differing 
energy densities and physical states at the earth’s surface and the booklet’s authors 
ultimately settled on one defined by the functional measure of vehicular range, specifying 
each kilogram of liquid gas to be equivalent to an average of 1.6 liters of gasoline. 
Determining how far a motor vehicle could travel was itself far from straightforward, 
however, being also dependent on vehicular weight, number of passengers, traffic 
conditions, speed, and many other variables.900 As was often true, however, that did not 
prevent the authors from reinforcing many of their claims with carefully calculated and 
numerically impressive statistics that were ultimately rooted in little more than imagined 
and idealized scenarios. Still, as with the statistical and numerical evidence deployed by 
Iranian officials during the Pahlavi era, figures like the 72 billion rial that Iranians would 
save per year if two million automobiles were converted to use gas provided an 
imprimatur of scientific truth to the claims being advanced.901 
A major portion of Iran Gāz’s booklet was dedicated to assuring readers that 
liquid gas was safe to use in their vehicles. Responding to a question about whether the 
“presence of a gas capsule in an automobile [is] dangerous,” the authors wrote that “we 
must ask whether you feel that the use of a gas capsule inside your own apartment within 
a few meters of your bedroom is dangerous.” By the middle of the 1980s, the use of 
canistered liquid gas was common in Iran’s urban areas. Building on people’s acceptance 
of that system of energy distribution, the authors argued that nearly all gas-related 
900 Ibid., 14-15. 
901 Ibid., 5. 
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accidents were the fault of user error or delayed maintenance, writing that “if we study 
the reasons for various fires that are the consequence of a gas leak…we find [that] the 
wear and tear on the stove, the [connecting hose], or the regulator, or the gas valve being 
left open by the consumer” were the primary culprits.902 The booklet went further yet, 
saying that “with courage” it could be argued that liquid gas fuel was safer than gasoline. 
Supporting the claim was the reproduction in full of two newspaper reports, both 
appearing in Kayhān, a major national daily, on two separate traffic accidents. The first 
took place on 23 October 1983 in Rey, when a speeding Volvo hit three parked cars due 
to the “incaution of the driver.” The resulting 
fire, fueled by the gasoline held in the tanks 
of all four vehicles, was successfully 
extinguished, but not before it fully consumed 
one of the Paykāns that had been struck.903 
The other told a more harrowing tale, one 
where a woman “burned amidst the flames” 
in front of “hundreds of people” under the 
Seyyed Khandān bridge in Tehran after a 
Nissan struck another Paykān.904 
With these stories of mortal threat, 
 
902 Ibid., 7. 
903 Ibid., 7. 




Iran Gāz sought to position liquid gas as a safer alternative to gasoline. Did not, however, 
the authors imagined readers asking, the “presence of a capsule of gas create fire or an 
explosion at the moment of a crash?”905 By way of response, they asked rhetorically if 
readers thought a canister of three millimeters’ thickness was easier to damage than the 
0.8 millimeter thickness of an average gasoline tank. The authors argued that the threat of 
fire and explosion is measurably less than with gasoline vehicles, writing that “it has been 
proven in accidents of police cars and taxis” that the use of gas could save lives. In 
support, the booklets’ authors told of an article in the July 1980 issue of Butane-Propane 
News in which it was reported that the Organization for the Research of Vehicles and 
Roads had declared the use of propane safe in automobiles. They also reported that some 
“research in Holland” also confirmed the safety of propane use in motor vehicles and, 
most significantly, they narrated how the use of liquid gas had saved the lives of people 
involved in traffic accidents. They reported how a large truck had struck a parked police 
vehicle in “Norristown,” severely injuring two officers and utterly destroying the rear of 
the car. A dual fuel vehicle with an empty gasoline tank, the gas fuel powering the police 
vehicle had not burned and the lives of the two officers were saved. The booklet quoted 
the Norristown police chief as saying that the “tank of propane gas that endured a strong 
blow during the accident experienced no damage and no leak.” Shortly thereafter a 
second police vehicle crashed during rainy weather in Norristown and again the propane 
tank suffered no damage. Similarly, in another unspecified town, a propane-powered taxi 
 
905 Ibid., 8. 
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had been hit from behind. Once again the vehicle’s rear section was damaged and once 
again the propane tank remained unharmed.906  
The booklet reinforced its vivid descriptions of the three accidents with 
photographs of their aftermaths. The three black and white photos meditate on the 
smashed and twisted metal of the cars, with their trunk doors bent skyward and wheels 
askew. Conspicuously absent is any evidence of fire or flame, and nestled amidst the 
extensive destruction the viewer is able to see the intact gas cylinders (Figure 23).907 
Pitched to a non-expert audience, Iran Gāz’s booklet evinces a deep concern for forms of 
evidence that could move people to accept gas fuel as safe. Readers are confronted with 
terrible accounts of people being burned alive in gasoline fires, and comforting reports of 
others saved by the sturdy resilience of gas canisters. In this telling, the crumpled metal 
of damaged vehicles suddenly become not dramatic evidence of danger, but soothing 
proof of safety. The rhetorical inversion of danger and protection deftly repositioned gas 
fuel not as an alarming newcomer to the automotive lives of Iranians, but as a safer 
alternative to a dangerous and deadly gasoline fuel poised to maim and kill without 
warning. It was gasoline that was the real killer, not the humble gas canister dutifully 
providing warmth and cooking flame in the home and propulsion on the road. 
The remainder of Iran Gāz’s booklet reiterated much of what had been described 
in previous publications, including questions of cost, different methods of liquid gas fuel 
906 Ibid., 9-11. 
907 Ibid., 12. 
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delivery, and the overall functionality of a converted motor vehicle.908 Despite the 
company’s apparent eagerness to restart the process of converting Iran’s automobiles to 
use gas energy, it would be many more years until significant progress was made. The 
issue did not disappear, however, and over the next decade the idea periodically 
reappeared as a potential solution to both the problem of deteriorating air quality and the 
issue of gasoline shortages. The increasing contribution of automobile exhaust to the 
problem continued to be highlighted in the national press. Alongside proposals to expand 
the urban mass transit systems, particularly the creation of a metro in Tehran, and the 
rationalization of traffic management,909 gas use continued to be seen as central to any 
long-term solution. One 1985 book celebrating the post-revolutionary accomplishments 
of the NIGC described the work of the national company to further the “uses of liquid 
and natural gas” in “high density” portions of the country where the “smoke from the 
burning of oil products is the cause of intense air pollution.” Promised were 
“experimental” plans whereby “approximately three thousand automobiles in Tehran, 
Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahwaz” would be converted to use gas, and in “future years” the 
plan would be expanded in Tehran and other urban regions.910  
But it would not be until nearly ten years later, in the mid-1990s, that any further 
progress would be made. By then, interest in the ability of gas to mitigate air pollution 
908 Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz, Āshnāi-ye Mokhtasari bā Koliāt-e Gāzsuz Kardan-e Otomobil-ha, 13-
17. 
909 “Otomobil-hā-ye Shakhsi Sāli 1,300,000 Ton-e <<Mono’oksid Karbon>> va Chand Gāz-e Sami-ye 
Digar rā Vāred Havā-ye Tehran Mikonnand,” Ettelā’āt (10 Dey 1368). 
910 Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Vezārat-e Naft-e Jomhuri-ye Islāmi-ye Iran, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e 
Iran Shesh Sal b’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e Islāmi (n.p.: Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Vezārat-e Naft-e 
Jomhuri-ye Islāmi-ye Iran, 1364), 40. 
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had only grown, as by the mid-1990s motor vehicle sources accounted for some seventy 
percent of atmospheric pollutants in Tehran.911 Combined with the national independence 
gas energy symbolized, the era saw a surge in new programs. Though sometimes grander 
in ambition, many of the proposals put forth at that time were still profoundly similar to 
the programs of the 1970s. In September 1993, for example, Ettelā’āt reported that 
“about 9 thousand automobiles have been gasified by the Self-Sufficiency Jihad 
Organization” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps using “kits…constructed 
domestically.” Prior to the program’s start, eighteen “experts and engineers” undertook 
nine months of study on “foreign examples” of CNG fuel systems to foster “domestic 
expertise” that was in turn used to design and produce kits within Iran. As he was quoted 
in Ettelā’āt, the program’s director expressed motivations for their work that could have 
been uttered three decades earlier under a different government: to improve the air 
quality of Iran’s cities and prevent the waste of the country’s natural and national 
resources.912  
Even at such a late stage there remained no real consensus on the best form for 
gas fuel. At the same time that Ettelā’āt was describing the use of compressed natural gas 
by Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization in 1993, Taghi Ebtekar was recommending that 
20,000 taxis be converted to liquid gas in Tehran, to be followed later by the conversion 
 
911 Taghi Ebtekar, “Environmental Impact of Alternative Fuel on Tehran Air Pollution,” Proceedings of the 
30th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, vol. 2, 31-36, (New York: The American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995), 32. 
912 “9 Hezār Khodro Tavasot-e Mo’asaseh-e Tose’eh-ye Motor-hā-ye Gāzsuz Vābasteh be Sepāh-ye 
Pāsdārān Gāzsuz Shodeh Ast,” Ettelā’āt (14 Shahrivar 1375). 
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of the city’s buses.913 That same year, the National Iranian Liquid Gas Company 
published a handbook stipulating the requirements and standardized criteria for liquid gas 
fuel systems and their methods of installation on automobiles, particularly taxis and 
personal vehicles. The committee of ten industry “experts” sought to pay heed to both 
“international standards” and the “climactic and social conditions of our country [Iran],” 
hoping to address the “phenomenon of air pollution and its undesirable effects on the 
natural environment.”914 The document addressed gas fuel systems in great detail, 
defining minimum standards for everything from the fuel tank and its potential locations 
in a vehicle,915 to the tolerances of fuel filters,916 the operation of valves,917 and the 
material of pipes and hoses.918 Much as with the programs to convert vehicles, the 
technical system described by the experts and engineers of the committee did not differ in 
its fundamentals from those described some two decades earlier. What was different was 
that in the 1990s as part of a larger push for environmental regulation these projects often 





913 Ebtekar, “The Prospect for Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Iran,” 896. 
914 Modiriat-e Mohandesi va Tarh-ha, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Māye’-ye Iran, Moqarrāt va Zavābet-e 
Sākht va Nasb-e Sistem-ha-ye Gāz-e Māye’-ye Vasāt-e Naqlieh-e Motori (n.p.: Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e 
Māye’-ye Iran, 1372), i-ii. 
915 Ibid., 3-9. 
916 Ibid., 14. 
917 Ibid., 16-17. 
918 Ibid., 17-20. 
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Iranian use of natural gas vehicles began to accelerate in the mid-1990s and grew 
rapidly in the first two decades of the 21st century. By the 2010s Iran had become a global 
leader in the use of natural gas vehicles, with some 4.07 million traveling the country’s 
roads in 2015,919 The expansion of gas fuel use in motor vehicles was a product of both 
the early attention paid to the potential of gas in the sector as well as the same twin 
ambitions that motivated push for industrial gas consumption: concern for urban air 
quality and a commitment to harnessing gas energy as a means for asserting Iranian 
sovereignty and independent national development. Though that period saw the rapid 
growth of such technology around the world—not only in Japan and the nations of North 
American and Europe, but also in places like Argentina, Brazil, India, China, and 
Pakistan920—the Iranian embrace of vehicular gas fuel was rooted not in an imitation of 
other countries, but in a deep-seated engagement that first found expression in the 1960s. 
Over the following decades and across the caesura of the 1979 revolution, Iranians inside 
the national petroleum companies, government ministries, provincial administrations, and 
private companies pursued the new fuel source to both alleviate worsening environmental 
problems and make use of one of Iran’s great natural and national resources. It was a 
pursuit grounded both in the materiality of gas fuel and its manner of combustion—
producing less of the tangible pollutants that so concerned Iranian observers during the 
period—and in the fundamentally political projects that expressed desires for national 
sovereignty and developmental independence.  
919 Muhammad Imran Khan, Tabassum Yasmin, and Abdul Shakoor, “Technical Overview of Compressed 
Natural Gas (CNG) as a Transportation Fuel,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review 51 (2015), 786. 
920 Yeh, “An Empirical Analysis on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles,” 5866-5867. 
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Early programs to deploy natural gas vehicles in the 1970s were heavily 
dependent on foreign firms and imported technology. With a few exceptions, the general 
cessation of meaningful scientific research in Iran in the first decade after the revolution 
did not spare the work being done on automotive gas fuel. As part of a broader revival of 
work in the sciences and engineering in the mid-1990s,921 and continuing at an ever-
increasing pace in the decades that followed,922 Iranian experts began to once again 
undertake significant research in the design and production of gas fuel technology. The 
experts that developed the 1993 standards for liquid gas-fueled motor vehicles in Iran 
may have been guided by the “international standards” that had grown up around such 
technology, but they were also building upon foundations that had been laid by Iranians 
at a time when those requirements had been much less settled. In this way, the use of gas 
fuel in Iranian motor vehicles reflected the interplay between domestic and foreign 
knowledge and expertise that surrounded the use of gas energy more broadly in the 
country: one that saw Iranians not merely or only learning from experts and experiences 
abroad, but also engaging in their own research, undertaking their own planning, and 
pursuing gas on their own terms. 
Throughout the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st, the belief that the 
widespread adoption of automotive gas energy would produce great benefits in the 
broader quest to tame Iran’s urban air quality crisis was commonplace among advocates 
for the technology. Though the conviction animated much of the rhetoric and practical 
 
921 See Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Iran’s New Scientific Community,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy, 
Society, Politics, edited by Ali Gheissari, 211-244 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
922 Amir-Hasan Kakaee and Amin Paykani, “Research and Development of Natural-Gas Fueled Engines in 
Iran,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 26 (2013), 810-817. 
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effort that surrounded the adoption of gas energy in the Iranian transportation sector, in 
the end the extensive adoption of dual fuel vehicles—Iran has led or nearly led the world 
in the number of gas vehicles on its roads for more than a decade now923—largely failed 
to halt the further environmental deterioration of the country’s urban skies. The 
commitment of the many Iranian experts and officials to designing and producing gas 
fuel technology inside Iran, central to the larger national gas energy project of which 
automotive gas fuel was part, ultimately resulted in the use of conversion kits that were 
notably more polluting than those made in other countries. The deficiencies of the 
equipment, rooted in obsolete and inefficient designs, were so great as to sometimes 
render gas fuel even more polluting than the gasoline it replaced as equipment aged and 
maintenance was skipped or improperly performed.924 
For decades, advocates of gas fuel inside government ministries, the national 
petroleum companies, provincial governments, and private industry had advocated gas as 
a straightforward solution to the issue of air pollution. Gas was a way to simultaneously 
allow the continued growth of Iranian automobile use while also mitigating some of its 
worst effects. As with the project to supply natural gas to industrial consumers, the push 
for gas energy in the automotive sector embedded ideas of clean air and environmental 
stewardship in the developmental programs of both the Pahlavi state and the Islamic 
Republic. This environmental consciousness was rooted in the same preoccupation with 
 
923 Khan, Yasmin, and Shakoor, “Technical Overview of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as a 
Transportation Fuel,” 786. 
924 For a detailed discussion of the failure of Iranian natural gas vehicles to help reduce Iran’s problems 
with urban air pollution see S.A. Hashemian, N. Mansouri, and M.A. Morady, “Investigating the Impacts of 
Retrofitted CNG Vehicles on Air Pollutant Emissions in Tehran,” International Journal of Environmental 
Research 7, no. 3 (2013): 669-678. 
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the most tangible forms of air pollution that animated the drive for the use of natural gas 
energy by major industrial consumers. Even when complemented with other measures, 
however—the expansion of public transit, particularly the construction of the Tehran 
metro system, and increasingly draconian traffic regulations—the use of automotive gas 
fuel failed to meaningfully slow the pollution of Iranian skies. The ability of gas energy 
to fulfill the environmental claims of its most ardent advocates in Iran thus found deeply 
uneven expression, largely successful in reducing the prevalence of industrial pollutants 
in the skies above Iran’s cities but actively counterproductive when it came to those 
emanating from automotive sources. In the end, priority was given to the desire to further 
assert Iran’s economic sovereignty through the domestic manufacture of gas fuel 
technology, effectively sacrificing the dream of a clear sky for a vision of a 
technologically independent Iran. Despite the potential of both compressed natural and 
liquid gas to produce less of the pollutants that blanketed Iran’s urban areas, the new fuel 
systems failed to be the answer to air pollution that its champions hoped. The simple fact 
was that all the environmental benefits of gas fuel and the technologies used to harness it 
could not overcome the social contexts within which they were embedded. Gas fuel 
systems needed to be maintained and replaced as they aged, something that proved to be 
difficult for Iranian authorities to demand and enforce. Even more fundamentally, while 
gas fuel may have reduced the emissions of any vehicle that used them, the rapid and 
continued growth of motor vehicle use in cities like Tehran rendered such gains 
inconsequential. In end, gas energy was simply not the technical fix to environmental 













In 2005, faced with intensifying international sanctions over its controversial 
nuclear program, the Iranian government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began an 
accelerated push to convert large numbers of Iranian automobiles into dual-fuel motor 
vehicles able to use both gasoline and compressed natural gas. This scheme to address a 
critical vulnerability in the Iranian economy was not sudden, nor was it motivated solely 
by the country’s confrontation with world powers. It was instead the latest manifestation 
of a long series of policies dating back nearly seventy years to the reign of the first 
Pahlavi monarch, Rezā Shah Pahlavi. Since the mid-1930s, officials working for the 
Iranian government and the national petroleum companies had undertaken a series of 
intensifying efforts to transform the country’s natural gas reserves from valueless waste 
into a cornerstone of Iranian society. From initial and largely failed ideas to create a 
petrochemical industry in the 1930s and 1940s to the rapid expansion of city natural gas 
distribution networks in the 1980s and 1990s, they had overseen the largely successful 
construction of a new system for the production and distribution of energy in Iran. 
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Beginning in the early 1960s, a new sociotechnical imaginary surrounding natural 
gas began to coalesce. It was one that placed gas energy at the center of a new 
technologically sophisticated Iranian society then under construction. Advocates for its 
use saw gas as being Iran’s bridge to the future, an abundant, inexpensive, and above all 
domestic source of energy able to fuel ambitions for Iran’s rapid industrialization and 
growing geopolitical independence. While such gaseous aspirations were fully Iranian, 
the work of designing and building the systems that made natural gas use possible was 
not. The construction of Iran’s gas system was international from the start, dependent on 
foreign expertise and abilities. That reality did not stop organizations like the NIGC and 
the Ministry of Petroleum from erecting a public image that largely elided the significant 
involvement of non-Iranians. Using photographs of monumental structures and 
impressive figures of size and scope, they instead built an understanding that established 
the country’s new gas systems as an expression of the Pahlavi state’s ability to harness 
modern science and technology as well as its commitment to the welfare of the Iranian 
people. But not all Iranians believed that commitment to be true. With the completion of 
the IGAT-1 pipeline project in the 1970s and the slow provision of natural gas to 
residential consumers, those who went without, largely rural or residing in older 
neighborhoods, saw the lack of gas as a statement of their sudden position as second-
class citizens.  
The frustrated expectations of Iranians became part of the growing revolutionary 
movement, a dissatisfaction rooted tellingly not in the fact of change but in its intolerably 
slow pace. Reflecting those desires, early on the Islamic Republic had committed itself to 
bringing gas to all Iranians and, rhetorically at least, giving precedence to the small 
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residential and commercial consumers that had been largely bypassed by Pahlavi gas 
distribution programs. That commitment was maintained for decades, and by the early 
2010s, Iran’s natural gas system had expanded greatly, supplying from both associated 
and non-associated sources more than 220 billion cubic meters of gas per year for 
domestic consumption, some 35 times more than had been carried by the original IGAT-1 
line. Feeding Iran were a dozen gas refineries and dehydration units all over Iran, their 
output carried by eleven major gas pipelines with a cumulative length of 35,000 
kilometers. From the few thousand gas consumers of the early 1970s, by the early 2010s 
there were some 16.3 million gas connections in 920 cities and 12,504 villages plus 69 
power plants, all supplied via 236,000 kilometers of distribution pipe. Residential users 
and power plants had become the greatest consumers of gas, at some 40 billion cubic 
meters per year each, followed by non-petrochemical industries at 25 billion cubic meters 
per year, with petrochemicals themselves accounting for some 20 billion cubic meters per 
year. All told some 55 million Iranians had access to piped natural gas in 2012, 96 
percent of the urban population and 54 percent of the rural.925 All the crucial differences 
between the Pahlavi monarchy and Islamic Republic notwithstanding, the latter’s triumph 
with respect to natural gas distribution was built upon the foundations laid under the 
former regime. More to the point, the fundamental sociotechnical imaginary that underlay 
the project was not only maintained but celebrated. When it came to natural gas, even in 
the tasks of political legitimacy for which it was harnessed, the two governments were 
more alike than dissimilar.  
925 For more see Chapter 1 of Elham Hassanzadeh’s Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the Post-Revolutionary 
Period: Optimism, Scepticism, and Potential (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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But the successful construction of Iran’s vast natural gas system was nonetheless 
accompanied by significant failure. Iranian pursuits of natural gas utilization were rooted 
in the AIOC’s unproductive disposal of associated gas and desires for the country’s 
national and natural wealth to be put to good use. Despite such underpinnings, significant 
volumes of associated gas continue to be flared in Iran. In 2011 that amounted to some 30 
percent of all gas produced at onshore oil fields and 80 percent at offshore, a total of 11.4 
billion cubic meters, third highest in the world after Russia and Nigeria.926 More notable 
was the absolute failure of industrial and vehicular fuel conversion to produce clean 
urban air. Despite the substantial completion of the industrial conversion process by the 
late 1970s and the increasing adoption of CNG-powered automobiles over the following 
decades, cities like Tehran continue to have some of the worst air quality in the world. 
Any improvements made in the amount of soot and smoke by individual fossil fuel users 





This dissertation tells the story of how natural gas came to play its essential role 
in Iranian society, joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, addressing 
the entanglements of human and nonhuman factors that have shaped the development of 
the country. In particular, it studies how the physical properties of its vast resources of 
fossil fuels and their attendant infrastructural assemblages have both reflected and 
influenced competing notions of progress, modernity, prosperity, and the environment. In 
 
926 Ibid., 35-36. 
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going beyond accounts of modern Iran that center questions of religion, ideological 
contestation, and Great Power meddling, this dissertation interrogates the role of 
hydrocarbons, geology, and air pollutants as nonhuman factors in the country’s history. 
By bridging the perspectives of national officials, local authorities, industrialists, and 
everyday users of gas, as well as spanning the caesura of the 1979 Iranian revolution, it 
highlights how natural gas energy and the environment became intertwined influences on 
a developing society. Between the mid-20th century and the early 21st, Iranians, both elite 
and not, monarchist and revolutionary, embraced gas energy as the means by which their 
country could become sovereign, modern, and clean. The new energy source would be 
both the fuel by which the nation would develop and the means by which it would avoid 
the polluted fate that had seemingly captured much of the industrialized world. Many 
Iranians, even the Pahlavi officials long-derided as gharbzadeh compradors, embraced 
the potential of gas energy not in imitation of Euro-American modernity, but in an 
intentional attempt to surpass it. They looked at what had befallen the polluted cities of 
Europe and North America and took specific attempts to try and avoid their fate.  
But there would be no tale of easy triumph. The saga of natural gas in Iran 
demonstrates that technical fixes to environmental issues are often deeply fraught and 
possibly do not exist. Iranians under two regimes embraced and pursued gas energy as a 
way to fight the slow poisoning of their air, and despite gas now accounting for some 
two-thirds of the country’s energy mix, the air quality of cities like Tehran is as bad as it 
has ever been. There are complex reasons for this—geopolitics, topography, 
contradictory and mutually-exclusive policies and demands from various social groups—
and that is exactly the point. While rooted in the particulars of Iranian history, the ways 
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that natural gas energy was made into Iran’s promised but ultimately failed 
environmental savior are equally visible in discourses surrounding “clean” energy in the 
region and around the world. As various technologies for carbon capture and green 
energy production push their way to the fore as potential solutions to climate change, 
countries like Iran that have already undertaken widespread experiments in energy 
transition offer a cautionary lesson. Simply put, any attempt to address our global climate 
crisis cannot begin and end with these technologies. If we are to address and survive a 
shifting global climate, we must also understand how people, especially those living in 
ecologically stressed developing societies like Iran, experience both their environments 
and the energy technologies around which they organize their lives. Failure to do so risks 
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